When Australia so tragically lost its qualifying series against Iran in 1997, the heavy post mortems determined that the failure was mostly attributed to the playoff format. Sure there were queries regarding player selection and substitution, a poor preparation, Fifa's stupid away-goals rule that rendered Australia's second goal worthless, and simple bad luck, but the format provided Australia with no second chance in case things went wrong. Things did go wrong. Australia was out. In contrast, that playoff series was Iran's third chance to qualify for France 98.
Nothing was learnt leading into the Uruguay series. As discussed already in the "Australia vs Uruguay - Same Mistakes Again" editorial, a behind the scenes deal forced Oceania's champion team into the a playoff series. Under-prepared in terms of serious World Cup competition, Australia were forced to play a team that was having its second chance to qualify after failing to finish in the top four-out-of-ten countries in their regional qualifiers after 18 tough World Cup games. Australia were on a hiding to nothing. The system gave them no recourse.
Everything mentioned in the "Iran - What went wrong", "One Year On", "The Definitive Answer" and "After the Mourning After" series of editorials applies equally here. In the "Australia's 2002 World Cup Qualifying - Another Stuff-Up", a qualifying solution involving South America was even provided. In essense, split South America's 10 nations into two groups of 5, add two teams from Oceania, one in each group, then play a 10-game round robin home and way. Top two teams go through, with the two third-placed teams playing-off.
This form of prolonged qualifying series is not just about having a fairer chance, it's more about having an actual series of quality games and a genuine competition. Two Oceanic countries would benefit as well. The sadness resulting from the loss to Uruguay was much less than the anger incurred from the fact that our entire World Cup qualifying campaign came and went within a week. Uruguay's fans had 18 months.
Australia just had to accept their lot and get on with the business of qualifying. Regardless of the result, Australia needed to leave the series with the knowledge that it had all bases covered and that the best team won. There had to be no excuses, no regrets and, most importantly, no mistakes. That did not happen.
Despite the nonsense that some commentators say it's a disadvantage, Australia was handed the advantage of playing at home thanks to Fifa obliging Uruguay's request. Even the revered Les Murray was guilty of such waffle. According to Les, had Australia come back to the MCG with a 2-0 deficit, they'd have a better chance of scoring three goals to win than holding Uruguay to a 0-0 in Montevideo. How? Australia only scored once against a semi-defensive Uruguay in Melbourne. Imagine how much more defensive Uruguay would have been had they had such a lead to protect. There's an editorial covering the entire decision of whether to home or away first, and statistically, historically and ultimately, Australia had the advantage. We just did not take it.
In analysing the Uruguay games, most people forget the first game and just focus on the second. Facts are, Australia dominated its home leg as much as Uruguay dominated theirs. Australia were a tad unlucky not to be rewarded with a two, even three goal lead. Still, the 1-0 win in the first leg against Uruguay was the first time Australia were able to win a game and keep the opposition scoreless in a non-Oceania playoff since 1973. That was the year Australia went on to qualify for the 1974 World Cup. The win was a phenomenal achievement and put Australia in the box seat heading to Uruguay. For once, Fifa's crazy away-goals rule would work for the team: if Australia could score one goal, Uruguay had to score three. Uruguay were already under pressure to score two goals to win anyway. That's the advantage of having the score on the board. Even a 0-0 in the first leg would have been a respectable result.
History shows that it all went wrong in Montevideo. Farina was blamed for his tactics, most specifically his choice of playing Kewell up front and not at left midfield. In reality, that criticism is unwarranted.
Firstly, the team created enough chances to win. Without repeating what's been said in the post-playoff editorials, Australia created six great chances in Montevideo and had more corners than Uruguay. Contrast that to Melbourne, where Uruguay created virtually nothing. Over the two legs, Australia were the better team on chances created. The goals did not come, but that's a quirk of the sport that cannot be controlled.
Secondly, what many fail to realise is that by playing Kewell left, it forces Lazaridis onto the bench. Unfortunately Australia has an abundance of quality left sided players (add Tiatto to that equation) and Lazaridis' crosses would have been missed had he been omitted. Australia elected to play its best possible players, even if it meant a slight reshuffle of the line-up. And it was only slight. Kewell had regularly played that off-striker role for his club, and also for his country under the Venables era.
Thirdly, at 1-1 and at 20 minutes into the second half with the series in the balance against a team noticeably tiring, Australia were dominating and running on. One goal would have been enough. Instead, Viduka missed that header from Okon's throw-in from two metres out, which is still unfathomable. Minutes later, Emerton unnecessarily fouled Recoba. That undisciplined act resulted in the free kick that ultimately decided the game. But even with the score at 2-0, Australia, thanks to the crazy away-goals rule that for once would work in our favour, still only needed one goal to win, and created two great chances in trying. The first was from a corner, whereby Agostino's header went straight to the goalie. A metre either way and it would have been a goal. Then late in the match, Kewell amazingly got a cross in from the by-line with two defenders harassing him. It was a brilliant piece of skill that not only surprised spectators, viewers and the Uruguayans alike, but also a loitering Aloisi, who failed to anticipate the cross. Caught a step behind his marker, all he could do was make a despairing lunge with his head at the ball, just a few metres out from goal. The bottom line is, up until Uruguay's third goal in the 89th minute, one Australian goal would have seen us heading to Korea/Japan. Qualifying was really that close, not the "thrashing" that most "johnny come lately" media types were saying.
The tactical failure was formation based. Australia only need a draw but were attacking from the get-go, which left them exposed for Uruguay's sucker punch. Furthermore, Farina knew of Uruguay's tactics - that of holding the ball deep in defence and sucking the opposition up midfield - yet he was unable to combat it.
In that light, the first goal was a standard Uruguayan attack - virtually choreographed. The ball was played over the top to a one-on-one situation and it was all over. All of Uruguay's breaks came in this fashion. Instead of focusing on where Kewell should be playing, the emphasis should have been on Okon dropping back and sweeping in front (or even behind) of the back four for extra cover rather than wandering about in midfield. The remaining midfielders should have been stationed just in front, and under strict orders to wait for Uruguay to come to them, instead of chasing shadows in no-man's land. All Australia needed was a 0-0 draw, so there was no reason to chase the Uruguayans and play the game they wanted us to play. With the lead, we had the advantage to impose our style on the game. That style should have been to sit back.
However, the fundamental blunder readily identifiable but easily acted upon was one that drew parallels with the Iran game: neither Venables nor Farina seemed to have entered their respective final matches with a proper match-scenario plan. Covering the complexities of tactics and formations are one thing, but what about simply defining your approach to the match. Both coaches of those respective games went in not playing for a 0-0, even though that result will allow them to qualify.
Given the home-ground advantage and an inferior opposition, scoring early against Iran and demoralising them was the way to go. But, it should have been drilled into the players that a second goal scored would be meaningless because of the away-goals rule. At 1-0 down, Iran needed two goals to win. At 2-0 down, they still only needed two goals to win. The second goal simply meant that Iran had to score twice in normal time, or Australia wins. At 1-0 up at half time, Australia needed to revise its approach to the game.
Simple fact of the matter, Australia needed two goals to really increase their advantage. When the second goal came, I was probably the only one in the stadium not celebrating. Instead, I vehemently reiterated to my friends and those around me that we needed one more to make the lead meaningful. The signs soon came, and way before Venables even started thinking about bringing on substitutes, that Australia was not going to score a third. The approach to the second half should have been that if the team scored early, allow them no more than 10 minutes to score the killer third. Else, immediately close up shop. Venables waited 30 minutes.
Against Uruguay, in a much tougher game, Farina, before and after, reiterated that the team had to score a goal. While Farina was actually saying that one goal scored would have made it very difficult for Uruguay, to say the team needed to score was rubbish. They simply needed to keep the opposition - one that was notoriously defence-orientated - scoreless. The defence should have been packed and counter attacks relied on for scoring opportunities. Then had Uruguay scored, revise that approach. But we'd still be level on aggregate, and ready to pounce in the second half against an expectably tiring team resulting from its difficult schedule and burdensome travelling. In retrospect, that's exactly what happened, except Australia conceded that galling early goal that should never have happened the way it did.
You'll often hear people say that it's dangerous to go into games playing for a 0-0, but why? For both the Iran and Uruguay games, all we needed was a 0-0 to qualify. But we attacked unnecessarily. It's common knowledge that in soccer it's easier to defend than attack. Especially against a team like Uruguay that ostensibly sat back themselves. Put up a brick wall up, and if a goal is conceded, then change tactics. That's what having a match plan is all about.
One thing's for sure, with ten men behind the ball, Uruguay's small strikers would not have scored through long balls. The excessive travel that affected their fatigue levels during the game would have come on even earlier had they been forced to work hard for their chances through uncustomary avenues instead of relying on easy pickings received on the break. Even with the knowledge of how they'd play, we failed to exploit their weakness and fell into their trap. On the field, our elimination to Iran was stupid; against Uruguay it was naive. We got ahead of ourselves. Don't need to be Einstein to determine where the responsibility lies when analysing what went wrong.
The mid-year Oceania Nations Cup debacle with a fourth-string team has been the national team's only activity for the past year. Australia's first choice team has sat idle and won't play a match until the friendly away to England next February. From then on, they'll be consigned to a mix-mash range of meaningless friendlies until the next World Cup qualifiers. However, those qualifiers will have a substantial new meaning.
After 20 years of heartbreak, December 18 (Australian time), 2002, Australia will be liberated from their unfair historical qualifying path when the Fifa executive meets. Despite some pessimism amongst commentators and, especially, Oceania officials using the issue to feather their own nest, the decision to grant Oceania one direct spot to the World Cup is a fait accompli. For Australia, that spot, realistically, will be at their mercy forever. While there's genuine concern that such an outcome by a dominant force in a small region containing mostly small-fry will be of any long term benefit to it or the nations it destroys every four years to qualify, Australia must seize the opportunity and reward those that just want to see the team at the World Cup regardless of how easy the task is to qualify.
Time will tell whether Oceania will develop with this guarantee of World Cup representation. It's highly unlikely, though. Those tiny island countries have no hope of closing the gap, ever. Only New Zealand would have the potential of even surprising the Australian ogres. Just look to Europe and South America - established soccer powers - as examples to see that their small countries have made no impact in major tournament qualification.
What the World Cup spot will really do is provide a powerful bargaining chip. Until now, Oceania has been ignored by Asia. But now, moves from Asia are already afoot to accept Oceanic teams into their club and national-team tournaments. That won't happen unless Asia gets something in return - part of Oceania's World Cup spot.
Oceania would be foolish to give up part of it so soon, but if no benefit to the region other than just participating in the World Cup has been returned after two World Cups, it will be time to haggle. The World Cup is a wonderful prize, but it does little to develop the sport in the country. Live, at the ground, action is a far more potent influence, as evidenced by the Iran and Uruguay games. These sorts of games will be non existent under direct qualification. Sure New Zealand, Fiji and Tahiti will do their best, but it won't be enough to sustain the live action appetite for four years.
As mentioned numerously on this website over the years, live action thrills can only be sated by a protracted league-style qualifying series that all other regions benefit from. Ideally, two Oceanic teams would join Asia's two final groups of five, for a six team league. Assuming Asia has four spots, add Oceania's one, for a total of 5 qualifiers. Top two teams from each group go through, whilst the two third-placed teams playoff home and away for the fifth spot. Achieving that goal should be the real aim for Oceania's direct World Cup spot.