Wednesday, the 29th of November marks the three year anniversary of the "Iran game" - the second leg of the final qualifier for the 1998 World Cup finals in France. Hell, this site was born from it and provided a comphrensive analysis of the playoff in the "What went wrong" series of editorials. Anyone who visits the Socceroo Realm's pages would be well aware of this, and also, of "The Mourning After" special that aired on SBS TV tonight. For those that did not see the program, it essentially covered that final MCG game and interviewed the key players from David Hill, Venables, to players on the substitute benches, for their reactions, feelings and thoughts of then and now and of what they thought went wrong.
Nothing really came out of the program that we did not already know or realise. The much hyped program, whilst excellent, could have been so much better. We failed to get interviews from the some of the big-name overseas players like Viduka, Kewell, and especially Bosnich, who was in the best position on the park to gauge the status of the team. Most disturbing, we failed to get any of the Iranian perspective. After losing to Japan in that playoff, how did they think they'd go against Australia? Whilst the Australians were uplifted, how did Iran feel upon arrival Melbourne? During the match, what was the feeling when the second goal went in - did they think it was all over? Did they think they got out of jail? How did the "net" incident affect them? SBS's limited budget showed in these key areas, but there were snippets of info that grabbed.
Clearly, and this reflected in many of the player's dialogue, the worst thing that happened on the night was to score the second goal. This imparted spurious emotions of relief, ecstasy, and finality of the game to many of the players. In an interview recently, Foster admitted thoughts of France wandered though his mind after the goal. As has been stated in the "What went wrong" series, the second goal meant nothing to the final result other than preventing the game going into extra time. At 1-0 down Iran needed two goals to win; at 2-0 down, they still needed two goals to win. Nothing changed other than the psyche of the Australian players and Iran having to score both their goals in normal time. The first goal was far more tangible, and exciting. During the half-time break discussions with friends, I kept repeating the need that ideally, we need to score two quick goals. And when the first came, I can still recall curbing my excitement and yelling out to my friends that we need one more. It never came. The coaches should have been drilling this into the team at half time, because that way, Aurelio would never have felt relief, and the boys would have remained on their toes.
There was talk about the tactics, substitutions and preparation, and the poor finishing. All of which were not as good as they should have been. Oh, and there was also that net incident. Aurelio and the fellow players readily admitted that converting chances in football is one of those great intangibles - sometimes they go in, sometimes they don't. That's football. In fact, Aurelio was very honest and philosphical about himself when saying on any given day that they (chances) go in, but on that night they did not. It was just one of those things.
The net incident was very prominent in discussion, but most players came to the conclusion that it should not of had bearing on the result. Again, it was one of those things. Whilst Venables claimed Iran were gone and Australia were hot, Johnny Warren commented on the night that the break was a positive. Often teams concede goals immediately after scoring themselves and the break was therefore advantageous to Australia. Sure Iran had the time to marshal the troops, but so too Australia to calm the excitement down and restore concentration. And the fact that it took Iran 25 minutes to score, you'd have to agree. Others who claim Australia would have scored more soon after had the net not gone down are fooling themselves. There is no way of knowing - it is all hypothetical - and there is nothing to say that Iran would not have hit back immediately either.
Graham Arnold ear-marked the lack of individual player preparation as a contributing factor. Whilst most of the players who started were not playing regular football or were returning from injury, other than Vidmar missing those chances, it is hard to find fault with the general performance of the players. Except one. Sure they tired, but not as noticeably as in most other football games. And it has to be remembered that Iran, immediately after playing a tough group phase, had been to three continents in three weeks to play a tough match and they looked a total rabble against Japan and often against Australia.
But who was that one player? Steve Horvat. He was one of those players that had been injured, and in fact was not even with a club at the time. He was also directly responsible for conceding the goal in Iran, and was no where to be sited for the first MCG goal. Aurelio briefly mentioned something about Ivanovic being in the team, but was more forthright and adamant about it on the first anniversary in a newspaper article where he stated that there was no way Australia would have conceded those goals if Ivanovic was in the team. Again, it's all hypothetical whether Ivanovic would have made a difference, until you examine the tactics of the team, that is.
Yep, tactics surfaced as the real culprit, which if anybody who is anybody, would already know to be the case. While Aurelio, even to this day, defended the offensive tactics in saying that they worked well all match and that there was no reason to change them as the game drew to an end, he can be forgiven for he is a mere striker on the pitch, there to score goals, and not obligated to manage such things. However, other players were not as forgiving, while Venables provided the greatest insight.
Much was made of the offsides that seemed to be in vogue for the playoffs and it has come to light that one of Venables' dictums is that defences should never be static: they should be pushing up and squeezing space, or falling back covering for long or wide balls. He firmly believed we were caught square and that something just went wrong. He refused to blame any individual claiming we all die by the sword. While the team was under strict instructions not to play off-side, this non-static defence dictum must surely have been the cause for the errors. Obviously particular members of the defence were not in synch in going forward or going back. The first goal saw no defenders about, only Aurelio tracking back with Moore following. Where were they - pushing up? As with Bosnich's goal kick that was won by Iran and and played straight to Daei, these were the times when the defence should have been falling back. Given the away-goals rule where away goals count for double in the event of a tied result, players should always have been falling back when the ball was coming towards them.
While Horvat, a key component of the defence offered nothing in explanation other than the whole thing was a blur, a mystery and a nightmare, which actually reflected accurately the actual way he played in those matches, Slater was more forthright. He announced that despite Venables' reprimand of players playing off-side in training, he saw some "nugget running out with his hand in the air and that was just stupid". He did not know who it was at the time, and still does not because like most of the players, has not watched the tape, but that nugget was Tobin, and the player standing back was "mystery" man Horvat. Venables had been with the team for nearly a year by then, so why did we not see these offsides before the playoffs, or indeed, at the Confederation Cup just after? Because Ivanovic was in the team, and calling the shots. In fact, it was probably the worst selection decision on I can ever remember in Australian soccer. Here was a player that played in all the lead-up games yet got dropped at the death to be replaced by a player without a club who was coming back from injury and expected to form part of a cohesive defensive unit that had never been tried before in such a cut-throat game. Absurd.
In contrast, look back to 1993 when Eddie Thompson, despite having overseas based defenders available, elected to carry the tried and test trio of locally-based Ivanovic, Tobin and Durakovic to curtail an Argentine attack consisting of Batistuta, Balbo and Maradona. Yes, read those names again. That is no Daei, Azizi or Bagheri! While chopping and changing of attackers and even midfielders may not upset the cohesion of the team that much, as learnt in the away leg against Canada, and maybe even in the tie against NZ, messing with the defence does. You just can't compromise the integrity of a tried and tested cohesive defensive unit unless there is real reason to do so. Horvat was not, and Venables did. Ignoring that flukey deflected goal in Buenos Aires, that defensive unit restricted Argentina to just one - and world class at that - goal over the two legs. Gee, I never thought I'd ever be longing for Eddie coaching the Socceroos, but for that Iran game, it might have worked.
Slater also thought silly the substitutions when Australia needed a goal: why was both Arnold and Aloisi left on the bench when he and Aurelio were taken off? Other than the fact that Tapai and T.Vidmar were already warmed up in preparation to come on as late defensive security, like Slater, buggered if I know what the reason was. And those two players should have been brought on much earlier anyway.
Hill made mention of the fact that the team was tiring, but noticed Venables warming up the players so was unconcerned. A few minutes later and just as they tied their shoe-laces, it was 2-2. However, both he and Venables, and seemingly everyone else involved with the game failed to see, the signs to substitute were much earlier. In going forward, you could tell the players were complacent: Viduka attempted a long bomb from a poor goal kick when he should have just laid it off to Kewell; a cross was sent to early when it should have been checked; and, errant passes crept into the game. The plan should have seen Venables warming up players immediately the second goal was scored, and ready to be brought on within 10 minutes in case the immediate critical third never came. And when Kewell received a yellow for being kneed by Aberzade, you sensed it was the perfect time to close up shop. I did. I was looking at the clock, not waiting for another goal. So too my friends.
It seems everyone concerned got caught up in the extravaganza of it all. The sucker punch came, if you will, direct from Arnold when he divulged a conversation Venables had had with him at the urinal. Venables told Arnold that he may have got caught up in the emotion. Slater added that, at the end of the day, Venables was paid not to get caught up in the emotion... he was paid to get us to the World Cup. Clearly both players, along with myself and most footballing pundits and experts alike, firmly put the blame at Venables. Missed goals, players' messing up, nets coming down, etc, are all things you can't control. But as what has been said before in these pages, team selections, substitutions and tactics, especially responding to game-evolving scenarios, are all things you can control. They weren't. We lost. Venables failed.
All the players echoed the stunned silence, the depression and the heartbreak felt after the match. During the interview, Slater showed signs of anger and Arnold showed signs of sadness. I share both. Of course, these were the players that had been around for several campaigns and saw their dreams thrown away. In contemplation, you have to be bitter. David Hill offered the most telling, though obvious, final comment: "It was Australia's single most sporting disappointment ever. Not just soccer". No shit.
The Future
The Iran game will become an even greater disappointment if we have not learned anything. You sense most of those coaching mistakes will not be made again. Unfortunately with football, you only get your report card after the game, and Farina will get his then. And hindsight will no doubt distort it somewhat. The main positive so far is the excellent match against Scotland that finally showed a cohesive unit. The 2-0 was always a bonus and should be rejoiced vociferously, but no optimism should be read into it. We are still a year to go to the South American playoff and the team will need to improve much more. Next year's Confederations Cup will give us more insight.
While we are short on genuine world class players like Kewell, Zelic and Viduka, the the depth of players just below that is astounding. What I'd like to see is to Farina to start selecting the team like a club team and rewarding players who play well. Gone should be the days when you have your first eleven firmly entrenched and revert back to it when all those players are available. The defence is a key area where players like Moore, T.Vidmar, Popovic, Murphy, Muscat, Laybutt are have similar capability. With Moore and T.Vidmar injured recently, others have come in and performed well. It is ultra-important to have a cohesive defensive unit - not a sixes and sevens defence of the Iran playoffs - and they have every right to stay as long as they are in form and the team plays well. While you would never leave out a Kewell or Viduka, leaving out a Bosnich for a similarly capable Schwarzer is reasonable. And you should never sacrifice defensive cohesiveness just to include a player of marginal superiority.
For what ever reason, Bosnich has missed playing for the national team for several matches now. Schwarzer has excelled in his place, and especially given Bosnich's club crisis, has every right to remain. Playing Bosnich next match would be a snub on Schwarzer and you could not blame him for simply giving up on the team. The media is quick to pick up that Moore, Vidmar and others that were missing from our first eleven against Scotland, but at this stage, the only players that have any re-claim to a spot would be a fit Kewell and Viduka. Given the performance against Scotland, that team is our first eleven now, and Farina should stick to it just like Venables should have stuck with Ivanovic in the Iran playoffs. Otherwise you are punishing players for winning and that does not make sense.
In "What went wrong Part 2", I made a point about playing at home first, which should be sought for in the eventual South American playoff. I still stand by this for the exact reasons outlined previously. The key thing is putting yourself under the least pressure possible. Playing away first means you accept to come from behind; you accept you will be behind after the first game. That is dumb and it means extra pressure at home, just when you don't need it, especially since now it is your last chance and you playing in front of a demanding crowd. It is even worst when you come home after leading, like what happened with Iran, because panic in defence is far more damaging than panic in offence. Against Argentina in 93, Thompson recognised Argentina's panic in defending at home against Colombia, which they went on to lose 5-0. Against Australia, they also panicked on several occasions by pulling down players, which in fact, should have produced red cards. But poor refereeing in World Cup ties goes part and parcelled for Australia.
While Australia has been lucky in rarely having to chase a deficit after the first leg, that may not be the case next time. In baseball and basketball, teams always want to start their best-of series at home first. They want to get the lead and put pressure on the opposition to come from behind. In tennis, the winner of the toss wants to serve first. In AFL, the team wants to kick with the wind first. In cricket, teams want to bat first to put the opposition under extra pressure by chasing in the last innings. Football should be no different. Given Australia's abysmal performance in playing at home last, every thing should be done to play at home first. And given the stupid away-goals rule, maybe an extra premium on defence should also be considered at home too. Remember, a 0-0 would have been good enough against Iran.
Crunch time awaits, and at present, just as long as their are no South American conspiracy theories to deal with, no obvious faults need to abrupt attention. You know, it is interesting to note that Asian officials before the last World Cup "hoped" Iran finished fourth because Iran stood the best chance of fending of Australia. That they did after spectacularly tumbling to second in their group after leading comfortably with three games to go and then blowing the third-place game against Japan. It looked all too cosy. And it looked like Brazil may have been doing the same until they recently picked up their game. We should be safe against playing either them or Argentina, the only teams I feel we would struggle against. Colombia, Uruguay, Chile and Paraguay would be 50-50 propositions. Venezuela, who won't make it, would be easy beats. The rest - Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador - I would put us slightly ahead of. It will be interesting. After that Scottish match, even the Poms are fearing the worst. One particular journalist was so unimpressed with the result because after Australia had defeated England in just about every other sport on the planet, he feared Australia now had a chance of handing England its ultimate embarrassment in the game it invented by out-performing it at the World Cup. His solution - for both countries - was to send Venables back to Australia to coach the Socceroos!