Football is one of the rare sports where major competitions between two teams are played on a home and away basis. In that time, conventional wisdom has evolved whereby home teams nearly always sought to play their home games last seemingly for no other purpose other than the knowledge that at home they know what has to be achieved to succeed. Another reason is that the final match represented the finality of the competition whereby the winner is known on the day. Therefore, it makes more sense to play home last because fans get a final result instead of leaving them in limbo until the decider. But would football authorities put the team's best prospects ahead of such trivialities as perceived fan preference? No. So other than the so-called knowledge factor, why do they sought to play home, last? There's never been any real conclusive evidence that home-last is an advantage. In exploding the away-first knowledge myth, analysing the comeback factor, the away goals factor and historical records, we'll show that electing to play home-last is just about the most ridiculous decision that can be made in the sport.
The most common explanation for coaches seeking home-last is that you have the knowledge of exactly what has to be achieved in the last leg. And that is basically all they tell you. OK. So how does that equate to actually having control over that final result? How does that equate to having an advantage? Coaches will quote getting a 0-0 or 0-1 in the first leg, then go crazy in front of home fans and win. The inference is that you have more control playing in the second leg, especially at home, as the first leg invariably sees a very tight low scoring game. It's a nice theory, but where was that control against Iran in 1997 and Israel in 1989 when we got those low results? What if the home team goes crazy in the first leg and you lose 3-0 first? They'll just sit back and defend.
Of course, the inference is that for some reason there is greater control over scoring goals in the second leg. Well, then surely logic dictates that in the second leg you'd have more control over defending? Even if it does not, why can't you have control in the last game? Surely if you win 3-0 at home first, you have that knowledge for the second match. And that knowledge derived from that is to not lose by more than three goals. Simple. Just put 11 men behind the ball. We all know it is easier to defend that to score in football as it is a game more about conceding less goals than the opposition rather than trying to score more. Are coaches serious when their argument is based on a theory? And it is a theory that is wrong. If we were to believe that you have more control in your game in the second leg, and we take the well known football axiom that it is easier to defend than to score, then surely you'd want to apply the theory to maximise its success. And that would be to defend away-last.
So should coaches now use this second leg knowledge in deciding how to play? No. It is all hocus-pocus - even the defend- away-last scenario - is 100% hypothetical. It really is absurd to think coaches would coach on hypotheticals. But it seems to be the case. The knowledge factor is bunk, and should be totally dismissed. Coaches should be looking at tangibles in making decisions.
A big statement here, but this rule is easily the worst rule in possibly the history of any sport. Soccer is fluky enough without having to give one side an even greater slice of luck with this dumb rule. I'd rather games go into penalty shootouts than have this rule. The reason being is that in a shootout - if properly refereed, especially with pre-shot goal-keeper movements checked - there is still skill in the outcome and it is a football method. Whereas to double the value of an already precious goal that can be scored in various fluky manners like deflections, dives, own-goals, optimistic long shots and refereeing errors is arbitrary and unjust to say the least. Remember that a refereeing error gave Iran its first goal that effectively ended Australia's World Cup hopes last time. It created the panic that led to the second goal for Australia's two-goal lead was suddenly realised as meaningless. At 1-0 down, Iran needed two goals to win. At 2-0 down, they still needed to goals to win. So while the away-goal rule affected the game on the pitch by rendering Australia's second goal virtually worthless, worse still, it affected the Australian mindset in a way similar to that of a real goal being score. It made them complacent. If there was no away-goal rule, that match would have went into extra time and then penalties. Losing that way still would have hurt, but not as badly as the unjust and unfair away-goals rule caused.
So why is there an away goals rule? Since it is harder to win away, logically you'd think that rewarding away goals higher to be meritorious. Because since it is harder to win, it must be harder to score, right? Wrong. The myopic authorities that brought in this rule failed to understand the distinction between winning away from home and scoring away from home. Yes, it is harder to win, but not to score. You often see second leg matches produce many more goals compared to the first leg. While the first leg will see a 1-0, etc, for the home team, the second will be a 3-1, or 4-2, in favour of the other home team.
Another purpose for the away goals rule is to help avoid the apparent unjust system of a penalty shootout. The aggregate goal rule and the golden goal rule has the same purpose too. Again, both these rules can provide for unjust results in the event of bizarre goal being scored. Ideally, both rules should go whereby the game result is paramount - especially for the type of playoff that Australia has to play to qualify for World Cups. If there is a tie, a third game on neutral soil should be played, like in the old days. However, in a tournament like the UEFA Cup, a third game would be impractical so the aggregate goal rule needs to stay. However, the Golden Goal rule should be refined to give the other team some hope of responding. A simple modification that states the match continue onto the 120th minute, but if the scores are level, then the team that scored first in the extra time period is the winner, would be fairer.
The away goals rule is an ill-conceived and ill-managed rule. And as we have seen, not only is it a source of unjust results, it has a significant impact on the field as well - especially in a second leg match. While it is in existence, it must be exploited. That can only be done by playing away last.
We've seen that invariably first leg matches are tight with both teams more desperate at not conceding: the home team because they don't want to concede an away goal, and the away team because they want a draw or small loss to take into their home match. In contrast, the second legs are more open. This is probably part of the reason coaches feel they have more control scoring goals in the second leg and sought to play it at home. Of course, they fail to realise that the opposition also has an increased chance of scoring. But worse, they're away-goals. We've seen the power of the away-goal and how it can wreak havoc in a second leg match, so it begs to reason that the time to cause the most damage in a two-legged playoff is to score in the away match that is the second leg. In fact, the very notion of attacking at home seems bunk because it leaves you open to conceding those precious away goals. With the hostile nature of home crowds inhibiting attacking inclinations of the away team, it is a wonder we get any goals in playoffs. But what goals that do come, invariably come in the second leg.
Now, no one is advocating to cease attacking at home and wait for the away leg. You have to take goals whenever you can get them, and psychologically, scoring at home does seem easier. Though, a quick tally of all those missed chances against Iran, Canada, Argentina, Israel and Scotland, may prove otherwise. Maybe it is more like creating chances at home that is easier. Anyway, invariably the home team does most of the attacking and unless coaches suddenly turn their attacking strategies on their head they will continue to do so. Besides, if the attacking impetus suddenly changed towards the away game, this very debate would be turned on its head also - to proclaim away teams to play away first. That leads on to another factor.
The notion of playing home-last, and hence having the greater chance of scoring, means you are placing all your eggs into one basket. You are writing off the first leg altogether, hoping to gain a draw or a narrow loss, then to respond at home. But what happens if you screw up at home? No second chance. However, failing to score home-first means it's not curtains - you have that second chance. You have the away game. As we've seen, it's an excellent chance because the acknowledged openness of the second leg means you have a greater chance of scoring those precious away goals than you would in an away game-first scenario. In essence, playing home-first means you get two games with the greater chance of scoring: the home ground advantage that comes with the home leg, and the more open game that comes with the second leg. Playing home-last, you have only the one greater chance. Eddie Thompson saw as much after the Argentina game. And I bet we'd all love the 2-2 home draw against Iran to come first, and to then go to Iran as a second chance.
Most coaches will tell you that sport is played 90% between the ears, and if true, again here is another area to exploit by playing at home first. Often commentators will remark on "fighting back" or a comeback that a team has made after being behind on the score-sheet. Clearly, the consensus is that coming from behind is a huge challenge and occasionally miraculous, so it begs to reason that in a playoff situation you should take every assurance possible not to put yourself in such a position and grab any advantage first. They do it in just about every other sport: tennis players serve first, cricketers take advantage of prevailing pitch conditions first, AFL teams kick with the wind first, even in penalty shootouts in soccer teams like to go first! It's the prevailing attitude in almost everything. The object must be to grab the lead and put pressure on the opposition to respond. Soccer should be no different. It really is just the craziest notion that you'd effectively write off that first away leg for the opposition to take a lead and then force yourself to come from behind to win. Why? The home-ground factor is the greatest advantage a team can have in the sport, and surely it must be seized first.
Having said all that, personally, I feel the comeback is over-rated. Especially when a team is only a goal up. I mean, some one has to score first, so why does that suddenly mean the other team has to perform a "comeback". For larger leads, or for when time becomes an issue, that's different. Looking at it rationally, if going into a match two teams are 50/50 then it begs to reason that if one team can score 3 goals in a half, so too can the other team. In fact, there is no law of nature that says teams have to go goal for goal. Surely they are allowed to score in spurts? It is only when the second team has less resources - like time, or even players on the pitch, or a reduction in ability, like injures - to match the first team's performance that a comeback can be truly appreciated. But certainly not when a team has score twiced in the first 10 minutes and the other team still has 80 minutes to respond! In fact, surely the performance of scoring 2 goals in 10 minutes is more of an achievement than scoring 2 in 80 minutes? But no, since team-A did it first, we lose all sense of its achievement and laud team-B's achievement just because they did it second. That's despite having seven times more resources (the time factor) than team-A to meet the achievement, and even in despite the fact that team-A maybe the acknowledged weaker team going into the match.
That's right, the weak team may fluke the lead, which somehow mythically propels their abilities to a new level, and the stronger team has to meet the new challenge. The game may end 2-1 to the strong team, which is essentially the pre-game prediction. But because the weak team scored first, the strong team's fought back and made a comeback! Absurd.
So why do commentators go ga-ga over the stirring comeback of the second team? In fact, having a "medium" type lead of 2 to 3 goals (1-0 would be small, 5-0 would be large) is the most dangerous lead to have. It prompts the opposition into action, and in the process, abandoning any psychological inhibitions that they once had. Basically, they now have nothing to lose and everything to gain, and because they are not that far behind, are quite capable of making up the ground, especially against a team that most likely is now complacent. If the opposition gets a goal back, that complacency then becomes pressure - derived from the knowledge that their lead means they are expected to win. Depending on the stakes, that pressure can become huge and even overwhelming, which only increases as the opposition gets goal after goal back. As for the chaser's, their goals serve as more and more inspiration and increasing their confidence to go on with the job.
We see this scenario play out often as the chasing team with nothing to lose suddenly turns play and starts dominating. Iran noticeably increased their tempo when the second Australian goal was scored as the leading Australians became complacent. Iran could no longer just plod along hoping to score an equaliser to push the game into extra time and then a shootout. No, they had to go for it now. And once they scored, we saw how the away-goals rule made Australia's second goal almost redundant. Australia, one minute expecting to win, suddenly had all the pressure place on them not to lose - especially with a World Cup birth suddenly at risk. Conversely, Iran were full of confidence, in with a sniff, and playing as if they had nothing to lose, and intensified by a World Cup birth. Similarly, in Buenos Aires, the last 15 minutes saw Argentina's 1-0 tenuous lead become the larger medium-type lead due to the time constraint. Australia, now with nothing to lose, dominated that match as Argentina suddenly became burdened with almost insurmountable pressure not to lose as time ticked by. We saw this theory played out perfectly as Eddie Thompson had imagined it (after seeing Argentina crumble 5-0 against Colombia in an earlier qualifier), and it nearly worked.
While comebacks are over-rated, you still don't want to be a position to achieve one. Facts are, the losing team rarely catches up. Suppose that's why they seem so special? This state of play gives the leading team extra confidence whilst adversely affecting the moral of the team behind. But unless these psychological pressures manifest themselves to the point that the previous 50/50 scenario entering the game becomes one of a clear on-the-day supremacy, both teams will continue to play according to their abilities. Logic dictates that the lead will then be preserved. Of course, you can get the extremes: a comeback, as what's been described; and even a blow-out, which is the opposite, and occurs when the losing team is exploited in its desperation to restore score-board parity. So it is still important to seize that advantage first and grab that lead, for it does put you in the box seat to exploit you opponent's reaction. Once in the lead, intelligent play and clear mindsets are the order of the day if the desire is to preserve and extend it, and to eventually win. In fact, good teams will often turn a 2-0 lead into something like a 5-1 victory. Games are never won until the final whistle, especially in soccer where a goal can come out of nowhere and in next to no time. Don't let probability skew judgment on game supremacy. A 2-0 lead means nothing after 10 minutes, or even at half time, for the opposition still has the resources to respond. Considering what Manchester United did to Bayern Munich in the European Cup Final a few years ago, only in the 91st minute would I consider a 2-0 lead as a time to relax.
Along with having an advantage comes pressure. When having an advantage, it's expected to be used. This creates pressure. Pressure diminishes your advantage. However, the pressure to make use of an advantage is not that sufficient that advantage is lost. But that's in normal circumstances. When playing home-last; when coming from behind; when it's your last hope; when an opposition's goal is worth two; to add this pressure to your advantage is merely to counter-act it. This sounds drastic, but in reality, rarely causes a meltdown of the advantage. Often the buzz at being at home with counter-act this pressure, hence, restoring the advantage as normal. But it is a factor, albeit latent, that's non-existent when using the advantage first.
While it is nice to theorise about comebacks, away-goals, and all the psychological influences placed on a team, it counts for nought if history does not support it. In many playoff situations, the superior team does win, and often this superior team does play the home leg last. However, when you start to look at upsets in playoffs over the years, the key pattern that emerges is that the home-first team is the one that is responsible for a great majority. I can remember vividly several years ago that a dominating Manchester United lost a European Cup round against Bordeaux when the French side pinched a goal at Old Trafford that suddenly meant Manchester had to score two more goals to win. Bordeaux won 1-0 in France, but snuffed out Manchester's goal to level 1-1 in the second half at Old Trafford. One minute Manchester were cruising and dominating play and needing just one goal in normal or extra time, or to win a shootout, to suddenly having to score two more goals in normal time. That is one result, but there are countless others where the inferior away team has sudden put the cat amongst the pigeons by stealing an away goal. While looking overseas is nice, it's fairer that we see what is more pertinent to Australia, especially the crunch games.
We are all familiar with the Iran and Argentina series, and these two series typify Australia's history perfectly. Remember, and disregarding that deflected Argentine goal, Australia, against much superior opposition in Argentina and using much inferior players and coaching compared to the Iran series, lost the same way: the away-goals rule. It is amazing how the superiority of one side was negated so much by playing at home, last. It is also further corroborated in other series where playing home-first has aided the inferior team.
Sure, most of the blame lay off the pitch with team selection and in-game tactics, but the home-last factor impacted severely on both teams' psyche. I just can't help feeling that if Australia had not have scored that second goal, they'd have won. Sounds strange, but that's the impact home-last and away-goals have. Iran would have left their surge for much later on, whilst the coaches would have closed up shop early and relied on scoring on the counter-attack. Eddie Thompson played this tactic against a rubbish Canadian team for a birth in the 1996 Olympics, and you can't help but feel this would have worked here too. Of course, we are wiser in hindsight, but leaving the score at 2-0 for so long helped Australia no end. They really needed the quick third goal to kill off Iran.
About the only time an Australian team has kicked on in the return leg after drawing 2-2 in Canada. Lozanovski and Spiteri scored there between Canada's two goals. This series was for a birth at the 1996 Olympics, and while it took Australia most of the first half to score first in Sydney, the floodgates soon opened in the second half. But with Viduka, Agostino, Tiatto, Muscat, Foxe, you'd expect that against this very ordinary Canadian team.
Australia missed half chances at home, but there weren't that many good ones, in what was a tight game. In Argentina, they created little until the end, however most of that was due to lenient refereeing on Argentina's spoiling tactics. Arnold got dragged down after passing the last defender, which should have resulted in a red card. Wade scored twice through headers against the nervous Argentine defence content to play off-side from free-kicks, however, both were offside as his impetuosity got the better of him. In fact, it was this nervous Argentine defence that helped Australia the most. A pity Wade made that early run, as a wiser Aurelio made a later run which would have seen him timed perfectly to be in the clear. At 1-0 to Australia, anything could have happened. Regardless, Argentina had great chances, and nerves and outstanding Australian defending denied them. The deflected goal was a fluke, but made nothing in the end, as Australia always had to score a goal to win.
A classic series where the overwhelming superior Australians nearly got rolled. First, the Canadian's stole an away goal in Sydney forcing Australia from a winning position straight into a losing one. Gee, normally a goal will see a team draw level, but not in this crazy away-goals rule scenario! Second, the nervous Australian's botched so many chances that you'd had to have seen the game to believe it. For guilt-edge, easier-to-hit-than-miss chances, Australia missed at least five. As for all the other great chances, count another six there. Plus there were another six half chances. A 12-1 scoreline would not have been out of place that day, yet Canada forced it into a shoot out after a desperate Australia managed to steal a late goal to level the series 3-3.
Well, that was almost Canada pre-visited except the Israeli goal suddenly meant Australia had to score two. They only got one, and were eliminated.
A relatively close scoreline somewhat belies this editorial. However, Australia were destroyed in every other department. They did very well restricting Scotland to 2-0 in the Glasgow first leg, but could easily have lost 6-0. In the return in Melbourne, there really was only one guilt-edged chance missed, and a couple of other good chances in the 0-0.
The 1992 Olympic team drew 1-1 in Sydney at home first against one of the predicted teams that could eventually challenge for Gold. In Utrecht, Zelic opened the scoring early to give Australia the edge, while Holland then dominated and equalised late in the game. They took the lead in extra time (no golden goal then), but from then, nerves set it as Australia where able to get back into the match. A tentative tackle on Zelic saw him clear to score that memorable goal near the by-line.
Whilst this was a good NZ team, losing at home 2-0 after drawing 3-3 in Auckland was a disgrace. NZ went on to beat China to qualify for Spain.
In qualifying for the 1973 World Cup, Australia played Iran and won 3-0 in Sydney. After 20 minutes in Iran, they were down 2-0, but managed to hold on. They went on to beat Korea in a third and neutral match of a three-match series in Hong Kong to qualify.
A much closer series than most realise. Australia dominated the first leg but could only manage one goal, and then were naively caught out playing too far up the field for Uruguay to score early in the second leg. While Uruguay created more chances, Australia held on until half time. Sure lucky to be only a goal down, but so were Uruguay after the Melbourne game. Honours even to this point. After two flights for Uruguay within five days, and the away-goals rule ready to be exploited, Australia was ready to pounce on a tiring team. They assumed control and narrowly missed scoring when Viduka fluffed a header just yards out facing an open goal when an Okon throw bounced over the scrimmaging pack to the unsuspecting Viduka. While Australia conceded a stupid free kick and conceded a goal, fact was that the away-goals rule rendered Uruguay's second goal virtually useless as Australia still only need one goal to qualify. While several chances were created, the most glaring miss came off a Kewell cross. No one expected him to cross it with two Uruguayans marking him. But somehow it did, and it sailed dangerously across the face of goal with Aloisi diving belatedly at it. Oh for a bit of luck.
Yes. Only when your opposition is much inferior, as with the Canada game above, or even recent series against New Zealand. First, you're unlikely to lose, and certainly not by much, so you'll never have to come from behind. And psychologically, since the disparity in ability is so large, they already accept they can't win, whilst you accept you will. Even if you do lose the first away leg, your confidence is so high that coming back is not even a perception whilst your opponents will still doubt their lead.
The home-first advantage must be sought because:
* Playing at home is an advantage, therefore, in any form of competition, you want that
advantage first.
* With an advantage comes the pressure to use it. This is minimised when having the
advantage first.
* The first leg is a tighter game, with the opposition more inclined to defend, meaning
less chance of conceding away goals.
* To gain a lead so you don't need to "come from behind".
* There's a second chance in case you foul-up the first-leg home-ground advantage.
* Second leg away-goals have immediate, and far greater, impact on the game.
* Historically, home-first teams have the advantage, especially during upset scenarios.
* Australia is an abject failure in home-last playoffs.
So history bears out the theory, but off course, other factors should be taken into account regardless. However, this time there are none that warrant a home-last scenario. In fact, they all warrant a home-first scenario, which they also did for the Iran games. Before that third-placed Asia playoff Japan vs Iran game to qualify for France, both teams publicly stated that that game was their final chance to qualify because they felt Australia would be too strong to overcome. Once Iran lost to Japan, instead of allowing them go home to be cajoled and encouraged, they should have been brought here, made as uncomfortable as possible, and have their mental status exploited. Just imagine what you'd do to a team that's just bombed their self-admitted final chance, is mentally wrecked, fears you, is playing in an unfriendly hostile environment and has just conceded a couple of goals? Who knows what level of damage Australia would have done in that scenario. And then, you go to Tehran, sit back, and grab a goal or two on the counter. Iran's home crowd would soon have turned on them, if in fact they'd not turned already for blowing two chances to qualify for France. For Australia, electing to play home-last was an horrendous mistake as it allowed Iran psychologically back into the tie.
Four years on, and it's time to apply what we've learnt over the years into practice. After two years of building a team and style of play, Farina seemingly has taken care of matters on the pitch. Undoubtedly this will be the strongest Australian team ever, and undoubtedly, it's cohesion and well-being are almost beyond reproach. The only slight hiccup is the lack of lead-up games, but unlike with 1997's band of thrown-together players, this team has been together for awhile. And as we saw with the Confederations Cup mid-year, they were able to slot straight into the groove and perform well. Training sessions and the game against France the week preceding the playoffs should see any cobwebs blown from the system.
Disconcertingly, once the home and away decision was announced by Fifa, there were grumbles from Farina and others that we've lost the advantage of playing home-last. And remember, this is an advantage that is just theory, and historically, has been refuted. Farina also cited the altitude issue - in that playing away first means more time to acclimatise. Rubbish. Under the current scenario, after the first leg in Australia, both teams will only have one week to acclimatise back in South America. Under his preferred scenario of playing at home last with the South Americans at home first, the South Americans would actually enjoy a longer acclimatisation period as they'd already be there for their own qualifiers on November 14. But Australia would still only have a week to acclimatise since they have the France match on the 11th. Surely we want that the other way around where we get the longer acclimatisation period leading into the first match?
Fifa has actually done Australia a huge favour because not only do we get that home ground advantage first, it means Australia will be in Australia for at least two weeks for acclimatisation, while the South Americans will have to hot-foot it over here to play a hostile match just three days after their final match. And it will be three days later, because they will lose a day as they cross the international date-line. That's not to mention the jet lag issue that Australia won't have to deal with at all. It's the best possible decision Australia could have hoped for. While Farina failed to realise it at the time, it seems he and media commentators have come around. In fact, the grumbles are now coming from the South Americans as they endeavour to have the playoffs postponed to give them more time to travel here. Fifa should not back down as the deadline for all qualifiers to finish (November 25) was set in stone ages ago and the South Americans should have arrangeed their own qualifiers to finish in ample time for the fifth placed playoff.
At last, Australia has taken care of all possible business. The team is as well prepared as realistically possible, have a warm-up game against quality opposition the week before the playoffs that ensure all the players will be here and acclimatised well in advance, and we play home first against a South American opponent that should be mentally down, jet-lagged, and tired after a rushed trip to Australia. Even the preferred identity of that opponent - Uruguay - seems to be falling into place. The only outstanding issues for the team is where to play Kewell and how Farina will tactically approach the games. We'll leave that question unanswered until closer to the playoffs.