CHAPTER TEN

AUSTRALIAN EXTREME RIGHT IDEOLOGY

This Chapter is structured to impose order upon the ideological labour of the Australian Extreme Right. The imposition of intellectual order could misrepresent that which is diffuse or unsystematic. Nonetheless, this Chapter proceeds upon the logic implicit in the narrative and analysis in Part Two, that ideological principles motivate the Extreme Right organizations. Although ideology is distinguished from propaganda, ideological statements shall be taken to mean what they say and their objective worth as political and organizational mobilizers weighed accordingly.

This Chapter benefits from the analysis of the tripartite Right and the specifics of Australian Right politics 1945-75 as advanced in Part One. It focuses upon the central proposition of this Thesis: that the contemporary ideological forms of the Extreme Right are largely a reaction against the control of the Australian State by a determined liberal internationalist capitalism. Specific probative questions would be:

· How can ‘neo-fascism’ be understood and then applied as a methodological tool to analyse the Extreme Right?

· What is the relationship between the ideological forms of the Extreme Right and the corpus of Australian Conservative Right ideology? At what points did radicalization occur?

· What are the key ideological concerns of the Australian Extreme Right? Do different groups express different combinations of the central principles which then define political conduct? How are they expressed programmatically?

This Chapter is based upon the primary material which includes participant interviews and questionnaires. Nonetheless, to guide the arrangement of the material, particularly because new lines of analysis of the Extreme Right present it as akin to European phenomena, reference to foreign scholarship occurs. Finally, the Chapter arranges its material to clarify the Extreme Right’s ‘four face’ typology.

SECTION 1

ISSUES OF IDEOLOGICAL DEFINITION 1975-95

The investigation of the Australian Extreme Right shows that while there were no ‘great thinkers’, there were systematized references to historical traditions (native and foreign) via energetic ideologists whose books, pamphlets and oral communications articulated the typological faces of the phenomenon. Lesser figures acting within the ‘schools’ developed the messages in journalism, speeches and coalface activities. This Thesis accepts that ideology functions on two levels: to consolidate or express a class interest or state interest and also as systematized and/or mythically inspired political doctrine. The two general cases intertwine as new opinions challenge ruling dogma.

Oppositional ideology can be found in:

the vast number of books, pamphlets, slogans scribbled on walls, banners upheld in demonstrations and such other forms of utterance.[1]

Indeed, it is the breadth of the Australian phenomenon which vindicates Mannheim’s classic view that ideology and utopia are difficult to disentangle.[2] In an oppositional political sub-culture new ‘visions’ of an Australian future could be explored. It is here that the radical quality of Extreme Right opinion is apparent. Meszaros reasoned of ‘western’ politics:

… in our liberal-conservative culture the socially established and dominant … ideology can function … to present and misrepresent its own rules of selectivity, bias, discrimination and … distortion as ‘normality’, objectivity and scientific detachment.[3]

Against the Australian liberal consensus, which since the 1970’s held that Australia was part of Asia, and imposed a globalist logic upon economics, foreign policy, immigration and labour-relations, the Extreme Right progressively responded with visions of ‘independence’ perceived as beyond the capitalist order, and with ideological portrayal of an ‘Australian’ of archetypal character. The State’s ‘utopian’ passion segregated these discourses, invited political ‘closure’, and consequent propagandist misrepresentations, of Right ideas.

Theorists of ideology say that ideological life has the quality of attitude lived as a truth, individual and supra-individual, irrational or mythic; no one ideologist encapsulates the whole message and the followers live the creed to various ‘degrees’ of commitment or discernment.[4] Australian Right ideologies, as the narrative chapters demonstrated, possessed these traits.

This Thesis has used the term ‘Extreme Right’ so that the research could be placed within the scholarship of fascism. The continuing validity of the ‘Left’-‘Right’ continuum (which can accommodate changes in position and ideologies of spatial transcendence) was also a consideration.[5] The term neither signified ranting nor eccentricity, nor in the aged tradition of Lipset and Raab’s American study was it explained as a type of divergence from Reason, exhibiting psychological simplism, anti-pluralism and a rabid style which challenges democratic processes[6] - ideas which also find some echo in Moore’s study.[7] Given ideological contest is a power contest, ‘extremism’ on the Right shall be understood as an ideological-political process of radicalization whereby some Australians challenge, in various ways and degrees, dominant liberal ideology and State practice.

Many participants objected to the label ‘Extreme Right’. Interviews with seven Confederate Action Party officials provided them with an opportunity to choose self-placements. The interviews revealed: Conservative (4), Populist (1), Centre (3), Nationalist (4), Traditionalist (4), Christian Patriot (4); the softer ‘Radical Right’ had no adherents. Graeme Campbell and Denis McCormack both preferred the term “radical centre”,[8] a presentation displayed by a British Third Way organization.[9] Radical-Nationalist leaders maintained that their system was ‘beyond Left and Right’, a theme also hammered in an extensive literature. The desire for new labels was revealing; it indicated a need to escape terms imposed by the dominant ideology and to locate ‘counterposing’ descriptions. It also showed the fluid state of contemporary Right politics.

The narrative in Parts One and Two of this Thesis empirically demonstrated that the developing Extreme Right after 1966 differed from that of the inter-war period in one essential respect. Whereas the latter represented a defence of the conservative State and imperial-capitalist system by militant means, the contemporary Extreme Right was genuinely ideologically and politically independent of the prevailing State and economic forms. This did not mean that all Extreme Right forces mobilized without either nostalgia for aspects of the old British-Australian political order and culture, or ambivalence about their place in the democratic ‘western’ order; but it meant that generally the ‘character’ of Australia, and the Extreme Right’s programmatic policy and strategic and tactical formulae were understood within a more modern framework.

Analysis of the Extreme Right has been operated with reference to the tripartite paradigm, taking account of the (Satellite) Conservative Right and the Radical-Nationalist forces (which has been discussed as part of the Extreme Right in that Radical-Nationalists carried the Extreme Right’s ‘radicalization’ processes to completion). The Extreme Right, as the intermediate category on the tripartite paradigm, could mobilize out of the Conservative Right; its new ‘independence’ would be weighed against how it developed older themes of identity, heritage and programme, or how it was drawn backwards into a less mobilized condition.

What is clear in any discussion of Extreme Right ideology, is that the existence of three types of ‘Right’ derived of particular historical traditions and which functioned amidst particular political conditions, has caused previous analysis to be confused. This Thesis must disentangle the strands.

SECTION 2

THE QUESTION OF NEO-FASCISM

While possible examples of Australian neo-fascism are discussed here in the context of the international scholarship, the concept is used to explain the logic by which the liberal State was delegitimized, and how radicalization within the Extreme Right family can be measured.

Eatwell argued that the term ‘neo-fascism’ was both a pejorative and an unwise self-description.[10] Unsurprisingly, those Australian subjects under examination (other than neo-nazis) refused to admit to a common heritage with historical fascism. Here, Griffin’s counsel is useful:

- if a contemporary movement is described as fascist, its supporters may well take this classification as a misrepresentation of their ideals … as libelous … however … in a serious work of social science or history … the term is neither an insult nor a condemnation but a matter of ‘value free’ classification (taxonomy).[11]

If the ‘core’ of neo-fascism is the same as for fascism - “palingenetic populist ultra-nationalism”[12] - the points of differentiation nonetheless require exposition.

Credible scholarship has reasoned that after 1945, certain former fascists developed fascist ideology, with new arguments and syntheses of ideas (about, for example, a Third Force Europe, radical democracy, co-operative economics), but repudiated Nazi and Fascist practice.[13] By the 1970’s intellectual neo-fascists had returned to the arguments of some unsuccessful schools of fascism - National Bolshevism, Conservative Revolution, National Revolution - and thereafter expounded new ‘revolutionary’ arguments against capitalism, U.S. imperialism and marxism, and for Third World liberation and environmentalism.[14] The writings of 1970’s French ‘neo-fascist’ Francois Duprat, anticipated recent scholarship by illustrating that ideological and organizational innovation has marked the path of neo-fascism.[15] Ideas have been drawn from Left systems and writers, from ecological and other thought, and structures have varied from cultural organizations with Gramscian agendas, to terrorist cells, and parties which operated as neo-fascist/national populist hybrids.[16] Such ‘neo-fascism’ was not only far removed from nostalgic groups but from many of the signpost figures and movements of the post-war period.

Griffin, Eatwell, Payne and Lacquer have separately acknowledged that neo-fascism in its kaleidoscopic quality has shown ideological and organizational styles at variance to historical fascism. Absent are the leader cults, the paramilitary structures, the militarist-imperialist ideology and the ariosophical racial ideology.[17] While these scholars understood the devious camouflage-capacity of neo-fascism, they showed that the former traits had become passé.

Diethelm Prowe provided a set of supposedly distinguishing ideological, political and circumstantial factors which set fascism and the post-1970 ‘new radical right’ apart.[18] He reasoned that the European contemporary ‘radical right’ was born into an emerging ‘multicultural’ social order, one no longer driven by the class disputes which fired fascism and created political openings. It was a product of a post-colonial age where ‘racism’ was no longer imperial in form. Western societies have become prosperous and politically stable, urbanized and post-industrial, traits which sustain a liberal, rather than a pre-fascist conservative ethos. Boredom and youth alienation in a system without clearly defined enemies cannot engender a revolutionary outlook. The ‘radical right’ has abandoned anti-semitism and anti-communism as mobilizing ideas but, it has sought to reinvent community, nation and race, within a ‘protective’ order (of cultural identity, industrial-trade systems, stabilizing alliances). Through this combined reasoning Prowe denied the efficacy of the term ‘neo-fascism’.

Moore opined that this author had also used a “sophisticated argument” to differentiate National Action’s ideas from fascism.[19] This argument had anticipated some academic opinion, and reasoned that historical fascism involved a cult of the state and dictatorship, anti-semitism, expansionist militarism and a “racial mythology” of imperialist quality;[20] by relying upon Stephensen’s criticism of fascism’s “Heil Hitler bunk” and his premise of a defensive nationalism within a state based on “socialism without doctrines”, it could be concluded that traces of palingenetic populist ultra-nationalist mythology were present in this version of ‘Australian nationalism’.

The evidence suggests that neo-fascism can possess ideological and programmatic aspects which separate it from historical fascism, but its protean quality and its weakness stem from the difficulty of obtaining adequate political space.[21] This was recognized by the European movements of the 1970’s and 1980’s which perceived themselves as continually in motion to escape “the ghetto”.[22] Without mass politics, a mass youth constituency, a paramilitary vanguard and a political or economic crisis situation, fascism would necessarily remain impotent or marginal. Responsively, any phenomenon with a mythic core component would mutate endlessly to find an ‘exoteric’ formula which worked. The author applied logic similar to Prowe’s, in studying 1970’s British neo-fascism, but affirmed there was an attempt to address contemporary realities by ‘creating’ new mobilizing myths.[23] The author also conceived in Bardeche’s logic, that a neo-fascism:

needs not be conscious of itself as a fascism; indeed modern fascisms may regard classical fascisms (1919-45) as unrelated to their existences.[24]

Therefore, when particular Australian Radical-Nationalist leaders maintained that historical fascism failed to inspire them, and may have provided at best only general political lessons on strategies and tactics,[25] they could still be participants in neo-fascist politics.

Whereas the history of neo-fascism involved a period twice as long as that of fascism, and included large parties and insignificant grouplets, the Australian investigation was fortunate to find a narrower field, not littered with organizational corpses. Nonetheless, the fundamental misanalysis which attended Australian scholarship of the Conservative Right and Extreme Right paramilitaries of the 1930’s, is complemented by the work on later periods. For example, Moore’s interpretation of The Association maintained that an anti-communist militia bonded to conservative political interests, represented a potential fascism.[26] However, there was no fascist party and no revolutionary ideology. Perhaps only if the Citizens’ Rights organizations are equated with activist cadres, and The Association substituted for stormtroops, would Moore’s argument that fascism’s 1950’s address was “The Lodge, Canberra”,[27] seem valid.

Chapter Two dismissed the ‘potemkin-fascism’ of Australian Nazism from consideration as a neo-fascism. Aside from the alien surface form of the movement, its auxiliary function fixed that conclusion. Nonetheless, two Nazi leaders, Smith and Cawthron, expressed neo-fascist impulses. The programmatic documents of Smith’s assorted grouplets (1957-62) and Cawthron’s NSPA were replete with references to White Australia, union with New Zealand, nationalization of credit, decentralization, abolition of the states, workers’ control and support for national independence struggles.[28] Both leaders corresponded with P.R. Stephensen, various British, American and European neo-fascists, and bemoaned ‘Australian and Western decadence’.[29] Smith maintained that the ‘1960’s Right “feared this sort of thing”. His failure to acquire resources for “the rebirth of the national ethos”[30] was absolute whereas, to use Moore’s description, Cawthron “bequeathed an important legacy … (the) distinctly Australian iconography, a populist tradition of political struggle …” - the Eureka tradition.[31]

Analysis of subsequent developments remained incomplete. Moore declined to characterize National Action as ‘fascist’ and Frankel who labelled it “neo-fascist” and “right populist” alluded only briefly to “the racist heritage which National Action can rightly claim as part of the Australian tradition …”[32] Meantime, Colebatch did integrate the discussion of neo-fascism and Radical-Nationalism into his conception of National Alliance/National Action:

This organisation consciously invoked what it identified as the radical and anti-capitalist traditions … to justify its anti-Asian polemics. Its politics were at odds with … the conventional Right.[33]

He concluded:

… [although] … categorized as ‘fascist’ by some … it will be seen [without necessarily disputing that categorization] that many aspects of its ideology were in the Labour-Unionist, Radical-Nationalist or leftwing stream of White Australia thinking …[34]

By recording ANA/NA’s distance from the Right by placing it within the old nationalist and ‘Left’ tradition, important questions of analysis were raised.

Chapter One established the existence of proto-fascist themes in the articulation of Australian nationalism, socialism, and cultural pessimism prior to 1914. It discussed 1930’s Labor nationalists, literary Radical-Nationalists and Australia First as either forces of fascist potential or in Stephensen’s case - the finished product. Logically, the forces of Conservative Right and Extreme Right ‘Imperial’ anti-communism/paramilitarism could not offer inspiration for neo-fascism, which by definition must express a palingenetic nationalism. Colebatch, referring to the post-1945 period, explained historically why ‘anti-communism’ was an unsuitable mobilizing factor for ‘Radical-Nationalism’:

… the Radical-Nationalist tradition with its isolationism was not … obviously compatible with moral or military opposition to international communism and the joining of alliances aimed at containing communism … the tradition appeared to have become quiescent … Australia was in a geographical position which … with the presence of ‘great and powerful friends’ of Britain and America gave it a degree of safety …[35]

Conditions for the re-crafting of Radical-Nationalism became operative only with a capitalist government which followed the big-power lead into the Asian region, one that demonstrated its disregard of ‘White Australia’.[36] These conditions the Fraser government willingly provided.

Did Australian National Alliance (ANA) conform to the new model of neo-fascism? Ted Murphy applied Linz’s typological definition of fascism to ANA;[37] he observed it repudiated the NSPA and NFA mimetic fascisms and concentrated on a nativist style. It was not anti-communist as much as anti-liberal, neither anti-Soviet nor pro-capitalist. After quoting its publications which argued for a ‘new consciousness, a new nation’ achieved by a vanguard party, Murphy then seized upon the Manifesto Of The Australian National Alliance, as expressive of fascism. It said:

The Nationalism of Australian National Alliance does not imply the suburban mentality of consumer goods and apathy. We will realize the National will and natural imperatives of the Australian people, especially the youth. We will mould a New Nation, formed out of the embers of the best traditions of our heritage. We will drive this continental chariot so that Australia will never again cringe as the trading post of the Third World and the West. The nationalism of the Alliance is futuristic in that we will adopt and improvise and build the most advanced civilization … Australia will become a great and powerful maritime nation that will surpass even the legendary Atlantis … We look backward into the past and forward into the future.[38]

This text, with its criticism of suburbanism, the consumption society, national dependence and cringe, as contrasted with a living heritage and a golden future, could qualify as fascist upon either Linz’s or Griffin’s model - because of its anti-liberal palingenetic spirit.

The ANA advanced a crisis mythos of global nuclear war and mass Asian refugee invasion of Australia. Its meagre booklist featured Japan Threat and The Camp Of The Saints, Stephensen’s Foundations and books by Lawson and Lang.[39] Here, the rebirth-of-the-nation-in-crisis seems an underlying theme. There was no ‘book’ of the new Australian Nationalism, but instead a series of spectral images contained in ANA’s mass of journalism and public propaganda. Recruits could infer whatever they chose from the references to the nineteenth century ‘Promise’. The particular period 1975-80 was one of renewed interest in Australian nationalism and folkculture, with later Radical-Nationalists agreeing with Boris Frankel about the role played by Maoist communists in this revival.[40] But it pointed too towards the retreat of the older ‘natural’ Australian social-cultural forms and networks under the pressure of immigration and multiculturalism. This left only a small ‘natural Anglo-Celtic base’ for a new ‘labour-nationalism’, and as the heritage passed into a new ideological sub-culture, it would seek a wider clientele. As the new trend articulated itself, its relationship with neo-fascism would reduce to first principles - as a palingenetic populist ultra-nationalism - without allusion to historical regime-fascism, and with only eclectic references to particular fascist ‘schools’ - and to Stephensen. Nonetheless, one aspect of the Australian historical-racism was suggestively reinterpreted.

That the Radical-Nationalist organizations (1977-95) participated in an ‘international’ movement is shown by personal contacts,[41] inter-organizational affiliations and ideological references. For example, Australian National Alliance publications reported on the British National Front, Italian Social Movement and French ‘nationalist revolutionaries’ indicating that the internal discussions concerning models (Chapter Four) were complemented by open expressions of solidarity. National Action subsequently participated in a loose ‘International’ in the 1980’s and in the 1990’s it drew inspiration from the Alleanza Nazionale, the BNP and the Front National.[42] These organizational references affirm that the Radical- Nationalists espoused the ‘universalist’ worth of the principle of ‘racial rebirth’ and placed themselves within a particular family, which although differentiated from neo-nazism, has been interpreted as ‘neo-fascist’.

The quest for political space beyond the limits of the Left-Right divide was a continually addressed question in the Radical-Nationalist camp. Here, the labour-nationalist legacy, synthesised with the ‘Third Way’ principle, was designed to challenge capitalism. The characterization of the State as alien to the national identity and a creature of capitalism was ‘friend/enemy’ discourse. With this came also the related visions of a “New Man” (co-operative, dynamic, moral)[43] and a New Australian[44] (fused of European stock) who would wage political struggle against the multicultural State. There were no bonds to shackle this ‘Extreme Right’ category to legality, Christian morality and British-state symbolism. The Radical-Nationalists could thence ‘conspire’ with Libyan officials, bash opponents, create violence cells and accept counter-violence and imprisonment.

The propaganda implied an ideological dynamic. The hagiographed historical icons (Lang, Lawson, Lane, Spence, Lalor, Kelly and others)[45] served as stylized archetypes, images of mythic antedelluvian Australia before suburbanism and then ‘multiculturalism’ disintegrated the ‘Promise’ of the nineteenth century.[46] The icons appeared on innumerable posters, adhesive stickers and banners. The younger membership were invited to immerse themselves as “political soldiers” in a living tradition which was posited as part of an avant-garde challenge to the Australian/western order.[47]

The forces of emergent national populism on the Extreme Right were theoretically the allies and/or foot-soldiers for the Radical-Nationalists. However, these forces usually conceived historical ‘fascism’ as an agency of international capitalism, another force of “centralism” and anti-tradition, and although this would not preclude working relationships with Radical-Nationalists, one factor caused cleavage. This tension was rooted in the fundamental ‘extremism’ of the former and not at the level of programmatic points, which (as below) were often convergent. This Thesis, in relying on the tripartite paradigm, would reason that the radicalization of the Extreme Right forces was incomplete when compared to those Radical-Nationalist movements which had concluded that the political system was ‘closed’, and should be challenged and replaced, that the ‘corruption’ of the political order arose from fundamental questions of Australia’s historical identity.[48] To clarify the discussion, this Thesis develops the logic contained in the paradigm advanced in Chapter One:

Table 10.1 Ideological-Political Paradigm 1975-1995[49]

Radical-Nationalism	Extreme Right	Conservative Right
1. Nietzscheanism, Agnosticism; Positive Christianity	1. Positive Christianity Agnosticism, Modernist	1. Christian, often of fundamentalist character
2. New Man/New Australian	2. Citizen-Participant	2. Sovereign Individual
3. Working-class; Youth; Alienated of sundry background	3. Professional; Farmer; ‘Working’ middle class; Some mixed backgrounds.	3. Farmers; Older persons; Rural; Retiree
4. State Idea: Radical Organization/Popular Power	4. Parliament under popular control. Voters’ Veto/C.I.R.; Partyless order	4. Constitutionalist; Parliament under Monarchy; New spirit in parliamentary servants
5. Vanguard organization; Militant action	5. Electoral organization/Cadre structure/Propaganda	5. Lobbyist-education forces
6. Planned economy; Sustainable economy in independent system	6. Populist economics; Money reform; Small enterprise; Independent system	6. Money reform; Ideas culled from earlier phases of the Satellite relationship with Country/Nationals
7. Mythic reference to the republican, nationalist labour heritage; Nativism	7. Acceptance of Australia as it evolved prior to 1966; Ethnocentric concept of culture-nationality	7. Mythic reference to Monarchy and British civic heritage

Griffin concluded that the “extra-systemic” energies of populist organizations do create a base for fascist mobilization.[50] Like some European examples,[51] the potential for an Australian ‘neo-fascist’ challenge was small. As the narrative indicated, the particular syntheses affected by the Radical-Nationalist fraction allowed contact-points with the populist forces and served as poles of attraction for those disillusioned with ‘legal’ action. There was an obvious attraction for those acclimatized to Extreme Right politics to reason that the Nation was an “Idea” and “Destiny” fallen into decadence, and as the property of all, a natural unit of existence whose regeneration overcomes individual alienation.[52] The “dream” of the New Man was seductive to some when dressed in nativist clothing, in that it inspired dedication and a psychological security unaffected by the drudgery of ‘normal’ Extreme Right politics. Unfortunately for the Radical Nationalists, the symbiotic relationship of the more ‘stable’ memberships with the electorally acceptable quality of the ‘national populist’ ideology/politics prevented their further radicalization in the study period.

Nonetheless, just as in 1981-2 when the residue of the failed ‘anti-immigration Extreme Right’ aided in the construction of National Action, a potential was present for further radicalization in the 1990’s. This was partly contingent on the resources and aptitude of the Radical-Nationalists themselves. As Chapter Five concluded, they failed that test.

SECTION 3

FATHER TO THE CHILD?: CONSERVATIVE IDEOLOGY AND THE EXTREME RIGHT

The paradigm adopted here, as much as the propaganda of the Extreme Right’s opposition, requires a discussion to answer the question posed above. In the period after 1945, terms required re-definition.

This Thesis has used the term ‘Conservative Right’ such that it included neither the official conservatism of Robert Menzies,[53] nor the NCC/DLP Catholic movement of the period 1940’s-1960’s and related Quadrant conservatives, nor the Constitutionalism of Lachlan Chipman, nor the devotees of Ayn Rand. Rather, as described in preceding chapters, it meant the ‘Satellite Right’ (1945-75) and its independent, and Queensland National Party connected, successors. This is partly the ‘Lunar Right’ of latter-day liberal commentary. This Conservative Right had coalesced from 1930’s historical residue (Social Crediters and the anti-semitic conspiratologists) fused with new anti-communist militants involved in the Citizens’ Rights movement. As Chapter Two discussed, the League Of Rights, crucial in this development which occurred during the Liberal Party’s conservative mobilization phase (1945-9), remained afloat thereafter to articulate the satellite position. The LOR’s original syntheses of Social Credit and British-Israel principles made it pivotal to a network of 1950’s/1960’s allies such as the British-Israel World Federation, Howard Carter’s Truth And Liberty magazine and various anti-Jewish and anti-communist publicists, ensuring the wide diffusion of its ideological themes.

However, analytical caution is warranted. As Chapter Two explained, whatever offensive, crankish or ‘extreme’ ideas were sustained within the satellite milieu, the factor which determined its quality in the years 1945-75, must be its subordinant position to Liberal-Country party anti-communist requirement. Nonetheless, as was implicit in the satellite concept, those ‘inspirational illusions’ which were its ideas, could serve independent politics: as anti-liberal counter-culture, and as nourishment for activists to propel themselves beyond the satellite boundaries.

This Thesis confirms the ideological domination of the League Of Rights within the conservative camp until the emergence in the 1980’s of new organizations, and the later publication of new magazines with wider audiences - Nexus, Exposure, New Dawn and The Strategy.

Four notable Conservative Right themes require consideration to assess any relationship with Extreme Right ideological formation: Holocaust Revisionism/Historical Revisionism, Conspiracy-theory, Constitutionalist theory and Social Credit.[54] Developed by the LOR, these ideas appeared as constants within this camp although varying in intensity over time.

First: ‘Holocaust Revisionism’ and ‘Historical Revisionism’, were important to the LOR as inter-connected ‘schools’ which challenged conspiratorialist-Establishment history. These discourses have attracted critical scholarship[55] and are necessarily constructs of prodigious ideological production. Significantly, Holocaust Revisionism began with Bardeche (1947) who denied the crux of the Holocaust - the gas chamber extermination of European Jewry[56] and then with Yockey, who introduced this idea to Americans.[57] The ongoing neo-fascist interest in this ‘school’, implied an effort to relativize and minimise fascist state crime and undermine one justification of the ‘system of Yalta’[58] - and further, the ‘anti-racist mythology’ of modern liberalism.[59] Although many protagonists of the genre were not associated with the Extreme Right,[60] its varied use by foreign Extreme Right movements has been manifest. It must now be characterized as a significant international phenomenon.

Rubinstein has traced the lineage of this ‘tradition’ in Australia:[61] from Eric Butler, de Louth and Harry Brus (a Social Crediter, with NSPA links and a 1965 scheme to create a ‘White Australia Legion’),[62] the campaign moved through to Cawthron, Smith, Carter and exiled Hungarian Nazis; but John Bennett’s efforts (1979 ff) and the establishment of the Adelaide Institute by Dr. Frederick Toben in 1994, were events independent of the LOR and with some public impact.[63] Noticeably, with the exception of ANM and other neo-nazis,[64] no Extreme Right movement has ever promoted Holocaust Revisionism. My interviews with some Extreme Right leaders revealed a mixed attitude towards the subject and its political utility. They thought the Revisionists were “useful” because they “side-tracked” forces which might otherwise be employed elsewhere.[65] Neo-nazis drew on available authorities for their Holocaust Revisionist arguments, but with one curious addition: some of those met by the author were disappointed that the Nazis were “not” responsible for the ‘Holocaust’; the Jews had therefore swindled the world and a genuine Holocaust was ‘necessary’ for their punishment (sic).[66]

This Thesis cannot indict the LOR as responsible for how Holocaust Revisionism was applied by others. As a counter-hegemonic idea directed at liberal historiography and values, it has some power, but its actual relationship to the Australian Extreme Right remained difficult to quantify. Just as Holocaust commemoration is “cultic” or religious in form,[67] Revisionism’s popularity with the ‘non-political post-millenarians’ of the League and the apocalyptic neo-ariosophists of neo-nazism, suggested that its political utility as a mobilizer - was negligible.

Historical Revisionism has similar qualities. The American and British versions of this phenomenon were accessible to Australians. Possibly, the genre’s objective was to ‘expose’ the ‘manipulation’ of America and Britain into the Second World War, to explain the destruction of the British Empire through American usurpation and the misconceived war against Germany, all of which ostensibly ‘benefited’ the Soviet Union and colonial revolution. Throughout the study period, the ‘Heritage And Conservative Book Service’ carried the classics of this school.[68]

Some immediacy centred on Historical Revisionism, because of the League’s 1980’s/1990’s championing of David Irving’s work, and Butler’s participation with him in an Anglo-European Fellowship circle in 1986.[69] Statements conveyed to the author in the 1980’s by van Tongeren and other neo-nazis, confirmed that Irving’s sanitization of fascist war aims impressed them as rehabilitation for Nazi ideology.

Nonetheless, Irving’s typological placement must be in the conservative camp. As an avowed believer in Britain’s Imperial mission, and convinced Churchillian politics destroyed the Empire, Irving has argued that the fundamental conditions for its preservation were acceptance of Hitler’s territorial ambitions and anti-communist policy directed against Russia. These principles were ‘High Tory’, and basically those of the British Conservative ‘Link’ group of the late 1930’s. Although after 1989, Irving addressed audiences of German ‘fachos’ and neo-nazis, his 1980’s Focal Point journal, with its orientation towards Britain’s Conservative Party, defined his programme. Indeed, Irving’s Goebbels: Mastermind Of The Third Reich (1996) confirmed his Tory interpretation of fascism. Irving castigated Goebbels’s ‘Total War State’ as “the next best thing to the dictatorship of the proletariat”; he baulked at Goebbels’s 1944 scheme to end the war by an agreement with Stalin. [70] Irving was unsympathetic to fascism’s revolutionary quality, failing to attempt any interpretation of Goebbels’s tilts towards National Bolshevism and the strength of similar opinion in party and state throughout the Third Reich period.

Logically, when the LOR’s ‘Veritas Press’ published Irving’s works, and LOR author Nigel Jackson compaigned over a visa ban for his admission to Australia (1993 ff), it was his Anglo-conservatism which was favoured. If Irving did rehabilitate fascism, or anaesthetize some persons to fascist scripts, then the LOR would bear some collateral responsibility. Seemingly, these scripts served at best as counter-hegemonic tools, a fate generally of the whole ‘school’.

Second: Internationally, the study of conspiracy theory is now underway as conspiratology is not only universal, but literature always crossed borders.[71] The LOR’s booklists between 1975 and 1995 were available as were those of Nexus, Exposure, The Strategy and other publications. I noted that much of the material was used by the Right in earlier periods and was written by foreigners.

What is meant by conspiracy theory? Conspiracy theory (or ‘conspiratology’) is a school of historical-political interpretation, usually patronised by non-academic authors, which has argued that world history, particularly in the last 250 years, was the product of an all-embracing conspiracy of secret or occult forces.[72] The school was fissiparous which made its canon inconsistent internally or amongst the competing theorists; it believed that the conspiracy may reduce to the occult machinations of Catholic or Masonic or Jewish secret societies, or international financial oligarchs, or communists, or any in combination, with the objective to overthrow civilization, morality, Christianity and property rights; and that the conspiracy would invariably produce a moloch-state with a terrorist method, whose purpose could only be evil - or Satan’s state on earth.

Andrew Moore reasoned that the Australian Right used conspiracy theory as an “organising concept”;[73] this Thesis would say that a ‘dis-organizing principle’, is a more apt term. Barkun’s assessment of American conspiratology’s organizational vehicles described a situation where, faced with a centralist, duplicitous enemy, the ‘anti-conspiracy’ Right organization could suffer a type of paralysis.[74] Unable to act in a world of shadows, and uncertain that action might not serve the conspiracy, the American groups would rant or crusade or ‘educate’ at the margins.[75] The Australian method was also the opposite to confrontation, revolutionary action or terrorism. Here, groups would function as the custodians of secret knowledge. This function suited the LOR’s post-millenarian religious perspective.

It is arguable that conspiratology entered Australia with the 1930’s Social Credit movement. Thereafter, Eric Butler mastered the field and applied it to explain Australian politics. The LOR’s output was massive and the speaking tours of Butler, Chresby, Lee and others, popularized the idea of a socialist conspiracy to centralize power. The conspiracy was to be met by a counter-response to educate parliamentarians and the ‘brainwashed’ public to defend the kernel-institutions of Australian freedom (Monarchy, Constitution, Parliament), and the British Empire/Commonwealth, the chief obstacle to the conspiracy’s triumph.[76]

The LOR’s booklists, have changed marginally within the twenty year study period. The author has observed that the LOR’s ahistorical lore could be fulfilling for those who cannot rationalize international politics - for there was no attempt to understand the processes of the internationalization of capitalism as a dynamic, interacted with by conscious (and perhaps malicious) players, who manipulate the routinized methods of power. Rather power whether operated by marxists, fascists, socialists or humanists, was evil. These forces were dubbed satanic implements.[77]

The conspiracy doctrines require separate study; the question here is whether the classics of conspiratology, as penned by Leon de Poncins, Nesta Webster, Archibald Ramsey, Anthony Sutton, Gary Allan[78] and others, including LOR authors, inspired Extreme Right ideology, politics and organization.

Radical-Nationalists, Azzopardi (1978) and Donnini (1983, 1985) made use of arguments from Sutton and Allen, to contend that the Eastern bloc survived because failed-marxism traded with capitalism. However, neither said communism was a fraudulent creature of finance capital, nor that ‘fascism’ was a mechanism of the international conspiracy.[79]

One representative conduit for the diffusion of conspiracy theory into the Extreme Right, was the long running series of articles authored by the Ron Owen in Lock, Stock and Barrel (1992-4).[80] Owen lambasted the New World Order (NWO) as a product of a conspiracy extending through Illuminism, Marx, theosophists, Fabians and the international banks which were accused of financing communism, fascism and other ‘socialist’ movements. The NWO had allegedly grown from immediate agencies such as the humanist United Nations and the Trilateral Commission. While Owen avoided the anti-Jewish thrust present in the LOR materials which argued this line, his review of a book written by a priestess of American conspiratology - Elizabeth Dilling[81] - showed his familiarity with the tradition’s arcane aspects. Owen defined the character of the State, and used a historical theory to delegitimize it. Although this ‘conspiracy’ was ahistorical, the case was argued without eschatological mania. Generally, the populist monarchists posited a conspiracy-of-the-apparatus undertaken by the ‘Socialist’ elites against the Nation. This conspiracy demonstrated its existence in the Lima Declaration which destroyed Australian industries, in multiculturalism and the ‘collapse’ of moral values.[82]

Van Tongeren’s case was different, since he consciously attempted to approximate LOR ideas. Even after this strategy was abandoned, old style anti-semitic ideas served the ANM. Van Tongeren had “educated” himself with the LOR’s booklists and regarded the ‘Jewish conspiracy’ as a political fact. The ANM believed Jews had conspired against White Australia from the time of World War I.[83]

By the late 1980’s, the old-school of conspiratology was challenged by historical circumstances. The school had long advanced anti-semitic canards such as the three-millennia-long plot against God and civilization,[84] and the scheme to implement Mosaic Bolshevism in a World Republic,[85] as essential bases in any analysis of the 1960’s/1970’s political superstructures formed by international capitalism (Trilateralism, Bilderbergism). The collapse of Soviet communism occurred amidst a declining conservative interest in fighting the Left. In effect, the period 1989-91 rendered the LOR’s book and video services anachronistic. It was time to move on. Hence, while the LOR and The Strategy grappled with changed circumstances, there were new trends.

Conspiratology developed into a cosmology. No longer ‘content’ blaming the usual suspects for conspiratorial machinations, the conspiratological genre became fantastic. Lacquer observed that internationally, the 1980’s/1990’s Right projected a ‘fin de siecle’ spiritualism and esotericism, which moulded together occultish preoccupations with the science fiction world.[86] The Australian case was similar. A review of Exposure, Nexus and New Dawn magazines, between 1993-5, reveals interests such as: universal surveillance, UFO cover-ups, lost civilizations (Atlantis, Lumeria), anti-gravity technology, the CIA and New World Order, cancer research, Martian pyramids, pyramidology, occult freemasonry, the ‘real authors’ of the Protocols Of Zion, and the AIDS conspiracy. Occasionally, these journals published sober material - the work of Noam Chomsky or current affairs analysis - which as bait, brought readers into the cultic milieu.[87]

Probably, as Dr Stewart argues, the conspiratological pathway was taken by those ‘westerners’ who sought to rationalize late twentieth century processes of cultural and social change.[88] The heterogeneity of the tradition allowed it to be consumed to taste. In terms of public acceptance it was a dud; but some Australians were seduced into a world-view founded upon it. Anecdotal material showed the Exposure editor as a One Nation Party candidate, and the magazine one of Hanson’s cheerleaders. Fearing real political action, the conspiratologists may have been searching for a ‘non-political’ pseudo-charismatic figure to restore the past(?)

In the named magazines, cosmic expectancy prevailed, no less potent than the ‘last days’ fury of the 1980’s independent conservatives. Although a closer textual inquiry is warranted, the developing attacks on ‘World Government’ were not dependent upon the chief theorists of the ‘old school’. This contrasted with The Strategy, which resurrected Ramsey and others from the LOR’s stable. Rather, the penchant for prophecy concerning the application of technology to social control (ID cards, surveillance, gun control, State armed violence), was more topical as well as proof of the elites’ malevolence. Although independent conservatives were constructively available for Extreme Right mobilization, they emerged from an anarchic milieu which regarded ‘organization’ as prime sin. The relationship over time must ultimately be viewed as fractured and sub-cultural.

Third: Constitutionalist theory was the core theme of the Conservative Right, possibly the explanative script for its activities. The conservative theory of the Constitutional Monarchical State may be given as: the Australian State is based on a Christian tridentine division of authority with Father-Son-Holy Ghost replicated in Monarch-Senate-House of Representatives; the Constitution does not mention parties only individual parliamentarians who should serve, and if are properly informed may serve, the elector’s will; defence of Constitutional government against centralist forces is an obligation, those enemies of freedom being socialism, communism and fascism; a Holy contract is sworn by the Monarch to provide limited government based on British constitutional enactments and Common Law; decentralized through the Governor-General, Governors, the states and so forth, this abstraction symbolised an Anglo-Australian politico-cultural identity with sovereign power diffused throughout the structure.[89]

In practice, such a doctrine composed by wartime Social Credit and United Electors’ groups,[90] and developed by the LOR and subsequent Conservative Right theorists, led to a defence of the governing system. The ‘theory’ was fairy-tale stuff, coloured by hagiography of the Royal Family and totemistic ‘worship’ of the Flag, the Constitution and colonial-British achievement.[91] Although the idea of limited government, glued together by pseudo-Christian myth, was not a fascist proposition, as Chapter Seven showed, populist-monarchists drew upon constitutionalist logic in arguing that the Monarch had become severed by the Australia Act (1986), from the exercise of State power; the ‘contract’ with State parties and institutions had therefore been broken. The development of parts of the Conservative Right corpus (the Common Law became the radical expression of popular rights; the Monarchy the depersonalized incarnation of the peoples’ will; the Constitution amended with CIR, a guarantee of popular-democratic government), and the presence of some common personnel, proved the organic bond.

Reasonably, the LOR, Constitutional Heritage Protection Society and other conservatives did not realize that their writings could eventually delegitimize State authority. In proclaiming the 1986 Australia Act a republican coup, they opened the way to a new radicalization. Notably, the long period of satellitization demonstrated the benign nature of Constitutionalist theory and that only under particular circumstances (the ‘independence’ of the Conservative Right after 1986-7), could it be adapted to Extreme Right experiments.

Fourth: Social Credit survived after 1945 in two streams, one under LOR auspices and the other, a fragmented network influenced by Dr. Bryan Monahan and rival Colin Barclay-Smith.[92] Butler effectively inherited the tradition, neutering it through his syntheses of Social Credit with British-Israel theology and imperial-patriotism[93], and his commitment to satellite anti-communism. ‘Social Credit’ became a programme for economic democracy to be implemented far into the chiliastic future, although the Country Party’s responses to rural crisis (1968-71) and Bjelke-Petersen’s ‘Petersen Plan’ (1974) were taken as signs of partial implementation.[94] As a doctrine suitable only for an Anglo-Saxon community with a monarchical constitution, it was integrated into a 1950’s/1970’s program which defended status quo political values and which necessarily frustrated any challenge to ‘conservative’ Establishment politics.[95]

By the 1980’s, ideas concerning money reform were perennial on the Australian Extreme Right. The ANM considered (erroneously), that Nazi Germany utilized Social Credit and adopted the term to describe its monetary policy. However, many rural groups, referred to ‘National Credit’, and used aspects of the ‘Money Power’ tradition in the labourist ideology and like Allan Jones, criticized Social Credit. The CAP desired debt-free credit and an internally-valued national currency. National Action’s Programme advocated the nationalization of the banks. Participant interviews revealed that many activists were aware of ‘Social Credit’ even if uncertain as to its precepts.

The wide diffusion of Social Credit/National Credit ideas, including also the 1990’s efforts of The Strategy (which pushed the native National Credit line), showed a certain sub-cultural success. Given the LOR’s longtime non-metropolitan propaganda efforts, it could be reasoned that ‘money-reform’ would figure in farmers’ protest groups. While the LOR rejected independent political action, this did not mean other conservatives or Extreme Right groups could not use the broad tradition for populist purposes.

This Section contests the ‘official theory’ of the Extreme Right. The LOR and the other conservative forces, had not ‘fathered’ the Extreme Right. The long period of Right satellitization (1945-75, but in Queensland until 1987), historically conditioned the conservative scripts, away from political activity and towards post-millenarianism, lobbyism and ‘educational’ work. There were other outcomes whereby the personal development of a particular leader, or cadre-group, or the availability of a clientele attuned to a certain rhetoric, could be conditioned by exposure to Conservative Right ideology. This was true in the case of the Confederate Action Party and we see traces of Conservative Right ideas in the programmes of groups as diverse as the ANM (Social Credit) and the Australian Community Movement (CIR). Other connections also exist at the fundamental base of what constitutes ‘Right’ values, as Section 4 investigates.

SECTION 4

THE AUSTRALIAN EXTREME RIGHT: PERSPECTIVES AND PROGRAMMES

This Section inquires first into those Extreme Right perspectives which shaped its politics, and then analyses the political programmes produced by this political family. As Part Two of this Thesis amplifies, the Extreme Right challenged the State vision of the national future: electorally, physically and hegemonically. The Extreme Right was never a contender for power but like the marxist Left of the period 1945-75, it was a type of part-underground, part sub-cultural force, seeking to break beyond the margins.

(a) Perspectives

Some reliance on the international literature was helpful in this discussion. Specifically, O’Maolain’s 1988 study set out a typology of some fifteen points. It included: an admiration of, or commitment to, violence as a political method; an authoritarian state and party; nationalism; white supremacism and/or opposition to immigration/miscegenation; Holocaust Revisionism; conspiratological criticism of international power elites (Jews, bankers, masons); defence of the patriarchal family and morality; rejection of class war; anti-communism directed at foreign governments and domestic parties; admiration of heroism, sacrifice, discipline, chivalry; rejection of free speech for the Left; construction of a genetically self-perpetuating new ruling elite; rejection of modern decadent society; the rescue of the nation from induced decline perpetrated by other nations or evil forces; a belief that the wrong side won the Second World War.[96]

O’Maolain seemed uncertain as to which of the typological points belonged to which of his three Right categories in number or emphasis. O’Maolain’s scientific detachment is questionable given the assistance rendered him by the disreputable Searchlight magazine. Was this typology shaped to keep the anti-racist/anti-fascist movement - barking? It is debatable whether it could have applied to the main 1980’s/1990’s forces of the Extreme Right. Objections abound in the cases of movements such as the French National Front, the German Republican Party and the GRECE to the propositions regarding white supremacism, ‘superior’ new ruling classes, the focus on the Left and the question concerning the Second World War.[97] In the Australian case, the populist ‘faces’ of the Extreme Right largely invalidated the typology. Perhaps only the ANM and other neo-nazi groups could fit O’Maolain’s structure with any congruity. Had the Right evolved?

Moore advanced a set of central Australian Right themes (Chapter Three).[98] This set bore similarity to O’Maolain’s system, a circumstance possibly linked to Moore’s acknowledgment to “Gerry Gable”,[99] prominent Searchlight identity. Moore’s contribution to the discussion lies in his view that the Australian Right was a deviation from official conservatism albeit with individual exceptions, with its occasional extremism as a potential-weapon to salvage capitalism or savage its enemies. This marxian position although undermined by the weight of empirical evidence, has rightly placed conservatism, and the State, into the foreground.

The ‘doctrinal’ principles of conservatism have been academically defined as a formula, not to protect a set status quo, but to develop a viable society. Conservatism reasons that God is the measure of value and religion is essential to society; classical philosophy and Judaeo-Christian ethics should guide reason; ideal visions for nations and peoples should be put aside in favour of order, custom and tradition, with empiricism and evolution better methods than revolution; the spiritual development of the person in a virtuous atmosphere of decentralized localism, community and family, builds for stability.[100]

Conservative ideology once served to defend ‘property’ against Red revolution; but after allowance is made for the guile which attended the exercise of power, the fundamentals of conservatism inspired Australia’s Menzies government.[101] The official conservatism of the State was endorsed by the satellites, which considered the British conservative tradition their core cultural heritage; but once a new liberal-internationalist ideology took charge in the State, the mutual-alienation of the true-believer satellites and the State, was inevitable. However, in the situation where the State’s symbolic arrangements (Monarchy, Parliament, States, Flag and Constitution) remained intact, the process of divorce was torturously prolonged.

The dependence of the Conservative Right upon the State introduced a structural-historical weakness into Australian Right politics. Seemingly, the ethereal elements of the Right (which allowed its enemies to coin the term ‘Lunar Right’) were ‘illusions’ meant to mobilize persons into a defence of the conservative State. Once this purpose was lost, the conservative milieu unravelled as the discussion of conspiratology showed, and as Chapter Seven affirmed in its analysis of conservative independence in-false-consciousness.

Interpretative confusion can be overcome. The Australian Conservative Right’s ideology (1945-1980’s) is defined as the combination of the conservative core-beliefs and the specific typology outlined in Section Three. This ideology was not congruent with O’Maolain’s typology, despite overlap. It was similar to Moore’s model, short of ‘authoritarian structures’ and any militancy implying violence (Moore had the paramilitaries in mind); however, because there were shared perspectives with the Extreme Right, there was a capacity to create confusion in the new forces. This showed in ICA/PCP’s insistence that it represented a true conservatism, Sisson’s NFA plan to politicize the Liberal-National ‘Right’, van Tongeren’s Right-regroupement project, the ‘tension’ between the CAP and rural radical-populists with the organized conservatives. The relationship should be defined as an historically conditioned problem of mobilization: some Extreme Right forces were ‘waiting’ for their ‘natural’ market to radicalize on their terms. Not until the birth of the One Nation Party, did this market mobilize - on its terms.

This Section shall make generalizations about Extreme Right ideology.

Classificatory inventiveness serves this analysis, which returns for thematic clarity to Chapter One’s discussion of Australian proto-fascism, native-fascism and the Conservative Right and Extreme Right defences of British-Australian identity. In the earlier periods, fundamental questions of Australian politics and heritage stood for resolution, setting style and problems for future movements. The discussion takes account of the history of the Satellite Right in defining ideological boundaries and themes which lie at the centre of debate on the Right. In developing a typology of themes, this Thesis will incorporate the effusive contributions of Australian Extreme Right ideologues into a form which gives both variations and common principles. This compilation demonstrates the utopian nature of ideology and the Extreme Right’s reliance upon myth.

(i) Whose Country? The Extreme Right has confronted the historical problem of Aboriginal dispossession. Generally, it has been unsympathetic. The NFA considered Aborigines “stone age”[102] and the CAP urged a single model-citizenship which rejected their separate legal identity.[103] The High Court of Australia’s legal activism in its ‘Mabo’ and ‘Wik’ decisions, deepened countryside opposition to Land Rights claims and intensified the CAP’s politics of opportunity.[104]

Radical-Nationalists invoked Stephensen and also lauded the Jindyworobaks’ attempt to engage with the Continent’s ancient history and people;[105] Graeme Campbell and AAFI warned of Aboriginal dispossession in an ‘Asian Australia’,[106] but this was a minoritarian view. There was a contradiction in many Extreme Right spokesmen: on the one hand, race was held as a defining quality of identity, but Aborigines were expected to be Australians ‘like everyone else’.[107]

The prior occupation of the Continent by Aborigines did not invalidate European occupation or violate the ‘legality’ of the Australian State. It followed that incipient ‘separatism’, criticized by the Conservative Right, was also condemned by most Extreme Right groups as an attempt to violate Australia’s indivisibility.

(ii) The Crisis. That Extreme Right communicators ‘predicted’ a national crisis, was inevitable. The marxist Left was once in the same position; vibrant sub-cultures with redemptive-historical messages can never win mass public sympathy without a political crisis.

The crisis was defined in catastrophic style. For Azzopardi, it was Australia’s mineral wealth and open-spaces, in a world where a scramble for territory and resources was driven by “the population food crisis”.[108] This theme was rebirthed by Joseph Smith who returned to Malthus, to reason the illegal/legal refugee and immigration pressures on Australia must increase.[109] The future involved the not implausible idea of “eco-refugees”[110] who would submit the Australian identity to effective genocide.

Themes of Asian military invasion ran through much of the Extreme Right’s theory and propaganda during 1975-95.[111] The Multi-Function Polis revived the idea of peaceful invasion and occupation, and immigration itself was characterized as the herald of civil war.[112] There were other crises visualized in the totalitarian aspirations of the ruling elites which would precipitate political crisis, confiscation of firearms and registration of citizens.[113] Economic collapse was another variant of crisis and this had immediacy in the rural distress of the 1980’s.[114]

The crisis mythos was continually reinvented as a motivational force, as sustenance for the activists and prophecy for the masses. The mythos says something of the Extreme Right’s self-perception(s). Either as rescuers of the nation from danger, or as revolutionaries who would use crisis to alter the political-social character of the State, participant cadres appreciated that their immediate fate was outside of mainstream political discussion; this last factor conditioned strategy/tactics.[115] Whereas the Radical-Nationalists pursued the counter-hegemony methods to locate a niche, other fractions fought for electoral and popular recognition and party building; still others moderated to win voter acceptance.

(iii) The Sovereign People. The Extreme Right’s literature and propaganda contained strong populist messages about sovereignty residing in the people, and the existence of an Australian social-contract (on immigration, protection and social justice) broken by either governments or the State.[116]

Historically, the Australian labour movement had supported CIR, Voters’ Veto and Recall and the defence-planning/Fortress-Australia idea of an ‘armed people’. In the study period, these principles passed ‘from Left to Right’. The principle of popular authority contained not an exaltation of the State, but a decentralist idea of the worth of local government and popular custom in the regulation of political life.[117] The sovereign people was on guard against the usurpation of power by undemocratic forces or elites. This populist notion took on new meaning as the Right adopted a particular ‘class war’ rhetoric expressive of a response to the internationalizing capitalist revolution.

The Radical-Nationalists, because of their historical reference points, could propagandize about the ‘have-nots’ marginalized by internationalization; some also alluded to class war as a justified strategy whereby the workers of all classes would fight the national struggle against the international capitalists.[118] A version of this idea appeared in the literature of the populist-monarchists and radical-populists. Here, the multinationals, the banks and the monopolies were in economic-conspiracy against the old middle class, skilled tradesman and the unionist.[119] These forces were justified to defend their interests. This redefinition of ‘class’ could only occur in a period of internationalization and with an impotent Left unable to propose policy or strategy.

The sovereign people was defined as the productive class and represented the real Australian. With these two attributes, this class was morally entitled to fight the parasitic-exploitive class of ‘anti-Australians’.

(iv) Race. First, the evidence did not support any claim that anti-semitism featured in Extreme Right ‘racial doctrine’. Other than the essentialist position of the neo-nazis, the Australian Extreme Right, while occasionally critical of individual Jews or the Jewish lobby groups, or Zionism, evinced no fundamental ideological concern with ‘the Jewish question’.[120]

Second, the evidence did not show that Extreme Right organizations preached the ‘racial superiority of the white race’. This Thesis cannot say (as in the case of anti-semitism) what any particular ideologist or activist might darkly believe; but judgement must be made on the material and on the public campaigning. Whether ‘soft’ ethnocentric, or ‘hard’ racial nationalist positions were taken,[121] race was held as a central element of Australian identity. The Extreme Right has used harsh language, referring to non-European immigrants as:

vanguard invaders; conquerors by stealth; the Chinese octopus (which pilloried drugs, vice and exploitation); economic crooks; cheap labour; cultural distorters; dangerous lobbies; disloyal; unclean and diseased; inscrutable; violent; those who would ‘outbreed’ the natives and displace them in jobs and educational institutions; overpopulators of vulnerable ecosystems; morally deficient or morally-politically superior.[122]

The florid language was probably an attempt to rationalize the irrational process of racial change.

Generally, it seems Extreme Right leaders had no objection to the presence of some non-Europeans in Australia, but contested the numbers and the ‘secret’ purpose of this immigration.[123] Yet it was also the case that culture, nationality and race were linked together. The movement was fighting against the “loss” of Australian heritage or culture.

(v) New Citizen. Extreme Right ideologists asserted that their social vision was one for a natural and moral order. Here, all three players on the tripartite paradigm agreed on the intrinsic worth of the family, of the feminine identity achieved in motherhood, and the natural character of heterosexual relationships.[124] The corollary was, that challenges to the family’s social viability, feminism and homosexuality, were anti-natural and immoral. There were arguments on the Right as to the position of these issues in public campaigning, and of the weight to be given to the equality of women.[125] However, the whole Right agreed as to the importance of ordering society to express these values.

These socially conservative principles underlaid the idea of a New Citizen. With sound moral grounding the citizen could be a healthy participatory democrat. The populist position argued that the New Citizen would exercise power directly, and otherwise through representatives amenable to the popular will.[126] Noticeably, Extreme Right literature criticized yesteryear fascism as dictatorship, and/or its ‘socialist’ method as the over-organization of the people;[127] the Extreme Right’s social model was one with power still limited by a monarch, or a constitution, or by cultural convention. Its criticism of fascism meant it disfavoured totalitarian or authoritarian models of government.

The Extreme Right’s New Citizen was a paler version of the Radical-Nationalists’ ‘New Man’. The literature refers to an idealized Australian type, where ‘mateship’, humour, resourcefulness and cynicism were born of isolation and the adversity of nation building.[128]

(vi) Faulted Century-Vision Splendid. The Extreme Right recognized itself as ‘nationalist’ and purported to articulate the Australian cultural identity. The ANZAC mythos, the Kokoda struggle, national-developmental achievements and a perception of Australian social equality and cultural singularity, were all aspects of an identity formed around war and positive symbols. Additionally: this identity should ‘continue’; it was under universal challenge; it was a community of experience of the living and the dead.[129]

The Extreme Right was saying that Australia was ‘neither British nor American’. Australia had outgrown both its colonial past and its civic anti-communist identity formed around the Cold War demands of the western alliance. The softer ethnocentric approach conceived that the society of 1966 was a worthy one, essentially Anglo-Celtic but adaptive to European migrant influences.[130]

There was the ‘vision splendid’ of an essentially ethnically homogenous country, a self-sufficient (environmentally sustainable) economy, politically engaging and personally relaxed order; the counter was the ‘faulted century’ whereby bewildering policies (immigration, industrial, social) had robbed the Citizen of his patrimony.[131] The idea of politico-cultural deprivation at the hands of ‘anti Australians’ was a powerful mobilizer.

(vii) Freedom Not Liberalism. The term ‘freedom movement’ favoured by many Extreme Right communicators, meant more than freedom from State over-regulation or internationalism. It was a development away from the Conservative Right’s ‘sovereign individual’ ideal towards a socially cohesive ideal of rights - to private property, family autonomy and political engagement; this formulation melded with commitments to community and country. Freedom was to be realized not as an individual thing, as much as a collective Australian experience.[132]

Inevitably, the Extreme Right condemned liberalism as an abstraction pitted against natural rules and responsibilities. Therefore, the breakdown of the family, homosexuality, pornography, the drug culture and crime were ascribed to a permissiveness born of liberal philosophy.[133]

For the Radical-Nationalists, liberalism was culture-disease, decadence of will and spirit; but they too shared the general Extreme Right positions on liberalism. Here, the Extreme Right was not opposed generally to freedom of speech for other opinions, although the Radical-Nationalists argued for the suppression of liberalism.[134] The Extreme Right’s appreciation of freedom was a moral goal worthy of the New Citizen.

(viii) The People’s Livelihood. The questions of class, power and economic security were within the Extreme Right’s populist scope. Given that the ‘productive class’ was disenfranchised, and its spokesmen were arguing for a type of nationalist class war, it is asked whether this was the rage of a declining social group, or an intellectual effort at grounding new ideas?

Certainly, the Extreme Right was nostalgic for the era of full employment, family farms, lower indebtedness and a national industrial base.[135] There was no opposition to trade unionism, and after the Fraser era few negative-references to industrial militancy. ‘Nostalgia’ for security did not involve the anti-Left politics of the conservative State.

There were arguments by Campbell, the RCSLP and the Radical-Nationalists that the free trade system could be opposed on the basis of national self-sufficiency, a theme which appeared in assorted documents of many groups in the study period.[136] There were generalized criticisms of international banking capital and the transnational corporations and references to green, sustainable growth and smaller business structures owned co-operatively. There were other statements favouring small business, tradesmen and the professions.[137] The Extreme Right produced limited economic analysis of the process of internationalization; but there was an extensive literature concerning money-reform which had immediacy for farmers, small-business and families (Chapter Eight).

Programmes may differ but the Australian future was to be one of class union founded upon a closed market organized co-operatively.

This description of Extreme Right core ideology showed that it was in juxtaposition to liberal State ideology and oriented towards Australia’s cultural, political and economic challenges. The typology expressed a call for Australian independence. While metapolitical argument is out of favour, there were general historical ideological continuities between the contemporary Extreme Right and the proto-fascist and nativist movements examined in Chapter One. The present vision was, by its espousal of ideas like those behind the ‘National Settlement’ (the core views of the Australian Natives’ Association), and the rigorous nationalism of its more thoroughgoing competition in the labour-nationalist-republican movement, clearly mobilizing the past to challenge the international capitalist State.[138] The discussions within sections of the Extreme Right showed knowledge of the previous traditions and a desire to wrap the contemporary Extreme Right discourse within the mantle of Australian past. This Thesis would conclude this was not camouflage but a recognition that the contemporary movement espoused a national populism in keeping with earlier movements, howsoever the different ideologists chose to define it.

The process of ideological production involved key figures who as authors, editors or communicators, styled their organizations. They are named as follows: for the Radical-Nationalists, there were Azzopardi, Saleam, Saunders, Donnini, Guild and Brander; for the neo-nazis, there were van Tongeren and Mladenovich; for the populist-monarchists, there were Jewell, Owen and Pitt; for the radical-populists, there were Campbell, McCormack, Spencer, Joseph Smith, Bryant and Provis. This Thesis recognized the importance of individual contribution in defining ‘doctrine’ (Section One), but there were also others cited in the text and footnotes.

Other participants, as activists or propagandists, established the parameters of each school, symbiotically lending the key ideologists their ‘authority’.

The extent of the Extreme Right’s ideological production went beyond the declamations of the key writers and the generalized typology articulated by them, and others. There were also other lesser or stagnant streams.

This analysis refers to two other descriptive issues. First, the Extreme Right was a sub-cultural force, meaning that all sorts of State-oppositional or cultural-alternative opinion could take refuge there. This field was vast. The author as a participant can testify that the available volume of Australian and foreign Right literature for adaptation would be beyond the intellectual assimilation of any single theorist. Thus, the variety of possible syntheses between any Right form and compatible historical, social or biological philosophy, was considerable. Available material included versions of Historical Revisonism, organic theories of Nationalism, historical and biological racial theory, existentialist philosophy, hard-green environmentalism and economics, political criticism of Australia’s Westminster democracy and geopolitical theory.[139]

It is certain that the prominent ideologists had diverse individual sources given many had formal educational training. It would be appropriate again to refer to the concept of ideological soup available to sustain new systems. There is no need to examine the precise roots of individual products outside of commentary passed in Part Two; that would take this Thesis into intellectual detective work irrelevant to the discussion of Extreme Right typology.

Second, there were ideological dead ends. The ‘abortive fascism’ of the National Front was one case. With its references to the “bulldog breed”, and plan for a middle class patriotism,[140] it failed to move beyond a propaganda grouplet. But it introduced the British NF and British neo-fascist materials to other Australians.

The neo-nazism of van Tongeren and Mladenovich demonstrated a slippery nature. It drew ideas from every Right category or typology. As a “force for moral regeneration”,[141] the ANM in its Education Policy spoke for “the British origins of Australian culture” against the “marxist plague” of internationalism.[142] The ANM also heroicised the labour-nationalist heritage in one document plagiarized from National Action.[143] While arguing for racial supremacy[144], van Tongeren also later constructed a sober analysis of immigration as the displacement of native-culture.[145] This neo-nazism, in line with its different strategies (Chapter Six), was looking for political openings and cannot be adequately placed upon the tripartite model. Australian neo-nazism’s capacity to distort themes for use, showed too in Mladenovich’s Caucasian Society, which wrote long pieces on the Vikings’ anti-Christian spirit and the Indo-European ‘racial soul’.[146] Radical-Nationalists also espoused an interest in the communalist traits of Indo-European society or its proclivity for the notion of the armed people,[147] but the reference was neither cultized nor a central ideological theme. Demonstrably, even a reference could be focused in different directions. It was because neo-nazism could mirror other parts of the Right that some commentators could be forgiven for believing that the Right was ‘tainted’ by that belief system. It was in fact - the other way around.

This Section now turns to discuss the programmes which rest upon the ideological base.

(b) Programmes

A political programme is more than a propagandistic wish-list, but a document which defines the ideological heritage and quality of an organization, and underpins its political strategy. The Extreme Right was replete with programmes. This sub-section refers to the programmes of the more prominent or typologically representative groups.[148]

The programmes examined are those issued by: the Progressive Conservative Party, National Front of Australia, Australian National Alliance, Australian National Action, Australian Populist Movement, Australian Nationalists Movement, Confederate Action Party, Australians Against Further Immigration, Advance Australia Party, Enterprise Freedom And Family, and Australian Community Movement. Other Extreme Right programmes shall be referred to; the programmes shall be occasionally contrasted with those of the LOR, NAA/Patriotic Lobby and the NSPA.

Extreme Right programmes demonstrate effort at policy formation. The genesis of each programme told a different story about the Extreme Right’s strategies.

The PCP programme relied heavily upon Hampel’s Conservative Party document, but included input from Clark and others. The PCP leadership wrote a programme pitched not only at those who were ‘nationalist’ and opposed to the Melbourne Club bourgeoisie, but to conservative Australians. Significantly, the PCP contested electorates which were held by Liberal representatives, and membership was a reflection of that orientation. The PCP’s ideological modification was that conservatism should be progressive; in the Extreme Right manner it would widen its base.

The NFA’s programme in calling for “closer political and economic co-operation with our kinfolk in the British Commonwealth”, restated the credo of the ‘British Brotherhood’ (1969); it recapitulated the National Australia Association objectives in this and other areas, so much so that the NFA document was probably plagiarised from the NAA programme. The strengthening of bonds with Britain, the continuing pre-occupation with the Left in the unions and universities, and cheap loans especially for newly marrieds, showed a programme formed to impress the satellite Right. The Commonwealth idea was carried on by the Patriotic Lobby and eventually by the LOR.[149]

The Australian National Alliance Manifesto (1978) authored by Azzopardi, while styled to impress the Right with its familiar references to debt free credit, anti-marxism and moral rebirth, possessed a nativist palingenetic anti-liberal thrust directed towards youth. It foreshadowed a scheme for a mass popular movement. Its ‘successor’, A Political Programme For Australian National Action (1983) drafted by a committee conscious of ANA’s failures, was to serve a “party of struggle”. Divided into sub-sections it covered general policy areas in point form. It was made an integral part of NA’s Constitution And Rules and was to serve organization-building. Modified over time by NA conferences, this document was dispersonal and held up to members as a declaration of intent and axis for propaganda.

The Australian Populist Manifesto was a booklet of some twenty-five pages, an argument against corporate and marxist “totalitarianism” nationally and internationally, and for a loose “movement” which would win independence. The argumentative environmentalist/anti-nuclear line had purposes related to target-market strategy as discussed in Chapter Five. Written by Donnini, it appeared personalist.

The Programme Of The Australian Nationalists Movement was intensely personal, a labour of van Tongeren and his brother. With references to “Eternal Laws Of Nature”, a “philosopher-historian” as president, “Roman Law” styled codes, “provinces” and “human genius”, it discussed “labour batallions” and then the “economic democracy” of “Social Credit”. This Programme validated the notion that Australian neo-nazism had the neo-ariosophical core, the German Nazi reference and assimilated some Australian Right ideas. The fantastic subjectivist programme tells that ANM would fall for The Turner Diaries to achieve its implementation.

The CAP’s A Promise To The People Of Australia, authored by Jewell, was broad in its sweep (Chapter Six). The grab-bag of points was integrated with an attempt at populist organization, and any lack of inter-connections could thence be ascribed to the intent to mobilize interest and social groups behind core principles. The Promise was the focus of intense intra-organizational loyalty and a yardstick of the CAP’s ‘honesty’.

The AAFI’s Manifesto (1989) was a well-composed critique of immigration, a statement developed from an earlier document (1988). It was directed at a more thoughtful audience. This surface-moderation in the discussion of immigration (Chapter Eight), was central to AAFI. This programme was provided to all members and media. It was impersonal in tone, although written by Dr Spencer and Robin Spencer.

The Advance Australia Party’s Platform And Policy (1994) expanded upon the documents of the RCSLP. This comprehensive document contained both the anti-deregulationist, pro-industrial protection aspects of Labor tradition, and the pro-family, firearms and anti-“political correctness” points then popular on the Extreme Right. A nationalist flavour pervaded it. The direction of the new group (Chapter Eight) led towards the idea of a broad Extreme Right front. The comprehensive nature of the document suggested the electoral road was favoured.

The EFF’s Statement Of Philosophy was written by Bryant and senior members. This programme was seemingly oriented towards the small business sector, and was libertarian in style. When the activism of EFF is also considered, this was a lure to a group previously the province of the New Right. Such ‘deviousness’ showed strategic acumen.

The ACM’s Policy Guidelines considered that Australia’s “decline” could be “traced directly to a lack of realism in Parliament”. This programme, written by Provis, was aimed at disgruntled voters who considered neither the major parties, nor the present parliamentary method, represented them. Its rural orientation and its CIR points were joined by unusual matter (for example, a plea for a French inquisitional justice system) which showed disquiet with conservatism. The document was employed to guide grassroots activism.

What did the programmes usually agree on?

First, all programmes (except EFF) expressed open or coded opposition to non-European immigration, multiculturalism and Asianization. Some contained statements about repatriation and sought the protection of the English language and Australian culture.

Second, the United Nations and other international organizations fared negatively.

Third, national defence was usually highlighted with assorted prescriptions to achieve security against external threats.

Fourth, various suggestions about cheap credit for consumer, family and business-government needs, were advanced.

Fifth, decentralization and increased power for local government were featured (supported by the NAA, LOR and NSPA).

What did the programmes usually disagree on?

First, the Radical-Nationalist documents were republican. The ANM programme concurred. Some programmes said nothing although were implicitly monarchist (NFA, CAP, EFF, ACM). The PCP and the Advance Australia Party were frankly monarchist, while AAFI implied nothing. The absence of programmatic frankness amidst sharp dividing lines indicated - an awareness of a changing national mood.

Second, the Radical-Nationalists and PCP favoured ‘conciliation’ with Aborigines (the NSPA had supported “separate development”) although ‘Land Rights’ were qualified by reference to Aboriginal ‘blood’ being a determining factor in Aboriginal political identity.

Third, foreign policy ideas varied. The Radical-Nationalists (and ANM) wanted independence of the three superpowers (1980’s). Foreign bases were opposed. The NA and CAP supported a Southern Hemispheric bloc. Nations or peoples which desired independence of oppressor states were to be encouraged (the NSPA agreed), whereas other programmes said nothing. The PCP, NFA, AAFI, EFF, CAP and ACM programmes neither said nor implied anything about American influence in Australia, but the Advance Australia Party decried “kowtowing to the United States”. The CAP and NA favoured close relations with New Zealand.

Fourth, the Radical-Nationalist programmes favoured a planned economy, and limited nationalization was to be encouraged (the NSPA agreed).

Some generalizations are possible. Each programme’s individuality arose from the interests of specific authors and/or their relationship to the typological school in which they moved. The personalist tones in some programmes tells us that the Extreme Right generally evoked intense feelings amongst participants who considered the international-capitalist revolution, subjectively offensive. Programmes expressed the search for political space and the effort to widen perceived markets; they were ‘positive’ documents with implied visions of renewal. The high degree of convergence strongly suggested that they were expressions of an ideological form divided only along the Extreme Right/Radical-Nationalist axis.

Reasonably, the programmes were taken seriously as vehicles for recruitment and propaganda. It must be concluded that they codified the Extreme Right typology advanced in this Section.

The historical long-view back to the 1919-45 and 1945-75 periods, confirmed that the Extreme Right formed a new position which revised much of the Right’s historical concerns. In the study period, the concern with the British heritage was essentially reduced to a mode of populist expression; opposition to communism faded away; a defence of capitalism was not considered without substantial qualification - or repudiated..

With the Extreme Right independent of the State, armed with the typology discussed in this Section and behaving like certain 1980’s/1990’s European movements (Chapters Seven and Eight), this Thesis reasons that it represented a national populist politics, similar to Radical-Nationalism typologically and progammatically, but divided at the level of myth, radical intent and political militancy. It was the dominant ideological form dwarfing neo-nazism and Radical-Nationalism.

CONCLUSION

Some Australian Extreme Right ideologists used compatible overseas material for justification and inspiration, but the focus was Australian. The universalization of ‘nationalist’ thought had an Australian application.

Neo-fascism was a modern palingenetic populist ultra-nationalism; its forms were such that it was critical of, and typologically deviant from, historical fascism. This analytical tool, when imposed upon the Radical-Nationalists, explained friendships with European movements generally understood as neo-fascist and it clarified the application of historical Australian racial-nationalist concerns. These descriptive processes allowed the differentiation of this family from neo-nazism, developing the typological and mythological definition of neo-nazism provided in Chapter Six.

Because the Radical-Nationalist category occupied the ‘extreme’ position on the tripartite paradigm, a yardstick to measure Right radicalization on the Right was available. This methodological tool was then applied into an Australian historical framework. Paradigmatic divisions were viewed as mythic and historical. The Radical-Nationalists represented a ‘reborn’ ideological statement of nativist identity; the Extreme Right category, a radicalization against State policy favouring an Australian identity and stability as it evolved under governments which subsequently broke their hypothesized ‘contract’ with Australians; the Conservative Right category a valuation of the ‘British’ State-symbolism of Old Australia. A genuine radicalization depended upon the intermediate category falling under the sway of the ‘extreme’ one. However, historical division continued to complement immediate political divergence and confirm the quiescence of the Conservative Right category which did nonetheless provide some recruits and tendentious ideological inspiration for particular Extreme Right manifestations (rural radical-populism and populist-monarchism).

The Extreme Right functioned as a political sub-culture with competing ideologists. This was implicit in the four-face typology. The segregated State-liberal discourse positioned the Extreme Right, defining its ideological-political-organizational function as one which was attempting ‘breakthrough’.

Two visions of Australia were in contestation. One was internationalist, economic and quintessentially liberal; the other was nationalist, populist and socially conservative. The mythic division between the Old Australian vision of Man and continental purpose, and the denationalized vision of a New World Order, was fundamental. From the corpus of theoretical literature came the mobilizing programmes.

The programmes of the Extreme Right had similarities and dissimilarities. There was a similar typology of immigration, guns, multiculturalism, CIR, cheap credit, the family, a self-sufficient defence system, independence from internationalist institutions and economic structures, and social-economic equality. There were dissimilarities on the republic, a planned economy and nationalization; foreign policy assumptions by some organizations produced system-alternatives such as a Southern Hemispheric bloc and support for national liberation, whereas others were silent.

The Extreme Right was divided courtesy of the four-face typology and a number of independent ideologists. The ideological variations had practical effect in the rationale of the programmes, whether electoral, counter-hegemonic or radical-action oriented constructions. While the core thematic and programmatic unities implied a populist impulse which bound the movements, other explanative and prescriptive material showed that the domination of one trend over the others was always problematical.

This Thesis rejects the liberal demonology imposed upon Extreme Right ideology and politics. Although the ideological corpus may be objectionable to its critics, it was not incipient right-wing Pol Pot-ism; but it is also clear that between State and Extreme Right ideology and politics was a chasm, and the victory of the latter would involve suppressive violence.

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[1] Kenneth Minogue, Alien Powers: The Pure Theory Of Ideology, London, 1985, p. 8.

[2] Kurt Mannheim, Ideology And Utopia, London, 1960, p. 176.

[3] Istvan Meszaros, The Power Of Ideology, London, 1989, p. 3.

[4] See: M. Seliger, Ideology And Politics, London, 1976; J. Plamanatz, Ideology, London, 1970; W.E. Connolly, The Term Of Political Discourse, Heath (Mass.), 1976.

[5] Norberto Bobbio, Left And Right: The Significance Of A Political Distinction, Cambridge, 1996, pp. 8-9, 46-47, 56.

[6] Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl Raab, The Politics Of Unreason: Right-Wing Extremism In America 1790-1970, New York, 1970, pp. 3-9.

[7] Andrew Moore, The Right Road?, pp. 2-5, 143.

[8] Graeme Campbell, Telephone Conversation, 1997; Dennis McCormack, Interview, 1996.

[9] “What Is Third Way?”, Third Way, No. 6, 1991, p.9.

[10] Roger Eatwell, “Neo-Fascism And The Right: Conceptual Conundrums?”, Unpublished Paper Presented At ‘Conference On The Radical Right In Western Europe’ 7-9 November 1991, pp. 2-3.

[11] Roger Griffin (ed.), International Fascism: Theories, Causes And The New Consensus, London, 1998, p. 246.

[12] Roger Griffin, The Nature Of Fascism, p. 172.

[13] Roger Griffin (ed.), International Fascism, pp. 242-246; Kurt Tauber, Beyond Eagle And Swastika, pp. 156-158, 205-250.

[14] Roger Eatwell, Fascism: A History, pp. 284-6; Martin Lee, The Beast Reawakens, pp. 171-183, 208-218; Thomas Sheehan, “Myth And Violence: The Fascism Of Julius Evola And Alain De Benoist”, Social Research, Vol. XLVIII, No. 1, Spring 1981, pp. 45-73, for the philosophic neo-fascist position on European ‘rebirth’; Alec Saunders, Nietzsche, The New Age And Ethical Socialism, Sydney, 1986, for a compendium of such ‘new’ arguments; Robert Steuckers, “Heidegger In Time And Place”, The Scorpion, No. 11, Spring 1987, pp. 29-31, on National Bolshevism, Conservative Revolution, National Revolution, as streams in the modern ‘neo-fascist’ melange.

[15] Francois Duprat, La Montee Du Nationalisme En Grande Bretagne, Le Trait, 1977, pp. 1-2, 33-35.

[16] Francois Duprat, L’Opposition Nationale En France De 1973 À 1974, Le Trait, 1975, pp. (i)-(ii), 22-25; Francois Duprat and Maurizio Cabona, Les Mouvements Nationalistes En Italie, Le Trait, 1976, pp. 18-26; Cahiers Europeens (Supplement Aux. No. 175), No. 8, passim; Roger Eatwell, Fascism: A History, pp. 285-6, concurred.

[17] Roger Griffin, The Nature Of Fascism, pp. 166-174; Roger Griffin (ed.), Fascism, pp. 311-316; Roger Eatwell, Fascism: A History, pp. 286-7; Stanley Payne, A History of Fascism 1914-1945, pp. 496-499; Walter Lacquer, Fascism, pp. 93-100. Note: the neo-nazis are exceptional here.

[18] Diethelm Prowe, “Classic Fascism And The New Radical Right”, in Roger Griffin (ed.), International Fascism, pp. 311-3.

[19] Andrew Moore, The Right Road?, p. 121.

[20] Jim Saleam, “Fascism, Neo-Fascism And Australian Nationalism”, Janus, No. 1, undated, 1983, pp. 4, 6.

[21] This discussion: Roger Griffin, The Nature of Fascism, pp. 146-7, 209-212, 219-221.

[22] “Quand On Veut Implanter Le PFN: Deux Exemples Concrets”, Initiative Nationale, No. 1, March 1975, p. 31; “Le Sens D’Un Congress”, Initiative Nationale, No. 12, November 1976, p. xv; “ MSI: 32 Ans De Combat”, Initiative Nationale, No. 26, July-August 1978, p. 22. Initiative represented the Party Of New Forces/Euro-Right bloc.

[23] Jim Saleam, “British Neo-Fascist Politics 1960-75”, pp. 43-45.

[24] ibid., p. 1; for Bardeche, see Chapter One.

[25] Michael Brander; Andrew Guild; Eugene Donnini; Jim Saleam, What Is To Be Done? p. (i). See book reviews of material from Jose Antonio Primo De Rivera and Corneiliu Codreanu in National Action News, No. 2, undated, p. 8 and No. 3, undated, p. 4.

[26] Andrew Moore, “Fascism Revived?: The Association Stands Guard 1947-52”, pp. 112-114, 118.

[27] Andrew Moore, The Right Road?, p. 139.

[28] “The Proposed Political Programme Of The National Socialist Party Of Australia”, in AA CRS A6119/89 Item 2246 (Edward Robert Cawthron); “Political Programme”, in AA CRS A6119/90 Item 2458 (Arthur Charles Smith, Volume 2).

[29] “The Leader Speaks”, in AA CRS A6122/48 Item 1925 (Political Parties - Oceana - Australian National Socialist Party, Volume 2).

[30] Arthur Smith.

[31] Andrew Moore, The Right Road?, p. 119.

[32] Boris Frankel, From The Prophets The Deserts Come, pp. 63-64.

[33] Hal Colebatch, “An Analysis Of Australian Reception Of Political Refugees”, p. 297. Colebatch described the two organizations as a single phenomenon.

[34] ibid. p. 298.

[35] ibid, p. 183.

[36] See this analysis in: An Asian Australia: Never, ANA poster, 1978; White Australia Or Asian Destiny, ANA leaflet, 1978.

[37] Ted Murphy, “Australian Fascism: The Politics Of The National Alliance”, Rabelais, Vol. 15, No. 8, pp. 7-10, passim.

[38] Manifesto Of The Australian National Alliance, broadsheet, 1978.

[39] Australian National Alliance Booklist, 1979.

[40] Andrew Patterson, The Fight For Australian Culture, Melbourne, pp. 7-8.

[41] Australian National Action, International Liaison File. This File contains correspondence from various persons/organizations directed to NA 1982-90.

[42] “Strong Showing For The Front National”, National Action News, No. 8, undated, p. 3; “Nationalist Electoral Advance In Germany, England”, National Action News, No. 13, undated, p. 3.

[43] B. Knight, Integral Nationalism: The Reborn Spirit Of The Australian People, Melbourne, 1995, pp. 9-10; “The Philosophic Basis Of The White Australia Policy: Geo-Politics”, The Attack, Vol. 4, No. 1, undated ANV bulletin, pp. 6-9.

[44] Dan Everest, “The Indigenous Australian”, The Australian Republican, December 1994, pp. 2-3.

[45] Jack Lang, White Australia Saved Australia, Melbourne, undated; Anon, The Roots Of Australian Nationalism: Eureka Stockade, Melbourne, undated; B. Knight, W.G. Spence: The Awakening Nation And The Trade Union Nationalist, Melbourne, 1995; B. Knight, Henry Lawson And An Australian National State, Melbourne, 1996; B. Knight, William Lane 1861-1917: Nationalism And The Labour Struggle, Melbourne, 1996. Alec Saunders, William Lane And His New Australia: An Introduction To Australian Socialism, Brisbane, 1985.

[46] “The Road To Nationhood”, Audacity, No. 6, undated, 1978, p. 6; “The Road To Nationhood, Part Two”, Audacity, No. 7, undated (1979), pp. 5, 6, 14; and latterly in “The Roots Of Australian Nationalism Part One: Eureka Stockade”, National Action News, No. 22, June-July 1995, p. 6; Multiculturalism: The Denigration Of Australia’s Unique Culture And Heritage, NRM leaflet, 1990; S. Lecosh, “The Menzies Debate”, The Australian Republican (an NRM bulletin), May 1995, pp. 5-6.

[47] Why Would Australian Youth Want To Join National Action?, NA leaflet, 1989; Jim Saleam, What Is To Be Done?, pp. 27-29, 32-33.

[48] Jim Saleam, What Is To Be Done? pp. 28-33; The Social And Economic Principles Of Australian Nativism/National Republicanism, NRM leaflet, 1990.

[49] The paradigm rests upon the narrative in Part Two.

[50] Roger Griffin, The Nature of Fascism, p. 25.

[51] Roger Griffin, “British Fascism: The Ugly Duckling”, in Mike Cronin (ed.), The Failure Of British Fascism, pp. 162-165. The logic of this section transposes onto succeeding sentences.

[52] B. Knight, Integral Nationalism, pp. 3-6, 10; Fight For Australia, Australian Populist Movement leaflet, 1985; The Green March, No. 1, March 1986, newspaper of Australian People’s Congress (successor to ANV), passim.

[53] Robert Menzies, Afternoon Light: Some Memories Of Men And Events, Ringwood, 1969, for a discussion of Liberal Party conservatism.

[54] Drawn from the subject material in: Conservative Booklist, LOR leaflet, 1980: Heritage And Conservative Books: Catalogue Of Books, Journals, Audio And Video Tapes, undated, Melbourne (probably 1992).

[55] Deborah Lipstadt, Denying The Holocaust: The Growing Assault On Truth And Memory, New York, 1993; Joel Hayward, “Holocaust Revisionism In New Zealand: The Thinking Man’s Anti-Semitism”, Without Prejudice, No. 4, December 1991, pp. 38-49. The riposte was also a vast subject. Historical Revision was criticized by Eberhard Jackel, David Irving’s Hitler: A Faulty History Dissected, Port Angeles, 1993.

[56] Roger Eatwell, “How To Revise History (And Influence People) Neo-Fascist Style”, in L. Cheles, R. Ferguson and M. Vaughan (eds), The Far Right in Western And Eastern Europe, pp. 316-7.

[57] Francis Parker Yockey, Imperium, pp. 533, 598-606.

[58] See: “Dossier Revisionnisme”, in Troisieme Voie, No. 11, Autumn 1986, in the context of the political line of this important European ‘revolutionary nationalist’ publication.

[59] William H. Schmaltz, Hate, pp. 49-50, 314-5, 338.

[60] David Cole, Untitled Video Recording, 1995. Cole was a Jewish activist in the Revisionist movement; Ditleib Felderer, Anne Frank’s Diary A Hoax, Torrance, 1979. Felderer, married to a Filipino, was a Swedish ‘bible researcher’. Several other examples including French Socialist Paul Rassinier, could be cited. Noam Chomsky has entertained ‘denial’ arguments.

[61] Hilary Rubinstein, “Early Manifestations Of Holocaust Denial In Australia”, Australian Jewish Historical Society Journal, Vol. XIV, November 1997, pp. 93-109, passim.

[62] AA CRS A6126/26 Item 1060 (Harold Brus).

[63] See: John Bennett’s Your Rights, throughout the 1980’s for argument about the public impact of his Revisionist campaign; the author holds Adelaide Institute, a photocopied bulletin produced by Dr Toben. Well written and documented, it would be a classic representative of ‘denial’ literature. Adelaide Institute promotes the principles of ‘free inquiry’, an idea doubtlessly derived of the fact that Dr Toben’s doctoral dissertation was composed about Karl Popper.

[64] See ANM poster, Media Cover Up: Holocaust A Lie: Seek The Truth, Julian Carloman, The Holocaust And The Myth Of Nazi Evil, Perth, 1985; sundry articles in The Nationalist, featured ‘Holocaust Denial’; Holocaust Is Six Million Lies, Skinhead poster, prob. 1990.

[65] Confidential. The persons who ascribed to this view were cautious as to be named regarding it.

[66] Members of the ‘NSDAP’ and some Skinheads; Sydney ANM; organizationally independent neo-nazis who attended LOR meetings or visited the NA bookshop in the hope it was a ‘neo-nazi’ installation. From this point of view, the moral rehabilitation of Nazism is not a factor in ‘Holocaust-denial’. Eatwell noted this in Britain (op.cit., pp. 309-310).

[67] Timothy W. Luke, “Memorializing Mass Murder: Entertainability At The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum”, Arena Journal, No. 6, 1996, pp. 123-143; the idea was confirmed generally by Isi Leibler, The Israel Diaspora Identity Crisis.

[68] See: Final Secret Of Pearl Harbour; This Difficult Individual: Ezra Pound; The Veale File; Falsehood In Wartime, and A.J.P. Taylor’s often abused The Origins Of The Second World War. The author has also seen ‘for sale’ in the LOR’s shops the works of Austin J. App, Admiral Sir Barry Domville and others which argue these themes. Many of the LOR’s books - like Leon Degrelle’s Hitler: Born At Versailles and Yockey’s Imperium - hardly favour the LOR’s sentimental Anglophilia and anti-fascism.

[69] “Eric Butler Joins Anglo-European Fellowship”, On Target, November 7 1986, p. 2.

[70] David Irving, Goebbels: Mastermind Of The Third Reich, London, 1996, pp. 414, 479, 486-7.

[71] Dr Stewart, comments on conspiratological research of ‘Centre For Conspiracy Studies’ of the University of Nottingham (U.K.), Lateline, ABC Television, May 13 1999.

[72] Richard Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style In American Politics (And Other Essays), New York, 1966, pp. 11, 26-7, 29, 31.

[73] Andrew Moore, The Right Road?, p. 3.

[74] Michael Barkun, Religion And The Racist Right, p. 251.

[75] Jim Saleam, “American Nazism In The Context Of The American Extreme Right”, pp. 246-252.

[76] Refer discussion of the LOR’s formative activism in Chapter Two; W.G. Selkirk, Wake Up Australia, Adelaide, undated, a popular British-Israel anti-marxist pamphlet; Butler’s early views and foundation principles, in Eric D. Butler, The Enemy Within The Empire, Melbourne, 1941; Jeremy Lee.

[77] The LOR used Anthony Sutton’s Wall Street And The Bolshevik Revolution and Wall Street And The Rise Of Hitler as the ‘rational’ anti-money perspective. This was balanced by Father Fahey’s Rulers Of Russia, Piers Compton’s The Broken Cross and Eric Butler’s Conspiracy Idea Throughout History, Video Recording, 1993; Eric D. Butler, “Zionism’s Grand Design”, The New Times, Vol. 51, No. 2, February 1987, pp. 1-5.

[78] Heritage And Conservative Books Price List 1994/5.

[79] Edward Azzopardi, “Capitalism: Enemy Of The West”, Audacity, No. 4, February-March 1978, pp. 4-6; Eugene Donnini, “Marxism: Reality And Myth Part One”, Audacity, No. 17, February-March 1983, p. 5; Eugene Donnini, “Marxism: Reality and Myth Part Two”, Audacity, No. 18, April-May 1983, p. 5; Eugene Donnini, “Corporate Capitalism In China”, Stockade, No. 2, Summer 1985-6, pp. 11-12.

[80] Ron Owen, “History Of The New World Order”, in Lock Stock And Barrel, Nos. 7-23, passim.

[81] “Book Review”, Lock, Stock And Barrel, No. 14, February-March 1994, pp. 44-5; for the importance of Dilling in the U.S./international conspiracy theory, see: Glen Jeansonne, Women Of The Far Right: The Mothers’ Movement And World War II, Chicago, 1996, pp. 10-28, 163-169.

[82] The Lima Declaration, CAP leaflet, 1992; CAP, Open Letter, directed to trades union secretaries, undated, pp. 4-5; see Section 4 discussion of these themes; Footnote 119; The Lima Declaration, EFF leaflet, 1992.

[83] Peter Coleman, “How Izzy Rules The Media”, The Nationalist Observer (Internal Members’ Bulletin Of The Australian Nationalists Movement), No. 1, March 1988, p. 4; Jack van Tongeren, “Towards Revolution”, The Nationalist, No. 25, October-November 1988, p. 2.

[84] See Douglas Reed, The Controversy of Zion, was a ‘classic’ of this school. Reed also (paradoxically) wrote favourably of Otto Strasser (The Prisoner Of Ottawa: Otto Strasser, London, 1953); Leslie Fry’s Waters Flowing Eastward, Zimmunism and William Still’s New World Order: Plans Of Secret Societies, argued this case. All texts were available in conservative bookshops.

[85] Frank Britton, Behind Marxism, no publisher’s details, in author’s possession. This book by the American Nationalist Party leader of the 1950’s, appeared on Heritage lists along with William Guy Carr’s Pawns In The Game, a book pushed by the Queensland LOR in the 1970’s.

[86] Walter Lacquer, “Fin De Siecle: Once More With Feeling”, Journal Of Contemporary History, Vol. 31, No. 1, February 1996, pp. 5-47, passim.

[87] Lists of early editions contents, see: Exposure, Vol. 5, No. 5, 1998-9, p. 66; Nexus, Vol. 4, No. 2, February-March 1997, p. 104.

[88] Dr Stewart.

[89] Drawn from: Arthur A. Chresby, The Father Of Lies, Brisbane, 1987 (distributed by CHPS); Eric Butler, The Essential Christian Heritage, passim; “A Great Christian Historian”, The New Times, Vol. 49, No. 4, April 1985, pp. 1-2; Edward Rock, Letter To James Saleam; Eric D. Butler, “While Farmers And Businessmen Slept”, The New Times, Vol. 34, No. 8, August 1986, p. 3; Eric D. Butler, Constitutional Barriers To Serfdom, passim; a general review of eight numbers of Heritage magazine 1975-84; Eric D. Butler, Centralization: The Policy Of Satanism; Arthur Chresby, Your Will Be Done; these fundamentals inspired Alan Gourley (Chapter Seven).

[90] From various documents in: AA CRS A6122/40 Item 1 Part 1 (Douglas Social Credit Movement And United Electors Of Australia And Electoral Campaign 1944-5); AA CRS A6122/40 Item 1 Part 2 (Douglas Social Credit Movement And United Electors Of Australia And Electoral Campaign 1937-1944).

[91] Drawn from a survey of Heritage, magazine 1976-80, a period wherein ‘Kerr’s coup’ was defended by the LOR.

[92] Colin Barclay-Smith, It’s Time They Knew, (2^nd edition), East Chatswood, 1967, one contribution to the post-war movement.

[93] Douglas implied these views. See: C.H. Douglas, The Monopoly Of Credit, London, 1979, pp. v, 10, 151; Butler’s contribution referred to in: Eric D. Butler, Advanced Social Credit School, 6 tapes, M.E.A. Tape Library production, undated (but 1970’s); Eric Butler, Social Credit And Christian Philosophy, no publication details.

[94] Jeremy Lee, Censored Economics: The Establishment Attempt To ‘Kill’ The ‘Petersen Plan’, Inglewood, 1976, passim.

[95] A conclusion drawn by an LOR appendix to its editions of Douglas’s works. See: “About The Author” in C.H. Douglas, Whose Service Is Perfect Freedom, Bullsbrook, 1983, pp. 81-85.

[96] C. O’Maolain, op.cit., p. viii.

[97] Harvey G. Simmons, The French National Front: The Extremist Challenge To Democracy, Boulder, 1996, pp. 221-3, 228-230, which while very critical, referred to the FN’s verbal positions that challenge these assumptions; “Le Systeme A Ruiner Les Peuples”, Elements, No. 85, Spring 1983, pp. 35-39 - just one example of GRECE’s racial position - and “Le MRAP Et La LICRA: D’Etranges Officines”, Elements, No. 15, February-March 1980, pp. 29-44 - on these themes; B. Westle and O. Niedermayer, “Contemporary Right-Wing Extremism In West Germany: The Republicans And Their Electorate”, European Journal Of Political Research, Vol. 22, No. 1, July 1992, pp. 83-100, indicated ambivalence in the definition of Republican ideology even for persons who share O’Maolain-like perspectives.

[98] Andrew Moore, The Right Road?, pp. 3-4, 11.

[99] ibid., p. vii.

[100] William R. Harbour, The Foundation Of Conservative Thought: An Anglo-American Tradition In Perspective, Notre Dame, 1982, pp. 2, 4-8.

[101] Judith Brett, Robert Menzies’ Forgotten People, Sydney, 1992, passim.

[102] The National Front: Objectives.

[103] A Promise To The People Of Australia; Policy Profile Of Some CAP Policies: Saving Australia For All Australians, CAP leaflet, 1994.

[104] See: Draft 1994-5 CAP programme documents, provided by Tom Little, in author’s possession. Little said these documents expressed CAP conference opinion; Dawn Brown.

[105] D. Merrett, “Forgotten Culture: The Jindys”, Audacity, No. 12, undated, p. 11; No Land Rights In Asian Australia, NA leaflet, undated; Jim Saleam, Address To Sydney Nationalists.

[106] Lionel Duncombe, Immigration And The Decline Of Democracy In Australia, pp. 21, 110 (this book distributed by AAFI); Graeme Campbell, Industry Policy: Directions For Growth, p. 2.

[107] This was chiefly the view of the rural populist groups. See: Saving Australia For All Australians, CAP leaflet, 1994; The Australians, Issue 2, election broadsheet, 1995, p. 5; Advance Australia Party: Platform And Policy, p. 32, Tony Pitt, Media Release: The Mabo Situation, June 16 1993.

[108] “Refugee Crisis Begins”, Advance, No. 4, January-February 1978, pp. 1-2; Edward Azzopardi, “It Begins!”, Audacity, No. 5, undated (1978), pp. 1-2; E. F. Azzopardi, “The Third Development Decade”, Audacity, No. 16, November 1982, pp. 4, 5, 7.

[109] Joseph Wayne Smith, The Remorseless Working Of Things, pp. 63-4.

[110] ibid., p. 70.

[111] Nicholas Lindeman, Japan Threat; Rosemary Sisson, “Invitation To Aggression”, Frontline, No. 18, November 1979, pp. 4-6; “Australia Imperilled”, Audacity, No. 6, undated, pp. 1-2; Australians Against Further Immigration, AAFI leaflet, undated; Timor Gap Treaty, CAP leaflet, undated.

[112] Multifunction Polis - The Japanese Colonisation Of Australia, NRM leaflet, 1992; “Alien Vanguard”, Frontline, No. 19, December 1979, pp. 2-3; Dennis McCormack, The Desirable Component Of Any Migrant Intake, p. 420; generally groups like ICA/PCP and CAP saw social divisions in multiculturalism; J. Saleam, Australia’s Road To National Revolution, pp. 1, 5, implied civil strife.

[113] “From Great Expectations To Reality: Republicanism Is Not A Game”, In The National Interest, No. 1, undated, p. 3; Chapter Six, Footnote 97; various posters, leaflets, stickers issued by the Australian Right To Bear Arms Association; The Constitutionalists, leaflet, 1995; New World Order, EFF leaflet, 1992.

[114] J. Saleam, Australia’s Road To National Revolution, p. 18; Chapter Eight’s discussion of the rural radical-populists; “Do You Want Higher Interest, Higher Inflation, Higher Taxes?”, Fight, No. 9, September 1993, p. 1.

[115] Drawn from the Activities Manual of the CAP; Joe Bryant, Fellow Australian, August 1987; Radical-Nationalist opinion was outlined in Anon, The Coming Struggle: Tasks For Australian Nationalists, Melbourne 1995 and Anon, Our Tasks; most interviewees appreciated their position was outside the mainstream.

[116] Joseph Wayne Smith, “Forward”, in John Tanton, Dennis McCormack and Joseph Wayne Smith (eds), Immigration And The Social Contract, pp. xiv-xvii; Jim Saleam, What Is To Be Done?, p. 31, referred directly to Social Contract theory; “A Confederate Action Party Credo”, in Confederate Action Party Constitution, Policy, Activities, Brisbane, 1994, pp. 22-3.

[117] In precisely these terms in, “A Confederate Action Party Credo”; Participation Not Representation, NA leaflet, 1988; National Republican Movement Programme; Australian People’s Congress leaflets dealing with people’s authority; see Chapter Eight discussions of the history of CIR agitation.

[118] Economic Chaos And The Depression Facing Rural Australians, NRM leaflet, 1991; Jim Saleam, What Is To Be Done?, pp. 30-31; “Australian Nationalism - A Class Basis?”, National Vanguard, No. 7, pp. 9-10; Anon, On Socialism And The National Struggle, pp. 9-11.

[119] Stand Up For Australia’s Middle Class, NRM leaflet, 1992; “Big Business And The Left”, Frontline, No. 13, June 1979, pp. 4-5; Anon, Letter To James Saleam, attached to CAP Questionnaires by CAP organizer; Confederate Action Party, Open Letter, to trade union organizations, January 5 1995.

[120] The discussion about Graeme Campbell/AAFI in Chapter Eight; “The Other Face Of Zionism”, Nationalist News (a Queensland NA newsletter), undated, unnumbered (but 1988), pp. 3-4, criticized Israel; “Paris Wailings”, Frontline, No. 33, February 1981, pp. 3-4, on Zionist infiltration of a Right group overseas; ‘The Australians’ obliquely questioned the extent of the Holocaust in one pamphlet - Vote 1 - The Australians, pamphlet, Belair (South Australia), 1995, p. 4. The evidence demonstrated Right reaction to Zionist criticism, but some a priori suspicion of Zionist motives.

[121] This relies on the narrative in Part Two which divided the populist typologies from Radical-Nationalism and neo-nazism; the NFA did argue a version of race supremacy. See: “Race: The Hallmark Of Destiny”, Frontline, No. 9, February 1979, pp. 3-5.

[122] From a survey of Viewpoint (Immigration Control Association) 1970-79; Jobs Not Refugees Campaign, ANA leaflet, 1979; “The Asian Invasion”, Frontline, No. 14, July 1979, pp. 1-3; Chapter Five on National Action’s campaign on overseas students; assorted stickers issued by White Australian Resistance 1993-5 on drug trafficking; The Bulletin’s ‘Chinese Octopus’ cartoon in Advance, No. 5, undated (but February 1988), p. 1; Ryan T. Jones, Mass Immigration: Undermining Australia’s Civilisation, undated, no publication details, covered these themes.

[123] Chris Steele, What Price Australians? The Racial Sell Off, Perth, 1985, passim; Dennis McCormack; Peter Krumins; Don Pinwell; even van Tongeren concurred. See: Jack van Tongeren, Crucial Issues For Australia, Perth, 1985, p. 6.

[124] For the Conservative Right,see: ephemera issued by Ladies In Line Against Communism (a LOR front) and Women Who Want To Be Women; For the Extreme Right, see: programmes of Australian Community Movement, Progressive Conservative Party, Advance Australia Party; For the Radical-Nationalists, see: Manifesto Of The Australian National Alliance.

[125] See internal debate in CAP over aggressive anti-homosexual material: Reg Murray and Robin Murray referring to John Jarvis, Letter to Tony Pitt, February 4 1994; the NFA criticized free-love, homosexuality in “Human Rights”, Frontline, No. 26, July 1980, pp. 1-2, but viewed it as fair comment; National Action’s campaign against the Reverend McMahon alienated the ANM (personal conversation with van Tongeren); A Political Programme For Australian National Action, referred to “a woman’s right to equality”.

[126] Refer citations in Chapters Seven and Eight on CIR/Voters Veto/Recall; A Political Programme For Australian National Action and the programmes of Australian Community Movement, Enterprise, Freedom and Family.

[127] B. Hall, “The Vision Splendid: Direct Democracy”, The Australian Republican, May 1993, pp. 11-12; photographs of Nazi leaders and victims in Fight/In The National Interest complemented by critical captions; Who’s For Gun Control?, Australian Right To Bear Arms Association poster, 1993; Ron Owen, “History Of The New World Order”; CAP Questionnaire (marked by author); some Radical-Nationalists were ambivalent about authoritarian force - Alec Saunders, Nietzsche, The New Age And Ethical Socialism, pp. 33-37, particularly when wielded over the ‘previous’ ruling class - Jim Saleam, The Nature Of State Power, pp. 10, 15.

[128] B. Knight, Integral Nationalism, p. 10; The Commonwealth State Order And The Decline Of Rural Australia, NRM leaflet, undated; Andrew Patterson, The Fight For Australian Culture, Melbourne, 1996, a recapitulation of Radical-Nationalist opinion, pp. 1-3; Ryan T. Jones, Mass Immigration: Undermining Australia’s Civilisation, pp. 6-8. Participants such as Dennis McCormack, Graeme Campbell and Tom Little described this view.

[129] The Roots Of Australian Nationalism: Eureka Stockade, Melbourne, undated (NRM pamphlet); Cameron McKenzie, The Menace Of Multiculturalism, pp. 7-9; Ian Hampel, concerning membership attitudes in the Immigration Control Association/Progressive Conservative Party; Chapter Eight’s discussion of the foundation of AAFI; CAP Questionnaires; the NFA’s view was of course thoroughly Anglocentric. See: “Euro-Nationalism Not For Us”, Frontline, No. 4, September 1978, pp. 1-3, an obvious criticism of other Extreme Right opinion.

[130] Dennis McCormack, The Grand Plan: Asianisation Of Australia: Race, Place And Power, Melbourne, 1996, p. 1, a pamphlet which summed up McCormack’s views; a review of Viewpoint where Anglo-Celtic/European input was seldom distinguished; Anon, Australian Nationalism Versus Anglo-Saxonism, Sydney, 1984, updated as John Croft, Australian Nationalism Vs Anglo-Saxonism, Melbourne, 1996, gave the Radical-Nationalist criticism of the ‘Anglo-Celtic’ position; refer membership data for RCSLP and CAP which indicated ‘European’ input into Extreme Right memberships.

[131] Anon, The Right To Freedom Of Expression And The Immigration Debate, Sydney, 1984; Cameron McKenzie, The Menace Of Multiculturalism, Melbourne, 1996; “The Road To Nationhood Part One”, Audacity, No. 6, p. 6 and “The Road To Nationhood Part Two”, Audacity, No. 7, pp. 5-6; Dr Dique, Immigration: The Quiet Invasion, Bullsbrook, 1985 (esp. pp. 164-166, concerning media assault on this patrimony) was popular on the Extreme Right also; Graeme Campbell, The Struggle For True Australian Indpendence, pp. 19, 21.

[132] Anon, Letter To James Saleam, September 13 1997, in reply to CAP Questionnaires; Ross Provis, on the Inverell Forum concept; An Introduction To Australia First, Kingaroy, 1996, pp. 1-4, summed-up this Extreme Right perspective; “All The Jazz”, Stockade, No. 2, Summer 1985-6, p. 3; Alec Saunders, The Social Revolutionary Nature Of Australian Nationalism, pp. 7, 42, on freedom being a tribalised notion.

[133] Untitled CAP leaflet, featuring homosexual acts with CAP logo and caption on government sponsorship of ‘gay groups’, 1993; The National Front Objectives; “Our Answer”, Bunyip Bulletin, Vol. 1, No. 6, p. 1, an indictment of pornographic homosexuality; the author had conversations with 1980’s Skinheads (Radical-Nationalists, neo-nazis and non-aligned) in these terms.

[134] Jim Saleam, The Nature Of State Power, pp. 14-15; The Constitution Of The Progressive Conservative Party, demanded “political liberty”; most political programmes were suspicious of media and information control; see Chapter Seven’s discussion of the populist-monarchist defence of Constitutional liberty.

[135] Turn Back The Clock, CAP leaflet, undated; “The Conservative Pastiche”, Audacity, No. 5, p. 6, referring to the Right; Graeme Campbell and Mark Uhlmann, Australia Betrayed: How Australian Democracy Has Been Undermined And Our Naïve Trust Betrayed. The subtitle argued the case; refer to Chapter Two for the attitude of Extreme Right groups towards Menzies-era stability.

[136] Graeme Campbell and Mark Uhlmann, Australia Betrayed, passim; Chapter Eight on RCSLP; “Confederate Action Party Of Australia Policy”, in Confederate Action Party of Australia Constitution, Policy Activities, pp. 18-19; “Save Our Industries”, The Australian Nationalist, No. 5, April 1991, pp. 1-2.

[137] CAP Questionnaires on banking system and free-trade; Dr G. Mosley, Autarky: The Foundation For An Ecologically Sustainable Organic Society, Melbourne, 1996 (a pamphlet popular in AESP); Allan Jones, Towards An Ecologically Sustainable Society, Melbourne, 1992; Joe Bryant, The Credit Note, Colyton, 1991 (this document reflected National Credit principles); A. Jones, The National Republican Bank, Melbourne, 1992; “The Confederate Action Party Of Australia Policy”, in Confederate Action Party Constitution, Policy Activities, pp. 12-13.

[138] This is said in similar terms in Dennis McCormack, The Desirable Component, p. 413; Jim Saleam, The Nature Of State Power In Australia, pp. 3, 17, referred to the survival of the National Settlement until the 1960’s; this idea seemed also implicit in Rex Connor’s attitude to the Labor Party (see Chapter Eight).

[139] Some examples may include material distributed by particular Right groups: Harrison Salisbury, The Coming War Between Russia And China, London, 1969; Dr G. Mosley, National Self-Sufficiency: Living Within Our Means: A Fundamental Solution To The Environmental Crisis, Melbourne, 1994; Ted Mack, The Farce Of Westminster Democracy, Melbourne, 1996 (reprint); Anon, The Scientific Basis Of Racial Nationalism, undated, no details, various distribution. See other citations.

[140] “The Bulldog Breed”, Frontline, No. 12, May 1979, pp. 1-3; “The Communist Menace”, Frontline, No. 23, April 1980, pp. 5-6, concerning legalist political change and the “communist menace”; “NF Past And Future”, Frontline, No. 37, June 1981, p. 2, on pressuring the Liberal Party; Frontline also reproduced Tyndall’s Spearhead pieces on how the Nazi party made use of ‘upper class’/middle class allies in its advance to power. See Frontline, No. 48, May 1982 and No. 47, June 1982.

[141] Jack van Tongeren, “To Australian Police”, The Nationalist, No. 26, December 1988-March 1989, p. 5.

[142] Australian Nationalists Movement: Education Policy, Perth, 1985, pp. 5, 10.

[143] Julian Carloman, The Myth Of Democracy: The Reality Of Plutocracy, Perth, 1986, pp. 10-11.

[144] Anon, Why I Am A Racist?, Perth, 1984. (This four-page pamphlet was authored by van Tongeren under the ‘Tides and Time’ logo.)

[145] Jack van Tongeren, Crucial Issues For Australia, Perth, 1985, passim.

[146] “Vikings”, Voice Of Truth Journal, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1986, pp. 1-11; Peter Stanbridge, “Odinism And The Old Religion”, Voice Of Truth Journal, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1987, pp. 1-6.

[147] James Saleam, The Ausralian State And The Australian Revolution: On National Democracy, Sydney, 1991, pp. 13-14; B. Hall, “The Vision Splendid”; Alec Saunders, The Social Revolutionary Nature of Australian Nationalism (2^nd edn), pp. 8, 11, 14.

[148] Because the Programmes are cited elsewhere, and discussed generally here, further citation will not occur. In this Section, footnotes will relate to other information.

[149] “What We Stand For”, Australia First, No. 12, May 1985, p. 12 (this publication represented the Patriotic Lobby); The Policy Of The Australian League Of Rights, LOR leaflet, possibly 1992.