PART III:

EXPLAINING ‘THE OTHER RADICALISM’

CHAPTER NINE

THE STATE AND THE EXTREME RIGHT

This Chapter has a theoretical and empirical aspect. The ‘rough beast’ Australian State[1] confronted the Extreme Right after 1975 just as it once aggressively confronted labour and the Left. This Chapter queries:

· Why did the State confront the Extreme Right?

· What was the State’s response?

· Did both sides delegitimize each other? With what results?

This Chapter utilizes academic and critical literature to provide a ‘working appreciation’ of the Australian State in the years 1975-95. This State differed in form from its predecessors described in Chapters One and Two; its ideological and practical liberal-internationalism caused it to develop a new power core which afforded no room for a Satellite Right arrangement.

This Chapter argues that the new State has not simply administered capitalism but rather has attempted to radically alter Australia’s demographic-cultural and economic-social terrain. Necessarily, it changed the political discourse, proscribing opinions which objectively denied the worth of the new order and creating for some power-core, allied and client groups, new sets of inspirational ‘visions’ and ‘illusions’. In this way, the Extreme Right could be marginalized and internationalist activism mobilized.

Justification was thence available to manage the Right by para-State and ‘legal’ action. This Chapter analyses this shadow contest which defines the Extreme Right as the ‘new radicalism’, and State measures as similar qualitatively to the anti-Left secret police and political-process activism of earlier periods.

It followed that liberal-internationalism could engage with the Left; this Chapter develops particular arguments on Left-satellitization and explains how the State reproduced the management-of-dissent conditions described in Chapter Two.

The Australian State experience with Extreme Right politics was not unlike the international experience. New forces of Extreme Right politics have progressively arisen in every western country; once some Right movements repudiated ‘anti-communism’ as the basis of activism in the 1970’s the chains which bound them to taking a side in East/West politics were broken, and the possibility of deeper radicalization actualized. These challenges were confronted. At several points, this Chapter detects an almost preventative strategy at work in State agencies, something certainly derived from overseas experience. The Extreme Right fought for political space; the State intended that it be denied.

1. THE INTERNATIONAL CAPITALIST STATE 1975-1995

The empirical evidence contained in Part Two of this Thesis indicated distance, not convergence, between the Extreme Right and the ideological and political structures of the Australian State 1975-95. The character of the State had changed from its form of the 1945-75 period. A new liberal-internationalist ideology was empowered: capitalism was building transnational political and economic structures; new social and political forces were being mobilized into a revised State power core bloc. These developments signified why the State confronted the ‘other radicalism’ and why the Extreme Right delegitimized the State or challenged State policies.

Linda Weiss has counselled against the idea that states are “powerless” in the face of “globalization”. Weiss reasoned that while any state is not a unified organization but a power exercised unevenly across policy areas, and given globalization of the economy was partial only, it was in tune with the evidence to conclude State measures existed to harmonize the internationalized and the ‘national’ economic components of the new order.[2] This cautious view of the actual impact of economic “globalization” upon various states, serves to base the idea that coercive state measures were everywhere necessary to realize the ‘Myth’. Catley has analysed Australian State 1980’s/1990’s actions conceived to “create a competitive market situation”.[3] Marquand continued this approach and concluded that state power was used in the ‘Anglo-American’-styled liberal states to “uproot collectivist values” and posit New Right values as expressive of higher State-interest.[4]

Undoubtedly, the Australian State was similar in construction to these ‘western’ states. It was a player in a constellation of states which ‘adhered’ to liberal-capitalist-internationalist ideology, and which acted in some degree of concert to further the development of a globalized marketplace. Demonstrably, the New World Order scheme was hardly the “world government” of Conservative Right propaganda, since many states remained outside the system. Nonetheless, within the ‘western’ bloc, a pervasive propaganda asserted that globalization would bring a political-economic nirvana, with established parties organized to best-manage the process.

An application of a marxist argument concerning the contemporary ‘western’ state, and an adaptation of the logic of Australia’s political-economy school to the characterization of the Australian State assists this Thesis to generalize a ‘working appreciation’ of the Australian State at this time.

The critical assessment of the Australian State as the executive of the comprador bourgeoisie allied to the transnational corporation, that “executive committee of the international bourgeoisie”,[5] might distort the precise relationship of the marketplace (global and national) and the state, but it does indicate the intertwining of the local and the international in the exercise of power. This interpretation would become more effective by restating basic marxist principle: that the modern state represented the congealed violence of the dominant class, a coercive and psychologically-manipulative ensemble of institutions and processes which combine to manufacture public consent.[6]

Some academic work about the Right, as quoted in this Thesis, has parodied the Imperial-State as hopelessly reactionary and the American client-State as conformity-at-home and support-for-imperialism-abroad. There is however, both academic silence and caution in determining where the impact of internationalism, the New World Order and the assorted implications in the breakdown of national boundaries, placed the Right on the political continuum.[7] After the period of Left-criticism of the Fraser government, the equally internationalist-capitalist Labor government defused the weakened Left; it blurred the nature of ideological contest, as it pursued a managed New Right agenda in social democratic language.[8] As Wheelwright noted, an opposition to “racism” was part of the transnational corporations’ programme,[9] and logically, economic internationalization and deregulation could be presented as stepping stones towards universalism. Nonetheless, a ‘Left-nationalism’ arose from the late 1970’s, organized around the political-economy group and residual Old Left activists. A ‘national’ interest was asserted as valid against economic-political internationalization. As Section Four further explains, the presence of the global vision in the transnationals’ political discourse disarmed and charmed the majority on the Left, those who thereafter analysed ‘Left-nationalism’ as Extreme Right in substance.[10]

Chapters One and Two described the essential characteristic of the Australian State during 1919-1975 as a certain inter-active dependency upon two dominant foreign powers: the British Empire and the United States of America. Each phase relied upon specific State power cores and an appropriate ideology: first, imperial-patriotism and then, democratic anti-communism. The State operated coercive auxiliaries and propaganda structures to achieve hegemony that the domestic capitalist order be preserved inside the prevailing international system. The progressive transformation of capitalism during the last two decades into a neo-Kautskyist ‘inter-imperialist’ system which favoured the transnational corporation and international bank, over national capital, had decided effects upon the conduct of Australian politics. Leslie Sklair described the new dynamic:

The transnational corporation is the most important institutional force for economic globalisation, the transnational capitalist class [TCC] for political globalisation and the culture-ideology of consumerism for cultural-ideological globalisation.[11]

Wheelwright had already discerned the impact of internationalizing capital upon Australia, as:

a kind of national disintegration … [the] … partial global integration of its advanced corporate sectors, hierarchical relationships within those sectors between metropolis and satellite …[12]

The class which sustained the emerging Australian (dis)order could also be described in a new way. Wheelwright identified a division of labour within the
class between a business and political elite.[13] Further, Sklair described the transnational capitalist class:

[it is] not made up of capitalists in the traditional marxist sense … Direct ownership of capital is no longer the exclusive criterion for serving the interests of capital.[14]

Its class ‘values’ were new. This class does not “identify with any foreign country or … the First World, or the white world or the western world …”; its interest was reconceptualized in the global capitalist system.[15] This Thesis would adopt Wheelwright’s description of this class: the executives of the transnational corporations and large domestic corporations and financial institutions; senior public servants particularly those in Defence, Foreign Affairs, Trade, Commerce, Science and security areas; mass media corporation owners and executives; some journalists; some professions with service roles; higher education staff and sections of the trades union bureaucracy.[16] An under-researched Australian example of this class defining itself, and acting for itself, could be the Committee For The Economic Development Of Australia. The CEDA’s forums, academic publications, foreign and ‘Australian’ corporate and executive memberships, and its ready access to political leaders who commission its documents and appear at its functions, sum to an effort to integrate the political and economic elites within the transnational capitalist class. The CEDA’s international focus and membership sought to manage Australian politics to realize the globalist myth.[17]

The Australian State during the period 1975-95 existed in a global environment underpinned by radical changes which can be described as: the continuing technological revolution; the increasing world population and resultant labour shifts via immigration into the ‘First World’; economic globalization; since the close of the 1980’s, the collapse of communism and the broker-role for the United States in the creation of the New World Order.[18] Over three decades, inter-connected and fundamental shifts in Australian State policy unfolded: the post-1966 destruction of the immigration-control aspect of the ‘National Settlement’ of 1901; Fraser’s putsch which favoured international capital and struck at labour; the Hawke government’s recognition of industrial protectionism’s limitations amidst the Asian economic ‘boom’ and the drive to locate Australia’s future within the Pacific Rim Economic Order.[19] To highlight these factors, the political-economy school warned by the end of the 1980’s of a new period for capitalism, in which the Asian ruling elites would play a major role; but for Australia, there would be the sale of national assets and businesses and Third World immigration which could create a cheap-labour underclass.[20] This prognostication followed upon the long-term forecast that Australia as “a valuable piece of real estate” governed by the “agents” of foreign capital and “cowed by security services”, could “degenerate into a form of sub-fascism.”[21] The aggressive character of Australian internationalist capitalism stands out very clearly. Its willingness to subvert constitutional process (1975), and its eventual use of the State’s coercive machinery to achieve the deregulation of the labour market and financial institutions, and to organize the rationalization of the rural economy, could be characterized as the practice of class war. That the process engendered countryside discontent and created pools of blue-collar and Old-Australian political-cultural alienation was the collateral damage which fueled the Extreme Right’s organizational efforts. There appears to be a dialectic in the inter-relationship.

How should the new State power-core be understood? Standard marxist analysis would re-identify the army, police, parliament, courts, para-State organs and the civil service.[22]. These structures function as institutions which empower, socialize and mobilize the human beings who staff them. However, the proposition of a ‘power core’, develops Weiss’s idea that a state is a power-across-policy-areas, into the notion that the writ of power is exercised also by the individual and organized members of the transnational capitalist class who manage aspects of the civil society. As veritable ‘representatives-on-mission’, class members when not serving directly in State institutions, manufacture capitalist ideological-political hegemony and otherwise regiment the population into the capitalist system.[23] Logically also, the power-core included not simply the class but other lesser State servants who willingly perform their integrated administrative function. Further, in a replication of conditions described in Chapter Two, a new system-loyal migrant sector, largely drawn from Asian countries in steadily increasing numbers, augmented the ranks of the transnational capitalist class, while simultaneously performing functions congenial to the internationalization of Australian capitalism. It followed too, that the party-system with its two minimally-differentiated machines working in tandem on ‘bipartisan’ issues, with a ‘rightist’ National Party to blunt conservative protest and a ‘leftist’ Australian Democrats party to subsume progressive-politics, brought other Australians into the power-core.

The reconstructed State remained secure and legitimated, but as previously, there were political and security fears. We now turn to the question of the liberal hegemony and how political space was denied to the Extreme Right.

2. THE POLITICS OF EXCLUSION: DENYING SPACE TO THE EXTREME RIGHT

This Thesis does not characterize the international capitalist State as ‘progressive’ or ‘reactionary’; but it was revolutionary in that it re-shaped the political dialogue, and set out to alter the sociological character of Australia, both to reflect its values and sustain its power. The Extreme Right therefore functioned in this period of decisive change. This Section argues that the Extreme Right was constrained in its quest for political space by a series of ideological, political and social obstacles which excluded it from the mainstream political debate.

As Chapter Two observed, the Fraser mobilization in 1975 made use of the Satellite Right and the new Extreme Right in the anti-Left struggle. From 1976, the non-European immigration intake and the Vietnamese refugee quota increased, and ‘multiculturalism’ became the official method for the management of racial-cultural change. Progressively, liberal politicians discussed the new national identity of the country as an Asian-Pacific one, and pushed immigration amidst economic deregulation and internationalization in order to demonstrate this commitment (1975-95). Whatever the degrees of opposition to State ‘race-policy’, reflected in ‘Opinion Polls’ and expert-criticism[24] at any point in the study period, there was evidence that the architects of the new order never intended to allow the public to freely choose the scope of any possible change.[25] It was to be imposed.

The issue of racial change has been stressed throughout this Thesis as the crucible for the reinvention of Australia. Certainly, the universalist vision of a multi-racial Australia, with citizenship contingent upon the recognition of the plural worth of individual cultural values and persons, has a particular compulsion; further, the idea extended to an ‘economic’ world without frontiers, trade barriers and chauvinisms, and perhaps peopled by a standardized human type, offered an utopian goal. Such a prophetic myth will inspire a negative political response, when recalcitrant forces (in this case the Extreme Right and a sullen section of the population), refuse to adopt its precepts.

The inter-relationship of state vision and Extreme Right resistance has been discussed in a way useful to the analysis of the hegemonic liberal project. The Sprinzak/Bjorgo “split-delegitimization” model of right-wing (usually neo-nazi) political violence inadvertently led to a model which clarified the exercise of liberal hegemony in the contemporary ‘western’ state.

Basically, Sprinzak conceived that Euro-American racist organizations opposed to the presence of non-white immigrants within European societies, found themselves ‘fighting’ “two opposing entities”, the illegitimate “alien” and the regime which was “primarily not challenged”, although it protects the “illegitimate community”;[26] but after the “regime involved has failed to support their platforms”, the state was delegitimized in an “uneven process”[27] in relation to the invader. Bjorgo concluded that the Right perceived the state as a multi-dimensional composite, ultimately merging government and liberal society as an amorphous enemy:

Table 9.1 The ‘Split Delegitimization’ Model[28]

	Government/Establishment Enemies	Non-Government/Non-Establishment Enemies
Ethnically in-group	Officials; Politicians; Journalists; Experts; Intellectuals	Communists; Anti-Racists; Leftists; Women Activists; Homosexuals; (Drug Addicts*)
Ethnically out-group	Jews; ‘Zionists’	Ethnic Minorities; Immigrants; Asylum Seekers; Muslims; ‘Foreigners’

This projection of the Right’s analysis, produced in an international theoretical journal which served security-services’ requirement and western state policy necessities, is re-interpreted as a distorted mirror projection of the exercise of liberal ideological hegemony.

The new Australian international capitalist State attempted a high degree of political-social integration. By simply recasting Table 9.1, a non-exhaustive but still descriptive, roll-call of activist State power core components, allies and clients, can be given:

Table 9.2 A Model For Liberal Hegemonic Action

	Government/Establishment Core Components	Non-Government/ Non-Establishment Allies And Clients
Ethnically in-group (Old Australians/Euro-migrants)	Officials; Politicians; Journalists; Experts; Intellectuals	Communists; Anti-Racists; Leftists; Women Activists; Homosexuals
Ethnically out-group	Jews; ‘Zionists’	Ethnic Minorities; Immigrants; Asylum Seekers; Muslims; ‘Foreigners’

The interest groups cited were equipped with specific agendas (as below) which sharpened the ideological contest with Old Australian cultural values. The Australian State by debate surrounding legislative enactments and via politicians’ statements, described the Right’s enemies in the terms of Table 9.1; the corollary was that the same forces could be assembled in the defence of the State (Table 9.2). A consistent liberal ideology sewed together the various fractions, whose collective behaviour might be labelled no less than the function of an Althusserian ‘Ideological State Apparatus’.

Cathcart’s indictment of “multiculturalism” as a State ideology which inspired a partitioned political discourse, is relevant to the present discussion.[29] Enforced in academic literature, political propaganda and in journalism, the new weapon was effective against the Extreme Right.

The liberal conceived himself as inclusive, tolerant, modern and successful. As a global citizen, the liberal saw nationality as an encumbrance and Australian history as a story of hatred, genocide and insularity. The “Nazi” genocide of Aborigines invalidated national sovereignty, and the future of Australia was both ‘Asian’ and part of a universal political system. Opponents of liberal ideas were denounced as racist, exclusivist, intolerant, hateful, backward, redneck ‘losers’, dangerous, neo-nazis, fearful, mistaken individuals, ‘blokey’ and anti-women/anti-gay, obscene, evil - and should be imprisoned.[30]

The irony which attached to the prescription is that the delegitimization of the anti-liberal (or non-liberal) view permitted only political closure. The dehumanization of the anti-liberal forces is no less potent than the thought-process of actual racists, although the protagonist of ‘anti-racism’ or ‘multiculturalism’ would not perceive it that way. The power of this discourse which was announcing the ‘superiority’ of ‘liberal man’, implied intellectual discipline. This brings forward the vexed issue of whether “the new class” was the articulator of liberal doctrine.

The conceptualization of the “new class” is contentious. Denounced as an “absolutely fictitious” descriptive label (by a self-interested multiculturalist),[31] the term was misused by Pauline Hanson to identify a caste of haters-of-the-masses akin to the Nietzschean intellectual leadership of historical fascism.[32] The “new class” has been given a paint-brushed characterization, as “a community of elite, professional and managerial (groups) … with little sense of civic or moral virtues … arrogant internationalists”.[33] In that vein, the term could apply to members of the transnational capitalist class who provide their intellectual or cultural talent, not capital, as the membership requirement of that entity. In the analysis developed by Katherine Betts, the focus was an intellectual elite which repositioned the immigration and Australian historical debates around an agenda shaped to achieve the shift in Australian demography and cultural-social values towards a cosmopolitan and liberal ‘de-genderfied’, ‘anti-racist’ and permissive order.[34] Max Teichmann has endorsed that criticism, arguing that the “new class” articulated in the 1980’s a new formula for a civic identity around sexual politics, “feminism, multiculturalism, the republic” and opposition to racism[35] - with the inference the “new class”, often involving former 1960’s Left militants, was not content to merely propagandize, but to act.[36] This argument was also contained in Michael Thompson’s analysis of Labor Party history, where these new middle class intellectuals and professionals were seen to have taken charge of a working man’s party to pursue these objectives.[37] Former advocate of Australia’s ‘Eurasianization’, Bill Hayden, has argued this case, and generally affirmed the contemporary influence of the ‘class’,[38] but suffered the inevitable vilification.[39]

However imprecise sociologically the “new class” idea may be,[40] the new middle class could be conceived as integrated at its ‘higher’ degrees into the power core, and otherwise as a key subordinate ally of the core bloc. The State was thus served by an ideological apparatus which as McGuinness concluded, had proclaimed its values universal and moral.[41] Through academic and professional inter-linkages, the “new class” had an ‘identity’ no less than the ‘forgotten people’ who served Menzies’s bourgeois ascendancy.

At a distance from the power-core, “new class” intellectuals could also connect with the marxist milieu. Criticism of the New Right’s multiracialist, but anglomorphic assimilationist vision of Australian cohesiveness, was expressed in a classic work written by academic multiculturalists including Bill Cope; the argument was for a “community without nation”, a stepping stone to a transnational identity.[42] This muddled vision which later won over most Australian political leaders, was acceptable to marxists. Indeed, in one example (among many) of career mapping, Cope was involved in 1988 with Chris Cuneen in the “socialist” Education Links, a network of teachers which tried to push “anti-racist education” in schools. This group focused on a history “revision” program to alter the language and content of the subject in school curricula.[43] Cuneen’s Faces of Hate, quoted elsewhere in this Thesis, bonded homosexuals, particular migrants, and the Jewish community as victims of hate crime, confirming the validity of the paradigm and the existence of the partitioned discourse.

Yet it was ‘on the ground’ that the battle to reshape Australia in the 1980’s and 1990’s was fought, where action occurred such that ‘Old-Australian’ cultural values and social norms were contested and overcome, although left to survive in social pockets.

This project to reshape Australian culture and society through a rewriting of the ‘racist’ historical past,[44] also meant that an emphasis would be placed upon ‘correct’ language and information as employed in higher education. It is reasonable to conclude through empirical observation, that the Extreme Right was shut out of the university environment with few academics or students active at all. Further, as the staff or advisers to State agencies including the Human Rights And Equal Opportunity Commission and ‘Anti Discrimination Boards’, “new class” theorists could guarantee that ‘Human Rights’ became the byword for the rights of those who were State allies and clients.

This Thesis does not differentiate in terms of practical effect the organizations of New Right thought and agitation, and the structures which in assorted ways proselytised for ‘anti racism’ and cosmopolitanism. The combination is understood here as hammer and anvil. The satellite idea of independently funded and staffed organizations, mobilizing new layers of people outside of the main parties, to sustain, defend and popularize the new order, is applicable.

First, groups such as the Institute of Public Policy, Sydney Institute, Tasmania Institute, Centre For Independent Studies, H.R. Nicholls Society, Council For The National Interest and Centre 2000, could be assessed as New Right forces which fought the 1980’s class war.[45] These satellites also misdirected into union-bashing some ‘populist’ forces, particularly in the countryside, which were open to Extreme Right recruitment (Chapter Eight). Their new value system based on economic rationalism and internationalism kept the loyalty of sections of the Liberal and National parties’ clientele which might have ‘radicalized’ earlier than they eventually did (Chapters Seven and Eight). The new contempt of the working class featured in a desire to increase Asian immigration because such people were ‘understood’ not to favour unionism.[46]

Second, the new ‘anti-racist’ satellites were active throughout the 1980’s and 1990’s as key structures which articulated internationalist ideology. When appropriate, these groups lobbied against the Extreme Right and were occasionally confrontational. As adept propagandists, the anti-racist satellites could ensnare the Extreme Right into media traps that exposed ‘racism’ and ‘neo-nazism’.[47] The cluster of anti-racist satellites included the Movement Against Fascism and Racism, Anti-Apartheid Movement, South African Support Campaign, Combined Unions Against Racism, Community Aid Abroad, People Against Racism, Campaign Against Racial Exploitation, Coalition For Multicultural And Democratic Rights, West Australians For Racial Equality, Community Alert Against Racism And Violence, and sundry anti-racist action groups. Particular ethnic leaderships and refugee advocacy agents also worked with these satellites.

The satellites of the international capitalist State varied in their specific programmes (as the satellites of the anti-communist State did). However, the combination of the politics of advantage and altruism was dynamic and showed in the pattern of State patronage of satellite action. For example, the New Right satellites were often led by persons who had links with the Liberal-National party leadership, while a group like Community Aid Abroad was patronised by Prime Minister Hawke. Anti-apartheid groups could liaise with the ANC and Pan-African Congress offices in Australia (which were encouraged by State foreign policy) and with security agencies. The circular linkages represented a degree of organization exercised against both the countryside and urban opposition to internationalization. Unions were broken, farms consolidated, and the multicultural system legitimated in action.

Beyond the satellite structures lay the State’s clients in the “new social movements”. First, this Thesis would suggest that the homosexual (‘gay’/lesbian) community, through its implicit challenge to Australia’s male culture (it is easy to agree with “new class” criticism that ‘mateship’ was a mythic sustained element of the archetypal ‘Australian character’), was a force apt to be used to support the liberal hegemony. The enemies of internationalist capitalism included the labour movement, the small farmer and small-business community, those social categories which generally posited heterosexual models of authority and family as normative social values. In the chaos of deregulation and economic internationalization, mass immigration and cultural change, a partial disintegration of old patterns of social order was as inevitable as the corollary: the reconstitution of bourgeois order on a new basis. There was nothing really ‘radical’ about homosexual conduct and as one major overseas study of the politics of this social movement noted, co-optation by the state occurred in several national cases.[48] While lip service was paid by the State parties to the ‘Australian family’, politicians courted these new clients from the early 1980’s, with ‘anti-discrimination’ legislation and other egalitarian enactments. The value of the new client force lay in the diffusion of tolerance as a social principle for an Australian ‘diversity’. The connection between this “social movement” and demographic-cultural change was set out by Kalantzis and Cope:

In a society with a post-nationalist sense of common purpose, all Australians need to know the processes of their moral and political becoming to be able to disentangle the multiple layers of their identities and political loyalties, and to be able to negotiate across boundaries: the boundaries of ethnicity and gender - of countries, the boundaries that divide the state from civil society.[49]

Second, this Thesis would refer to organized feminism, with its “new class” intervention, which corroded the ‘legitimacy’ of the Old Australian family and gender roles. Throughout the 1980’s period of the vaunted ‘political correctness’, feminists enjoyed some success in imposing semantic style upon political discussion in the public service, education institutions and the trade union environment.

Although weakened by the 1990’s, the campaign left residual formalised codes of behaviour within particular institutions. Basically, feminists maligned not only the traditional family, but also ‘male culture’, Australia’s white male historical mythology, while favouring the cult of childlessness in a manner P.R. Stephensen might have characterized as ‘decadence’. In establishing new family structures and new gender roles, the State was acquiring new clients who could reasonably oppose Right social values and extend the social principle of ‘tolerance’.

Third, this Thesis notes that the white-liberal component of the Land Rights movement played an ideological function in amassing new State clients. In the discourse about the proto-Nazi extermination of Aborigines, the incomplete legal claim of the State to its continental occupation and the plight of disadvantaged Aboriginal communities, ideological mechanisms were in place to delegitimize the European-Australian heritage. In what may ultimately pass as a fraud perpetrated against Aboriginal-Australia, intellectuals involved in the articulation of these ideological precepts (Andrew Markus, Colin Tatz, Brian Attwood, Robert Manne, Henry Reynolds and others)[50] refused by omission to address the future position of Aborigines in the Pacific Rim Economic Order. Yet all were strident supporters of non-European immigration which must eventually problematicize Aboriginal identity and Land Rights, no less than Asian capitalism’s demand for Australian natural resources. In the short-term however, and particularly in country areas, resentments did build from the 1980’s against both Land Rights activism, and against perceived Aboriginal privileges and welfare advantages, but this was balanced by the near-certainty that many Australians were neutralized against any movement which relied upon a Euro-racial description of Australian identity. The additional success of the inclusion of Aboriginal leadership structures in the multicultural system has shown that little awareness of racial change was present in the Aboriginal community. Generally, Extreme Right movements were neither interested in acquiring, nor able to affect, any Aboriginal interest. With the blunting of early New Right developmentalist criticism of Aboriginal land claims, the ‘de-regulated’ State could present itself as a moral actor in the resolution of those previous injustices grounded upon racist violence.

The sardonic achievement of an image of State moral rectitude could be viewed as partly contingent upon an activist media which took up the generalized theme of ‘tolerance’; but the media’s impact upon the Extreme Right’s potential was much wider.

As an essential aspect of research for this Thesis, the author asked participants in the Extreme Right movements for their subjective opinion of the media’s response to their efforts. Generally, all apprehended the power of the partitioned dialogue. For example, Michael Brander maintained that Adelaide’s Channel Seven had throughout the ‘Nineties pursued a vendetta against him, while newspapers would accuse National Action of neo-nazism, ‘hate’ or involvement in crime including even the 1995 desecration of Jewish graves in Adelaide. Denis McCormack described journalistic condescension and attempts to link AAFI with ‘extremism’. Tony Pitt wrote:

The mainstream media will publish nothing, or they will tell voters we are Nazi, Fascist, Red Neck, Right-wing, Radical Ratbags.[51]

The author can provide direct testimony.

Media bias was obvious in a secretly tape-recorded 1993 conversation between the author and Sydney television producer Howard Gipps. Gipps dismissed with laughter and dissimulation my vehement denial of his report of my ideological connection to neo-nazism.[52] The Press Council was as accommodating, dismissing a complaint of “criminal libel” made against the Daily Telegraph; it had said:

… Saleam is now out of jail and sources say National Action is once again gaining momentum. As the numbers grow, so will the violence.[53]

The author has met ‘professionally’ at least one hundred journalists; all but one were either aggressively or passively opposed to the views given. Similar hostility was aimed at the more credible Graeme Campbell who claimed that he was seldom reported accurately and often “connected” with extremists. As Chapter Eight observed, Jewish organizations and publicists were permitted to make regular media attacks upon Campbell, and they were not alone.

If the behaviour of media towards the Extreme Right in the period 1975-95 was unreasonable, media reaction to Pauline Hanson during 1996-98 was hysterical and abusive, which implied the existence of a long-standing bias against the Right.[54] Since the public’s perception of the Extreme Right was considerably reliant upon the media, a hostile media would serve to delimit progress. While interviewees could not have hoped to use media as an open platform, they were seldom treated with objectivity, a conclusion supported from the footnoted citations adduced in this Thesis.

Noam Chomsky posits that western states rarely murder dissenters, but delegitimize their views, ‘manufacturing consent’ through the media; he argues that western media markets politics as the actualisation of the democractic ethos and not as the protection of capitalist privilege.[55] Further, this Thesis accepts Marcuse’s logic that capitalist media merges ‘news’ and ‘advertising’ into an ideological product; and that capitalist advertising sells the virtues of the consumer system with its products.[56] R.W. Connell developed Marcuse’s principle, observing that Australian ‘conservatism’ tied its future to prosperity and progress. Its managers and staff were “political functionaries” who employed media in “regular processes”, “producing and reproducing an ideological interpretation of the world”. Connell’s discussion of “images” and “symbolic reassurances” promoted daily, remained appropriate.[57]

This Thesis has observed that within the study period Australian media produced certain messages and slogans which were staples for capitalist hegemony: the new power - ‘the world economy’; the farmers compelled-with-sadness to modernize; the non-European faces of commercial advertising; the out-of-step union militant forced to ‘accept’ the Accord-cum-rationalization; the heroic refugee and friendly/successful “Asian migrant”; the suburban consumerism yielded to lifestyle acquisition within the global market; the ‘loser’ who is left behind by change; the commoditization of sex where personal choices for happiness justified the mail-order-marriage-market, especially if the result could be ‘Eurasianization’.[58] It is clear that the Extreme Right did not have the material resources to compete with media misrepresentation of its ideas and the processes of information distribution and advertising which normalised the internationalist order. It might be hypothesized that only in the country environment could more personal modes of communication overcome this deficiency; in the city the only viable option was ‘political guerilla warfare’ and few took that road.

With the Extreme Right organizations excluded from mainstream academic and media discussion, there remained only the various modes of physical action and the electoral path. The Australian political party and electoral system is briefly mentioned here as an institutional block constructed against any form of anti-system politics. There have been exceptional victories whereby alternative ‘radical’ candidates defeated the two party catch-all candidates, or used the Senate’s proportional voting system to advantage.[59] However, within the study period (1975-95) only one Extreme Right candidate (Trevor Perrett of the CEC) achieved election to an Australian parliament (1988), while Graeme Campbell sat as ‘Labor’ until 1995. Despite extensive electoral campaigning, cynicism about politicians in the general community and some percentage point breakthroughs (CAP/AAFI), the Extreme Right was unable to “influence” the major parties which maintained a type of consensus politics and opposed Extreme Right themes. How these parties would have treated a major challenge was shown in their ultimate dealings with the One Nation Party: parliamentary shunning, preference swapping deals, political attack.[60] The parliamentary-election-quest engaged in by the Extreme Right ‘parties’ could be understood as a trap. This strategy generally demonstrated a failure to assess the essential obstacles which were standing in the path of a genuine political challenge. First, the capacity of the major parties to marginalize challenge, or through the National Party to cater to some ‘Right’ concerns, was a simple fact of political life. Second, while electoral action brought membership and publicity, it did not create organization which could contest the liberal hegemony and fight the State parties.

The inverted interpretation of the ‘split delegitimization’ paradigm described ‘Jews/Zionists’ and migrant groups as factors in the maintenance of the liberal hegemony. While the latter were by their very presence, a quality which could regulate personal conduct, familiarize Australians with ‘change’ and neutralize others from reactive politics, the leadership of Australian Jewry was a dynamic and forceful participant in liberal activism as Part Two of this Thesis has, at different points, described.

Although credible Jewish opinion has rated anti-semitism in Australia as “slight background noise”[61] and contended that some anti-Jewish activity was basically ordinary anti-social conduct,[62] the official Jewish attitude demanded constant attention to supposed anti-semitic incidents and political groups.[63] The Jewish leadership also focused on Israel-Palestine issues, Soviet anti-semitism and Jewish emigration rights, the 1980’s war-crimes legislation and anti-racial vilification legislation.[64] Further, by referring to the physical suffering of the European ‘Holocaust generation’, Zionists ensured that a moral impetus operated in the anti-racist discourse of Anti-Racial Vilification Legislation (ARVL).[65]

The Jewish leadership used a heavy-handed methods. In 1995, when Helen Demidenko (Darville) won an award for a novel which proclaimed the existence of a Jewish-Bolshevik nexus in the 1920’s/1930’s USSR, a media witchhunt was orchestrated, and critical books published to deny the existence of an utterly explicable historical fact.[66] It followed also that any ‘criticism’ of Jewish history or Zionist activism was racist and anti-semitic, and that all ‘racism’ was potentially anti-semitic.[67] It is uncertain if public opinion could appreciate the subtleties of these debates; hence the Zionist intervention in the articulation of liberal politics was always intimidatory.

The political, cultural and civil society blocks placed in the way of Extreme Right mobilization were not activated simply because the State power-core bloc and its allies and clients conceived that there was a political resistance of a threatening nature; but given that there was open public criticism of Old Australian cultural, trade union and ethnocentric attitudes, reasonably the international capitalist State considered that in the process of disintegration of the Old Australia, a ‘new normality’ hostile to any ‘nationalist’ opposition would indeed be constructed. The new degenderfied, sexually tolerant, multicultural-multiracial society expressed in practice the internationalist vision, and with the ‘rewriting of history’ and intensive media and satellite activism and propaganda, many (younger) Australians may have considered it the only conceivable society. With the promise and partial delivery of a ‘consumer heaven’, albeit one paid for by a deregulated labour market and free trade, any economic grievance which might have translated into dissent, was the province of minorities. The Extreme Right could scarcely locate political space which was not being perpetually encroached upon. Nonetheless, there were potential threats to the capitalist revolution which merited a para-State response.

3. POLITICAL POLICE AND POLITICAL PROCESS

(a) Background

Para-State intervention against the Australian Extreme Right was an emotional subject for those who claimed to be victims and something vexing for academic and critical literature. Jenny Hocking’s work on the “Australian security state” reasonably described “terrorism masquerading as counter-terrorism”, an ideology and practice at State command, ready for use against disfavoured political ideas;[68] but nowhere was there any analysis of Extreme Right ‘violence’ and para-State response. This omission was at least addressed by McKnight, who noted that the “racist and violent Right” had become ASIO’s chief concern by the 1990’s.[69] Meantime, Moore seemed uncertain of whether Extreme Right counter-allegations of para-State illegality directed at prominent groups, were accurate;[70] Greason merely scoffed.[71] The place of a political police amidst the mechanisms of the ‘anti-racist State’ would be taboo for many scholars and commentators who essentially approve of the disruption of ‘nationalist’ forces which oppose the liberal vision.

The evidence advanced in Part Two indicated that after 1975, security agencies maintained a watching brief on the Extreme Right, with some active forays such as infiltration of the Australian National Alliance, the Cameron operation and arrests of activists throughout the 1980’s. Certainly, the Extreme Right warranted surveillance. For example, Pash’s Libyan adventures led to contacts with radical Aborigines,[72] precisely when Gaddafi’s Vanuatu diplomacy drew condemnation from Foreign Affairs Deputy-Secretary, David Sadleir (later Director-General of ASIO).[73] ASIO fears of incipient violence were enhanced by National Action’s early clashes with opponents (1984-5), and its ‘provocative’ propaganda materials which cited the ‘anti-Australian State’ for its use of violence, and the necessity of a counter-strategy of ‘political struggle’ to achieve “independence”.[74]

The late 1980’s change in ASIO from a ‘watchdog brief’ to a ‘suppression operation’ is discussed here, albeit with some limitations. There are no admissions from ASIO that a new ‘Operation Whip’ was underway, nor any exact statement concerning the strategy and tactics employed against target groups. Therefore, it is necessary to survey what was done to infer the existence of those mechanisms required to achieve the results.

With the termination of the Queensland Satellite Right arrangement (1987-8) which foreshadowed radicalization, the ANM’s propaganda drives that caused community tension, National Action’s ‘political guerilla war’, and the emergence of violence-cells, ASIO reported in 1989:

… domestic groups on the extreme-right have shown a clear potential to cause distress to sections of the Australian community and perhaps threaten life.[75]

Security concerns connected with, and reflected, other interests. As Chapters Five and Six noted, ‘racist organizations’ were conceived by business/political leaders as a threat to the Asian market. Further, liberal groups had pushed for ‘anti-racial vilification legislation’ (ARVL) continually after 1975, with a plan in 1984 for a tribunal with powers to imprison anti-immigration activists,[76] and finally they organized the 1988-91 National Inquiry Into Racist Violence. What changed in the 1988-89 period was the development of political will to cripple ‘disruptive’ organizations.

Historically, the Australian State has quashed threats to the established order. From the 1891 trial of the Queensland strikers,[77] the 1917 trial of syndicalist militants and the perjured informer evidence which caused the 1942 internment of Australia First members,[78] to the more sophisticated processes of Royal Commissions into Communism (1949-50) and Espionage (1954-5), a pattern of the ‘political show trial’ was set. More recently, the Ananda Marga Trial (1979), the Croatian Six Trial (1980), the Royal Commission into the BLF (1981-2) and the Hilton Bomb process (1989-91), showed themselves as State attempts to achieve political and propaganda victories over targeted villains[79] - and occasionally such that State crime could be concealed.

Security service intervention against overseas Extreme Right activism was established in the Canadian case[80]; British scholarship has used the term management for historical and contemporary phenomena in that country;[81] America’s FBI dirty-tricks harassments of the Extreme Right, are near-legendary. The Australian case also involved specific legislation, informers and disruptions; but additionally, the Extreme Right was to be delegitimized through terrorism trials (“operational success”), ‘managed’ by imprisoning prominent activists and thereafter monitored by Human Rights agencies responsible for the creation of an ‘anti-racist’ institutional and cultural environment.

(b) The National Action Trials 1989-95

The New South Wales government, after receiving various deputations from anti-racists who purported to be the victims of violence (November - December 1988), referred to Special Branch (SB) the task of investigation and prosecution of National Action. This corrupt agency[82] was ideally suited to co-operate with ASIO in a suppression operation. Upon Mark Findlay’s analysis, SB was:

… unique within the state’s sphere of social regulation … its potential to achieve an orchestrated ideological victory in terms of a particular police investigation is significant … an essential conduit through which the ‘independent’ process of political intelligence is advanced.[83]

Neville Ireland, who figured in the Ananda Marga affair, and who was SB’s ‘ASIO-liaison’, was an appropriate agent to conduct a twilight war with National Action.

Between April and October 1989, Ireland brought numerous charges against NA members, the centrepiece being the Funde prosecution against Frost, Michael George White, Saleam and Smith (Chapter Five). Statements taken from Frost and White alleged that Saleam and Smith gave them a shotgun, and the order, to discharge the weapon at Funde’s home. The latter were charged on October 13 1989, co-incidently perhaps, some four weeks after Foreign Minister Gareth Evans hosted African National Congress representatives in Sydney.[84] Ultimately, at Saleam’s sentencing in May 1991, the trial judge referred to “a naked act of terrorism conceived in the mind of the prisoner”.[85]

The convictions rested upon the uncorroborated ‘accomplice’ evidence of Frost and White; there was no scientific, confessional or independent evidence corroborative of guilt and a number of defence witnesses who denied the prosecution case. A full analysis of the trial evidence prepared by the author for pardon-proceedings in the NSW Supreme Court,[86] highlighted the pandemic contradiction in the evidence of Frost and White (which indicated that these actual offenders had falsely accused others under pressure), and the extreme likelihood that the convictions resulted from Special Branch’s receipt of intelligence from ASIO, courtesy of a transmitting device in the author’s office. This unique circumstance permitted Special Branch to build on this intelligence and anticipate the defence’s legal strategy and achieve a singular coup: the harassment and discrediting of a crucial ‘surprise’ defence witness, a friend of Frost who disputed his allegation that Saleam and Smith were involved in the crime. In fantastic style, the witness was harassed for weeks by telephone, and finally, illegally detained by anonymous men on the day he was due to give evidence. After this, the prosecutor addressed the jury, saying it was Saleam who was intimidating his own witness to testify falsely. Only after the trial was it learned thanks to public proceedings against Whitehouse (Chapter Five), that ASIO at least, would have known about this witness. Special Branch became a suspect in this case of witness-tampering.

The Crown submissions on the Saleam Appeal (1993) rejected the notion of security services’ conspiracy, accusing the author of “an obsession with spies and spying”.[87] The Crown argued that because the defence had presented evidence to the jury concerning the harassment of the ‘surprise’ witness, and that the strategy of accusing police with then-minimal information had backfired, the convictions were sound - regardless of new information on offer. The rules of adversary procedure proclaimed jury-prejudice a “consequence” of a “deliberate” decision. The appellate court agreed.[88] It refused Orders to compel ASIO to disclose all taped material and what was done with it.

The intensity of Special Branch’s methods crystallized in Ireland’s dealings with ‘Catherine’, who in fifty meetings in 1989-90, provided Ireland with detailed intelligence on NA’s attempts to avoid ‘suppression’; but ‘Catherine’ was quirky, and the victim of a disorder which manifested in dual personality, and often misled Ireland, providing false information and tipping off National Action to Special Branch monitoring. Ireland intended to use ‘Catherine’ in a terrorism show-trial of about ten NA members which would be, according to the former, “bigger than the ANM case”.[89] Although the Director of Public Prosecutions gave him advice in August 1990, the mass-arrests did not eventuate; the mercurial ‘Catherine’ who refused to perjure, changed sides.

While ASIO ‘intelligence’ seemed ultimately decisive in the Saleam prosecution, the rough boot of Special Branch was condoned by the reticence of State agencies and courts to cause any investigation into NA’s allegations of conspiracy. The ideological victory over National Action was seemingly significant to State requirement and the development of para-State programs for the defeat of ‘future’ Extreme Right efforts.

The subsequent discrediting of Ireland/Special Branch by a Royal Commission, does not mean the ‘terrorism’ verdict against National Action will be surrendered.

(c) The ANM Trial 1989-90

The basis for the arrests of the ANM leaders in 1989 has been described in Chapter Six. Although the trial process showed that those convicted were guilty of criminal acts, the State proclaimed them terrorists. The sentencing judge summed the offences together (and a further ‘political’ offence of conspiracy to drive Asian persons from Western Australia) and described them as a “terrorist campaign”.[90]

The Prosecutor, Graeme Scott (later a Supreme Court Justice), used his ‘terrorism’ line to win draconian penalties. To succeed in producing this outcome, the ingredients of a political trial had to be, and were, manifest: the compliant media’s denunciations of the accused;[91] the attribution of svengali qualities to van Tongeren; sensational recorded evidence added to by uncorroborated oral material from Willey; the publicised ‘cleverness’ of the watchful State cutting into the fabric of neo-nazism, racial violence and secret cells; a secured courtroom; a refusal to grant legal aid (other than in the advent of guilty pleas); and Willey’s indemnity, granted despite his role as a substantive offender.[92]

To prove terrorism, the State alleged the following[93]:

· ANM had a para-military section - the Australian Aryan Army,

· a specifically constructed ‘training camp’ existed at Bindoon,

· paramilitary training took place at that property.

But the accused were not charged with operating a paramilitary organization, nor with the Commonwealth Crimes Act offence of “levy war against the Commonwealth”. No evidence other than Willey’s testimony ever established the existence of any ‘Army’.[94] Evidence given by Willey and the police regarding the supposed use of a “watchtower”, “bunker” and “firing range”, has been demolished by a detailed description of the Bindoon site in material published by van Tongeren.[95] Verisimilitude is lent to his claim of the property’s innocuous nature, by the refusal of the trial judge, the appellate court, and the W.A. Attorney General to inspect the property.[96] Then in 1992, the trial judge in another ancillary judgement, ruled the property might not have been a camp.[97] Other than occasional firearm discharge, no evidence of paramilitary training has been adduced outside of Willey’s oral evidence. Suspicion hangs over this material when perjury prosecutions brought by van Tongeren against Willey and police about this issue, were quashed by the Director of Public Prosecutions in 1992.[98]

Was the ANM campaign ‘terrorist’? The arsons, and the one bombing carried out by Willey, were all of free standing, unoccupied properties well distant from other property and persons. Certainly, the Court of Criminal Appeal upheld trial decisions, proclaiming terrorism as “force and violence to intimidate”,[99] that loose idea of “politically motivated violence” (PMV) advanced by ASIO. However, terrorism is defined in the academic literature as a program of violence which involves killing, or the reckless endangerment of people, organized provocation and symbolic violence, which altogether terrorize the society.[100] By confusing terrorism with PMV and relying upon unsubstantiated evidence, the court system has acceded to ASIO’s self-interested security program.

The script directed at this proclaimed “dangerous”[101] organization - and bearing in mind the strong suspicion of ASIO’s ‘foreknowledge’ of ANM’s ongoing campaign (Chapter Six) - suggests an ASIO strategy to stigmatize ‘anti-Asia’ political causes as terrorism and neo-nazism and to intimidate opposition that it conform with State policy. This was a rewarding strategy. Whereas any Commission of Inquiry would establish that ANM’s actual deeds and Turner Diaries scheme fell short of terrorism, there is no State interest in that, leaving van Tongeren a de facto political prisoner.

(d) ‘Anti-Racist McCarthyism’

The Commonwealth Attorney General’s Department said of the 1994-5 ARVL proposal, and the National Inquiry Into Racist Violence (NIIRV):

The legislation largely stems from the findings and recommendations of … [the NIIRV] … [and] … was motivated by a widespread community perception that racist attacks … were on the increase. During 1988, a number of church and community leaders and other prominent anti-racists were subjected to … a well organised campaign to intimidate and deter them.[102]

Curiously, an inquiry into racist violence was predicated upon claims of violence directed at Australian ‘church and community’ liberals. The Inquiry’s Report confirmed that these liberals lobbied to establish it, and gave evidence before it. The Race Discrimination Commissioner, Irene Moss, chaired the Inquiry. Moss, a Chinese woman married to a banker, was a public supporter of ARVL and ‘anti-racism’; she later wrote approvingly of “a broad Asianising of Australia as we recognize that our future lies in Asia”.[103] Deputy Commissioner Ron Castan, was more brazen; he ‘predicted’ the Inquiry’s results in Australia-Israel Review[104], eighteen months before the Report was issued.

Pierre James commented upon the simultaneous push for ARVL in Western Australia:

… the Law Reform Commission of WA was asked by the Attorney-General in November 1988 to investigate possible changes to the law … to deter acts which incite racial hatred. This was in response to the activities of the Australian Nationalists Movement … a very important aspect of ARVL is its symbolism … a direct attack on racist organisations … [designed to] … create a social norm which … most people will conform to.[105]

Moss’s Inquiry, the Western Australian proposals, the passage of ARVL in the New South Wales Parliament in 1989, ASIO’s public statements and NSW Special Branch actions, showed a pattern of State response to Extreme Right militancy.[106] Inquiry witnesses and officers played roles similar in function to the former Commissions into Communism and Espionage, whereby the McCarthyist star chamber atmosphere and the vilification of a new demon, was hidden by a public process designed to uncover racist violence focused at Aborigines, migrants and their ‘supporters’. Rather, it was in the Inquiry’s recommendations that an authoritarian impulse was revealed. The Report reviewed the ARVL proposition in the context of the Commonwealth sedition law and state laws on violent disorder and affray which curb ‘racist’ political action.[107] It praised European parliament’s declarations condemnatory of Extreme Right parties, and noted the local racist criticism of Garnaut’s plan for Australian capitalism.[108] It mapped out a responsive political framework for an ‘anti-racist’ society. This involved:

· monitoring of media reporting about “foreign investment, immigration and multiculturalism”;[109]

· “the police should take the lead” in co-ordinating local authority agencies to ward off racial attacks;[110]

· “police training” and “promotion” should be based on cultural education;[111]

· “police and intelligence agencies” should give “higher priority” to political racism;[112]

· “multicultural and anti-racist education” should exist in schools and universities;[113]

· “urban youth culture” could be used as “more important bases of identity and friendship than presumed race or ethnicity”;[114]

· “broad based public information campaigns” would occur;[115]

· “area committees” would form to cover over racist posters and bring a “wealth of knowledge” (informers?) to the fight.[116]

This model was essentially British[117] with an echo of Brigadier Kitson’s counter-terrorism strategy which involved preventative action and the management of dissent.

While the NA/ANM prosecutions demonstrated the enforcement by the State of its claim to a monopoly of violence, the NIIRV and the ARVL enactments illustrated the ideological proscription of opposition. Without pretense, ASIO Director-General Sadleir was quoted publicly that, with “our universally based immigration policy” providing a “grindstone for prejudice”, a “close watch” on the racist Right would be maintained.[118] The curtailment of the “extreme nationalist” groups[119] did not mean ASIO ignored the CAP, AAFI and others. The evidence advanced in Part Two inferred the existence of a new ‘Operation Whip’ as much as the tone of the Report(s) To Parliament (1992-5) alluded to a para-State strategy directed against the Extreme Right. With any deepening of the challenge, ASIO would be ready to repeat its “operational success” achieved in 1990-1, and be backed by Attorneys General aware of “extremist organisations” and their “serious” public acts.[120] In the new order, anti-racism was ideological glue for the liberal-capitalist system [121] just as anti-communism had been in previous decades. “As Australia’s political, economic and social future becomes more closely linked with Asia”,[122] similar hard State responses to threats to the capitalist order showed an historical continuity. This Thesis now turns to the use of auxiliary organizations to defend the liberal hegemony.

4. THE SATELLITIZATION OF THE LEFT

Chapter Five examined the inter-related subjects of the phased co-optation (1978-89) of the marxist Left by State and liberal forces in the ‘anti-racist’ fight, and its steady abandonment of political positions which favoured industry-protection and Australian independence. This was a dying Left, battered by the Fraser government and confused by Labor economic rationalism. The Thesis now argues that weaknesses in post-1975 Left politics bore upon the co-optation process. The manipulation of the Left to constrain the Right was a new development which defined each in relation to the State. If the Left became satellitized, then the Extreme Right had become the new radicalism.

(a) Historical Faults In The Left?

The intense debate which split Australian communism in 1963-4 showed evidence of its enmeshment with social democracy. The Maoist fraction’s assessment that the CPA had become “revisionist”, involved more than a criticism of the ‘bankruptcy’ of economist trade unionism and parliamentarist action. Such politics were perceived as bourgeois politics. Maoists posited that marxist organization was surrounded by the older capitalist ideology and its integrative economic-cultural practice, and that bourgeois politics could enter and even control a communist party.[123] Maoists stated thereafter, that the CPA would habitually adapt itself towards Labor.[124] Subsequent 1980’s ‘passages’ into the ALP by leading communists like John Halfpenny, Laurie Carmichael and Bernie Taft, demonstrated a blurring of ideological position. Similarly, when the CPA dissolved, the closing internal debate focused around a social-reform agenda constructed with progressive Laborites.[125] A concept of ‘Left satellitization’ must take account of the Old-Left’s historical enmeshment with Labor.

The 1970’s hard-Left had ostensibly been different, but ‘Fraser-ism’ was a rough opponent which converted Labor to economic rationalism while ‘inverting’ politics with aggressive internationalist liberalism. The re-ordered State broke the Extreme Left in a crippling and psychologically enervating way. For example, the Maoist position, that a 1930’s style drift towards world war (with the USSR in the Hitler role) demanded a class collaborationist united front with Fraser,[126] symbolised the elimination of Maoism as the ‘radical’ competitor to Trotskyism. Meantime, Trotskyists who ritually responded ‘Vote Labor’ to Fraserism did so with the imperatives of the Transitional Programme in mind. However, despite class struggle rhetoric, it was never demonstrated how even conditional support for social democracy had ever advanced Trotskyism. The tradition was notorious for its doctrinaire prescriptions for “general strikes” or “Labor Left government” or “nationalization”, addressed to, and duly rejected by, Labor conferences, in unions and elsewhere.[127] Whereas the CPA approached Labor for “reforms”, Trotskyists could be reproached for performing ritual incantations to an uninterested milieu. To suffer marginalization is to invite intra-sectarian disputation and disorientation.

Unlike the CPA, SPA and CPA(M-L), Trotskyism’s leadership cadre came from fringe intellectual and student circles involved in late 1960’s protest politics - those who rejected the Stalinist tradition in international marxism.[128] Notably, the Australian Stalinist parties operated with some historical-residue working class support; but with the exception of the cultic Socialist Labour League, no Trotskyist organization has ever produced a proletarian component, let alone a real union presence.[129] Indeed, quite the contrary. The Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) explained its genesis:

The DSP and its associated youth organization, Resistance, came into existence out of the same struggles that led to the new rise of struggle by lesbians and gay men in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s.[130]

Trotskyism’s origin in a ‘new social movement’ with a developed lifestyle suggested it was pressed for a clientele. It pursued opportunist practice, such as the enthusiastic near-liquidation of the DSP fraction into Peter Garrett’s Nuclear Disarmament Party (1984).[131] There were other no less fraction-driven searches for alternate ‘mass vanguards’.[132] Neither leaving the International, nor formally renouncing Trotskyism (1985), changed the DSP’s direction. As an “ecology” party after 1989, it searched for new “rainbow” structures whereby it could enter the mainstream and salvage the socialist project.[133] Other Trotskyists were not as sophisticated.

The international cleavages in Trotskyism reflected locally, the inner-city fringe quality of some of the membership, and its hyper-critical attitude towards all who failed to accept its peculiar interpretations of mainline communism, were defining factors of the Left in the 1980’s. A concept of Left-satellitization must therefore take account of the structural weakness of the Trotskyist tradition.

This Thesis concludes that by 1989 the entire Left was adrift, marginalized and under Extreme Right assault. Co-optation reached an intense stage precisely at a crucial historical moment - the disintegration of Eastern European communism. The crisis of the Old-Left (CPA/SPA) effectively ensured that the subsidiary Trotskyist tradition became dominant. Trotskyism had been a driving force in the ‘internationalization’ of Left politics in the 1980’s and its unexpected ascendancy was decisive in the conduct of Left politics subsequently.

(b) The State And Left Satellitization

Chapter Two’s discussion of post-1945 Satellite Right and para-State auxiliaries, provided a framework to understand Left-satellitization. The satellite concept showed how the Right’s ideological confluence with State interest on the question of communism, occasioned its public and sanctioned loyalty to State parties, and allowed manipulation by politicians and political police. Given the satellites’ delusion of objective contribution to the anti-communist struggle (1945-75), there was functional normality about the arrangement. The new method, unlike the former inter-war auxiliary system, kept a distance between the State and its agents.

The relationship between the State and the Left would be necessarily different again, as it involves forces theoretically in juxtaposition. The publically unmarketable relationship between the State and its Left satellites would not only have to be obscured but be generated at the deeper levels of cultural-ideological reproduction and the exercise of hegemony. Satellite Left status would constructively mean: the lack of an ideological alternative to the processes of internationalization; devotion to the principles of open-borders and cultural-racial standardization; the trenchant ideological criticism of any ‘nationalist’ or racist-ethnocentric opposition to capitalist globalization; hence drawing on the mythic-ideological flavour of the socialist sects, the attraction of dedicated persons who refuse to either join the structures of the transnational State or endorse capitalism; these Left satellites are permitted delusional organizational freedom to practise privatized auxiliary intimidation at street level.

Peter Beilharz has provided an historical description of 1980’s Trotskyism’s ideological ambivalence, and the opening this gave for its co-optation:

If the conscious enemies of Trotskyism … [ie the Stalinists] … can thus become its unconscious world executors, so then can Trotskyists become obstacles in history’s way. If … there were two major camps, communism and imperialism, then there was always the risk that Trotskyists might become the indirect instruments of other classes.[134]

Abruptly, ‘communism’ melted away. Thereafter, the Trotskyists’ attempt in Australia to find a niche led into anti-racist politics, alliances with immigrant groups and ‘anti-fascism’. Under New World Order capitalism, Trotskyists visualized in these arrangements a method to build a new visionary but practical socialist project, free of Stalinism’s stain.[135]

The debate launched in Britain by the ‘Anti-Fascist Action’ (AFA) (1997ff) covering the preceding two decades of European Left anti-racism/anti-fascism, assists in the assessment of Australian Trotskyism. The AFA, whose ‘anti-fascist’ credentials were impeccable, interpreted British Trotskyism as an auxiliary of “the status quo”:

… anti-fascism continues to be identified in the public mind with the antics and stance of the ANL [Anti-Nazi League], Searchlight and the Board of Deputies of British Jews … an apologist and cheerleader for … Labour …[136]

With the perfect ‘Intelligence’ which perceived ahead of proof, that neo-nazi ‘Combat 18’ was an MI-5/Special Branch construction, the British Extreme Left was criticised for playing the political police game in confronting neo-nazis in a way which buttressed state politicians and restricted civil liberties.[137] The dependence of Australian Trotskyism upon the international movement for ideological-political ‘models’ in the anti-fascist/anti-racist struggle is undeniable.[138]

For example, the DSP had considered in 1991, that ten years thence it might share government with the Greens and the Australian Democrats.[139] Thereafter, the DSP enthusiastically built anti-racist united actions with Victorian Democrat Senator Sid Spindler, and endorsed “Brunswick Against Nazis” which was a creature of local ALP politicians, Senator Halfpenny and the Zionist Australian Union Of Jewish Students - with ISO street activists in the van.

The point of ‘anti-fascism’ seems to rest in historical arguments better understood as mythic intangibles. First, when the DSP referred to Trotsky’s idea of a “mass united front with social democratic workers and others”,[140] and the ISO to the 1930’s fight in Germany “crippled by the Communist Party’s mad strategy of branding the Social Democrats ‘social fascists’ … (ruling) … out a united working class fight against the Nazis”,[141] they expressed the standard Trotskyist critique of yesteryear’s anti-fascist struggle. Its validity, naturally, can never be measured. What then occurred was that the struggle against the new Extreme Right was cast in 1930’s terms, with the enemy either Nazis in name or quality, and the ‘anti-Nazi struggle’, a type of historical vindication over the non-existent Stalinist enemy. Practically, the new ‘united front’ did not produce Trotskyist independency. Second, when Perth liberal ‘anti-racist’ Rob White endorsed the 1990’s line of the Trotskyist Left, which rejected a populationist argument against immigration, and any concession to “Left-nationalist’ criticism of Asian investment,[142] he betrayed the hope that the internationalist Left would work for an anti-racist order inside a global economic system. Indeed, contemporary Trotskyism, like leftover Left fractions generally, building upon its 1980’s stance (Chapter Five), prayed or hoped that socialism would emerge from the womb of globalist capitalism and rejected any barrier against the breaking of frontiers. [143] If Trotskyism’s ‘special set of illusions’ let it visualize Trotsky’s world republic grounded in capitalist internationalization, the deception was complete. That White could publish alongside non-Marxist propagandists and truly ‘advise’ the Left, suggested its loss of independent political will.

(c) The Pattern Of Satellite-Auxiliary Action 1989-95

The marxist Left after 1989 has been a metropolitan phenomenon. Marxist electoral participation (1989-95) produced only insignificant ballot box support. A cluster of groups - DSP, ISO, Workers’ Power, Spartacists, Militant, Socialist Alternative, Freedom Socialist Party (FSP), Socialist Equality Party and Communist League - were Trotskyist. A ‘new’ CPA and the CPA(M-L) held to their ‘traditions’. Organizationally, Trotskyists focused on issues ‘mobilizations’ and existed in a ‘Left bloc’ identifiable by lifestyle and suburb-address.[144]

The new ‘rural/country town’ Extreme Right groups such as the CAP and EFF organized beyond the reach of Left counter-protest. The AAFI in Sydney, Melbourne and Adelaide was essentially ignored until 1994 when Left groups issued condemnations.[145] Ultimately, the catalysts for a new Left activism directed at the Extreme Right, were the re-emergence of National Action, and a new ‘anti-anti-semitism’ policy pursued by Jewish organizations which dragged the Trotskyists into street confrontations.

Of course, it can be argued that the Left reacted to the presence of the Right. Brander told the author that he intended in 1993-5 to provoke the Left with street rallies, and in Melbourne and Adelaide, he was duly ‘rewarded’ with publicity arising from these disorderly events. However, to place this discussion within the framework outlined in Chapter Two: Australian political police were undoubtedly watching NA closely, keen to ensure that there was no ‘soft preparation for violence’ and return to the ‘political guerilla warfare’ model.[146] Restricting NA’s ability to re-organize and linking it with “neo-nazism” would be considerations.[147] The Left took on this role, and otherwise confronted assorted Skinhead efforts and the ‘anti-semitism’ of the CEC. Here, Australia-Israel Review editor Greason, appeared to provide advice and leadership.[148]

Although the Left remained under general surveillance, it not only operated without hindrance, but its marxist nature was ignored by media. Indeed, Gerard Henderson felt confident enough to offer ‘advice’ the Stalinist CPA would have choked on:

Respect Intelligence agencies. Here the Left can lend a hand. In the past the Left has opposed Intelligence gathering and police Special Branches. Some of its criticisms were warranted but not all.[149]

He was not replied to. Rather, the DSP had already agreed with Henderson that ‘racism’ should be criminalized[150] - a sanction only the State could enforce - and liaised with NSW Special Branch concerning racist incidents. Groups like ISO/Militant/FSP in Melbourne and Adelaide ‘anti-Nazi’ actions, missed the dominant roles of Zionists, ALP leaders and Irene Moss[151] in these events.

Significantly, the Extreme Right did not discount the Left and some felt threatened by it. Some AAFI officials detected an implicit threat.[152] Radical-Nationalists took Left groups into strategic-tactical account.[153] The Left street groups grew in bravado and their power awaited exhibition in the anti-Hanson/ONP demonstrations of 1997-8.

The satellitization of the Left was useful to Australia’s internationalized capitalism. Trotskyism provided a network of agitational forces that constrained the Extreme Right and propagandized for globalization within a potentially ‘independent’ milieu. This demonstrated the orchestrated character of the new State arrangements. In this way, only the Extreme Right was considered an internal enemy.

CONCLUSION

The Australian State, through coercion and policy initiative stimulated the growth of an internationalized economic sector dominant over, but integrated with, national capital. In its post-American-client phase the State participated in New World Order political structures and the Pacific Rim Economic Order. The State was secure but politically ‘closed’. A new State power core involving a transnational capitalist class, State officials, coercive machinery, para-State agents and intrusive migrant groups, with alliances and clients beyond the bloc, guaranteed compliance with internationalization. The new course was inspired by a new globalist myth, a State civic cult.

State values exercised cultural hegemony, delimiting Extreme Right potential. As enforced economic internationalization and mass immigration altered Australia’s sociological face, liberal-internationalist cultural values were imposed in a partitioned discourse aimed at pockets of cultural, political and economic ‘national’ resistance. State policy was directed at undermining the Old-Australia, symbiotically bringing change which was pronounced natural and normative.

The integration of the new middle class intellectual elite, like the ‘alteration’ of sexual norms and the ‘promotion’ of racial inter-marriage and multiculturalism provided civil society allies and clients for the State and assisted to marginalize Extreme Right challenge.

The para-State employed with considerable impact management techniques against the Extreme Right over the twenty-year period, such that all its fractions were enervated. The use of show trials, conspiratorial action, informers and dirty tricks implied the historical continuity of repressive method from the State’s anti-communist period. The inter-connected ‘anti racial-vilification legislation’ and political police method demonstrated determination to deny opportunity to the new radicalism.

The State severed the useless Satellite Right relationship, but a new ally was ultimately found in the satellitized Left. The defeat of the Left 1975-82 and the taming of the crisis-ridden Left 1982-90, helped in the co-optation of the residual (Trotskyist) Left after the collapse of Soviet communism. The liberal State’s inversion of the political discourse to involve universalist anti-racism meant the Left unwittingly, but competently, played the violent auxiliary function: it besieged, harassed and intimidated the ‘current’ urban radical opposition.

The Extreme Right, as Chapters Four - Eight demonstrated, waged political struggle against State policy by various means. This Chapter concludes the State had fended off, but not silenced, the new radicalism.

---

[1] See Chapter One, Note 60, for this descriptive term applied to the 1920’s Australian State.

[2] Linda Weiss, The Myth Of The Powerless State: Governing The Economy In A Global Era, Cambridge, 1998, pp. 2, 28, 209.

[3] Robert Catley, Globalising Australian Capitalism, Oakleigh, 1996, p. 65.

[4] David Marquand, The New Reckoning: Capitalism, States And Citizenship, Cambridge, 1997, pp. 163-4.

[5] Greg Crough and Ted Wheelwright, Australia: A Client State, p. 173.

[6] Bob Jessop, op.cit., pp. 147, 193-199; Boris Frankel, Beyond The State? Dominant Theories And Socialist Strategies, London, 1982, pp. 29, 31, 184.

[7] Andrew Moore, The Right Road?, pp. 138-144; Moore’s conclusions on the history and practice of the Right say nothing of these matters; Hal Colebatch, op.cit., pp. 291-298, placed the Radical- Nationalists on the ‘Left’ White Australia tradition, but his Thesis did not concern the present question; Boris Frankel, From The Prophets The Deserts Come, pp. 64-70, 244-254, did not view ‘populism’ as a radical option to these and related issues although the questions were covered in a general way.

[8] Rob Watts, “Laborism And The State: Confronting Modernity”, in Paul James (ed.), The State In Question, St. Leonards, 1996, pp. 62-63. See also Chapter Five of this Thesis.

[9] Greg Crough and Ted Wheelwright, op.cit., p. 79. In discussing the work accredited to members of the political-economy group, I shall mention Wheelwright as the chief bearer of its precepts.

[10] See for example: Rob White, “Immigration, Nationalism And Anti-Asian Racism”, in Chris Cuneen, David Fraser and Stephen Tomsen (eds.), op.cit., pp. 15-16, 36-41.

[11] Leslie Sklair, “Who Are The Globalisers?: A Study Of Key Globalisers In Australia”, Journal Of Australian Political Economy, No. 38, December 1976, p. 2.

[12] E.L. Wheelwright, Radical Political Economy: Collected Essays, Sydney, 1974, pp. 38, 41.

[13] Greg Crough and Ted Wheelwright, op.cit., pp. 175-6.

[14] Leslie Sklair, Sociology Of The Global System (2^nd edition), Hampstead, 1995, p. 70.

[15] ibid., p. 134.

[16] Greg Crough and Ted Wheelwright, op.cit., pp. 187-8.

[17] Drawn from a comprehensive review of CEDA documentation.

See: for CEDA’s Immigration policy intervention and its integration with State agencies and politicans: N.R. Norman and K. Meikle, Immigration: The Crunch Issues For Australia, Sydney, August 1984, and Ross Garnaut, op.cit.;

for CEDA’s self-definition, “strategy” and plan to integrate business and ‘political’ members of the class: Anon, Think Tanks And The Political Environment: CEDA’s Evolving Role, Sydney, September 1985; its structure in A Concise GuideTo CEDA: What It Is, What It Does, pamphlet, Sydney, 1990;

for CEDA’s massive research based publications list from the 1960’s - 1980’s: CEDA Publications List Melbourne, 1986;

for CEDA’s political, academic and business membership: CEDA Annual Report(s) 1985, 1989, 1992;

a useful anonymous National-Left interpretation: The Committee For The Economic Development Of Australia: Or Friends Of The Trilateral Commission, undated, in author’s possession.

[18] Lester C. Thurlow, The Future Of Capitalism: How Today’s Economic Forces Shape Tomorrow’s World, St. Leonards, 1996, pp. 8-10.

[19] Robert Catley, op.cit., pp. 194-5.

[20] Abe David and Ted Wheelwright, The Third Wave: Australia And Asian Capitalism, Sutherland, 1989, pp. xv, 164-175.

[21] Greg Crough and Ted Wheelwright, op.cit., p. 219. The definition of fascism employed here would be a marxist one.

[22] Philip Abrams, “Notes On The Difficulty Of Studying The State”, Journal Of Historical Sociology, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1988, p. 71.

[23] Robert Bocock, Hegemony, Chichester, 1986, pp. 34, 37, 94, assists this conclusion.

[24] For an accurate survey of opinion polls in an otherwise partisan source, see “Appendix Six Immigration Opinion Polls”, in Chris Anderson, The Asianisation Of Australia: An Exposure Of The ‘Asian Future’ Being Forced Upon Australia, Melbourne, December 1996, pp. 48-53; for the public’s wariness of immigration levels: Katherine Betts, “Immigration And Public Opinion In Australia”, People And Place, Vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 9-20; essential immigration criticism contained in, Katherine Betts, “Refugee-Status Procedures And The Boat People”, People And Place, Vol. 1, No. 3, pp. 9-15. And other material by Bob Birrell consulted for this Thesis and published in People And Place, has been generally ignored by multiculturalist advocates.

[25] Bob Hawke, on major parties “ahead of the electorate”, quoted in Dan McDonnell, “Hawke Reveals Political Pact”, Herald Sun, May 25 1993, p. 4; the journalist-commentators were honest: see Greg Sheridan, Living With Dragons, pp. 5, 15-16; Peter Robinson, “Australia’s Asian Destiny”, Sun-Herald, December 12 1993; Peter Robinson, The Future Of Australian Capitalism, Sydney, 1978; the deceptive early 1970’s policy is recorded in a biased source: John Dique, Immigration: The Quiet Invasion, Bullsbrook, 1985, pp. 164-6.

[26] Ehud Sprinzak, “The Process Of Delegitimization: Towards A Linkage Theory Of Political Terrorism”, Terrorism And Political Violence, Vol. 3, Spring 1991, p. 52.

[27] ibid., p. 64; Ehud Sprinzak, “Right Wing Terrorism In Comparative Perspective”, pp. 31-2.

[28] Tore Bjorgo, “Introduction”, in Tore Bjorgo (ed.), op.cit., p. 7; *Given here as a ‘right-wing target’, this group is hereafter excluded from the discussion of political contention.

[29] Michael Cathcart; Defending The National Tuckshop, p. 125.

[30] A view distilled from: Professor Richard Bosworth’s “Introduction” to Gianfranco Cresciani, Fascism, Anti Fascism And Italians In Australia; Robert Manne (ed.), Two Nations: The Causes And Effects Of The Rise Of The One Nation Party, Melbourne, 1998, various authors of longstanding ‘anti-racist’ pedigree, pp. 20, 21, 35, 45, 57-8, 92-3, 114-122, 174-5; HREOC, Report Of The National Inquiry Into Racist Violence, passim; Graeme Campbell, “The National Inquiry Into Racist Violence”, The Record, Spring 1993, pp. 39-46; from the citations in this Thesis concerning Gerard Henderson, David Greason and Australia-Israel Review; Mark O’Connor, “Immigrationism, Racism And Moral Monopoly”, in John Tanton, Denis McCormack and Joseph Wayne Smith (eds.) Immigration And The Social Contract: The Implosion Of Western Societies, Avebury, 1996, pp. 126-132.

[31] Bligh Grant, “Introduction”, in Bligh Grant (ed.), Pauline Hanson: One Nation And Australian Politics, Armidale, 1997, p. 16.

[32] Pauline Hanson, Pauline Hanson: The Truth, Ipswich, pp. 89-90.

[33] Tom Dusevic, “Democracy Under Siege”, The Weekend Australian (Weekend Review), April 8 1995, p. 6.

[34] Katherine Betts, Ideology And Immigration 1976-1987, pp. 118-119.

[35] Max Teichmann, “Whatever Happened To Labor?”, News Weekly, July 17 1999, pp. 14-15.

[36] Max Teichmann, “The Via Dolorosa Of The Left”, The Adelaide Review, October 1996, p. 16.

[37] Michael Thompson, Labor Without Class: The Gentrification Of The ALP, Leichhardt, 1999.

[38] Bill Hayden, “New Class, Now Problems” How Labor Got Into The Wrong Hands”, Sydney Morning Herald, August 7 1999, p. 8s.

[39] Gerard Henderson, “When The Pen Isn’t Mightier”, Sydney Morning Herald, August 24 1999, p. 17.

[40] Boris Frankel, From The Prophets The Deserts Come, pp. 114-125, 142-5.

[41] Padraic P. McGuinness, “The Left Right Beat Of The Hanson Drum”, The Age, May 3 1997, p. A29.

[42] Stephen Castles, Bill Cope, Mary Kalantzis and Michael Morrissey, Mistaken Identity: Multiculturalism And The Demise Of Nationalism In Australia, Leichhardt, pp. 72-73, 96-98, 128-134, 148.

[43] Education Links, No. 33, Autumn 1988, passim; Education Links was not the only ‘anti-racist’ effort. See: Phil Carswell, “An Activities Course In Human Rights”, The Victorian Teacher, August 1984, pp. 35-36; Caroline Lees, “Attacking Racism Early”, The Bulletin, August 16 1988, p. 24. Changes in school history, government, social studies courses, to accommodate cultural sensitivities etc are often subjects of the daily press.

[44] Jon Stratton, Race Daze: Australia In Identity Crisis, pp. 91-3; see the works of Andrew Markus, Ann Curthoys, Kath Cronin, Kay Saunders, Ray Evans, Verity Burgmann, Mary Kalantzis, Stephen Castles, Judith Brett, Henry Reynolds, Robert Manne, as cited in this Thesis; the black armband view of history has been referred to by no less than Prime Minister John Howard and Geoffrey Blainey and requires no further exposition here.

[45] Andrew Moore, The Right Road? pp. 126-134; see Chapter Seven, Section 1 and Chapter Eight, Section 1(b) of this Thesis.

[46] John Hyde, “Why Growth In Population Is Environmentally Sound”, The Australian, June 1 1990, p. 9. Hyde was a prominent New Right advocate.

[47] See: Australian National Action, News-Current Affairs Video, 1988-89 (various programs involving anti-racist satellites and NA); Australian National Action, News Video 1994-5 (Chapter Five) (describes Anti-Racist Action and other groups in Adelaide); Chapter Five Footnote 30 on Community Aid Abroad. Articles also discussed pro-South African action groups.

[48] David Rayside, On The Fringe: Gays And Lesbians In Politics, Ithaca, 1998, pp. 3, 308-312.

[49] Mary Kalantzis and Bill Cope, “Republicanism And Cultural Diversity”, in Wayne Hudson and David Carter (eds), The Republicanism Debate, Kensington, 1993, p. 234.

[50] Henry Reynolds, Aboriginal Sovereignty: Three Nations; One Australia?, Sydney, 1996, passim; Colin Tatz’s work at Macquarie University on ‘genocide’ and media commentary in Australian National Action, File: Colin Tatz.

[51] Tony Pitt, The Fight/CAP Relationship, Fight newspaper subscribers’ letter, November 8 1993.

[52] James Saleam And Howard Gipps, Tape Recording, June 1993.

[53] Jacqueline Lunn, “Loose Cannons”, Daily Telegraph, November 11 1995, p. 37.

[54] See Chapter 19 “Pauline Hanson Persecuted?”, Your Rights 1999, Carlton, 1999. John Bennett’s comments derive directly of media reporting.

[55] Noam Chomsky, as presented on Manufacturing Consent, SBS Television, December 15, 22, 29 1992.

[56] Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man, pp. 8-12; Herbert Marcuse, Counter-Revolution and Revolt, Boston, 1972, pp. 17-23.

[57] R.W. Connell, Ruling Class Ruling Culture: Studies Of Conflict, Power And Hegemony In Australian Life, Cambridge, 1977, pp. 195-197, 200.

[58] A composite overview taken from representative items: Millie Eden, “Ads For A Racial Rainbow”, The Herald, December 10 1989, p. 29; Myer advertisements in The Sun, March 21 1985, p. 18, May 22 1985, p. 29 and Impressions On Wool, catalogue, 1985, p. 24; Phillip Adams, “Soapies: Washing Away The Barriers”, The Bulletin, July 2 1985, p. 60; Greg Sheridan, “On Common Ground”, The Australian (Asians In Australia Supplement), March 15 1994, p. 1; television reporting of the BLF, the ‘Dollar Sweets’ anti-union case; sundry articles from daily press (1985-95) on the ‘existing challenges’ of cross-racial/cross-cultural marriages, held in Immigration Folios, Parts 1, 2, 3, 4 (maintained by the author); a review of The Australian Financial Review and business sections of The Australian and The Sydney Morning Herald, for material on Australian farmers, globalization and economic ‘losers’.

[59] Dean Jaensch and David Mathieson, A Plague On Both Your Houses: Minor Parties In Australia, St. Leonards, 1998, pp. 22, 182, 188-9, discusses such constraints on minor and ideological party electoral successes.

[60] From a mass of journalism (newsclippings) involving statements by Senator Richard Boswell, and parliamentarians such as Tony Abbott, Helen Sham-Ho, Jeff Kennett, John Howard, in Pauline Hanson Folio, Parts 1, 2 and 3, as maintained by author: see also: Robert Manne (ed.), Two Nations, pp. 85-88.

[61] Sol Encel, “Anti-Semitism And Prejudice In Ausralia”, Without Prejudice, No. 1, September 1990, p. 40.

[62] Paul Gardner, “Anti-Jewish Harassment In Australia”, Without Prejudice, No. 5, November 1992, p. 32.

[63] Racism And Anti-Semitism In Contemporary Australia Conference, leaflet and program, June 1994.

[64] See Chapter Eight, Footnotes 162 and 163; from a general overview of the Australian Jewish News, Without Prejudice and Australia-Israel Review.

[65] Prime Minister Paul Keating and Senator Nick Bolkus referring to these issues before the Zionist Federation Of Australia conference, quoted in, “Ministers Differ Over Race Laws”, Australian Jewish News, June 3 1994, p. 2.

[66] The Demidenko-Darville affair was covered in journalism such as: David Greason, “A Fraction Too Much Fiction”, Herald Sun (News Review), August 26 1995, pp. 15-17; Michelle Gunn, “I Am Truly Sorry: Demidenko Comes Clean”, The Weekend Australian (Review), August 26-27 1995, pp. 1, 4; Editorial “Demidenko Still Needs To Explain”, The Weekend Australian, August 26-27 1995, p. 20. The four books on the ‘affair’ are not cited here. For the balanced historical nature of the ‘Jewish-Bolshevik nexus’ see George Katkov, Russia: 1917, London, 1974, pp. 88-107.

[67] The logic of Jacqui Seaman, “Racial Vilification Legislation And Anti-Semitism In NSW: The Likely Impact Of The Amendment”, Sydney Law Review, Vol. 12, Nos 2-3, March 1990, pp. 597-615; Colin Rubinstein And Michael Kapel, “Racial Vilification Bill Is Crucial Test For Coalition”, Sydney Morning Herald, November 1994, p. 13.

[68] Jenny Hocking, Beyond Terrorism: The Development Of The Australian Security State, St. Leonards, 1993, pp. 40, 177, 194.

[69] David McKnight, Australian Spies And Their Secrets, p. 300.

[70] Andrew Moore, The Right Road? pp. 124, 155.

[71] David Greason, I Was A Teenage Fascist, pp. 303-4.

[72] Mike Seccombe, “Racist Whites ‘Used’ Mansell On Libyan Visit”, The Australian, May 5 1987, p. 1; Pilita Clark, “Mansell Denies Link With White Supremacist”, Sydney Morning Herald, May 5 1987, p. 6.

[73] George Wilson and Bruce Jones, “The Disciple Of Gaddafi”, The Sun Herald, May 10 1987, p. 5; Patrick Walters, “Gaddafi To Be Told Of ABC Dingo Program’s Slander”, Sydney Morning Herald, May 13 1987, p. 2.

[74] Jim Saleam, The Nature Of State Power, pp. 12-13, 15-16.

[75] Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, Report To Parliament 1988-89, Canberra, 1989, p. 5.

[76] Human Rights Commission, Proposal For Amendment To The Racial Discrimination Act To Cover Incitement To Race Hatred And Vilification, Canberra, 1984, passim.

[77] Glen A. Davies, “’A Time Of Perceived Rebellion’: A Comparison Of The Charters Towers And Rockhampton Showcase Trials Of 1891”, The Australian Journal Of Politics And History, Vol. 38, No. 1, 1992, pp. 27-40.

[78] “Frederick Thomas’s Statement” (untitled), in AA CRS A6119/78 Item 557 (Percy Reginald Stephensen).

[79] For the Ananda Marga and Hilton Bomb cases, see: Tim Anderson, Free Alister Dunn and Anderson: The Ananda Marga Conspiracy Case, Glebe, 1985; John Jiggens, The Incredible Exploding Man: Evan Pederick And The Trial Of Tim Anderson, Brisbane, 1991.

[80] Stanley Barrett, Is God A Racist?, pp. 70-71, 76-77, 184-5; Martin Lee, The Beast Reawakens, p. 487.

[81] Richard Thurlow, “State Management Of The British Union Of Fascists In The 1930’s”, in Mike Cronin (ed.), The Failure Of British Fascism: The Far Right And The Fight For Political Recognition, London, 1996, passim; Kenneth Lunn, “British Fascism Revisited: A Failure Of Imagination?”, op.cit., p. 177. For the inside view, see the National Front production: Nick Griffin, Attempted Murder: The State-Reactionary Plot Against The National Front, Norwich, 1986.

[82] Police Integrity Commission, Report To Parliament Regarding The Former Special Branch Of The New South Wales Police Service, Sydney, June 1998, passim.

[83] Mark Findlay, “The Justice Wood Inquiry: The Role Of Special Branch In The Cameron Conspiracy”, in Kerry Carrington, Margaret Dover, Russell Hogg, Jenny Bargen and Andrew Lohrey (eds.), Travesty! Miscarriages Of Justice, Sydney, 1991, p. 41.

[84] “Isolate Apartheid, Support ANC”, Tribune, September 20 1989, p. 1.

[85] Judge William Ducker, Sentencing Transcript, in R. v Saleam, NSW District Court Registry File 89/11/1795.

[86] James Saleam, Application To The Supreme Court of New South Wales For Inquiry, and James Saleam, Pardon Me, provide the information in this paragraph.

[87] Crown’s Final Submissions, p. 13, in R. v James Saleam, NSW Court Of Criminal Appeal Registry File 60312/91.

[88] Judgement Of The Court Of Criminal Appeal, Record Sheet, p. 11, in R. v James Saleam, NSW Court Of Criminal Appeal Registry File 60312/91.

[89] Catherine; James Saleam, Pardon Me, Section 5.

[90] His Honour Judge Kevin Hammond, Sentencing Of Jack Van Tongeren, September 20 1990, p. 68.

[91] ANM Folio: Michael Sinclair-Jones, “Doctor Says Dead Son Was ANM Fanatic”, West Australian, undated (August 1989); Sue Yeap, “No Bail For Man Accused In ANM Explosives Case”, West Australian, August 26 1989; Debbie Kennedy, “ANM Leader Remanded On Conspiracy Charge”, West Australian, August 16 1989; “Nazi Arms Cache Seized”, Sunday Times, August 27 1989; John Mayman, “Six Accused ‘Planned A Nazi State’”, Telegraph, May 11 1990; “Bombs To Scare Asians”, The Australian, August 10 1990. The sensationalist style came through in most articles.

[92] Wayne Van Blitterswyk, Letter To Phillip Adams, October 30 1997, pp. 2-4.

[93] Jack van Tongeren, Details Of The Injustice Inflicted Against John Van Blitterswyk And Jack Van Tongeren, no publication details, February 17 1995.

[94] Wayne Van Blitterswyk.

[95] Jack van Tongeren, The Nature Of The Bindoon Property Of John Van Blitterswyk And Judi Lyons, no publication details, February 1 1996.

[96] Jack van Tongeren, Circular Letter forwarded to various persons seeking judicial inquiry, July 26 1994, pp. 3-6. In this letter, van Tongeren referred to a voluminous public correspondence.

[97] Judge Kevin Hammond, Judgement On Crown Application MC91, May 28 1993.

[98] Brian G. Tennant, Folio Of Correspondence With W.A. DPP, 1992, in author’s possession. (Tennant was prominent West Australian law reform campaigner.)

[99] Judgement Of The Western Australia Court Of Criminal Appeal, Record Sheet, pp. 99-100, in R. v John Van Blitterswyk, WA CCA File 161/1990.

[100] Eric Morris and Alan Hoe, Terrorism: Threat And Response, Basingstoke, 1987, pp. 20, 24, 43, 65; Stephen Aust, The Baader-Meinhoff Group: The Inside Story Of A Phenomenon, London, 1985, pp. 320-322; Conor Gearty, “What Is Terrorism?”, in Conor Gearty (ed.), Terrorism, Aldershot, 1966.

[101] Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, Report To Parliament 1989-90, p. 60.

[102] Attorney General’s Department, Factsheet: Racial Vilification, Canberra, 1992, p. 2.

[103] Irene Moss, “Plotting A Path To Change”, The Weekend Australian, May 30-31 1992, p. 21.

[104] Ron Castan, “Inquiry Into Racist Violence”, Australia-Israel Review, Vol. 14, No. 10, June 27-July 9 1989, p. 12.

[105] Pierre James, “Legislating Against The Racist Right”, Without Prejudice, December 1991, p. 30.

[106] Hon. E. Pickering, Hansard: The Legislative Council (NSW), pp. 7225-7226 covered the gamut of these issues.

[107] Human Rights And Equality Opportunity Commission, Report Of The National Inquiry Into Racist Violence, pp. 30-31.

[108] ibid., p. 225.

[109] ibid., p. 217.

[110] ibid., p. 247.

[111] ibid, pp. 330-1, 333.

[112] ibid., p. 316.

[113] ibid., pp. 346, 352-3.

[114] ibid., p. 383.

[115] ibid., p. 380.

[116] ibid., pp. 377-8.

[117] Stephen Castles, Issues For A Community Relations Strategy: A Report To The Office Of Multicultural Affairs, University Of Wollongong: Centre For Multicultural Studies, 1990, passim; Annie Goldflam, “Anti-Racist Strategies In Britain And Australia”, Without Prejudice, No. 3, June 1991, pp. 9-14.

[118] Bernard Lagan, “Spies Still Needed Says ASIO Chief”, Sydney Morning Herald, April 22 1993, p. 3.

[119] Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, Report To Parliament 1993-4, Canberra, 1994, p. 3.

[120] Attorney-General Michael Duffy, Second Reading, Speech By The Honourable Michael Duffy MP, Canberra, 1992.

[121] Graeme Campbell, “The National Inquiry Into Racist Violence”, The Record, Spring 1993, pp. 39-46.

[122] Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, Report To Parliament 1992-3, Canberra, 1993, p. 111.

[123] E.F. Hill, Looking Backward: Looking Forward: Revolutionary Socialist Politics Against Trade Union And Parliamentary Politics (2^nd Edition), Melbourne, 1967, pp. 45-46, 96-97, 110, 117, 132-4, 153-4.

[124] E.F. Hill, Australia’s Revolution: On The Struggle For A Marxist-Leninist Communist Party, Melbourne, 1973, pp. 76, 100, 113, 115.

[125] “The Changing Left: Questions Of Organisation, Coherence, Theory And Realpolitik”, Tribune, April 3 1991, pp. 12-13.

[126] E.F. Hill, Frustrate War Plans Of Soviet Social-Imperialism, no publication details, pp. 4-5, 7-8.

[127] From a survey of Labour Press and Workers News, 1972-80; Vote Socialist Labour League, Election Broadsheet, 1983.

[128] John Percy, “Who Are The Democratic Socialists?”, in Vote 1 Democratic Socialists, DSP election pamphlet 1998. For clarity in this section ‘Democratic Socialist Party’ is used to imply ‘Socialist Workers’ Party’ although the DSP subsumed the SWP in 1990.

[129] Denis Freney, The Socialist Labour League: The Moonies Of The Left, Sydney, 1984, pp. 7, 10, 12.

[130] Socialism And The Struggle For The Rights Of Lesbians And Gay Men, DSP Conference Resolution 1995, Sydney, 1995, p. 1.

[131] Jim Percy, The Labor Party, The NDP And The Elections, Sydney, 1984, for the enthusiastic endorsement of the NDP by these isolated Trotskyists.

[132] A collection of articles in Australasian Spartacist set out Australian Trotskyism’s 1970’s liquidationist search for international ‘vanguards’ - Third World guerillas and local vanguards - young workers, women, nationalities. See: “Guerillas In Power”, No. 31, May 1976, pp. 3, 10-11; “As Mandelite Secretariat Swings Right: CL Joins Fake ‘Mass Paper’ Craze”, No. 34, August 1976, p. 5; “The Weekly Militant - Bridge To Reformism”, No. 35, September 1976, p. 5; “CL Surrenders To SWP Reformism: Fake Trotskyists Announce Shotgun Fusion”, No. 45, August 1977, pp. 3, 7.

[133] “Green Politics: Looking Beyond Labor”, Green Left Weekly, March 27 1991, pp. 1, 12-13; “National Green Party”, Green Left Weekly, April 17 1991, p. 12.

[134] Peter Beilharz, Trotsky, Trotskyism And The Transition To Socialism, London, 1987, p. 182.

[135] Lisa Macdonald, “Wealth Of Ideas At Socialist Scholars’ Conference”, Green Left Weekly, July 31 1991, p. 5. While a criticism of the DSP-line, see also: “International Green Left Weekly Conference: The Unspeakable In Pursuit Of The Inedible”, Australasian Spartacist, No. 153, Winter 1994, p. 11.

[136] “All Or Nothing”, Fighting Talk, No. 18, December 1997, pp. 16-17.

[137] “AFA Statement”, Fighting Talk, No. 19, April 1998, p. 6; “Under False Pretenses”, Fighting Talk, No. 17, September 1997, pp. 6-7; “A View From Valhalla: The Strange Story Of C-18”, Fighting Talk, No. 16, March 1997, pp. 8-10.

[138] “New World Order Socialists. SWP: Counterfeit Anti-Labourites”, Australasian Spartacist, No. 150, Spring 1993, pp. 4, 5, 15; Tom O’Lincoln, Asians Are Welcome Here: The Fight Against Racism, Melbourne, July 1984, pp. 14-16; Nick Fredman, “Fighting The Racist Threat In Britain”, Green Left Weekly, November 3 1993, p. 21. Other available references not cited.

[139] Ken Peak, “Left Politics: Where To Now?”, Green Left Weekly, August 14 1991, p. 9.

[140] Phil Hearse, “The New Fascism In Europe”, Green Left Weekly, April 27 1994, p. 17.

[141] Alex Callinicos, The Fight Against Racism, Melbourne, 1996, p. 10. (A popular British pamphlet published in 1991 and certainly known in Australia to ISO prior to Australian publication.)

[142] Rob White, “Immigration, Nationalism And Anti-Asian Racism”, in Chris Cunneen, David Fraser, Stephen Tomsen (eds.), op.cit., pp. 36-41.

[143] Peter Beilharz, Transforming Labor: Labour Tradition And The Labor Decade In Australia, Cambridge, 1994, pp. 215-216, for cultural and political-economic background to that proposition.

[144] Computer Index: some 500 names/addresses of Trotskyist and other-Left activists, 1992 ff. In author’s possession.

[145] Editorial, “Multicultural Australia”, Green Left Weekly, February 16 1994, p. 8; No To Racism, ISO leaflet, 1994.

[146] Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, Report To Parliament 1993-4, Canberra, p. 9.

[147] Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, Report To Parliament 1992-3, Canberra, pp. 111-112.

[148] See Greason’s articles which describe his ‘line’ and activities: Stop The Racists, International Socialist leaflet, May 1993, where David Greason speaks at an ISO rally as “founder” of National Action; David Greason, “Who’s Afraid Of Racial Vilification Laws?”, Australia-Israel Review, 27 July - 9 August 1994, p. 9, on CEC anti-semitism; David Greason, “National Action Resurrected?”, Australia-Israel Review, 25 April - 8 May 1994 on NA as “neo-nazi”; Sean Lennon, “What Makes A Fascist?”, Green Left Weekly, October 19 1994, where Greason calls on the Left to use street action against “fascists”; David Greason, Radio 7ZR, April 27 1995, transcript from Media Monitors, dealing with CEC duping Tasmanian politician/appeal to act on violent Right. Other examples of Greason’s journalism cited elsewhere.

[149] Gerard Henderson, “Words And Unexpected Consequences”, Sydney Morning Herald, May 9 1995, p. 13.

[150] Reihana Mohideen, “Immigration Policy: The Alternatives”, Green Left Weekly, March 10 1993, p. 10.

[151] Australian National Action, Video Compilation. The author viewed this compendium of 1993-5 television reports of Adelaide and Melbourne NA demonstrations where such personages featured prominently.

[152] Dennis McCormack; Edwin Woodger.

[153] Michael Brander; Simon Dinsbergs.