CHAPTER EIGHT

The radical-populist face of the extreme right

This Chapter examines the fourth face of the contemporary Australian Extreme Right – radical-populism. This family partitions neatly into two sub-categories.

The first sub-category was a predominantly rural/country town phenomenon which appeared from the early 1980’s particularly after the advent of a Federal Labor government. Its ‘freedom’ agenda was derived from the needs of people burdened by indebtedness and the State bureaucracy, and who saw in popular democracy, gun ownership and grassroots activism, a chance for resistance and empowerment. The breadth of the movement was clear. Representative structures such as Enterprise, Freedom and Family (EFF), Inverell Forum, Australian Community Movement (ACM), and others, will receive attention.

The second sub-category was urban and emerged after 1988 with a non-racist cultural and environmentalist argument against the immigration/multicultural policies of Labor and ‘the new class’. Organizations such as Australians Against Further Immigration and Reclaim Australia Reduce Immigration articulated the trend, while politician Graeme Campbell and Rex Connor (Jr) gave the cause new depth in the Labor populist vein.

This Chapter interlinks the two sub-categories through their common placement on the tripartite paradigm and their common populist underpinnings.

This Chapter also develops the ideological discussion advanced in Chapter Seven. The ‘tension’ between radical-populist politics and conservative politics will receive treatment. This tension does not express itself in debates over interpretations of monarchical-constitutional power, but in discussions at the level of grassroots action especially over legalism and political methods.

Both particles of radical-populism catered to new constituencies whose availability signalled a deeper malaise in Australian economic and political life. Clearly, the needs and attitudes of these new groups could not be accommodated by the bourgeois parties. Specific research questions to be addressed include:

· What new political market opened for the Extreme Right? Who joined radical-populist organizations and what was their impact?

· What were the issues addressed?

· How did radical-populism articulate a radicalization against dominant liberal institutions and values?

Together, populist-monarchism and radical-populism indicated the potential for ‘national-populist’ politics and the possibility of a deeper radicalization. Necessarily the Chapter provides interpretative narrative on the inter-relationships within the broad Right family.

1. Rural/Country Town Radical-Populism 1975-1995

(a) Special Definitions And Criteria For Group Selection

This Thesis has employed the term ‘populist’ to describe ideologies and organizations.

Canovan’s study of historical populism’s “exceptionally vague” nature broke it into a “rural radicalism” and a phenomenon more ‘moral’ than programmatic, an activist protest of the alienated, disinherited and ‘small man’; both sometimes featuring the call for a direct democracy and exalting an ethnically defined ‘people’.[1]

Scholarship dealing with the new ‘national populist’ parties was referred to in Chapter Seven. The populist-monarchists were discussed with reference to this literature, but whereas they radicalized within a particular framework and mobilized an electoral clientele chiefly drawn from the bourgeois parties, the radical-populists shall be shown as responsive to issues which supposedly affected the lives of the common person, but were ignored by liberal elites and government. One European study advised:

The most important distinction to be made is between trust in the political system as such [regime support] and trust in the incumbent authorities and their policies.[2]

Here we witness the refusal to trust such authorities. The more serious situation arose mainly in Radical-Nationalist and neo-nazi groups in the 1980’s/1990’s; however, as has been observed in academic discussions concerning “Hansonism”, there was an ongoing right-wing reaction against “the social movements” and “globalization” from the 1980’s.[3] In addition, the “catch-all” State parties, differentiated minimally, could not assimilate all Australians during the years of Accord-ism/New Right ‘reform’. Protest from the Right demanded new organization.

The Australian environment after 1975 had encouraged some disengagement from mainstream structures (“anti-politics”), a similar process occurring in most ‘democracies’.[4] The evidence shows that radical-populist groups (like the Extreme Right generally) perceived the new internationalized order as another aspect of political sleaze.[5] Certainly also, political corruption has been endemic in Australia.[6] A radical-populism with electoral-mass action methods, appealing to a dispossessed people who incarnate sovereignty and virtue, against the liberal elites and parties, was bound to have some minority appeal.

In fact, there were significant organizations whose patterns of action and propaganda showed their place in this camp. To construct a working list of these organizations required detective work. Four key documents became available which recorded hundreds of possible candidates: Directory Of Conservative, New Right And Anti-Socialist Organizations (1988), A Directory Of Organizations (1986) and two lists of “loyal organizations” (1992) (1995) issued by Tony Pitt.[7]

By applying the tripartite paradigm, most of the groups fitted precisely into the Conservative Right category (Australian Family Movement, Christians Speaking Out, Party To Oppose The Petrov Conspiracy and many groups discussed as ex-satellites in Chapter Seven), while some were New Right groups or adjuncts of the old Satellite Right (People Against Communism, Baltic Council). Left over were about 50 possible radical-populist organizations.

Questionnaires were dispatched and 10 replies received.[8] Some of the groups (Committee For Integrity In Government, Australians For Commonsense Freedom And Responsibility and A Better Compassionate Australia Movement), were in fact conservative. It was clear that many of the circularized groups, were defunct. This had some significance. Groups were founded as localized ‘oppositions’ to liberal or State economic policies, enjoyed a flurry of activity and then died. This suggested a fertility on the Right and an audience, but limited opportunities for most groups to move out of the fringe. Barrett’s Canadian analysis of a number of ‘Fringe-Right’ single issue or local or marginal groups beyond the limits of mainstream conservative parties and auxiliaries, and Spoonley’s similar review of New Zealand rightists, noted occasional blurring between radicals and conservatives;[9] this situation was paralleled in the Australian cases where for some the process of radicalization was, as shall be shown, similarly incomplete.

How far this activist discontent could mobilize was contingent upon resources and opportunity. How the new forces developed ideologically, politically and organizationally shall now be examined.

(b) Radical-Populist Activism

It is a precept of the ‘accepted’ theory of the Extreme Right that rural Australia has periodic crises, during which extremism waxes with its populist economic policies involving cheap credit, debt reduction or orderly-produce-marketing. The focus is on particular ‘extremists’ who are beaten back by National Party ‘hicks’ who essentially keep the liberal-capitalist faith. [10] Because rural Australia is a bastion of ‘Old Australian’ cultural mores with their British-Australia overtones, this criticism can draw on modernist prejudice which both lampoons and fears the countryside. Nonetheless, like all propaganda, there is some truth in the presentation.

The rural crisis of 1967-70 (Chapter Two) was overcome economically and politically. Prices improved, and the new National Party asserted control over the farmers’ organizations. Further, the Bjelke-Petersen ‘system’ revamped the Satellite Right and after the defeat of Labor socialism in 1975, the reinvigorated capitalism of the Liberal Party promised a new prosperity.

In 1979, Prime Minister Fraser endorsed the foundation of the National Farmers’ Federation (NFF). This organization would prosecute a class struggle. Tom Connors’s study of the NFF, showed it a blend of patrician ‘pastoralist’ graziers (who voted Liberal and favoured a free market) and a less homogenous farmer group (which voted Country Party and favoured orderly marketing and protectionism); the graziers achieved control.[11] By 1984, the ‘pastoralist’ faction found an aggressive New Right leadership in Ian McLachlan and Andrew Robb, both later prominent Liberals. These New Rightists sought an artificial rural unity aggressively directed at “costly industrial anarchy”.[12] One inside commentator wrote, that the scheme was to

create an atmosphere favourable to the types of economic reform a labour government would not normally be able to contemplate.[13]

The vigorous NFF attack upon state-regulated labour during 1985-87 concealed other aspects of the deregulationist NFF agenda: to undermine ‘protection’, to promote agribusiness and international and local ‘competitiveness’. Certainly, the Hawke government’s own agenda moved in tandem with the New Right, whatever its public antipathy to its aggressive liberal-capitalist rhetoric.[14]

The circumstances which prefaced the birth of radical-populist organization, lay in the years of drought (1980-83), which induced hardship across rural Australia; thereafter, an orgy of bank lending followed the breaking of the drought and the deregulation of the financial industry. By 1985, rural indebtedness had soared.[15] Rising mortgage rates (correctly) convinced indebted farmers that they had been the victims of fraudulent bank-contracts.[16] While the NFF attacked the unions in the period 1985-7, mass actions broke out particularly in New South Wales, directed at indebtedness and openly critical of the process of credit-creation.

The protests grew in intensity. Robyn Tiffen and Peter Ryan of the Canowindra Rural Reform Committee formed in 1985, led the way. Farmers’ strikes, wheat dumping in conjunction with the Livestock and Grain Producers’ Association, and town meetings were organized. The NFF affected to critically support protest, but tried to channel it into lobbyist activity.[17] The attitude of various anti-bank groups, ‘rural-action’ committees and others thence became critical of the NFF.[18] Simultaneously, a weakening of the National Party was underway, the NFF’s aggressive ‘industry’ role progressively undercutting the NP’s function, just as its repudiation of the old McEwan protectionist principle challenged traditional wisdom.[19]

The ‘accepted theory’ of the Extreme Right suggests that rural people are prone to extremism when ‘pressured’, although the theory does not explain the ease by which the angry masses return peacefully to their farms with the passing of immediate crisis. Obviously, the quick return to normal life indicated that the majority of graziers and farmers and country-town people had never radicalized, although some endorsed protests against perceived ills.[20] The crucial point is that discontent did not lead to a significant sector breaking from bourgeois politics in the 1980’s period.

Allan Jones’s ‘National Credit Co-Ordinating Committee’ (NCCC), part of his small ‘National Technocrat Party’, was one propaganda group which tried to deepen the protest movement. Jones’s group developed upon the residue of such Social Credit networks as the Eyre Peninsula grouplet, the ‘Rockhampton Anti-Inflation Group’ and others. Ideologically, Jones’s idea of ‘National Credit’ relied upon Frank Anstey and Commonwealth Bank governor Denison Miller, criticized Social Credit as utopian and consumerist but advocated debt-free credit, ‘new technology’ and sustainable ‘green’ farming.[21] Jones liaised closely with Tiffen and Ryan, but when Wagga Wagga employed a community shutdown in April 1986, Jones warned the Canowindra group against backsliding towards the NFF and New Right activists like Katherine West and placing hopes on Bjelke-Petersen’s Nationals.[22] His prompts gained significance in the later foundation, by the assorted rural-action committees, of the Union of Australian Farmers in 1987,[23] and a new round of anti-bank demonstrations in New South Wales. This section of farmer opinion thence branded the NFF as linked to Westpac Bank and Elders-IXL, putative agents of rural distress.[24]

These years of destabilization also brought forth militant posturing. The ‘Australians United For Survival And Individual Freedom Scouts’ were formed by millionaire Cobar district grazier, Ian Murphy. A tease for liberal journalists in the period 1987-95,[25] the Scouts purported to be an armed militia (an auxiliary to the Army which would be ready to oppose the inevitable Indonesian invasion) and a Christian moral force.[26] Despite intense ASIO interest in 1995, which focused on Scout links with a Christian militia active in the Defence Department,[27] no evidence existed that the Scouts were - in the study period - engaged in violence. An initial influence from Lyndon La Rouche soon yielded to traditional conservative concerns centred on the influence of Fabian Socialism’s attack on the family farm.[28] While the Scouts opted for ‘training’ and Christian prayer, they attracted in 1990, the patronage of Brigadier Ted Serong, former commander of Australian troops in Vietnam. Serong had LOR connections, and his critique of defense unpreparedness and New World Order dictatorship, favoured also by some radical-populists and the populist-monarchists, showed how the Conservative Right and Extreme Right categories could blur. This was a matter of relevance to political formation in the 1990’s (as below).

By 1988, the sense of immediate rural crisis had eased with rising livestock/grain prices and downward interest rates. However, the political climate had changed through the richness of the anti-bank protest movement and crucial external events. First, whereas most farmers sought only a better deal from financial institutions,[29] some had questioned State policy and the private monopoly of credit creation. The mass groups built on efforts to reform State and bank policy receded, leaving discontented grouplets to campaign for various forms of the National Credit/Social Credit argument. Second, a tradition of localized militancy had emerged with a pool of people familiar with populist messages; but rather than ‘popular’ protest, there was now the option of populist organization. Third, the Queensland National Party had pushed ‘de-satellitization’ (Chapter Seven) after Bjelke-Petersen’s fall, and its commitment to New Right internationalist deregulation alienated some traditional supporters. Similar processes outside Queensland led to an opening for new organizations. Fourth, Left-influenced commentators reasoned that the ‘devastation’ caused by New Right rural policies was assisted by populist action. Here we witness the traditional Left view of the Extreme Right as a troubleshooter for capitalism;[30] but this ignores the fact that the ‘anti-bank’ groups came up against New Right opposition. Last, some commentators have recorded the 1980’s-1990’s decline of rural Australian towns and farms as an important social division of contemporary Australia, the veritable creation of ‘two nations’, and a factor later relevant to the emergence of the One Nation Party.[31] Reasonably, some country people felt this process intensely. This crisis produced cult-heroes like Charlie Kerr (1986-ff.), a farmer bankrupted by banks[32] which refused to understand the culture of farm life, and the Muirhead family driven to advocate fantastic “secession” from Australia to avoid losing their “racial identity” and Marlborough property.[33] Out of this background emerged the first major organization of radical-populist action, Independent Enterprise, Freedom And Family (EFF), founded by Joe Bryant in September 1987.

Bryant, born in 1934, was a long-time resident of western Sydney, a successful business and property owner, and deputy mayor of Blacktown. His business activities brought him into contact with other small-business operators who shared his resentments of petty regulation and ‘unfair’ taxation.[34] A manifesto authored by Bryant, set out the EFF’s formative ideas and purposes which included that partial delegitimization of the State that characterizes the ‘Extreme Right’:

Myself and associates have been actively lobbying for common sense for some five years. This lobbying evolved … to the Ballot Box, as we did in ‘Rockdale’ resulting in the Unsworth win of only 28 votes … and [on] … from there. It has become quite apparent that when governments refuse to hear, or listen, or see what the average Australian hears and sees, lobbying even carried to the ballot box produces little … We have been forced from deligation (sic) to Ballot Box action and now to direct action, due solely to the constant refusal of those in power to hear or see.[35]

Initially, EFF was Sydney based. Its Platform which involved the limitation of workers’ compensation, voluntary unionism, elimination of unemployment benefits and flat tax[36] was petty bourgeois, and echoed positions taken by New Right Centre 2000 with which Bryant was - like some farmers - initially connected. However, Centre 2000’s deregulationist economics poisoned the relationship soon enough.[37] Although Bryant sought a country clientele, those opposed to Liberal and Labor “socialism” and alienated from the “wishy-washy” Nationals,[38] he did not consider the labour movement as the enemy.

Whereas Conservative Right doctrine argued for the absolute independence of their fairyland parliamentarians from party direction, the EFF insisted on a party to elect a “group” of independents committed to core policies.[39] This idea would pass through to Campbell’s Australia First. The new party would be a staff and a nucleus, an agitational force, not simply an electoral organization.[40]

Bryant possessed a capacity for showmanship. Bryant reputedly brawled at a Blacktown Council meeting, lending colour to his activism.[41] In early 1988, he constructed “Effie”, a large metal Trojan Horse, and parked it at Sydney’s Parliament House, as a protest. In 1988-89, “Effie” toured country New South Wales, painted in slogans demanding Citizens’ Initiated Referenda (CIR) and reductions in interest rates.[42] It was the “people’s weapon” to ‘bust’ party politics.[43] Through to 1995, the Trojan Horse appeared at farmers’ rallies,[44] a 1993 cavalcade through Brisbane for ‘Freedom’ from unrepresentative government,[45] and at Marlborough as the Muirhead family fought a bank-obtained eviction order. Bryant, the “Prime Minister of the Principality of Marlborough” became a provocative advocate of farmers’ rights,[46] the Muirhead saga winning supporters across Australia.

The EFF’s history fitted into the Extreme Right category in the paradigmatic model advanced in this Thesis. In 1990, EFF brought conservatives George Turner and Alan Gourley onto its NSW Senate ticket under the slogan “Sack A Politician, Elect A Representative”[47] and subsequently Bryant remained friendly with conservative groups like The Strategy circle[48] and the LOR. He sought their co-optation into his freedom front; but these forces were suspicious of his ambivalence about the monarchy. In 1993, Bryant told Lock, Stock And Barrel of his particular interpretation of Citizens’ Initiated Referenda:

The CIR I support is required to replace the long advocated duty of the monarch.[49]

He would stay ambivalent, ending as a de facto republican, but also a supporter of Pauline Hanson.[50]

The EFF served as a mobilizer. It built sections across Australia. For example, South Australian co-ordinator Doug Giddings, described participation in a series of conservative groups prior to his Freedom Foundation’s association with EFF.[51] He attacked the politics of New World Order capitalism as a cause of the rural economic crisis.[52] The EFF also fielded candidates across Australia. Some initially favourable New South Wales results were not built upon:

Table 8.1 EFF Electoral Results[53]

1988 NSW Legislative Council	72955
1990 NSW Senate	63378
1991 NSW Legislative Council	49077

The EFF continued to field candidates throughout Australia. Although results were unsubstantial, they inferred the availability of a basic clientele for a populist economic-political platform.

The EFF was in hindsight a sort of drummer for a wider movement. Bryant was quick to appreciate the potential in the new anti-immigration groups in the cities but he remained “painfully aware” of the disunion in the country movement and the confusion over strategy and personalities. Nonetheless, Bryant maintained that rural distress could also breed clarity in the activists.[54] One example was Ross Provis, an Inverell farmer with a facile pen, who participated in the farmers’ protests (1984-7). Provis’s account of his political evolution explained how he was drawn into an association with Keith Coulton, trustee for leftover funds belonging to the dissolved 1950’s/1960’s New England New State Movement and President of the ‘Grains Council’. Both men were converts to the idea of CIR and lobbied that it be adopted as Farmers’ Association Policy.[55] In 1988, they founded the ‘Inverell Forum’.[56] The first six Forums (1988-9) brought hundreds of participants to discuss the idea of a ‘freedom movement’, organized in grassroots structures, to defend the rural community. The EFF, ‘Voters’ Veto’ and South Australian ‘Groundswell’ were all actors in the inter-change of views.[57] However, there was continual input from the LOR which argued against political party activity, and from Michael Darby who had unsuccessfully challenged Robert Sparkes for the leadership of the Queensland Nationals, and who led the Forum into divisive debates about Peter Sawyer for whom he organized.

In September 1989, out of the Forum’s chaos, Provis established the ‘Australian Community Movement’ (ACM), “a political party that’s not a party”.[58] A manifesto articulated the Extreme Right countryside consensus, with demands centred around ending immigration, “strong tariffs”, support for the family unit and a moratorium on farm foreclosures. ‘Get Big Or Get Out’ was expressly condemned.[59] The “dictatorial control” of the “party-ocracy”[60] was part of a system of “crime, graft and corruption”.[61] It was to be challenged not just by electoral candidates, but by successful resistance which empowered participants. According to Provis, ACM helped farmers secrete goods against their seizure by re-possession agents, picketed banks and generally tried to create a climate of opinion favourable to the country cause. He also remained aware of the limitations imposed by the absence of an allied urban movement. The ACM did build a working relationship with EFF which had metropolitan activists and continued to organize country-town CIR meetings until 1994,[62] when it fizzled through lack of finance.

The tempo of EFF, the Inverell Forum and ACM was sustained by a certain optimism arising from a base of continuous action. The ‘Rural Action Movement’ (RAM) appeared in two states (Victoria and Western Australia) in 1991; it sabotaged rail lines, organized radio protest discussions and truck-convoy demonstrations.[63] RAM leaflets proclaimed the value of direct action outside of parliamentary parties.[64] The group attracted a ‘protest’ membership, but the leadership was more radical. This pattern also existed in groups such as the Queensland ‘Australian Right To Bear Arms Association’ where Ron Owen’s populist-monarchist ‘The Constitutionalists’ provided both the idea that the right to bear arms was a ‘right’ derived of the 1688 Bill Of Rights, and protest organizers.[65] Some oral evidence was given by Owen and Provis that ‘freedom’ militants were active in mainstream urban and country gun organizations during 1990-5, with the line that gun ownership was an attribute of national defence strategy and the ultimate sanction against bad government.[66] This ‘market’ was potentially a large one which often overlapped with urban groups, and farmers active in anti-bank protests who believed access to guns was a normal social rule. One semi-urban example was the ‘Unite Australia Party’ (UAP) which operated in Picton and Thirlmere where it conducted a public campaign around the aforementioned themes.[67] Was the increasing 1990’s clamour for ‘gun control’ a para-State driven reaction to countryside radicalization? It is impossible to determine that, but there were definite limits upon political radicalization.

The conservative structures competed with the gamut of Extreme Right effort and were not ‘overwhelmed’. In one of his appeals to the ‘freedom movement’ for an alliance, Tony Pitt described the division of organizational method between the populist parties and the conservatives in a manner apposite to the argument of this Thesis:

To those who seek change by educating the people, I would point out that Jeremy and Eric have been educating for 25 years … but education without action is a waste of time. To those who would pressure existing politicians, I would point out that Arthur Chresby and his associates wrote My Will letters for 25 years. The politicians put them in the bin … Independents don’t work either. The voters want to see a party under one name in all states with sensible policies. They do not care that the word party is unacceptable to the purists who hate parties and call themselves foundations, forums, leagues, societies etc. Those who want to be non-political will never fix anything …[68]

Ross Provis and Joe Bryant told the author that they generally concurred with Pitt’s view.

Lee dissented, having told Lock, Stock And Barrel that ‘anti-freedom’ initiatives such as the ‘Australia Card’ “required neither new parties nor candidates”.[69] In one major pamphlet, Lee reproduced The Horsham Declaration, a statement issued as a result of a country people’s rally in Horsham in April 1991.[70] The document ‘typically’ called for re-regulation of banking, a debt-moratorium, orderly marketting of rural products, the abolition of sales tax and a freeze on immigration. Lee argued that this programme should be put to Liberal candidates who could be “threatened with a denial of votes until they take a stand”.[71] Here was the rub. The EFF and ACM, along with RAM and others, attended the Horsham meeting and could endorse the Declaration, but not the LOR/Lee strategy.

Significantly, it was not only the LOR and Lee who temporized over strategy. The Strategy group provided direct evidence not only of strategic difference but also of the ideological variance between radical-populism and conservatism. Published in Bendigo by Ray Platt, The Strategy, founded in 1992, set out to provide a focal point for the independent conservatives (ex-National satellites and new groups) and a co-operative agency for the more radical groups. Essentially, The Strategy regularly advertized and networked the Christian Identity church (a quietist version of the U.S. group), the British Israelite groups, the Anglo-Saxon Keltic Society, Jeremy Lee, Christians Speaking Out, constitutionalist authors and the ‘Monarchist Action Network’ (below) which looked to revivifying the Liberal Party ‘Right’. It sponsored the LOR-influenced Inverell Forum (after Provis’s withdrawal) and worked with Australian Capital Territory Assembly representative Dennis Stephenson, who supported CIR.[72] The Strategy was not nationalist; rather it could support in the name of British-heritage preservation, the secession of Western Australia and Tasmania from Australia.[73] Identity was an abstraction, inherent in the exercise of ‘rights’ against centralist forces.

The Strategy was rapt in the American campaigners Jack McLamb and Jack Mohr, whose material on the New World Order was staple fare.[74] As Barkun observed in the case of writers such as McLamb, their conspiracy theory went beyond “simply an extreme form of economic determinism in which a wealthy elite seeks to further aggrandize itself”, into a description of literal last-days Satanic politics.[75]

This Thesis must reason that the 1960’s/1970’s post-millenarianism of the LOR was replicated and developed by The Strategy’s network. The application of such politics brought similar earthly results: that after first restricting political action and then lending support to Bryant, AAFI and Campbell, The Strategy and its network passed over into the One Nation camp, confirming actual paradigmatic place. Once parts of the Liberal-National ‘Right’ seceded into electoral independence, confusion about electoral-activist-verses-pressure-tactics, vanished. Further, other groups which replied to my Questionnaire, those loyal to “one nation, one flag”,[76] “freedom”[77] and critical of “new class” interests or changes to the civic culture[78] also pushed for a Liberal return to power prior to 1996. Their ‘conservative’ refusal to embrace independent politics confirmed the usefulness of my paradigmatic model.

The conservatives contested with the rural radical-populists for support; but they also sustained a moral climate which the Extreme Right could exploit. Nonetheless, it was clear the rural/country movement could not win its goals without urban allies. Circumstances required an inclusive party which expressed a populist-nationalist programme. A nexus with urban anti-immigration organizations was one solution to isolation.

2. Anti-Immigration Populist Organizations

(a) The Foundation Circumstances Of Australians Against Further Immigration (AAFI)

In May 1988, Dr. Rodney Spencer and his wife Robyn, founded ‘Australians Against Immigration’ in Melbourne, and advertized for members in the daily press.[79]

Victoria’s anti-immigration forces had hitherto divided into two camps. As Chapter Seven discussed, Australian conservative groups understood that under the Hawke government, the pace of Asian immigration had quickened. After the so-called ‘Blainey Debate’ (1984), conservative groups such as the LOR and the ICA (Q) urged a strident defence of the ‘Anglo-Celtic’ British civic culture. The most prominent spokesman for this trend - Victorian RSL President Bruce Ruxton - never encouraged any form of activist politics. Even so, throughout the 1980’s, ‘Anglo-Celtic’ propaganda was widely distributed and its general line-of-march culminated in the 1993 formation of the Ruxton-patronised Monarchist Action Network.[80] In contradistinction, National Action’s “war from the political jungle” claimed its Melbourne scalps, but it stayed politically isolated, recruiting just over 100 members in the city by 1989. With Skinhead gangs and the ANM cell the only other militant ‘anti-immigration’ forces in Melbourne, it may be reasonably concluded an opportunity was available for a tactically moderate, but activist organization.

There was thus a new approach. Evonne Moore, an Unley City councillor (Adelaide) and AAFI candidate, has analysed the growth of an anti-immigration impulse in the Australian environmentalist movement.[81] She explained the development of a population debate within the Australian Conservation Foundation centred around Dr. Geoff Mosley.[82] It occasioned a “dilemma”, whereby some environmentalists believed they would be accused of ‘racism’ in pushing for immigration-restriction, and while employing rhetoric about “sustainability”, they abandoned the field.[83] The gap was filled by ‘Australians For An Ecologically Sustainable Population’, ‘Writers For An Ecologically Sustainable Population’ (supported by poets Judith Wright and Mark O’Connor) - and ‘Australians Against Immigration’. The former groups specifically repudiated any idea of racial preference. Dr Spencer’s organization was equivocal. Its manifesto Australians Against Immigration, proclaimed the group was “open to all regardless of race or cultural origin except those who hold racist beliefs”, but argued, “Australian culture is unique and worthy of continuing”.[84] The AAI’s support for “sustainable” economic progress outside of the Establishment’s free-market/mass-immigration ideology drew support from prominent Victorian academics, such as population-expert Dr. Bob Birrell and Dr. Katherine Betts, neither of whom could be considered ‘racist’. However, the group possessed an underlying dynamic.

A Members’ Letter described members as:

… ordinary concerned citizens like you whose knowledge is imperfect … [but] Common people have common sense …[85]

Yet, the same bulletin issued a populist-nationalist clarion call:

Only when the rich Japanese, Americans and Hong Kong residents start to play Monopoly on TV with nationally-known Australian streets, beaches and scenic country towns, will the majority of Australians, realise they have been disenfranchised for the sake of the greedy minority who hold our national capital and sovereignty as their stock in trade.[86]

Although the group was pioneered as a lobby force and propaganda organization, it was placed in a singular position. The synthesis of an environmentalist argument against immigration with a populist-nationalism directed at overseas economic forces and internal traitors (to whom liberal intellectuals were soon added) was inherently radical. Fortunately, the leadership was not cranky like the conservatives, nor tainted with violence like the Radical-Nationalists and neo-nazis. Dr. Spencer presented as a prosperous general practitioner in a stable middle class marriage and home.[87] Publicity could be generated and members acquired into a non-threatening structure. The name change in 1989 to Australians Against Further Immigration encapsulated the external moderation so far missing from the anti-immigration camp.

Unbeknownst to the Spencers, European ‘national-revolutionary’ organizations had already taken the ‘green road’. The GRECE and The Scorpion had participated in European conferences on nationalist ecologism and the British National Front and other Third Way parties had published extensively[88] against the inter-relationships amongst the capitalist megalopolis, ‘open borders’, and unsustainable growth. The Australian Populist Movement had raised similar arguments. However, the Spencers and their new recruit, Dennis McCormack, a flamboyant intellectual who was fluent in Mandarin, were verbally effective in this approach and unburdened by participation in the neo-fascist tradition.

The AAFI’s push towards activist and electoralist politics involved that partial delegitimization of the Australian State expressed in the ‘lesser’ delegitimization of governments and opinion makers. This process could be understood as the main characteristic of the Extreme Right paradigm. The 1990 AAFI Manifesto explained immigration as a disadvantage to wage earners compelled to compete, to the quality of life, and to the environment - all neglected by parties with a “disregard for public opinion”.[89] There was also the threat of subjugation:

The mass movement of people from third to first world countries will not solve third world problems but will create third world standards of living in the countries unwilling to resist such immigration. [90]

An insulated ruling class would emerge:

The wealthy insulate themselves with their private facilities, pools, clubs, country and beach properties. Once again, the average Australian is hardest hit …[91]

There was the idea of social-contract in the “institutional foundation of Australian life”. Australia as established in 1901 was not “British” but unique, free of the “class system” of the old world as a consequence of mateship and egalitarianism.[92] The governments of the 1970’s - 1980’s had repudiated this vision and thus provided ‘justification’ for AAFI’s campaign. The party would appeal to the common sense of the common Australian to defend an archetypal cultural identity.

The AAFI emerged less than half-way through the Hawke-Keating Labor era. The sporadic challenges to immigration/multiculturalism launched by Radical-Nationalists, neo-nazis and conservatives may well have encouraged government, business and liberal forces to intensify these programmes, while striking hard at such forces to maintain their marginality. This did not mean however, that there was not public disquiet at the pace of ‘racial-change’. By 1991-2, a new genre of critical literature had come into being which challenged the costs, underlying economic-rationale and cultural assumptions of immigration.[93] This criticism could marry with the economic dislocations of rationalization-globalization. With this connection, the anti-immigration message won a suburban audience. How AAFI sought to mobilize a grassroots constituency and make an ideological and electoral challenge to immigration is now examined.

(b) Electoral Breakthrough For Anti-Immigration Politics

During the years 1991-5, the AAFI became a national organization, with some claim to minority-party status. With almost 2000 members by early 1995,[94] the AAFI showed skill in winning a degree of legitimacy through adaption to opportunity such that it influenced Australia’s immigration debate. How was this achieved?

Essentially, AAFI’s position on Australian population policy ensured it could mirror the policy of legitimate forces during its implantation phase. During Senator Coulter’s leadership of the Australian Democrats, his party urged a population policy which would have restricted immigration;[95] and, as late as 1993, the Australian Conservation Foundation recommended zero net migration.[96] Australians For An Ecologically Sustainable Population stayed vocal, participating in government population policy discussions, and arguing against the “loss of biodiversity and deforestation” through population increase.[97] The AAFI played these cards, organizing seminar-like events where Birrell, Betts and O’Connor spoke alongside McCormack, to posit that immigration had become harmful to both the physical and cultural environment.[98] The pacific presentation of AAFI was such, that McCormack was considered suitable to address the Bureau Of Immigration Research’s November 1992 conference, where he announced that “Australia is not a solution to any country’s population problems” and called immigration policy a veritable cargo cult.[99] In the years to 1993, AAFI’s electoral propaganda placed environmental maintenance as its central consideration.[100] Essentially, the AAFI achieved a national implantation before it was accused of ‘racism’.

The AAFI was also energetic in use of media; regular press releases and letters to the editor of metropolitan newspapers were issued.[101] Members appeared at meetings of community groups and electorate gatherings. Although newspapers like Melbourne’s The Age never referred to AAFI candidates before 1994 as other than ‘independents’,[102] the party name was still widely broadcast prior to organizational ‘take off’.

Progressively and deliberately, the AAFI penetrated circles with anti-Establishment/anti-immigration perspectives. In Adelaide, AAFI liaised with the ‘Australian Patriots’ Movement’ a round-table discussion forum directed by Evonne Moore and Dr. Joseph Smith of Flinders University. Smith condemned the idea of a “borderless world”, a “Universal Empire” constructed by agencies like the Trilateral Commission; for Australia it meant the “decadence of Australian culture, materialism, individualism and consumerism”[103] amidst environmental degradation. Eventually from mid-1994, Moore provided local leadership for AAFI. Peter Crawford, a personal friend of NSW Labor Premier Bob Carr and ex-Labor M.P. for Balmain, became a Sydney committee member in 1992; he lobbied for a strong environmentalist position.[104] However, in 1992-4, AAFI developed very different associations, accepting speaking invitations to League Of Rights seminars. This shift, which demonstrated the anti-Establishment quality of populist politics, alienated Birrell and Betts, but it encouraged a new supporter base. In 1994, the “racist” National Reporter group in Sydney affiliated,[105] and former National Action members joined. The differing sources of support sent different public messages; although ‘anti-racist’ resistance now crystallized, AAFI was henceforward armed with additional aggressive cadre.

The AAFI cultivated a most valuable link with Graeme Campbell, whose parliamentary speeches against immigration often relied on McCormack’s research.[106] In 1994, he openly campaigned for AAFI candidates,[107] which assisted in building a public image of legitimacy. In turn, Campbell could point to AAFI’s struggle as indicative of community feeling in an age of big-party bipartisanship and as a credible opposition to the “social engineering” which threatened to turn “our country into a nation of tribes”.[108]

The AAFI participated in electoral politics during 1990-93 in order to focus its organizational talents and gain public attention. The otherwise insignificant vote-tallies did not reflect the publicity won and the steady achievement of name-recognition. The early results were:

Table 8.2 AAFI Election Results To 1993[109]

1991	Menzies By-Election	6.84%
1992	Wills By-Election	0.9%
1993	NSW Senate	0.67%
1993	Victoria Senate	0.69%
1993	South Australia Senate	0.38%
1993	A.C.T. Senate	0.21%

Thereafter, in a series of 1994 by-elections, AAFI produced results which suggested a ‘breakthrough’ for the urban Extreme Right. These results were:

Table 8.3 AAFI 1994 By-Election Results[110]

January 29	Werriwa (NSW)	7.24%
March 19	Boynthon (S.A.)	6.82%
March 26	Mackellar (NSW)	8.16%
March 26	Warringah (NSW)	13.54%
November 19	Kooyong (Vic)	7.91%

Nick Economou’s analysis of the early-year results[111] referred to various factors in each contest: absence of a Democrat (one case) which could have delivered protest votes; the absence of Labor candidates (two cases) which probably encouraged interest-voting; there was a ‘tradition’ of anti-major party voting in Werriwa. He argued that interpretation was difficult, a theme taken up by some journalists.[112] However, there was a contrary view which reasoned that in Werriwa, AAFI campaigned successfully, proving to voters how immigration “was not a single issue”, but one of generalized social impact; it had popularized intellectual arguments and also won some non Anglo-Celtic voters.[113] The later strong result in Kooyong tended to confirm that AAFI had mobilized a new constituency.

The immediate concrete result of by-election participation was wide media attention, and thence the steady increase in AAFI membership which grew to about 800 in Sydney by early 1995. With that came an appetite to break into the New South Wales Legislative Council courtesy of its proportional voting system.[114] Electoral successes brought the party to a crossroads. Its officially ‘non-racist’ stand (AAFI’s Constitution excluded holders of “racist views” from membership)[115] and its melding of environmental and cultural concerns, revived an anti-immigration consciousness that neither neo-nazi underclass violence nor marginalized Radical-Nationalist activism (1991-4), had achieved. The AAFI’s new usage of the term ‘nationalist’ alongside an aggressive condemnation of “Asianisation”,[116] meant it was defining its political direction; here, AAFI would occupy political space for interest-voters, those who voted for principles and policies, without reference to class, geographic location, or age. It could theoretically defuse any challenge from Radical-Nationalists for space and move towards Campbell’s Labor populism or other Extreme Right forces. However, events soon showed that AAFI had not developed a consistent strategy which bound its leadership.

Sue Hammond, who served AAFI briefly as New South Wales chairperson in mid-1995, was in CAP when she first advocated a new Extreme Right political and electoral front.[117] Other leaders like Terry Cooksley and Peter Krumins had argued that too,[118] but the new members who demanded electoral action and the New South Wales leadership around Edwin Woodger who were also keen on subordinating ideological development and cadre development to electoral contest, considered AAFI alone could alter the political climate on multiculturalism and immigration by a major electoral campaign. While AAFI failed to elect Woodger to the Legislative Council in 1995, it did illustrate ‘breakthrough’ into a potentially stable new anti-big-party ‘nationalist’ constituency.

A full analysis of the March 1995 returns was completed for the AAFI executive by Warwick Tyler, candidate for Blacktown.[119] While seat by seat discussion is not appropriate here, Tyler’s close attention to detail, permitted this Thesis to offer overview: the total vote over twenty electorates was 38,016 or 5.9 per cent on this sample; a limited survey in Blacktown showed considerable variation (2 per cent) between manned and unmanned polling booths; AAFI polled better in ‘Labor areas’ (Campbelltown, Blacktown, Ermington, Davidson) than in ‘Liberal areas’; Labor/Liberal preferences split 26 per cent/28 per cent but 36 per cent of AAFI voters gave no preference; AAFI received one-eighth of Green preferences and a smattering of small party preferences; AAFI polled well in Myall Lakes (Taree) and The Entrance (7.5 per cent and 6.2 per cent respectively), benefitting perhaps from urban-flight voters.

The organizing dynamo in this campaign was the Secretary - Woodger - who saw “spectacular results” in the achievement.[120] Unfortunately, the truism that electoralism breeds opportunism in radical politics, should be applied to AAFI’s post-election chaos. Briefly: most of the candidates, drawn chiefly from petty bourgeois backgrounds and many members too, had favoured Woodger’s broad thrust over Dr Spencer’s plea for concentration on key seats. Nonetheless, after the poll, and with the party in debt, some rallied back to his faction (see next Section) and clashed with Woodger over future directions. The organization had grown ‘too fast’ in Sydney. The AAFI was weak in Western Australia and Queensland, weaker than National Action in South Australia and insignificant elsewhere, but from its Melbourne stronghold, it was in Spencer’s grip. According to some credible participants the Sydney section was in 1994-5, too preoccupied with posing as a ‘popular alternative’ to assess the party’s human and material resources soberly and develop organization in depth.[121]

The AAFI’s crisis came as Australia’s public debate on race and identity was souring. The Right was definitely combative. For example, National Action clashed on the streets of Melbourne and Adelaide in May-July 1995 with the Left ‘anti-racists’; the mayors of Port Lincoln and Port Augusta became strident critics of multiculturalism, and in early 1996 Mayor Joy Baluch (Port Augusta) denounced some Asian migrants as “scum” while advocating a vote for AAFI.[122] The party, now obviously the anti-immigration darling of most Extreme Right and Conservative Right forces, was “endorsed” by The Strategy newspaper[123] and served as a magnetic pole for those who saw it as a key player in a general regroupment on the Right. That appeared to be Campbell’s view. Some momentum had been lost in schism and the 1996 federal election results were only in the ‘fringe-party’ 2-3 per cent range. Even so, AAFI was still a major player on the Extreme Right and as opportunity presented, ready to take a “co-operative” role in a new alliance.[124]

(c) Splits and Division

The 1995 splits in AAFI, which created a Federal ‘Reclaim Australia Reduce Immigration’ (RARI) and an independent ‘AAFI’ in New South Wales, further clarify Extreme Right politics and organization, particularly as a prelude to the foundation of Australia First and One Nation.

Following the ALP’s defeat in the March 1996 poll, Paul Keating resigned from his Sydney seat of ‘Blaxland’, an electorate centred on cosmopolitan Bankstown. A by-election conducted on June 16 1996, without a Liberal candidate, produced a shock result: Peter Krumins (AAFI), 8759 votes (13.63 per cent); John Hutchison (RARI), 5771 votes (8.98 per cent).[125]

Although accepted by Labor’s candidate as a barometer of public opinion on the multiracial society,[126] and seemingly a major breakthrough for the Extreme Right, the result occurred at the tail end of an AAFI/RARI internecine ‘war’ which, according to Krumins’s inside view, had already weakened his party in the Federal poll in New South Wales and elsewhere, and limited his branch’s ability to capitalize on sensational results.[127]

The 1995 ruptures in Sydney AAFI created two factions - one loyal to Woodger and another to Spencer. Personal rancour occurred, of a sort which suggested some cadre treated their party as a club. The feud, fought between January and July, showed a lack of ideological depth. The issues seemed to be whether ‘Sydney’ would be run by ‘Melbourne’ and whether Woodger was a “dictator”.[128] It was Spencer who offered an analysis of the NSW branch’s 1995 electoral campaign which led into broader issues of ideological-political function:

In 1993 NSW Senate AAFI obtained 23,000 votes or 0.69% … In 1995 NSW Legislative Council … 56,000 votes or 1.65% … In 1995 NSW Lower House … 38,000 votes or 5.4% in 21 seats … In 1994/5 by-elections [Federal] averaged 8% … [We conclude] … 1. People will vote where they find AAFI in a small field, but not in … the Legislative Council 2. Lower House votes do not translate into Upper House votes.[129]

In another document, Spencer said:

AAFI uses the electoral system, but our function is far wider. We must have an organization … people capable of debating issues, researching information … media presentation and … (inter-group liaison) …[130]

Spencer was planning for the long-haul. In reply, Woodger argued for a “nationalist” party with “broad” public appeal but thoroughly organized around electoral contests.[131] Woodger’s supporters apparently excluded ideological contest from their method. The NSW State Electoral Office eventually recognized the ‘State’ AAFI under Woodger as the legal entity;[132] however, there is no real doubt that both this group and its federal equivalent the RARI, were splits from the Spencer organization.

An examination of the Electoral Office file showed correspondence which testified to the tensions in the party. Once again, as with CAP in 1993, allegations of ‘conspiracy’ were raised by some leaders. Party Secretary, Janey Woodger, told the author of a 1994 visit from Kay Whitty, a corrupt police officer from the State Intelligence Group, who aggressively advised AAFI against “contact with extremists”;[133] perhaps this showed para-State concern that AAFI could become more militant. One disruptive person, “Wayne Robinson”, used a friend in the Federal Police to forward misleading fax messages; he addressed open letters to the membership and waged factional warfare, before dropping from the scene.[134] Some members received anonymous threats and “peculiar” phone calls[135]. The ‘NSDAP’ infiltrated meetings and offended members.[136] This Thesis cannot make any firm conclusion as to a ‘dirty tricks operation’ although the possibility exists. The disruption in the NSW branch had the effect of wasting resources and energy. The AAFI schism produced weakness at the critical moment Campbell chose to build a new Extreme Right party, and as Pauline Hanson entered Federal Parliament. We might conclude that the topography of Right politics in the following period was affected by incidental factors which occasioned a certain demobilization of AAFI towards electoral politics only.

(d) A New ‘Labor’ Populism: Rex Connor (Jr) And Graeme Campbell

The possibility of a ‘nationalist’ split from mainstream Labor politics was a longstanding Extreme Right hypothesis.[137] Its ultimate advent centred on Reginald (Rex) F.X. Connor, son of Whitlam government Minister Rex Connor, and Graeme Campbell, Federal Member for Kalgoorlie (1980-98). No personal connection between the men is known.

The 1988 foundation of the ‘Rex Connor Senior Labor Party’ (RCSLP), resulted from personal and ideological considerations derivative of factional and parliamentary pre-selection brawling in Wollongong-area Labor branches in 1986-8.[138] Connor was sidelined by the ALP machine and made a personal enemy in Stewart West, a Minister in the Hawke government. Expelled from the ALP in early 1988, Connor was followed by 200 disgruntled Laborites.[139] Sure he could win West’s seat of ‘Cunningham’, a party was registered which could draw on residual community goodwill towards Connor Senior. This old-style nationalist’s “buy back the farm” policy, was thereafter contrasted to Hawke-Keating internationalism and ‘deregulation’.[140]

The evidence showed the RCSLP failed to capitalize on any other disquiet in Labor ranks outside the Illawarra, but it could be reasonably characterized as a response of some members to the party’s ‘new’ 1980’s direction. Connor’s re-statement of former Labor Party policies was stridently expressed in the RCSLP Constitution; it demanded:

The establishment of a planned and regulated economy, the absolute protection of Australia’s … industries … a sane and selective immigration policy … price and cost controls …[141]

Connor’s political ‘radicalization’ mirrored Tony Pitt’s, validating the existence of the ‘Extreme Right’ category in my tripartite Right model. Pitt wrote that the ‘rot’ in Australia (economic decline, over-regulation, ‘socialism’) set in with Whitlam after 1972. Both major parties lost their compact with the public, whereas the ‘conservative’ parties broke faith with him.[142] Connor has stated that Labor lost its natural path when Whitlam repudiated his father’s economic nationalism.[143] He gave his raison d’etre as:

… this once great political party has turned its back on its origins and is slowly betraying those … who fought … almost 100 years ago … Truly it must and will be said, no one has left the Labor Party, for the reality is, that the Labor Party has deserted us.[144]

Neither Pitt nor Connor rejected the monarchical state, but both published against the legitimacy of traditional party loyalties and government policies.[145] Although opposed to each other about planning and regulation, they shared opposition to foreign banks, land sales and ‘de-industrialization’.

The RCSLP was registered on July 14 1989 over the stringent objection of the ALP which carried on administrative action until 1991.[146] There was probably concern that Connor could un-seat West, and considerable bitterness between the parties - which bubbled over into actual physical violence at polling stations during the March 1990 election.[147] Although the RCSLP maintained energy throughout the Illawarra, in its use of traditional campaigning methods (the purchase of radio time, newspaper advertizing and regular meetings), it could not expand its electoral appeal beyond fixed limits. Its results in the 1990 and 1993 Federal elections, were:

Table 8.4 Rex Connor (Snr) Labor Party Election Results[148]

1990 Rex Connor: Cunningham	7947 votes: 13%
1990 J. Doyle: Eden Monaro	330 votes: .47%
1993 Rex Connor: Throsby	7083 votes: 10.48%

The continuing evolution of the RCSLP indicated convergence with the ‘national populism’ of the CAP, AAFI and other Extreme Right groups. The RCSLP warned against Labor’s New World Order government “conspiracy”,[149] the “absurd proposition of multiculturalism”,[150] the multi-function polis and defence unpreparedness.[151] The ultimate renaming of the party in 1994 as the “Advance Australia Party”[152] saw the creation of a Platform And Policy which was ‘soft-green’, decentralist, “opposed to the policies of multiracialism, multiculturalism and Asianisation”, and against the culture of “internationalism, dependency and cosmopolitan sameness”; it supported gun ownership and “traditional family values”.[153] Indeed as Chapter Seven observed, the RCSLP was considered part of the Extreme Right family by other constituents - like the CAP.

Connor was addressing ‘the people’ dispossessed of decision-making power and the bearers of democratic authority and the native identity: “One Flag, One Nation, One Future”.[154] This populist commitment, common to old Labor and the new Extreme Right organizations, was obviously a key aspect in the RCSLP’s drift towards these new movements.

Graeme Campbell’s trajectory led to a similar position. As ‘Member For Kalgoorlie’ (ALP), Campbell represented for 18 years (1980-98) the largest electorate in the democratic world,[155] earned the sobriquet of “maverick”, won an Aboriginal following and was a 1980’s critic of Labor policy. After assisting Keating in his 1990 leadership ‘coup’ against Prime Minister Hawke, Campbell took to opposition towards internationalization.

Between 1991 and 1994, Campbell authored a set of ideological texts which signalled his rupture with ALP politics. In Immigration And Consensus (1991), which sparked a mini-immigration debate,[156] Campbell condemned Labor’s bourgeois leaders who “regard the Australian working class with derision … (because) … the working class is most resistant to their agenda”. They pushed high immigration to break Labor’s privileges and pursue “integration into Asia”. The “working class” and the “middle class” possessed “common sense” in the struggle against “the schemes of big business” and the “intellectuals”.[157] Then, in Industry Policy: Directions For Growth (1992), Campbell denounced “Adam Smith” anti-protection principles and urged an economic “Australian nationalism”.[158]

His book, Australia Betrayed, was first published in 1992. This manifesto, which also made an impression on the Right, criticized liberal media, multiculturalism, deregulation, new elites, “Asianization” and Australia’s economic internationalization; these evils were cast as a system which corrupted both major parties.[159] Was Campbell a Radical-Nationalist in National Action’s mode?

Campbell set out the limits of his ideological and tactical radicalization in a speech, The Struggle For True Australian Independence (1994). He said:

… the country’s biggest battle will be won or lost at home … fought between groups with two broadly conflicting views of how Australia should … secure its future and the skirmishes have already begun. One view can be described as basically nationalist and the other broadly internationalist. Naturally, both sides will attract extremists, but it is the moderates with coherent visions and a commitment to democracy who will determine the outcome.[160]

To certain liberal and Jewish opinion, Campbell had taken the ‘extremist’ road. Campbell told the author that the “Jewish lobby”, by concentrating on his decision to address the October 1993 League Of Rights national seminar, smeared him with anti-semitism and extremism.[161] Campbell insisted his democratic ideals and commitment to a Constitutional Monarchy precluded that.[162] While this Thesis could say this was sound when placed upon an ideological paradigm, his critics would scarcely concur.

The 1990’s were years of aggressive Jewish community agitation favouring anti-racial vilification legislation,[163] for action on war crimes prosecutions and for anti-racist political mobilization. An overview of the Australian Jewish News and Australia-Israel Review revealed continuous attention to issues such as German neo-nazism, multiculturalism and ‘Holocaust revisionism’.[164] Yet, Isi Leibler in his The Israel-Diaspora Identity Crisis: A Looming Disaster (1994), provided evidence of a different agenda concerned with “alarming” rates of Jewish inter-marriage, and the “Holocaust cult”, which ‘educated’ gentiles, but ignored “Jewish education”. He also said candidly:

… anti-semitism can no longer be relied upon as a strengthening element of Jewish identity … [it] has virtually been eliminated …[165]

Anti-semitism was endlessly ‘located’ by Jewish publicists in the CEC and the LOR.[166] Moreover, the swirling Right vortex around Campbell appeared even more threatening. Greason attempted to persuade Campbell against talking to the LOR;[167] Jewish writers reasoned that AAFI was ‘racist’, LOR-connected and possibly anti-semitic.[168] In August 1995, Australia-Israel Review uncovered a video of Campbell addressing the LOR; his words, that Paul Keating’s “state funeral” would be his best contribution to Labor’s fortunes, occasioned Labor dismay. Campbell’s ultimate sin was to address a November AAFI conference, which brought his expulsion from the ALP.[169]

In early 1996, Campbell commenced approaches to the ‘gun lobby’ around Victorian Sporting Shooters’ Association President, Ted Drane; through his ‘Friends Of Graeme Campbell’ he organized meetings to prepare for an ‘Australia First Party’.[170] His ‘Labor’ nationalism and protectionism, and the enviro-cultural anti-immigration stand of his AAFI allies, also attracted Queensland recruits from the ‘direct democracy and local branch’ faction of the CAP.[171] The pace of these developments elicited counter-reactions from Australia-Israel Review, which lobbied to alienate the shooters and sow disputation.[172]

Whereas Connor and Campbell were pale versions of Langite nationalism, they could be seen in that tradition. The essential fluidity of their Labor politics easily produced positions akin to AAFI and CAP. Indeed, Campbell spoke of CAP as a kindred spirit and averred not to repeat its errors;[173] but as his followers penetrated the Queensland rural networks, Campbell came up against the ‘conservative’ side in CAP’s internal rows. Noticeably after the 1996 federal poll, came the ‘radicalization’ of the conservatives of the Liberal/National party electorate. Although potentially a factor in Campbell’s favour (and symbolised best by Hanson’s election to parliament and the “support groups” which championed her), it represented a challenge for national organization. Campbell’s difficulties with Drane’s gun lobby (thereafter the Reform Party),[174] a bad press and AAFI’s split, combined to limit opportunity. Reasonably, these circumstances contributed to the ONP occupying his political space. Campbell had predicted the “demise of the National Party”,[175] but the volatility of the Queensland Right served as a springboard for conservative pseudo-charismatic Hansonism, not activist organization and politics.

3. The Membership, Organization and Politics Of Radical-Populism

As discussed in this Chapter, radical-populism grew from source pools in both rural and urban Australia. Because of the post-1987 crisis of confidence in the National Party (with the Queensland environment favouring the formation of the Confederate Action Party), and continuing New Right deregulation policies which engendered discontent and confusion, an opening for new organizations was available. Further, the ALP’s aggressive high-immigration and enforced multiculturalist policies and strident economic internationalism, encouraged an urban opposition, willing to function outside mainstream politics. This section asks: who held membership and directed radical-populist organizations?; how were the groups organized?; allowing for their different foci, what features permit the named groups to be catalogued together?

(a) Membership

Significant membership and historical data were available on the EFF, AAFI and RCSLP from those files maintained by the Australian Electoral Commission and the NSW Electoral Office. Due to particular requirements, names of organizers were generally eliminated from AEC files; no membership lists were accessed. Fortunately, the NSW files on the EFF and AAFI contained membership information. Of course, other-states detail was not held in these files, and it was consequently necessary to blend participant interviews and media reports to build the composite all-Australia picture. Membership data on other radical-populist organizations was patchy, and collected from organization-questionnaires, publications and interviews.

The Independent EFF demonstrated a membership increase to a peak of under 1000 around 1992, a growth contiguous to that of the CAP.[176]

In 1988, EFF presented the NSW Electoral Office with a membership list to meet state party-registration requirements. The entire File was provided to the author by administrative mistake; while a list of members’ occupations was made,[177] a subsequent request for access so that an ‘ethnic derivations’ list could be constructed - was declined. There were 265 members.

The EFF was initiated in Sydney before its gravity shifted westwards; hence, the initial membership was largely metropolitan. Using the same occupational categories employed in the National Action discussion, we observe:

Table 8.5 EFF Membership By Occupational Category

Unskilled	Skilled Manual	White Collar Employees
56	68	56

Students	Professionals	Business
2	47	29

(seven were unlisted)

There were clusters of housewives, shop assistants, milk vendors and secretaries, which suggested a particular linear recruitment through friends and business acquaintances. As EFF grew however, it gained rural/country town members scattered in many locales. Membership was reputedly derived of diverse occupations[178] and consequently not restricted to any obvious single sector; older than average persons predominated.

The AAFI showed steady membership increase throughout the study period. Figures available in AEC files indicated 631 members in November 1989 when AAFI applied for party registration,[179] rising to almost 2000 members in 1995. The NSW File contained membership details on 349 persons and I compiled a list of names/addresses.[180] Unfortunately, there was no occupational data; but the ethnic-surname check revealed some 317 ‘Anglo-Celtic’ and 32 Continental-European names.

The leaders of AAFI perceived that party membership was attractive to a layer of older, economically secure native-born Australians (including many women), a pattern operative in all branches;[181] the leadership involved some professional and otherwise educated persons whose vision for the party went beyond electoral contest and the provision of a culturally-homogenous retreat-structure for those angered by multiculturalism. The organization of this Spencer-McCormack agenda was rewarded by recruitment of members in universities, academia and the professions, thereby replicating the foundation cadre which granted the party a certain intellectual vitality.

As some leaders observed, AAFI suffered tension between the ‘intellectual’ push inspired by enviro-cultural nationalism, and the “ordinary members” who pursued the electoralist method as a technique to mobilize ‘voter materialism’ around themes such as unemployment, education, health and transport services.[182] In a democratic, non-vanguardist organization, membership quality and strategic-tactical perspective, could and did become related volatile issues.

The RCSLP had, as of June 22 1989, a membership of 563 persons.[183] Membership was maintained throughout the study period.[184] The resignation of some 200 ALP members in the greater-Wollongong area to join the Connor party[185] set its tone as a ‘working class’ organization. Shirley Connor told the author that the initial members, who were generally active trades unionists, turned to friends and contacts to recruit additional members.[186] This enhanced the ‘working class’ quality of the organization, as much as its campaign themes ensured it via linear recruitment.

One election leaflet issued in 1990, was authorised by 102 persons who could be understood as party members.[187] As completed elsewhere, a breakdown of surnames revealed sixty-six ‘Anglo-Celtic’ and thirty-six Continental-European names. The strong ‘Euro’ representation implied an appeal beyond the old Anglo-Celtic working class. Shirley Connor told the author these proportions held good in the organization generally.[188] Reasonably, the RCSLP membership was ‘homogenous’ by class and political origins and united across ‘Old-New’ Australian lines by a recitation of the nativist prescription of national identity born from Labor tradition. The ultimate attempt to broaden the party’s appeal as the ‘Advance Australia Party’ merely confirmed (despite RCSLP’s overwhelmingly working-class aspect), the populist quality of the labour heritage.

The other groups such as Australian Community Movement, Inverell Forum and Rural Action Movement were country organizations, while the Unite Australia Party operated on the urban fringe near Wollongong. The anecdotal evidence affirmed that the country groups attracted poorer farmers, truckers and rural labourers;[189] the ACM described its supporter base and recruitment targets as: “farmers, small-business proprietors/managers, truckies, fishermen, shooters, monarchists, Christians, pro-flag supporters, tax reformers, bank victims and pro-defence groups …”,[190] with some hundreds recruited.[191] Doug Giddings, who operated both Australian Independent Alliance and Australian Freedom Foundation in addition to his EFF role, reported “less than three hundred members”[192] for both, drawn from those categories referred to here; some supporters were from Adelaide although cross-penetration of old LOR and Social Credit networks in the Eyre Peninsula, Whyalla and Port Lincoln occurred, ensuring the non-metropolitan emphasis. Therefore the country groups were inevitably ‘Anglo-Celtic’ or native born, and of the late-middle-aged/older generation.

The membership data when generalized, showed the predominance of the ‘productive class’ of populist mythology or ‘the middle class’ and ‘working class’ - something which encouraged a general electoral appeal. The radical-populist organizations, upon a tabulation of the figures, involved about 4000 persons in the period 1988-95.

That membership interest in the political issues of these groups was sustained over a decade, as confirmed by the rapid implantation of the Campbell and Hanson parties in 1996-7, and the recruitment of their then-present and inactive cadres and members.[193] Membership quality presented some radical-populist groups with a difficulty, since the older and less educated would restrain progress through their preference for external moderation, loose organization and interminable internal debate, leaving organizational achievement to the scarce ‘dynamic’ cadres.

(b) Organization

Unlike other forms of the Extreme Right, the radical-populists seem not to have produced any key blue-print document for the conduct of politics and organization. Nonetheless, attention applied to what the organizations did would explain organizational methods and quality.

The significant groups (EFF/AAFI/RCSLP) were electoral ‘parties’. They were organizations open to the general public by subscription fee and subject to normal rules.[194] The structures of these three bodies were different. While EFF membership was widely scattered with weak metropolitan cells, the RCSLP was geographically concentrated; but both were the possession of dominant personalities. Only AAFI produced a genuinely national structure albeit with constitutional imperfections (as above), with definable state leaderships and a tentative system of local organizers.[195] Whether the structure of the groups favoured individual or collective responsibility seemed incidental.

The smaller and non-electoral groups were loosely organized. The ACM united CIR activists and farmer-protesters in north-west New South Wales electorates, without having a disciplined centre.

The RAM in Victoria and Western Australia, despite its country town demonstrations, produce dumping, and its stated programme of ‘challenge’ to the National Party and the NFF, retained the features of a media-oriented propaganda organization; but it kept networks alive and sustained the militant activist psychology.

None of the radical-populist movements functioned with public shops and offices but there were many near-full-time activists paid from their own pockets.[196] Generally, groups were run from private homes, formally met in rented halls and communicated by direct personal and electronic contact.[197] Like the CAP, the radical-populist groups often used home meetings, social events and outdoor picnics to bond membership.[198] The election campaigns or specialized protests, as described in the other sub-sections, united the memberships in action.

The radical-populist experience of organization involves flexibility, but the serious groups too, do not appear to have been intensively mobilized. Although there was no model for the achievement of power, electoral or counter-hegemonic (either at the ideological or social-economic level), their electoral and activist achievements were clear, and signified a certain capacity for Extreme Right ‘electoral breakthrough’ on a scale beyond AAFI’s impressive scores and the 1992-3 surge of the CAP.

(c) The Politics Of Radical-Populism

Chapter Seven’s discussion of populist-monarchism as an ‘antipodean version’ of European national populism should be recalled here, since populist-monarchism and radical-populism shared a similar place in the typology; each argued for the partial delegitimization of the State, and mobilized beyond the Conservative Right boundary. Whereas the populist-monarchists and their reactive radical interpretation of constitutional-monarchical power was a narrower focus, the radical-populist family articulated oppositionist ideology in a superficially more modern, yet still culturalist, reaction at several points: to rural crisis and decline, the perceived displacement of Euro-Australians by non-whites, and the alienation felt towards the political and social elites. The mythic Australian ‘way of life’ was challenged and many publications argued for its defence.[199] Jon Stratton who projected this same impulse onto Pauline Hanson, defined this culturalist discourse:

One unforeseen consequence of the major parties’ consensus to support non-discriminatory migration and the policy of multiculturalism, has been that there has been nowhere to go for those with economic and social concerns … during the Hawke - Keating ascendency, … large numbers of people were increasingly hurting economically … the socio-economic transformation of Australia appeared to be intimately bound up with their economic impoverishment.[200]

Stratton’s idea of alienation has a complement in the European scholarship of Right extremism which centres on those ‘losers’ in the process of modernization who critique the system’s legitimacy.[201] It is confirmed by Carol Johnson’s interpretation of the ONP ‘losers’ and Australian conservatism which articulated grievances and resentments against globalist economics and the visible population change.[202] Certainly, the late-middle-aged and older generation memberships recalled an ‘earlier’ Australia of 1950’s/1960’s prosperity and Euro-homogeneity; more succinctly they were the opponents of internationalization. As ‘nationalists’ they desired to cut across Left/Right political and social divides to unite the disenfranchised Australian and empower the individual.

The typology of radical-populism indicated this. First, the country gun-owners groups which inter-linked with more ‘mainstream’ urban bodies, demanded the right to bear arms by Common Law right and as a defence mechanism against usurpation of government by New World Order forces.[203] Second, the principles of Citizens’ Initiated Referendum, Veto and Recall, once principles of the Australian Labor Party,[204] were central political planks, presented as necessary adjuncts to Parliaments which should represent the people, not the party system.[205] Like the populist-monarchists, an “anti politics” is contained within the programme; but the ‘Queen’ and ‘Westminster’ were not the focal points they were for the populist-monarchists. The talk was more of a sovereign people exercising direct power. Third, usually conceived around protest, the groups generally advocated a debt-free ‘National Credit’ system, “re-regulation”, protection, small private enterprise and Australian independence against globalization. The political Left had abandoned this field, leaving the Extreme Right to ‘defend’ farmers and the urban poor, against the capitalist order. Fourth, around the issues of immigration and multiculturalism, there were ultimate defences of Australian identity and independence, and a capacity to mobilize younger memberships.

The new typology had that synthetic quality drawn from historical Australian Left and Right heritages. It inspired strident propaganda focused on issues of public concern. This radical-populist politics favoured protest and electoral action, not confrontation, and unlike Radical-Nationalism, did not delegitimize the historical-political basis of the State which would have permitted republicanism and contestation with the State’s ideological and repressive apparatuses. Lastly, Spoonley’s ‘petty bourgeoisie’ argument about the essence of the Extreme Right’s politics might deserve some reconsideration, just as far as leadership cadres were concerned; there was certainly a rebellion against the new ‘elite’ middle class, but also that uncertainty of how far to go in undermining the mainstream parties through a more aggressive conduct. Only towards the end of the study period were there signs of radicalization in National Party voters and indications of a real urban potential around the gun movement[206] and ‘racist’ voting, which together could have supported deeper radicalization.

CONCLUSION

The radical-populist family of the Extreme Right was not conditioned by a central formation which established its quality. Rather, it was diffuse, with core values rather than external labels, demonstrating populist character.

These core values were: a belief in an Australian cultural identity that was neither ‘British’ nor exclusively ‘Euro-nativist’; a culturalist position not absolutely exclusive of non-white input; a commitment to the idea of a common sense Australian people secure within an economic system serving their interest and organized against bureaucracy, big business and the banks; an idea of direct democracy, firearms ownership and common law derived individual rights.

The radical-populist organizations emerged at different political points as opportunity presented. They emerged from ongoing rural-country town decline, from the environmentalist movement unable to accommodate populationist argument, from disquiet in Labor ranks at the pace of immigration and globalization, from suburban Australia under assault from immigration-multiculturalism and economic instability.

Yet this extra-systemic crisis-response was an incomplete radicalization conformative to the Extreme Right model advanced here. It used electoralism and built cadres and education structures, but avoided violence and confrontationism. There were strong electoral showings which mobilized memberships. Specific clienteles appeared for each form of the phenomenon, with leaderships and cadres expressive of their concerns.

Together with the populist-monarchists, the radical-populists represent a national-populist phenomenon, broadly similar to European movements of the Extreme Right. While the radical-populists denied space to the Radical-Nationalists, neither they nor the populist-monarchists could disintegrate the conservative structures in their favour (despite some inroads), nor fracture support for the New Right National Party. The chances for a national Extreme Right party, lost first in 1993 with CAP’s disintegration, and again in the misfired Campbell movement of 1995-6, prefigured a new phase of independent conservative mobilization and the birth of ‘One Nation’ in 1997.

---

[1] Margaret Canovan, Populism, London, 1981, pp. 1, 8-10, 290-92, 294.

[2] David Hine, “Elite-Mass Linkages In Europe: Legitimacy Crisis Or Party Crisis”, in Jack Hayward (ed.), Elitism, Populism And European Politics, Oxford, 1996, p. 145.

[3] Carol Johnson, “Pauline Hanson And One Nation”, in Hans Georg Betz and Stefan Immerfall (eds.), The New Politics Of The Right: Neo-Populist Parties And Movements In Established Democracies, New York, 1998, p. 216.

[4] Andraes Schedler (ed.), The End Of Politics: Explorations Into Modern Anti-Politics, Basingstoke, 1997, passim.

[5] See: There Is Something You Can Do, Australian Community Movement pamphlet, undated, p. 4; The Rip Off Factor, EFF election leaflet, 1988; CAP official Cec Clark’s appeal to the “freedom movement” for unity, was couched in these very terms - To All Freedom Loving Organizations, Open Letter, January 6 1995.

[6] Note could be made of affairs surrounding: Sir Robert Askin; the Queensland Fitzgerald Inquiry (Chapter Seven); the ‘West Australia Inc.’ Royal Commission 1991 ff; the misuse of police powers provides references too numerous to cite.

[7] Craig M. White, Directory Of Conservative, New Right And Anti-Socialist Organizations, the author, 1988; Conservative Action And Victory Fund, A Directory Of Organizations, Maitland, 1986; Loyal Organizations, Confederate Action Party leaflet, 1992; Untitled List Of Organizations, Confederate Action Party leaflet, 1995.

[8] As discussed hereunder. In author’s possession.

[9] Richard Barrett, Is God A Racist? , pp. 9, 28-30; Paul Spoonley, The Politics Of Nostalgia, pp. 16-18, 69-70.

[10] See: David Greason, “Bullets And Ballots”, Rolling Stone, No. 489, November 1993, pp. 39-40; Gerard Henderson, “The Great Conspiracy To Enslave Australia”, Sydney Morning Herald, June 22 1993, p. 13.

[11] Tom Connors, To Speak With One Voice: The Quest By Australian Farmers For Federal Unity, Kingston, 1996, pp. 3-4, 140-141.

[12] Rod Metcalfe, “Costs Must Be No Bar To Victory: NFF Leader”, The Land, August 1985, in File: NFF Fund, in National Farmer’s Federation-Fund Box, in, The Land Archives.

[13] Don Jones, “A Giant Step Forward For Agriculture”, The Land, July 13 1989, op.cit.

[14] Tom Connors, op.cit., pp. 240-243; See the following for ALP’s dispute with means not ends: Michael Grattan, “Hawke Hits ‘Lunacy’ Of New Right”, The Age, August 29 1986, p. 1; The Hon. J.S. Dawkins, MP, The False Patriots Of The New Right, Sydney Speech, January 26 1986, pamphlet form (no publishing details, in author’s possession).

[15] Peter Austen, “Banks’ Secret Agenda Behind Debt Blow Out”, The Land, October 6 1988”, in Finance Banks Futures Box, in The Land Archives.

[16] “Deregulation Began A Long Road To Crisis”, The Land, April 18 1991, in Finance Banks Futures Box, in The Land Archives.

[17] David Petrukas, “NFF ‘Not Going For Throat’ - Militants”, The Land, undated (but 1986), National Farmers Federation- Fund Box.

[18] Vernon Graham, “‘Canowindra Seven’ Plans To Make Farmers Revolutionaries”, in Rural Crisis 1986-1988 Box, in The Land Archives.

[19] Tom Connors, op.cit., pp. 59-61.

[20] Vernon Graham, “Old Timers Back Protests - If They’re Legal”, The Land, February 2 1986, Rural Crisis 1986-1988 Box, in op.cit.; Vernon Graham, “Farm Militancy Has Grass Roots Support”, The Land, June 5 1986, ibid.

[21] Allan Jones, The Enemy Behind Your Enemies, Concord West, undated (but 1986), pp. 21-25; A. R. Jones, Beyond Economic Treadmill, Concord West, 1986, pp. 55-71.

[22] A.R. Jones, The Eureka Message, broadsheet pamphlet, 1987, p. 1, for opposition to system parties; for Bjelke-Petersen/New Right nexus, see: “Grass Roots News: What Really Happened At Wagga”, The Optimist, No. 12, January-February 1987, pp. 10-11.

[23] Vernon Graham, “Fighting For The Family Farm”, The Land, July 23 1987, in Rural Crisis 1986-1988 Box, in The Land Archives.

[24] Tim Powell, “More Anti-Bank Protests Likely”, The Land, July 9 1987, in Rural Crisis 1986-1988 Box, in The Land Archives.

[25] Andrew Byrne, “Outback Militia On ‘War’ Footing”, Sydney Morning Herald, May 5 1995, pp. 1, 7; various television reports 1990-5 on video, in author’s possession.

[26] Who Are Aussie Freedom Scouts?, leaflet, undated.

[27] “Hunt For Extreme Rightists”, Sydney Telegraph-Mirror, May 5 1995, p. 4; “Freedom For ‘Scouts’ Is Right To Bear Arms”, Sydney Morning Herald, May 5 1995, p. 7.

[28] Ian Murphy, “Letter To The Editor”, untitled document (in author’s possession); AUSI Freedom Press Release, undated (in author’s possession).

[29] Richard Piggot, “Bank Bills Could Cut Interest Rates”, no other details, in Finance-General Interest Rates Box, in, The Land Archives; “Demand Mounts For Farm Interest Relief”, The Land, March 20 1986, op.cit.

[30] Brian Aarons, Here Come The Uglies, pp. 87-89; Andrew Moore, The Right Road?, pp. 134-5.

[31] For the ‘two nations’ discussion, see: Antony Green, “Nationals Face Threat From New Breed Of Independents”, Sydney Morning Herald, March 20 1999, p. 11; Paul Sheehan, “Angry Bush Set To Spark A Revolution”, Sydney Morning Herald, March 22 1999, p. 17.

[32] Don Jones, “Indebted Farmers Face A New Twist”, The Land, August 9 1990, in Finance Banks Futures Box, in The Land Archives.

[33] G.A.R. and S.S. Muirhead, Secession: Benefit, Duty, Necessity, Tanah Merah, 1993, pp. 12-13, 56. On the Muirhead struggle, see below.

[34] Lee Masters, “Bryant Sickened”, Blacktown Advocate, October 21 1987, in Blacktown City Council Personal File BR0019/1 Joseph Bryant; Joe Bryant, Telephone Interview, June 1999; Joe Bryant, Fellow Australian, Open Letter, August 1987.

[35] Joe Bryant, Fellow Australians, Open Letter, January 11 1988.

[36] The EFF Platform, leaflet, September 1987.

[37] See Bryant’s artwork used in The Optimist, No. 15, July - August 1987, p. 1; Joe Bryant.

[38] “New Political Party To Start In Central West”, Western Advocate, August 1 1988, in Australian Electoral Commission, Party Registration - Independent Freedom And Family File No. 88/00495.

[39] Joe Bryant, The Reasons For Independent EFF, EFF pamphlet, January 1988.

[40] About Independent EFF, leaflet, 1988.

[41] Megan Timmins, “Censure Motion Over Council Brawl”, Daily Mirror, October 23 1989, in Blacktown City Council Personal File BR0019/1 Joseph Bryant.

[42] See: “Mall Hosts Trojan Horse”, The Advocate (Coffs Harbour), August 6 1988, p. 1; “Trojan Horse”, West Wyalong Advocate, July 26 1988, p. 3; New Campaign For Trojan Horse”, The Northern Star, August 12 1988, p. 6; People’s Trojan Horse, Tour Of New South Wales, EFF leaflet, undated (1989).

[43] Joe Bryant, quoted in Graeme Johnson, “Keating Cool On Trojans”, The Sun (Melbourne), May 28 1988, p. 9.

[44] The Trojan Horse Story, leaflet, undated.

[45] “Freedom Rally”, Lock, Stock And Barrel, No. 12, October-November 1993, pp. 26-31.

[46] “Interview With Joe Bryant”, Lock, Stock And Barrel, No. 15, April-May 1994, p. 45.

[47] Sack A Politician: Elect A Representative.

[48] See: The Strategy’s reports on the Federal Parliament ‘demonstration’ by “Effie”: August 1995, pp. 1, 7; September 1995, pp. 1, 3.

[49] “Interview With Joe Bryant”, loc.cit., p. 46.

[50] In 1999, as a contribution to Australia’s ‘republic debate’, Bryant produced Alternative Three: Draft Proposed Constitution Of The Commonwealth Of Australia, St. Mary’s, 1999 and The Alternative Three Constitutional Review: Your Say, Your Future Freedom, St. Mary’s, 1999, which defend the Common Law inheritance - without the Monarch; John Pasquarelli, The Pauline Hanson Story: By The Man Who Knows, French’s Forest, 1998, pp. 134-5.

[51] Doug Giddings, Interview, October 1997.

[52] Australian Freedom Foundation: Truth In Time, AFF pamphlet, undated.

[53] State Electoral Office, New South Wales Legislative Council Election, 1988, p. 141; State Electoral Office, New South Wales Legislative Council Election, 1991, p. 136; Australian Electoral Commission, Senate Election: New South Wales: Statement Showing The Result Of Scrutiny Of First Preference Votes, p. 2.

[54] Joe Bryant.

[55] Ross Provis, The Inverell Forums: A Unique Page In Australian Politics, the author, undated (but 1990), pp. 1-2.

[56] First National Independent Conference Program, June 1988.

[57] Second Inverell Forum Program, August 1988; Minutes: Second Inverell Forum, August 12 1988; Ross Provis, Interview, May 1999.

[58] The Australian Community Movement: The Party That’s Not A Party, ACM leaflet, undated.

[59] The Rural Crisis Is A Grave National Crisis, ACM pamphlet, Inverell, 1990.

[60] What Is ACM? ACM Is You, ACM pamphlet, Inverell, 1990.

[61] Australian Community Movement Policy Guidelines, Inverell, 1991, p. 3.

[62] Taree Action Conference, ACM invitation, 1994.

[63] Ken Edwards, “Nasty Turn On The Land”, Time, December 9 1991, pp. 54-5.

[64] The Family Farm Is Australia, RAM leaflet, undated.

[65] The Constitutionalists, leaflet, undated; Ron Owen.

[66] Ron Owen; Ross Provis.

[67] Australians!, Unite Australia Party, leaflet, 1995.

[68] Tony Pitt, To All Groups Interested In Saving Australia, Open Letter, May 15 1994.

[69] “Interview With Jeremy Lee”, Lock, Stock And Barrel, No. 12, October-November 1993, pp. 63-4.

[70] Jeremy Lee, The New World Order And The Destruction Of Australian Industry, Cranbrook, 1991, pp. 92-94.

[71] ibid., p. 92.

[72] The list of The Strategy contacts etc. from a reading of all numbers 1992-1995.

[73] “Will Apple Isle Secede?”, The Strategy, September 1994, p. 1; “Will Premier Court Take W.A. To Secession? Or Will The West Succumb To Centralised Government?”, The Strategy, May 1995, pp. 1, 2.

[74] “Jack McLamb Is Coming”, The Strategy, July 1995, p. 17; see also various booklists in The Strategy.

[75] Michael Barkun, “Religion, Militias And Oklahoma City: The Mind Of Conspiratorialists”, Terrorism And Political Violence, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 55, 58.

[76] R.F. Sherlock, Dear Concerned Citizens, A Better Compassionate Australia Movement pamphlet, Perth, February 1995.

[77] Charles J. Connelly, The Committee For Integrity In Government, leaflet, undated (Brisbane).

[78] J.M. Cooray, Common Sense On Immigration From An Asian-Born Australian Citizen, Australians For Common Sense Freedom And Responsibility pamphlet, Epping, undated.

[79] See: Australians Against Immigration, leaflet, 1988.

[80] Monarchist Action Network: Act Now, Defend A Free Australia, Heritage Society pamphlet, 1993.

[81] Evonne Moore, “A Sustainable Population For Australia : Dilemma For The Green Movement”, Master Of Environmental Studies Thesis, University of Adelaide, 1990, pp. 59-61.

[82] Dr. Geoff Mosley, National Self-Sufficiency; Living Within Our Means: A Fundamental Solution To The Environment Crisis, Melbourne 1994, for a summary of his long-standing arguments.

[83] Evonne Moore, op.cit., pp. 59-62, 70-71.

[84] Australians Against Immigration, Armidale, 1988, pp. 10-11.

[85] Australians Against Immigration, Members’ Letter, undated 1988, pp. 1, 3.

[86] ibid. p. 2.

[87] Paul Heinrichs, “The Good Doctor Yearns For Those Old Values”, The Age (Late Edition), March 28 1994, p. 1.

[88] See: “Ecology: The Growing Dilemma”, The Scorpion, No. 11, Summer 1987, pp. 3-15; “Harness Nature - Don’t Destroy It”, National Front News, No. 112, November 1988, p. 1; “Animal Rights”, Third Way, No. 5, undated (1990).

[89] Australians Against Further Immigration Manifesto, p. 2.

[90] ibid., p. 3.

[91] ibid, p. 5.

[92] ibid, pp. 9-10.

[93] Stephen J. Rimmer, The Costs Of Multiculturalism, Bedford Park, 1991; Lionel Duncombe, Immigration And The Decline of Democracy In Australia, Canberra, 1992; Katherine Betts, Ideology And Immigration, Melbourne, 1988.

[94] Dennis McCormack; Edwin Woodger; Peter Krumins; a reasonable computation when Electoral Files are considered.

[95] Australian Democrats Immigration Policy, leaflet, September 1995. This document was essentially a reprint of the earlier 1991 sheet.

[96] Population, Australian Conservation Foundation broadsheet, 1993, p. 4.

[97] “Australia’s Carrying Capacity Inquiry - Final Report Of The Parliamentary Committee”, AESP Newsletter, No. 25, March 1995, pp. 2-3.

[98] AAFI Sydney meeting invitation leaflet, November 2 1992.

[99] Denis McCormack, The Desirable Composition Of Any Migrant Intake, Speech At The Bureau Of Immigration Research Second National Immigration Outlook Conference, November 1992, p. 419.

[100] Keep Australia Liveable, leaflet 1993, “Immigration - Time For A Decision”, in AAFI Sydney Members’ Election Letter, February 1993; Vote 1: Australians Against Further Immigration, leaflet, 1993.

[101] See: press cuttings leaflet in possession of author; this AAFI NSW 1994 leaflet featured Melbourne Herald-Sun, March 3 1993 election article, and a The Age letter.

[102] Rodney Spencer, “A Party Against More Migration”, Letter To The Editor, The Age, March 3 1993, p. 12.

[103] Joseph Wayne Smith, The Remorseless Working Of Things: AIDS, The Global Crisis: An Ecological Critique Of Internationalism, Canberra, pp. 67, 89-90.

[104] Debra Jopson, “Anti-Immigration Party Pitches Case At Jobless, Greens”, Sydney Morning Herald, December 2 1995, p. 29.

[105] Andrew Silverberg, “We’re Not Racist, But … “, Sydney Morning Herald, April 15 1994, p. 11.

[106] Graeme Campbell; Dennis McCormack; “Australians Against Factual Information”, Australia-Israel Review, June 1-14 1994, p. 11.

[107] Graeme Campbell, Put Australia And Australians First, electorate letter, March 10 1994; Innes Wilcox, “The Backbencher Who Bites Back”, The Age, April 4 1994, p. 13.

[108] Graeme Campbell, Put Australia And Australians First.

[109] “Menzies By-Election”, in Australian Electoral Commission, 1990-91 Annual Report - Appendix H - Table 2; “Wills By-Election”, Election Newsfile, No. 24, April 1992; Australian Electoral Commission, Statistics: Result Of Count; Senate House Of Representatives, Canberra, 1993, pp. 8, 10, 18, 21.

[110] Australian Electoral Commission, “By-Elections, Werriwa, Boynthon, Mackellar, Warringah, Kooyong”, from Internet, www.aec.gov.au/EXTERNAL/results/by-elections/October 19 1999.

[111] Nick Economou, “A New Constituency Or A Glitch In The System? A Note On Recent AAFI Federal By-Election Results”, People And Place, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 30-35.

[112] Kate Legge, “Closed Door Politics”, The Weekend Australian, March 26-27 1994, p. 24; Innex Wilcox, “Bolkus Hits ‘Misleading’ Poll Policies”, The Age, March 29 1994, p. 7.

[113] Lyle Allan, “Immigration And The Werriwa By-Election”, People And Place, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1994, pp. 53-56.

[114] “Political Campaign For Next Seven Months”, Australians Against Further Immigration Members Letter, September 1994.

[115] Australians Against Further Immigration Constitution, p. 1.

[116] Vote 1 Robyn Spencer, AAFI leaflet, March 1994; Dennis McCormack, quoted in Alan Ramsey, “A Wilderness Voice We Can’t Ignore”, Sydney Morning Herald, March 1994, p. 31.

[117] Chapter 7. Note 124.

[118] Terry Cooksley; Peter Krumins.

[119] Warwick Tyler, AAFI Election 1995 Report.

[120] Australians Against Further Immigration, untitled members bulletin, April 1995.

[121] Terry Cooksley; Peter Krumins.

[122] David Penberthy, “Some Asians Scum: Mayor”, The Adelaide Advertiser, February 28 1996, p. 3; Rick Holden, “Mayors Unite To Back Anti-Migration Party”, The Adelaide Advertiser, February 27 1996, p. 1; “New Call For Mayor To Resign”, The Adelaide Advertiser, March 1 1996, p. 8.

[123] “A Vote For The Future: Australians Against Further Immigration”, The Strategy, March 1996, pp. 1-2, p. 4.

[124] Australians Against Further Immigration Newsletter, October 1996, p. 7.

[125] AEC, House Of Representatives By-Election Blaxland: Result Of Scrutiny Of First Preference Votes, July 15 1996.

[126] Philip Cornford, “Anti-Migrant Vote No Surprise”, Sydney Morning Herald, June 18 1996, p. 9.

[127] Peter Krumins, Interview, July 1996.

[128] Take Over By Melbourne: Attempt No. 3, AAFI (Woodger) Letter, undated; E. Woodger, De-Registration Last Week: Calls For Party Split This Week. Spencer Attempts To Destroy Your Party, May 31 1995; E. Woodger, Letter >From E. Woodger Secretary NSW State Party AAFI, August 1995; “Unfortunate But Necessary - Removal of Secretary Woodger Explained”, AAFI News, October 1995, pp. 5-6.

[129] Rodney Spencer, Letter To NSW Members From the Federal Executive, undated.

[130] Rodney Spencer, The Need For New Leadership In NSW, undated.

[131] Edwin Woodger, Takeover By Melbourne Attempt No. 3, RARI/AAFI Members’ Letters, undated (but September 1995).

[132] Crown Solicitor’s Office, “Letter To The Electoral Commissioner”, February 6 1996, in NSW State Electoral Office, Parties: Australians Against Further Immigration File 96/856.

[133] Janey Woodger, Interview, July 1996. For Whitty’s ‘corrupt’ character, see: Royal Commission Into The New South Wales Police Service, Transcript, pp. 21191-21196.

[134] Edwin Woodger; Janey Woodger; Peter Krumins; Terry Cooksley; Wayne Robinson, Dear Fellow Member, January 27 1995 (in author’s possession). Other Robinson texts are in the State Electoral Office file on AAFI.

[135] Peter Krumins.

[136] See Chapter 6, Section 3(a).

[137] J. Saleam, Australia’s Road To National Revolution, pp. 7-8; drawn from different Australian People’s Congress papers: “A New Left”, National Vanguard, August-September-October 1985, p. 1; “A New Left”, The Green March, No. 1, February-March 1986, p. 1; “Broad Left Conference”, The Green March, No. 4, August-September 1986, p. 5.

[138] Rex Connor, Address To Chairman/Members Of The Commission, p. 2, and “Connor Makes Move For Federal Seat”, Illawarra Mercury, February 15 1989, in Australian Electoral Commission, Party Registration - Rex Connor Snr Labor Party File 89/146.

[139] “Rex Connor Snr. Labor Party: One Nation, One Future”, Illawarra Mercury, April 11 1989, in AEC, op.cit.

[140] Rex Connor, “Selling Off More Of The Farm”, advertisement, Administrative Appeals Tribunal - Australia Labor Party - Party Registration. Rex Connor Snr Labor Party File 89/743.

[141] Rex Connor (Snr) Labor Party Constitution in AEC, Party Registration - Rex Connor (Snr) Labor Party File No. 89/146.

[142] Tony Pitt, A Proposal For Co-Ordination But Not Amalgamation, Open Letter, May 2 1991.

[143] “West Bags Connor For Riding On Dad’s Name”, Illawarra Mercury, February 23 1990, p. 2; Rex Connor, Address To Australian Electoral Commission, in AEC, Party Registration - Rex Connor (Snr) Labor Party File 89/146.

[144] Rex Connor, Media Release, November 13 1988.

[145] Rex Connor, Statement Of Concern About The Grave Social And Economic Situation Within Australia, Daily Telegraph, July 13 1989, in AEC, op.cit.; Tony Pitt’s commentary in Fight was effusive. For example: “There Is Alternative”, Fight, No. 6, February 1993, p. 1.

[146] Seventieth Meeting Of The Australian Electoral Commission, July 14 1989, in AEC, Administrative Appeals Tribunal - Australian Labor Party - Rex Connor Snr Labor Party File 89/743.

[147] Helen Thew, “Voters Confused By Two ‘Labors’”, Daily Telegraph, March 27 1990, p. 8.

[148] Australian Electoral Commission, House Of Representatives Election: New South Wales, 1990, Canberra, 1990, Table 3, pp. 6-7; AEC, New South Wales House Of Representatives Election 1993, Canberra, 1993, Table 3, p. 35.

[149] Rex Connor, “Selling Off More Of The Farm”.

[150] Rex Connor, A Point Of View, transcript of talk on Radio 2VOX FM, February 4 1991, p. 4.

[151] “Whither Australia”, RCSLP advertisement, Daily Telegraph, June 8 1990, p. 9.

[152] AEC, Party Registration - Advance Australia Party (AAP) File No. 95/724.

[153] Advance Australia Party Platform And Policy, Wollongong, undated.

[154] Advance Australia Party, leaflet, 1995.

[155] Don Pinwell, An Introduction To Australia First, Kingaroy, 1986, p. 5.

[156] Brad Crouch, “White Australia Was Right: MP Pushes For Change To ‘Gutless’ Stand”, Sunday Telegraph, January 26 1992, pp. 14-15; Jason Alexander, “MP Slams Immigration Policy”, The Kalgoorlie Miner, May 18 1991, p. 3.

[157] Graeme Campbell, Immigration And Consensus: A Discussion Paper, Canberra, June update 1992, pp. 28, 10, 63-64.

[158] Graeme Campbell, Industry Policy: Directions For Growth: A Discussion Paper, Canberra, August 1992, pp. 3, 20.

[159] Graeme Campbell and Mark Uhlmann, Australia Betrayed: How Australian Democracy Has Been Undermined And Our Naïve Trust Betrayed, Victoria Park, 1995, pp. vi-viii.

[160] Graeme Campbell, The Struggle For True Australian Independence, University of New England, Armidale, September 2 1994 (Speech at Drummond College), p. 9.

[161] David Greason, “Graeme And The Kernels”, Australia-Israel Review, Vol. 18, No. 18, October 12-25 1993.

[162] Graeme Campbell, Telephone Interview, June 1997. See LOR praise for Campbell: “Behind The David Greason Affairs” and “Zionist Jewish Lobby Financing Both Australian Parties”, in New Times, August 1994, pp. 6-7, which quoted criticism from Campbell of particular Jewish community lobbying.

[163] “Ministers Differ Over Race Law”, Australian Jewish News, June 3 1994, Section 1, pp. 1-2, for views of Executive Council Of Australian Jewry; “Racists Must Face Jail”, Daily Telegraph, May 31 1994, p. 14, for view of Mark Leibler of the Zionist Federation; Peter Costello M.P., Speech To The 36^th Biennial Conference Of The Zionist Federation Of Australia, Melbourne, May 29 1994, transcript version, passim.

[164] The author consistently read Australian Jewish News 1990 ff. and examined near-all numbers of Australia-Israel Review 1990 ff. in reaching this conclusion.

[165] Isi Leibler, The Israel-Diaspora Identity Crisis: A Looming Disaster, broadsheet, 1994.

[166] “Cranky Cranks”, Australia-Israel Review, December 7-31 1993, p. 6; see Chapter Three, Notes 3, 4, 5 and 6; Irene Nemes, “Anti Semitic Hostility” in Chris Cunneen, David Fraser, Stephen Thomsen, op.cit., pp. 64-65 which quotes other Jewish sources.

[167] David Greason, “Graeme And The Kernels”; Graeme Campbell.

[168] “Simply La-AAFI-ble”, Australia-Israel Review, 10-30 August 1994, p. 11; Andrew Silverberg, “Who’s In League With The ‘AAFI’?”, Australia-Israel Review, 13-24 April 1994, p. 11.

[169] Michael Millett, “Defiant MP Refuses To Apologise To ALP”, Sydney Morning Herald, August 2 1995, p. 4; Paul Chamberlain and Michelle Grattan, “Rebel MP Campbell Axed By ALP Executive”, The Age, December 1 1995, p. 1.

[170] An Australia Day To Remember Media Release, January 1996; Australia First, leaflet, 1996.

[171] Don Pinwell; Dawn Brown: see Don Pinwell, op.cit., pp. 10-12, where CAP themes were recounted.

[172] David Greason, Australia First: Third Reich, Fourth Force, Fifth Column, document in possession of author; Michael Shannon, Campbell’s First Flops, document in possession of author.

[173] Graeme Campbell, paraphrased from Robert Keating, “Campbell Guns For The Nationals”, The Strategy, September 1996, p. 3.

[174] “Secret Birth Of Hatchet Jobs”, The Strategy, August 1996, pp. 1,3; Mike Steketee, “Tingle Snubs Campbell Party Overture”, The Australian, June 25 1996, p. 4.

[175] Graeme Campbell, quoted in, Lenore Taylor and Mike Steketee, “Australia First Opens Fire In Favour Of Political Home For ‘Patriotic Majority’”, The Australian, June 1996, p. 2.

[176] EFF Letter To The AEC (unsigned), June 20 1991, in AEC, Party Registration - Independent Enterprise Freedom And Family (EFF) File No. 92/0088; see also Note 125 in Chapter Seven.

[177] Drawn from: Register Of Membership Independent EFF, in NSW State Electoral Office, Policy File: Parties: Independent EFF No. 96/775.

[178] Doug Giddings, Interview, October 1997.

[179] “Minute Paper: Party Registration Australians Against Further Immigration, 14 February 1990”, in AEC, Party Registration - Australians Against Further Immigration File 89/1008.

[180] List Of NSW Members Of AAFI 1995, self-titled, in NSW State Electoral Office, Parties: Australians Against Further Immigration File 96/856.

[181] Dennis McCormack; Peter Krumins; Edwin Woodger.

[182] Drawn from: Vote For Australians Against Further Immigration And The People Of Werriwa Will Achieve, AAFI Leaflet, 1994.

[183] “Meeting With President And General Secretary Of The Rex Connor (Snr.) Labor Party, Canberra, June 22 1989”, in AEC, Party Registration - Rex Connor Snr. Labor Party File 89/146.

[184] “Minute Paper, October 12 1993”, op.cit.

[185] “Advertisement, Illawarra Mercury, April 11 1989”, op.cit.

[186] Shirley Connor, conversation with author, May 1990.

[187] Rex Connor: Candidate For Cunningham, RCSLP leaflet, 1990.

[188] Shirley Connor.

[189] Doug Giddings; Ron Owen.

[190] Ross Provis, Dear Concerned Australian, Open Letter, undated (but 1993).

[191] Ross Provis.

[192] Australian Freedom Foundation/Australian Independent Alliance, Questionnaire (in author’s possession).

[193] For a general confirmation see: Mike Steketee, “Messiahs Of The Right”, Weekend Australian, May 3-4 1997, p. 22; Gerard Henderson, “Hanson’s Truth: Nothing But”, Sydney Morning Herald, April 29 1997, p. 11; Brian Woodley, “Fellow Travellers”, Weekend Australian, May 31 - June 1 1997, p. 25.

[194] Independent EFF Rules, September 12 1987; Australians Against Further Immigration Constitution, 1988; Rex Connor (Snr.) Labor Party, Membership Form, undated.

[195] See organizers’ list for Sydney in, AAFI Members’ Letter, August 27 1995.

[196] Edwin Woodger; Dennis McCormack; Doug Giddings; Ross Provis; Shirley Connor; Joe Bryant.

[197] Drawn from: a series of AAFI meeting invitation forms 1989-95 (Melbourne and Sydney), in author’s possession; Minutes Of Advance Australia Party Meeting, May 23 1995; Joe Bryant; Ross Provis.

[198] Ross Provis; drawn from a number of Sydney sub-branch AAFI social gathering invitations, in author’s possession.

[199] Australia For Australians, Unite Australia Party leaflet, undated; Dennis McCormack, The Desirable Composition Of Any Australian Migrant Intake, passim.

[200] Jon Stratton, Race Daze: Australia In Identity Crisis, Sydney, 1998, pp. 212, 214.

[201] Bettina Westle and Oskar Niedermeyer, “Contemporary Right-Wing Extremism In West Germany: ‘The Republicans’ And Their Electorate”, European Journal Of Political Research, Vol. 22, No. 1, July 1992, pp. 6, 11, 19, 23; Michael Minkenberg, “The New Right In Germany: The Transformation Of Conservatism And The Extreme Right”, loc.cit., pp. 67, 70, 77.

[202] Carol Johnson, op.cit.

[203] Australian Right To Bear Arms Association, leaflet, 1993 (untitled).

[204] Geoffrey Walker, Initiative And Referendum: The People’s Law, St. Leonards, 1994, p. 20.

[205] Bruce Chapman, Electors’ Initiative And Referendum: Why We Need It: How It Works, Gympie, (undated); Ross Provis, The Question Of Standing Candidates, Inverell, 1988, passim; Gympie Elect CIR, Public Participation And Direct Democracy In North Sydney Municipality, Gympie, 1990.

[206] Kevin Meade, “Campbell Finds Audience In Nats Heartland”, The Australian, June 7 1996, p. 2; Bernard Lagan, “Bushwhacked: The Nationals In The Breach”, The Sydney Morning Herald, June 1 1996; “Gun Rage”, The Sun Herald, June 2 1996, pp. 1, 2.