This Chapter analyses the third face of the contemporary Australian Extreme Right - populist-monarchism.


It groups together those ‘freedom’ organizations, represented chiefly by the Confederate Action Party (1990-5), which shared a common ideological belief - that the Australian Constitution contains a populist-democratic sub-text and the de-personalized Monarchy incarnates the popular will.


It is argued that the populist-monarchists emerged out of the crisis of confidence experienced amongst especially Queensland Conservative Right organizations during the late-1980’s.  Ultimately, some conservatives rejected the auxiliary loyalty shown towards the National Party and in responding to official corruption favoured the moralization of politics.  This Chapter applies into the contemporary period the logic of Chapters One and Two.  Independence of conservative norms therefore is conceived as retaining a tension, despite the creation of electoral and activist organization with new social bases, and especially after the conservative-auxiliaries received independence from the State.


This Chapter begins by differentiating the satellite conservatives from the New Right which, while it did utilize some traditionalist iconography and inspire many Nationals, expressed an internationalist liberal-economic ideology.  Other analysis has muddled together the Conservative Right, Extreme Right and New Right.  Once this confusion is cleared away, my analysis of populist-monarchist politics can be compared with models of foreign populist Right parties as discussed in academic literature.


Last, the Chapter will answer particular questions:


·                How did the Satellite Right prepare the ground for populist-monarchist organization?

·                How was this new phase of Extreme Right independence expressed politically?

·                How were the populist-monarchist groups organized and who joined?  What was their impact?


This Chapter advances an interpretative narrative to illustrate where appropriate the labrynthine inter-relationships of the Right family.



1.                    The New Right Muddle


The vocal 1980’s ‘New Right’ impressed the Australian Left as extremist and racist and bonded to the requirements of aggressive capitalism.[1]  Moore generally accepted this critique;  he endorsed Paul Spoonley’s book which linked the international New Right and the ‘Extreme Right’.[2] 


Yet Spoonley could not distinguish between New Right economic rationalism, ‘Thatcherism’ and ‘Reaganism’ and the French Nouvelle Droit - which rejected the notion of ‘economic man’.[3]  Senator John Woodley’s Fascism Fundamentalism And The New Right compounded this error.[4]  Nouvelle Droit’s subterranean links with the Front National, which after 1978 advanced policies of a New Right character (Atlantic Alliance, deregulation, ‘economic liberty’),[5] convinced them of the New Right’s subversive, racist and fascist essence.[6]  After ignoring the Front National’s ideological complexity,[7] and drift after 1986 towards working class and ex-communist voters, and its anti-Americanism,[8] Woodley proceeded by adopting a discredited view of historical fascism’s external eclecticism:


… to pin down Fascism to a final doctrinal statement is impossible.  Rather than a consistent philosophy, Fascism is an amalgam of bits and pieces pitched together from other and even contradictory philosophies …[9]


Consequently, it became easy to confuse New Right social-economic ‘restructuring’ with the marxian model of Extreme Right or fascist integrative violence:


.. those movements of the extreme right which are experiencing a revival … should be described as fascist rather than conservative … they don’t stand for progressive reform within a framework of traditional institutions … there is little difference between the objectives of the New Right and the totalitarian control exercised by the classical fascists … The ‘individual’ of right-wing ideology can achieve his freedom … only if the rights of the poor, of the workers, of the unemployed and other ‘out-groups’ are ignored or suppressed …[10]


This interpretation overlooked the New Right’s ‘globalism’, ‘multiracialism’ and its non-violent organizational character.


Of relevance here, Frankel discerned the political cleavages on the 1980’s Australian Right in the new international environment.  Tracing this development out of the Fraser period, he argued:


Anti-communism was not sufficient in itself to paper over the deep cracks which … divided racists in the League Of Rights from non racists in the DLP … [National Civic Council][11]


He observed both the old conservatives and the New Right shared some enemies:   “multiculturalists”, “environmentalists” and “the larger egalitarian and modernist cultural tendency”;  however, they were sharply divided on nationalism, protectionism and race.[12]  Prominent New Rightist and mass-immigrationist Greg Sheridan, understood the Australian New Right as a streaming together of market-liberals, Santamaria’s anti-communist moral philosophy and the pro-American conservatism of the Quadrant school.[13]  Sheridan had little time for true-believer conservatives or Extreme Rightists.  His liberal positions on immigration made him a continual, indefatigible opponent of racist  nationalism.[14]  Sheridan, and  others  such  as  John Hyde,[15]  Katherine  West[16] and Hugh Morgan[17] epitomized the liberal-conservatism which in dialectical tandem with Labor ‘Accord-ism’ pushed immigration and the ‘economic restructuring’ of the 1980’s.


The early study of Marian Sawer (1982) averred that the New Right was a philosophic and energetic assertion of hypercapitalist principle whatever its connection (like its American cousin) to moralist, pro-family, Christian fundamentalist and anti-feminist groups.[18]  This overlap was recognized by the LOR[19] and enthusiastically endorsed by Urbanchich Liberals in New South Wales as expressive of common intent.[20]  However (as below), with the exception of Bjelke-Petersen, no substantive alliance was ever sought by the Australian New Right with the conservatives.


Nonetheless, some scholarship has maintained that New Right ideology contributed to the growth of the Extreme Right parties in various countries - by legitimizing them.[21]  This theory suggested migrant-assimilationist, anti-socialist and individualist propagandizing opened some sort of new political space which, rather than being occupied by ‘traditional’ parties, was seized by “Extreme Right” parties such as the Front National, the German Republikaner and the Austrian Freedom Party.  No example of this ‘process’ in Britain or the United States could be advanced which is significant, given these countries provided the New Right with prominent champions.  This theory seems to unite marxists, some liberals and official-conservatives in a worried and blame-casting framework.[22]


Possibly the Extreme Right was ‘legitimized’ only in a very limited way.  However, neo-liberal economics does not mobilize a cross-class and youth movement and notably, ‘successful’ European Extreme Right parties had moved away from these ‘legitimizing’ ideas by the close of the 1980’s.  Nonetheless, two 1980’s Australian New Right positions did figure in some later Conservative Right and Extreme Right propaganda:  first, an hysterical opposition to the Aboriginal Land Rights movement and second, an anglomorphic assimilationist attitude to migrants.[23]



2.                    The Conservative Right:  From Satellite Status To Independence 1975-90


(a)                Bjelke-Petersen’s Satellites


By the close of the 1980’s two inter-related events had occurred on the Right:  first, the last links which bound auxiliary conservatism to the capitalist state were broken and second, from the conservative soil an Extreme Right developed.  These occurrences shall be reasoned as largely derivative of Queensland’s political exceptionalism.


Interestingly, conservatives and liberals provided a clue to understanding the process.  Each considered Bjelke-Petersen in a dialectically similar way:  one had him defending traditional Australia against change;  the other pilloried him as a hold-out against social liberalization.  Significantly, his authority rested upon the developmentalist capitalism of the mining and rural-export entrepreneurs who provided the financial means to maintain his croneyist politics.[24]  Here, the development of Australian capitalism could be seen as uneven.  Consequently, earlier modes of political method and official ideology could survive in a nook partly sheltered from the economic direction and problems of the other states.[25] 


This materialist causation applies when we note also that Bjelke-Petersen’s Queensland developmentalist regionalism was placed in conflict with the Fraser-Hawke ‘national’ models for integration with the global market.  Inevitably, the Bjelke-Petersen system would have had direct usage for reliable satellites that preached a states’ rights constitutionalism, which proclaimed the Queen monarch of each state, and thereby asserted an independent Queensland interest.  The contradiction lay in the fundamentally internationalist nature of capital and the degree of mobilization the isolated Queensland system required for its maintenance against the pressure of ‘liberal’ Australia.


After 1975, the NSW Liberal Party conservatives and the National Australia Association, had tried to reanimate Menzies’s conservatism to roll back Fraser’s new liberalism.  By the late 1970’s, this had become a Herculean task.  While the Liberal Party (NSW) struck at the ‘Uglies’, the NAA dissolved and the LOR become a pariah.  For the Satellite Right only Bjelke-Petersen provided an anchor.


The satellites supported Bjelke-Petersen for a number of reasons.  While he did not support ‘White Australia’,[26] Bjelke-Petersen’s anglomorphic assimilationism and faith in Flag and Crown, evinced loyalty.  Although characterization of Bjelke-Petersen as a ‘totalitarian’ with a paranoid Hitleresque anti-marxist programme was excessive,[27] he certainly loathed the Left.  Conservatives applauded anti-Left repressive legislation and Special Branch activity.  Adeptly, Bjelke-Petersen mobilized the Christian fundamentalist pentacostal, reconstructionist and charismatic sects, using his Lutheranism as proof of piety.[28]  Activist satellites outside of the National Party could organize public opinion and intimidate opposition.


An overview of satellite conservatism chiefly in Queensland shows those ideas which became available to the subsequent Extreme Right, how the auxiliaries aided the Bjelke-Petersen-regime and why the bond was broken.


First, a National Party branch official, Jacki Butler, organized in 1979 in Brisbane Women Who Want To Be Women (WWWW);  this organization pushed philosophic and moral objections to feminism and homosexuality.[29]  Butler was pivotal also to the Council For A Free Australia (CFFA) whose patron was Liberal Aboriginal Affairs Minister Sir Charles Porter.  The Council set up in 1980, produced Queensland First, thence Wake Up!, around each election in hundreds of thousands of copies to urge a National vote for “constitutionally restrict(ed)  … government”.[30]  In line with LOR principles, Wake Up! argued that Federation in 1901 established a limited sovereignty, antithetical to centralism, with the Monarch Queen of each state.[31]  Butler was also closely bonded with Rona Joyner whose criticism of evolution theory, morals education and “alien cultures” in school life, earned both activists attention as morals’ oracles.[32] 


Second, the CFFA co-operated with Dr Rupert Goodman’s Australian National Flag Association (ANFA).  Goodman, a former Reader in Education at Queensland University, also interlinked with Butler on morals issues.  He was connected to the LOR and conservative Bruce Ruxton.[33]  The RSL sponsored Flag groups in all states in 1983-4.[34]  These groups were publicly supported by the LOR, the Patriotic Lobby and others.


Third, the LOR continued to enjoy an intimate relationship with the Nationals.  This included convivial links between the Cilento and Bjelke-Petersen families, a message of support from the Premier to an LOR conference and LOR assistance in the NP’s branch organization.[35]  Earlier in 1975, Jim Hobson, manager of the LOR’s Conservative Bookstore, told the author that League mailing lists were vetted by Special Branch so “infiltrators” could not destabilize the League,[36] implying the organization was to be both protected and rendered subservient.  This networking continued.  In 1983, Dr John Dique was told by “League officials” and “Special Branch” his Immigration Control Association should restrain its “criticism” of the Nationals.  He loyally complied.[37]


Fourth, a symbolic example of Bjelke-Petersen’s ‘co-ordination’ of the conservatives in anticipation of a possible ‘National Conservative Party’, was the “Australia In Crisis Rally:  For Faith, Family And Constitution” held at Brisbane Town Hall on 22 July 1984.[38]  Here, Bjelke-Petersen recreated the 1960’s-1970’s state-auxiliary bloc.  Bjelke-Petersen’s platform was shared by Goodman, Ruxton and New Right ‘constitutionalist’ Professor Lachlan Chipman.  The rally was authorised and attended by - Citizens For Freedom, Big Brother Movement, Vietnamese Community, National Civic Council, Country Women’s Association, Right To Life, Captive Nations’ Council and Christian Outreach Centre along with other smaller groups.[39]  This alliance stayed alive and later enjoined New Right groups like Centre 2000 and Council For The National Interest, in the 1986-7 ill-fated ‘Joh For Canberra’ push, which ultimately precipitated the crisis of the system and the collapse of the satellite arrangement.


The ‘Joh For Canberra’ push presented the New Right with two choices:  to encourage on a national level the Bjelke-Petersen style of free-enterprise developmentalism and patronage, with its supportive conservative satellites or to follow the internationalist line of Greg Sheridan and Gerard Henderson which linked through to the Committee For The Economic Development Of Australia and its nexus with the Federal Labor government in the ‘restructuring’ of the workplace, tariffs, banking and foreign investment.


After failing to gain hegemony over the New Right, Bjelke-Petersen’s regime was then compelled to endure the 1987 revelations of corruption issuing from the ‘Fitzgerald Inquiry’, conduct which involved the Premier personally.  In November 1987, Bjelke-Petersen was overturned as Premier by a NP revolt.


If materialist causation is applied to explain this change, the Hawke Labor model of internationalizing development, with its appropriate ‘liberal’ ethos, provided the superior path for Queensland capital.  Dangerous National Party alliances with conservative auxiliaries could be ditched.



(b)                Independent Conservatism


The Conservative Right in Queensland had independence thrust upon it.  However, a surgical procedure was undertaken to limit conservative reaction.  In March 1988, Sir Robert Sparkes, President of the Queensland NP, urged all National politicians to collect information on LOR activities pending intra-party action.[40]  One body blow was the attack on the League Of Rights by Senator Ron Boswell in April 1988.  As a Queensland National, he was neither ‘tainted’ by the Victorian Labor government’s attack on the League in 1984[41] or the 1988 Federal Labor threat of a parliamentary inquiry.[42]  Boswell struck out to exclude the LOR from the Nationals.  He admitted to previous links but now criticized it as subversive, anti-semitic and a threat to democracy.[43]


‘Desatellitization’ was not simple.  The state sanction of Christian fundamentalism relaxed, but the network of religious-conservatives inside and outside of Queensland had been too long encouraged by Bjelke-Petersen to quietly disperse.  Indeed, their moral-political hysteria, given their biblical inspiration, meant they were permanently mobilized.  In 1981-2, Bjelke-Petersen employed the International Council Of Christian Churches to pronounce Aboriginal Land Rights struggles as pagan or marxist.[44]  Throughout the 1980’s, Western Australian Aboriginal reverend Cedric Jacobs, and his One Australia Movement, denounced funds’ wastage, nepotism, alienation of national sovereignty and communism as aspects of the new Aboriginal activism.[45]  The Toowoomba Logos Foundation found the liberal ‘new class’ enthroning secular humanism, threatening to change the national flag and debase morals, all as part of an anti-Christian rite.[46]  Logos founder and ‘reconstructionist’ theologian, Reverend Harold Carter, penned a defence of ‘limited government’ and free market principles,[47] which put him in a 1987 alliance with the CFFA in a last-ditch defence of the old system.  Finally he spent massively in a vain 1989 effort to re-elect the National Party government.[48]


The religious core of diverse groups like the Logos Foundation, Christian Identity (Cardwell) and It’s Time newspaper (Nanango) all of which demanded godly government, was in one way or another, millenarian.  This logic would explain the destabilizing politics of the extensive Christian conservative organizations.


A credible American literature has defined the impact of Christian millenarianism upon conservative and Extreme Right politics.  It has separated the ‘pre-millenarians’, who observed a biblically-periodized prophecy of ‘Christ’s return’ whereby action would precede the Kingdom, from the post-millenarians who practised political quietism laced with propagandistic ‘witnessing’.  This literature transposes directly upon the Queensland Christian scene which was, as Neville Buch has revealed, strongly influenced by American pre-millenarian Protestant forms.[49]


The LOR, well in decline by the mid-1980’s was post-millenarian, but other ‘righteous remnants’ were willing to crusade against the satanic, humanist world government forces;  as in America, this Christianized style permeated the Conservative Right thoroughly influencing even ‘secular’ activists.[50]  Queensland especially saw new conservative leaderships in noisy ‘last days’ activism.  Retired businessman Alan Gourley, started the gnostic First And Last publishing group and built it into Sydney’s Constitutional Heritage Protection Society (CHPS) which he launched in 1988.[51]  Its eschatology considered the Australia Act (1986) as the formalization of the Fabian “humanist”, United Nations oriented, republican dictatorship.[52]  The CHPS sanctified the Constitution and delegitimized the State as illegal and frenziedly asserted monarchical loyalty.  John Grover’s The Hellmakers, praised by Gourley at mass meetings, sounded the ‘last days’ tocsin to rescue children from satanic secular brainwashing.[53]  The CHPS networked with the Australian Constitutional And Common Law Defence Association (Brisbane), the League For Commonwealth Friendship (Sydney) and People For A Free Australia (Perth).[54] 


Soothsayers and false prophets made the message propagandistically immediate.  Peter Sawyer, a sacked Social Security employee, became an oracle.  Sawyer rose to fame upon insisting a conspiracy existed at the ‘Deakin Centre’ to use super-computer departmental linkages to re-formulate the ‘Australia Card’.[55]  In 1987 he predicted Aboriginal revolution:


The real weapons for the Great Black Revolution arrived quietly in WA some months ago.  7,000 AK47 Russian assault rifles, plus ammunition.  These were shipped in on false documents prepared by Fuller Firearm Group of … Sydney.  Transfer of funds was arranged through Mr. Laurie Connell’s Merchant Bank, Rothwells and they are currently …  stored … around various warehouses owned by Mr. Alan Bond.[56]


Panic was recorded in some rural centres.[57]  Sawyer drew large audiences in many Queensland towns[58] and was vociferously endorsed by Sydney radio personality Brian Wilshire, who subsequently authored ‘conspiratology’ books himself.[59]  Sawyer suggested black revolution was a plot of the United Nations to permit military intervention in Australia.


Sawyer’s wild tales utilized ex-CPA member Geoff McDonald, whose Red Over Black, described ‘Land Rights’ as a communist/United Nations conspiracy.[60]  ‘Pro-mining’ McDonald, who had been patronized by Bjelke-Petersen, Ruxton, the LOR and Liberal-National branches, travelled throughout Australia during 1979-85, predicting violence.[61]  Nonetheless, Sawyer’s star-gazing outdid  McDonald and even Eric Butler, who denounced him.[62]


In 1988-90, the LOR tried selling its own ‘alienation-of-sovereignty’ campaign whereby World Heritage wilderness was threatened with “foreclosure” by the international banks[63].  Rev. Jacobs was ‘activated’ by the LOR to travel Queensland in 1989 with this warning, but he could not draw the Sawyer crowds.[64] 


The LOR was also pressed by the Citizens’ Electoral Councils which arose to take up LOR themes such as voters’ veto and Citizens’ Initiated Referenda.[65]  A CEC candidate took Bjelke-Petersen’s seat (Barambah) in 1988 but soon returned to the Nationals when CEC began to recruit followers of American cult-politician Lyndon La Rouche.[66]  CEC thence parodied LOR financial principles and appealed to farmers-in-distress.[67]  Because of difficulties with the Jewish community, attention was lavished upon it and calls were made for public inquiries.[68]  This Thesis declines further comment on this organization save in one area:  Jewish community internal politics which dictated a reaction to CEC’s cultic attraction for Jewish youth.[69]


The 1980’s Conservative Right also perceived its ‘Anglo-Celtic Australia’ under attack.  Tasmanian public servant Reg Watson formed the ‘Anglo-Saxon-Keltic Society’ (1980) and worked with Maina’s Patriotic Lobby, the ICA(Q) and the LOR.[70]  Other ‘Anglo-Celts’ such as John Bennett, Victorian civil libertarian, solicitor and ‘Holocaust Revisionist’, utilized his respected annual publication, Your Rights, to demand immigration restriction, defence of ‘traditional’ culture and free speech on multiculturalism.[71]  The thrust of conservative perceptions of Australia’s character involved the British legacy - “common law”, “Westminster government” and the decentralized liberty supposedly inherent in the Constitution.[72]  Under the impress of enforced multiculturalism and multiracialism, conservative Australia was hurting,[73] but its traditional political culture precluded a shift towards either Radical-Nationalism or van Tongeren’s neo-nazism.


Opposition to State ethnic-policy increased contemporaneously with declining interest in anti-communist propaganda campaigning.  Yet again, the logic was torturous.  Most conservatives gradually abandoned agitational anti-communism and their defence of laissez-faire capitalism.  That is apparent from the literature, the tendency growing more marked from the mid-1980’s when the Fabianism of the Hawke government and the humanist globalist ‘socialism’ of the United Nations became the essential enemies.[74]  The collapse of communism (1989-91) finalised the issue, confirming the independent condition of the Conservative Right:  there was not the slightest basis for a satellite relationship.  While some groups had contact with newly emergent ‘populist’ groups (Chapter Eight) and hence ground in tendentious reality, others were crusading organizations alternately ignored or vilified in the mass media.[75] 


This Thesis cannot identify any Conservative Right strategy to fight “World Government”, the anonymous ‘humanists’ and Fabians.  The fundamental sense of threat to Australia’s ‘British Identity and Constitutional freedom’ was possibly too overwhelming for more than strident protest against a State which was committed to internationalism.


Interestingly, the conservatives identified issues of national significance (cultural change/challenge;  national independence versus United Nations treaty obligations) but many understood politics as the ‘last days’ workings of satanic conspiracies.  Through the prism darkly, the Conservative Right possessed a ‘false consciousness’.



(c)                Generalizations


Some generalizations on the transformation of Queensland politics during 1975-90 and the State severance of the satellite conservative link, provide a framework to assess populist-monarchism thereafter.


First, Queensland conservative politics had been continually mobilized in various anti-socialist/anti-centralist campaigns since the ‘State Of Emergency’ of 1971 which began Bjelke-Petersen’s authoritarian phase.  This mobilization ensured Right satellitization in a continually tense atmosphere which obscured and furthered the system’s developmentalism.  Reasonably, Bjelke-Petersen’s fall was traumatic for conservatives who had put their faith in his character and system.  The National Party was destabilized.


Second, the various Conservative Right organizations were sizeable groups which had agitated for a moralized Christian politics inside a stable Constitutionalist order.  Many people, not just Queenslanders, had heard this message.  Conservative groups also preached various apocalyptic millenarian messages of dictatorship, invasion and revolution.  The sudden freedom of these auxiliaries from the National Party meant that previously tamed ideas of popular sovereignty and populist-economics could surface.  The CEC victory in Barambah and the crowds drawn by Sawyer suggested a crisis of confidence in Queensland politics.


Third, in 1989 the Queensland National Government of 32 years fell from office, just as discredited as its type of capitalism.  Yet as Queensland joined liberal-Australia, the networks that had vociferously fought socialist-humanism were confronted by the dreaded Labor ‘socialism’ in power.  A cluster of new ‘conservative’ parties, founded by ex-Nationals, signalled the crisis (mainly) of the National Party across Australia.  An ‘Australian Conservative Party’ was formed in late 1989 with Bjelke-Petersen’s tacit support; a New South Wales ‘Country Residents Party’ formed around Marulan to protest their abandonment by the NP; a ‘New Conservatives’ party formed in Canberra in 1991 to criticise the Liberal leadership’s “arrogance”; a ‘New Country Party’ in Western Australia, demanded attention to rural infrastructure.[76]  These groups apparently expressed a generalized nostalgia for a strong rural lobby placed in the government.  However, the National Party had long pledged itself to economic rationalization and internationalization.  These conservative groups faded leaving many ordinary National voters angry, and available for new experiments.


Last, there was an intangible.  East European communism was disintegrating.  Allowing the Conservative Right had already exchanged communism for humanist-socialism as its agitational axis, there was now an opportunity for a new Extreme Right to mobilize upon Karl Leibneckt’s maxim:  ‘the main enemy is at home’.



3.                    The Confederate Action Party:  Foundation, Growth, Crisis And Decline Of Populist-Monarchism


(a)                Foundation


On July 20 1990, the Confederate Action Party of Australia (CAP) was founded by six persons in a trucking office near Ipswich.[77]  The foundation circumstances and histories of CAP’s initiators have become shrouded in myth.  For example, Don Vietch formerly of ASIO and the Citizens’ Electoral Council, constructed a fanciful tale about CAP’s first leader, Perry Jewell:


Perry Jewell arrived from Africa in the last decade and had been a comrade of Brigadier Frank Kitson … he worked for a Jewish community leader as a hotel manager … Many claim he was responsible for … [CAP’s] destruction …[78]


A related version by second CAP President, former Australian commando John Jarvis, had Jewell “trained under Colonel Crispen”, an African mercenary leader.[79]  In fact Jewell, an Ulsterman who lived in Kenya and South Africa, arrived in Australia in 1972;  he was a soft-spoken, South African army-trained, ‘hard’ character, who denied any knowledge of or contact with Kitson, the master of counter-insurgency warfare.[80]  As a new man in politics his background lent itself to the vituperative rumour-mongering which engulfed CAP in 1993-5.


The foundation meeting adopted A Promise To The People Of Australia, a leaflet-programme of almost fifty policy points.  How this document was formulated implies the CAP was conceived as a populist response to elitist politicians.  Jewell maintained that his programme was the result of late night conversations with customers at a petrol station;  he informally polled thousands of persons on the various planks over an 18-month period.[81]  For CAP, the Promise was to be a non-negotiable instrument of policy and intent.[82]  It announced CAP’s intention to ensure a society which drew “immigrants from traditional and Christian countries”, guaranteed national independence from U.N. conventions and rebuilt “pride in our Nation and the Flag”.  Gun owners, small business people, farmers and retirees would benefit and criminals would suffer.  The “Aboriginal Affairs Department” would be abolished.  Citizens’ Initiated Referenda and Commonwealth Bank interest-free credit, were featured.[83] 


The founders had met through the transport business and had little prior political involvement and had tenuous contacts with organizations either of the Conservative Right or Extreme Right.[84]  Their coalescence matched the formative stages of other Extreme Right organizations examined in this Thesis:  personal contacts, formation of ideas and a will to act, and the generation of organization initially unconnected to other structures on the Right.  The CAP leaders had financial means – as truckers, small businessmen and sales representatives – to fund their party.


An initial strategy was designed.  The CAP desired membership sufficient to register as a Commonwealth Electoral Act ‘party’.[85]  The choice of the term ‘Confederate’, although quickly damned by media as ‘wild-west’,[86] was meant to symbolise the organic compact of people and government and a plan to overcome the splintering of patriotic efforts in the gentle union of a grassroots party[87], in opposition to fascist-communist command-party models and the establishment “triad” of “ALP/Lib/Nat” manipulation-politics.[88]  The CAP’s password would be freedom.  This moral tone accommodated those influenced by Queensland’s extensive Christian activism or angered by corruption.  It was decided to direct mail to people who wrote ‘patriotic’ letters to newspapers and turn to pools of personal contacts and approach potentially-interested organizations.[89] 



(b)                Growth:  1990-93


In mid-1993, the CAP counted about 2,500 members in Queensland and about 800 elsewhere,[90] most recruited in a growth spurt in 1992-3.  The CAP was thence larger than the contemporary Left.  The founders’ dedication had delivered this result.  The CAP’s propaganda was spread from truck-stop to truck-stop by carriers connected to CAP founder, Warren Woodford.[91]  In 1991-2, Perry Jewell motored through Queensland coastal towns leafletting,[92] giving interviews on local radio stations and speaking at local halls to explain The Promise.  Although Jarvis later claimed Jewell “has never been known to chair a meeting and evidently is lacking in general office procedure”,[93] his activism was undeniable.  Jewell’s near-bumbling oratory, delivered with sincerity,[94] won new members in the smaller towns.


It took CAP two years to reach its 500-member level for Commonwealth and Queensland party registration.  Don Pinwell, an Australia First Party leader, said that initially, other organizations on the Right ignored CAP, perceiving it just ‘another’ patriotic organization.[95]  Experienced cadre was scarce, since Extreme Right militancy in 1980’s Queensland was ineffective.  A small National Action branch, Skinhead groups, an ANM cell and Pash’s grouplets amounted to little.  None had penetrated the countryside where the LOR maintained a presence, nor been active in the coastal ‘industrial-rural’ towns.  Therefore no legacy of activism could hamper or assist CAP expansion.  It is noted also that the ‘radical-populist’ groups described in the following Chapter – Australians Against Further Immigration (AAFI) and Enterprise, Freedom and Family (EFF) – did not offer any competition in Queensland during the take-off period.  The CAP could unrestrictedly expand its reach organizationally and electorally, as described below.


The CAP absorbed supporters from the pre-La Rouche Citizens’ Electoral Councils (CEC) which, through its Hervey Bay newspaper The Citizen, popularized the idea of a “grassroots” electoral mobilization.[96]  After its editor was tried on a sexual assault charge in 1990-1, a drift in support in the Wide Bay area brought forth a strong CAP branch centred in Maryborough.


Its leader was Tony Pitt, a pensioned-off airforce officer, whose capacity for hard work has made him a nationally known Extreme Right activist.  Pitt’s political evolution demonstrated that some Extreme Right militants adopt their position through an involved process of progressive alienation from mainstream politics.  In a May 1991 circular, Pitt explained how he entered politics as a founding-Australian Democrat after rejecting the ‘socialist’ Labor Party; but here too he detected machine-manipulators:


I will not bore you with my sojourn with the Nationals, my return to the Liberals, my betrayal, my remorse … Now I seek revenge.  I want to get rid of the whole lot of the bastards … Time is short.  The socialists have started to move against the activists …[97]


Other CAP cadre felt this sense of alienation.  Dawn Brown joined, at age 58 in 1991, from the National Party:


I joined CAP out of frustration with [the] major political parties.  Candidates of the major parties do not represent their electorates.  I demand representation.[98]


Her Ingham branch included several ex-Nationals.  Tom Little, Chairman of the Nanango branch, joined in 1992 at age 45, because the “major parties ignored the ordinary person”.[99]  Bill May, a Childers grazier, CAP candidate and organizer, cited “frustration” amongst his branch members who had “very good Christian values”, out of place in the ruling parties.[100]


It may be reasonably concluded from the official reaction of the Queensland National Party, that CAP’s cadre were not the only people alienated from the main parties.  In June 1992, the NP(Q) issued a campaign booklet to counter CAP’s inroads.  With branches in 33 Queensland centres and its alarmist propaganda[101] about Land Rights claims, gun confiscation and Indonesian invasion,[102] the rising CAP earned the rebuke of prominent National, Russell Cooper:


It would be a tragedy if people in country Queensland were to be seduced by the false promises of a fringe group whose only effect would be to split the conservative vote.[103]


The September 1992 Queensland poll delivered CAP a startling success.  Although listed on ballot papers as ‘independents’ (electoral registration was delayed), CAP candidates in 12 electorates beat the Liberals for third place as the table shows:


Table 7.1                General Tabulation Of CAP Result[104]








Liberal Party



Labor Party



National Party
















All seats were outside of the Brisbane metropolitan area.  The high percentages – Callide 15.7%, Lockyer 11.4%, Mackay 18.3%, Maryborough 15.9%, Mirani 14% - indicated the potential of CAP.  The sources of CAP votes could be decided since the official election statistics record the distribution of second-preferences from the unsuccessful CAP candidates:


Table 7.2                CAP Preferences To Major Parties[105]


Labor Party

Liberal Party

National Party





(Note:  Many CAP second preferences went to independents or were “exhausted”)


The momentum achieved by CAP induced a mini-stampede of rightist support.  A Western Australian ‘Confederate Party’ established in 1991[106] began to haemorrhage into CAP.  The branch would stay weak (it had 100 members in 1994) but it was active.[107]  Throughout 1992 branches were established in New South Wales thanks largely to Jim Perrett, a farmer from Warialda.[108]  A rural/country town network (Coffs Harbour, Dorrigo, Kempsey, Moree, Taree, Gunnedah and Gloucester) was operational by September 1993.[109]  However, it was in Queensland that CAP built upon particular interest groups in the lead-up to the 1993 Federal Poll.  Ron Owen, editor of the nationally circulated firearms magazine Lock, Stock And Barrel, became a CAP supporter in Gympie, lending lustre and bringing supporters.[110]  Bob Doring, a Sunshine Coast gun dealer and major gun owners’ rights advocate, swayed many into CAP.[111]  Kevin Polzen, whose ‘National Country Party’ preferences had won Barambah for the CEC in 1988, was a Christian farmer in Wondai when in late 1992 he entered CAP;  with Polzen came an extensive local network of anti-bank activists.[112]


The CAP campaigned hard to project itself as an ‘alternative’ to Labor/Liberal ‘socialism’.  Pitt editorialized in his Fight newspaper:


For years right-wing extremists have been telling me and people like me that the bad guys have a plan to ruin our economy and … our ability to defend ourselves.  I am finally convinced.  There is a plan to destroy us by taxing the middle class out of existence, by subversive education of our children, by entering such foreign treaties …[113]


However, it was Jewell who succinctly expressed the populist-monarchist programme in Like A Hole In The Head, his 1993 Federal Election manifesto:[114]


.. that’s how badly we need another political party in Australia.  And yet the Confederate Action Party is the party that Australia had to have … Our Nation has need of salvation – from political party dictatorship, from political chicanery, corruption … People ask of the … [CAP] … ‘Are you left-wing or right-wing, socialist or capitalist?’  We are none of those.  We are simply pro the people of Australia and pro a Genuine Democracy … We want the right to dismiss representatives if they fail us.  We want Citizens Initiated Referendum and Recall … We want British Common Law as our inherited entitlement not some United Nations bill of non-rights.  We want to be our own Nation and not the multicultural vassal and servant of some New World Order.  We want … [to oust] … world monetary forces.


This manifesto was the platform for 33 CAP House of Representatives candidates, (24 out of 25 Queensland seats were contested, 8 in New South Wales, 1 in South Australia) and Senate candidates for Queensland, New South Wales and Western Australia.[115]  The Queensland result gave CAP 51,565 lower-house votes (2.89%).[116]  Expenditure returns for those candidates for Dawson, Hinkler, Wide Bay, Groom, Maranoa and Kennedy who exceeded the four percent public funding barriers, gave electoral outlay at $72,487.20.[117]  While other costings were not available, it is certain the CAP campaign was the most expensive waged by any Extreme Right organization, demonstrating that it had achieved considerable financing.  Although it had not duplicated its Queensland poll success, it had brought Extreme Right voting to tens of thousands, maintained its base in areas where strength was previously demonstrated and shown other Extreme Right fractions that it was a leading force.  Unknowingly, the CAP had reached its zenith.



(c)                Crisis Of Strategy In CAP:  Divisions And Disruption


In the six months following the March 1993 poll, the CAP was riven with division.  Jewell’s National Executive moved to expel Pitt;[118]  the party’s National Council passed a ‘no confidence’ vote in Jewell.[119]  Jewell’s Executive deregistered the CAP federally, but amidst membership-protest failed to achieve Queensland deregistration;[120]  Jewell’s faction launched a new ‘CAP’ (Consolidated Australia Party) in Mackay in September.[121]  The CAP restructured itself under Jarvis who was based in Caloundra.  It would be tempting to dismiss the splintering of CAP as a case of stereotypical Extreme Right personality-politics, except that strong evidence exists of a deep internal debate on strategy and organization, illustrative of Extreme Right structural weakness.


As CAP expanded it had made tentative friendships with those rural ‘radical- populist’ and conservative organizations which met annually at the ‘Inverell Forum’ (Chapter Eight).  Since 1991, Pitt had argued for a united front with all anti-Establishment organizations, holding out the lure of “co-ordination” and tactical alliances rather than outright amalgamation.[122]  As editor of Fight, he had issued over 700,000 individual papers by mid-1993 (about one million by late 1994)[123] and overseen the production of another million recruitment documents.  With such a prodigious output, Pitt concluded CAP could be hegemonic in any united front, but in tune with CAP’s grassroots philosophy would not impose its programme upon its allies.[124]  Jewell was more hard-fisted.  In an April 20 1993 letter to CAP branches, he commented upon the organizations which gathered at the ‘Inverell Forum’:


Some of the facts that should be considered by CAP members … [are]:  Since registration in 1988 Enterprise Family and Freedom [EFF] has only built membership to about 850.  The Australian Independent Alliance had only 180 members last year, the Phoenix Alliance a few hundred maximum and the CP Western Australia about 200 members … Most of these organizations have been around for years … I believe the correct procedure would have been to go to the next Inverell Forum to look, listen and discuss …[125]


In refusing to be pressed, Jewell bared the concealed contradiction between populist politics and democratic organization.  Jewell recognized the need for party discipline particularly when negotiating with potential supporters.  Whereas the NSW State Council noted “problems with the name ‘Confederate’”[126] in dealing with the Inverell bloc, Jewell insisted on the integrity of CAP’s Promise and Constitution.[127]  He had noticed certain conservatives like Jeremy Lee who had influence with Inverell Forum posed a “stumbling block” towards both a deepening radicalization of its constituents and a principled unification.[128]


These discussions were potentially of great importance to the regroupement of a number of serious and activist groups.  At the coalface of activism, the populist- monarchists and the radical-populist groups (Chapter Eight) were not far different;  CAP’s particular belief in the popular-democratic potential of the constitutional monarchical heritage should not have precluded unification.  A national Extreme Right party was constructively possible.  However, Jewell was undermined before these hypotheticals could gain substance.  The NSW State Council reported in February 1993:


Slur campaign against Perry has started.  Was editor of a communist paper.  Was a South African Police Mau Mau terrorist when he was 10 years old.  CAP financed by MI-6.[129]


This smearing of Jewell was connected to his alleged leadership style.  A retrospective summation was provided by Polzen, who argued:


… the CAP executive was dictatorial … P. Jewell was attempting to impose a particular philosophy on the members of CAP which it opposed to ideas allowing the rank and file to set policy.[130]


The very success of CAP brought an influx of untried members attuned to electoral work;  the open nature of membership and the grassroots branch-based principle. combined with the hysterical Fight which warned against “dictatorship” in principle, made founder-leader Jewell’s position untenable.  The two-monthly state conferences became mechanisms for “powerhungryness” and “egoistic gratification”[131] by persons who would not recognize the need for authority and encadrement.  Pitt’s testimony against himself could explain much about CAP’s organizational anarchism:


As far as wanting to be President … I have no ambition.  In fact I wouldn’t even be in a party.  I recognize that I’ve always been a lone ranger.  I don’t work well in a party, that’s a problem I’ve always had.  I don’t go out of my way to aggravate the other party members;  however, I find committees abhorrent.  I’ve worked with them for ages and I just find they retard things and delay … So you know I am not well suited for team work, and that was the psych’s assessment of me in the Air Force.[132]


Other CAP officials considered their protest against government-party authoritarianism extended into a generalized rejection of discipline from a party centre.[133]  With their enthusiasm unrestrained, some leaders were willing to negotiate CAP out of existence, exchanged for a broad leaderless party.  In this manner the unity discussions were mixed with the question of organization.  The resultant fragmentation of the CAP invalidated it as a suitor for the Inverell groups.[134]


The split had another element.  When Jewell’s Executive penned Your Party Is In Peril, they assumed that the split with Pitt’s faction had grown from a dispute over placements on the 1993 Senate ticket which, fanned by personalist disputation, intersected with a resentment experienced by new members with an un-elected leadership.[135]  Pitt’s faction demanded internal democracy and benefited from the tide of vilification directed at Jewell.  Both factions knew that a jealous CEC had smeared Jewell’s background and motivations.[136]  However, the destabilization of CAP was far-reaching and many members told the author of their pet-theory of its source.  Anonymous mail, phone calls and faxes arrived at the branches;  petty plots were hatched at conferences;[137] threats of violence were aimed at the Executive.  Some members accused the National Party, other party “agents”, and political police agencies.  The truth cannot be determined.  The vehemence of seemingly rational people that some ‘agency’ disrupted CAP weighs for its possibility.



(d)                The Decline Of Populist-Monarchism 1993-95


The schism in CAP permanently divided the ranks of populist-monarchism.  At least nine CAP branches in Queensland (out of 53) defected to Jewell’s Consolidated Australia Party[138] which rechristened itself the Conservative Action Party in November 1993.  After criticizing the former CAP’s Constitution which ‘encouraged’ factionalization and the “destructive faction” which compelled the deregistration actions, Jewell’s Executive condemned the Confederates:


They are the ones who want to reduce the Promise to some 23 wishy-washy same-as every-other-party’s policies and to inflame racial tension by telling the Aborigines to go to hell instead of treating them as citizens …[139]


Although Jewell’s group failed to prosper and finally disintegrated by late 1994 into a Toowoomba committee for ‘A New Political Party’,[140] the shift in Confederate ranks had been observed.  Policy change was obvious.  First, CAP’s new immigration policy became:  “Migrants must not be selected on the grounds of race, colour or creed” but “only on the basis of value to the Nation”;  “We are One Nation and all people must be assimilated …”[141]  Second, Aborigines were to conform to Australian Law and their Land Rights claims were dismissed:


The belief that sacred status devolves upon an area of Australian earth is rooted in mythology, tradition and folklore and cannot stand against intelligence and scientific knowledge.[142]


The softer immigration position and the hardened anti-Aboriginal stand[143] were probably designed to mobilize conservative National Party rightists into CAP.  Jewell had sought to move the conservatives towards grassroots action.  The new CAP leaders wanted to win conservatives for an electoralist programme.


Sure signs of change came after falling membership caused the replacement of Jarvis (undermined by Pitt) by Polzen.[144]  In September 1994, Polzen invited Bjelke-Petersen to address Kingaroy CAP and praised him as a “great leader”.[145]  The CAP had already contacted the “211 loyal organizations” warning that “Keating will go to the polls early … (to) … get rid of the flag, Constitution, the States, the Senate and Democracy”.[146]  The party’s criticism of the Prime Minister’s multiculturalism, pro-Land Rights stand, and United Nations “sycophancy” held these views as violations of Westminster tradition and the inherited rights of Magna Carta and the Bill of Rights (1688).[147]  The new ‘promise’ was one centred on acquiring seats in Parliament, not “to make new history in Australia … [but] … to reinstate Constitutional Monarchy and Magna Carta based on democratic representation …”[148]  The programmatic tensions between reforming parliament and creating popular authority, and organizational disputation between electoral work and grassroots activism, were not extinguished.


In March-April 1995, CAP ruptured again between Pitt and Polzen, some 1200 members dividing into successor groups.  Pitt’s deradicalized ‘The Australians’ argued for “good government … by ensuring the … re-establish(ment) of Westminster …”[149] while Polzen’s ‘Correct Australian Parliaments’[150] sought mechanisms to compel loyal adherence to Westminster rules.  These appeals to old-satellite and conservative-National supporters had hitherto only partly deconstructed that bloc.  The 1996 election of a new Liberal government was required to complete the process of their disillusionment with mainstream ‘conservatism’.  A new leader was necessary to proclaim conservative independence.  The foundation of the One Nation Party by Pauline Hanson, in April 1997, would strongly indicate the entry of independent conservatism as an electoral player and the division of populist-monarchist forces between ONP and Graeme Campbell’s Australia First Party (Chapter Eight), the ultimate resolution of the “tension” with conservative ideology and politics.



4.                    The Membership, Organization And Politics of Populist- Monarchism


This Thesis has argued that populist-monarchism was a radicalization of longstanding Conservative Right ideology.  With the ‘independence’ of satellite conservatism and the crisis of National Party authority over its voter-periphery, a window of opportunity opened for an Extreme Right breakthrough.  Yet such a mobilization may draw in new forces as the paradigm indicates.  This Section asks:  who held membership and directed populist-monarchist organizations?;  how was the chief force, the CAP, organized?;  how can populist-monarchist politics be analysed?



(a)                Membership And Cadre


Considerable membership and organizational data was available on the CAP and successor organizations.  As a result of the dispute concerning the ‘deregistration’ of CAP as a Queensland and Federal party, the respective Electoral Commissioners maintained extensive files.  These files contained membership forms, internal documents (as quoted above) and correspondence from members to the Commissioners.  Some rank and file members provided information about their motives and ideas.  From these files a list of 299 members with addresses was constructed.[151]  While this was valuable, it was considered more rewarding to research CAP through its cadres, those who led it and best articulated its ideology.


Fortunately, the CAP published a 1994 branch list and two extensive organizers’ lists (September 1993, March 1994) featuring almost 400 phone numbers.[152]  Some 171 addresses were thence realized and that number of questionnaires was dispatched.  Thirty replies were received.[153]  Provision had been made for the respondents’ anonymity but some provided their names.  Interviews then took place by telephone or in person.


The membership and cadre data permits several generalizations relevant to defining the character of populist-monarchism.


First, the available information showed CAP membership and cadre to have been overwhelmingly ‘Anglo-Celtic’.  Of the 299 noted members, only 21 had Continental-European surnames.  While of course surnames do not decide ethnic derivation (and most members and cadres were ‘native-born’),[154] it was suggestive.  Similarly, of the 400 organizers, only 23 had Continental-European surnames.  Since the CAP emphasized the British Common Law heritage, Monarchy and Flag, a predominantly Anglo-Celtic membership was predictable.


Second, although CAP operated metropolitan sections, its membership was drawn from the rural and smaller city populations.  According to Robin Murray, CAP Secretary (NSW), her section was “80% rural” and “20% Sydney – Newcastle”.[155]  Party conferences were invariably organized in non-metropolitan cities and plans unfolded to purchase a headquarters in Toowoomba.[156]  The spread of CAP into western and northern Queensland was notable, although the Queensland bias was towards the south-east quarter with strong sections in Hervey Bay, Lockyer, Logan and Maryborough.  Inevitably, the membership would reflect the values of country Australia (particularly country Queensland) in contradistinction to the internationalized mores of the metropoli.


Third, the membership was disproportionally older.  While the Constitution described a “Young People’s Forum”, members under 30 were rare.  Retirees on the Gold and Sunshine Coasts were common.[157]  Jewell said that CAP’s plan was to mobilize numbers and he “accepted” an initial generational limitation.[158]  The average age of organizers who answered the Questionnaire was 54.5 years at time-of-joining.


Fourth, CAP leadership cadre had a particular social-occupational distribution.  The organizers’ sample (25 responses) (all non-metropolitan) listed seven farmers, one grazier, four engineers, five self-employed, one journalist, two company directors, one property-manager, one manager, one salesman and, two pensioners and one factory worker.  This limited sample showed active participants (property owners and/or professionals) in country economic life.  Further, the biographies published of CAP’s 1994 Queensland ‘State Council’ nominees, listed a shire chairman active in the Cattleman’s Union, an official of the Plastic And Rubber Institute, and a surveyor.[159]  It seems intentional that CAP sought to replicate Jewell’s foundation cadre.  Indeed, one advertisement for CAP candidates called for “those who have shown ability to run a business”.[160]


Membership qualities related closely to issues of politics and organization.  The CAP, by working amongst farmers, retirees, small-business, gun-owners, sugar workers (whose livelihood was threatened by tariff negotiations during 1991-3),[161] truck-drivers and owners, and led by a cadre recruited from small business and by areas of country life, represented a type of embryonic people’s party not unlike ‘Poujade-ism’.  In smaller cities and country districts, this strategic formula was reasonable.  The CAP with its red-white-blue propaganda documents extolling “One Flag, One Nation”[162] approached and won enthusiastic converts from the named target groups.  However, much of the instability that wracked the organization came from its cadres.  Why?


Three CAP organizers (Bill May, Dawn Brown and Tom Little) offered a social interpretation of CAP fractiousness.  They said that many organizers were newly politicized people who considered themselves the “productive” element of society.  They tried to transpose onto politics their professional or business skills whether self-assertion, competitiveness or huckstering.  Cadres clashed with each other, assumed results should follow “outlay” and, as individualists, repudiated Jewell’s centralism and thereafter, any form of party discipline.[163]  This interpretation of cadre-weakness was plausible.


It is reasonably estimated that over 4,000 persons held CAP membership (and hundreds more joined ‘successors’ like Conservative Action Party, Correct Australian Parliaments, Australian Right To Bear Arms Association and The Australians).  This established populist-monarchism as the largest Extreme Right family in the study period.  The capacity to attract older membership and cadre, with a non-metropolitan bias and an Anglo-Celtic character, meant the CAP produced the logical clientele for its ideology.  With these specific social target groups fielding members and votes, CAP had moved beyond the ex-satellite milieu.



(b)                 Organization

The CAP directly stated that it sought a mass membership.  The Constitution was geared for a top heavy structure of national executive, state councils and state council meetings to oversee a grassroots branch system built around federal electorate boundaries.[164]  Jewell favoured centralism and his successors local control, but constitutional arrangements do not display these alternatives.  The energy necessary to maintain the constitutional structure was considerable.  Bill May, Tom Little and Kevin Polzen as branch officials, reported time lost in paperwork and conference participation.  They recorded the “inevitable frictions” generated by intermidable conferences.[165]


The engine for growth and influence was the branch.  CAP published an Activities Manual of importance to this Thesis as it defined both branch activities and the ideological-political reference points of populist-monarchism.  Branches were to be formed in a “private home” and “preferably” meet there.[166]  Meetings should “preferably” open in “silent prayer”.[167]  The branch was to integrate its members socially, through wine and cheese nights, picnics, bushwalks, movie-nights, country dances and performance nights,[168] and politically through “house groups” which after a function for the four or five members and families would discuss tactics, “democracy” and ideology.[169]


There was agreement amongst interviewees that CAP functioned in the ways formulated in the Manual, but that the post-1993 CAP and successor groups progressively lost this grassroots dynamic.[170]  The participatory style was favoured by at least some members who were moved to write about it.[171]  The Manual provided that branches could compel policy discussions by higher echelons[172] and here the system varied from the CPA’s democratic centralism although the branch system approximated communist organization.


The branches took advantage of the CB radio, the fax and the truck-driver message system to communicate.  Branches were active, organizing leaflet drives, talk-back radio publicity and street stalls.[173]  Members participated in community groups and controlled the Australian Right To Bear Arms Association.  Efforts were undertaken to have members join trade union branches and win trade union support.[174]


The branch organization was democratic with an elected chairman and other officers subject to “rotation”.[175]  Here the potential for chaos was obvious and this compounded the other cadre problems in CAP.  It seems one of the ironies of populist organization is that it requires more than “shepherding” from the centre[176] (that is gentle guidance that all branches conform with the rules), lest its centrifugal quality disrupt it.  The CAP’s short life did not allow the two qualities to synthesize in a way that might have made CAP into a formidable organization.



(c)                The Politics Of Populist-Monarchism


This Thesis argued that populist-monarchist politics can be considered an antipodean version of European ‘national populism’ albeit with two qualifications:  we must choose appropriate argument from various theoretical constructs and appreciate the specifically Australian historical origins of our subject.


The debate over New Right influence on conservative and Extreme Right politics retained practical significance.  Kitschelt considered “free market appeals” issued by particular 1990’s European parties which espouse ethnocentrism, the reason for their success.  He contrasted these ‘New Right Radicals’ (‘Progress parties’ in Denmark, Norway, Austria) with “populist anti-Statists” in the “post-industrial welfare states” (Republikaner, Lombard League), the former supposedly more likely to achieve mass influence.[177]  Betz however, while noting the anti-tax, anti-bureaucratic anti-regulationist appeals of the “neo-liberals”, concluded that the ‘national populists’ (Front National, Republikaner, Vlaams Blok) articulated a deeper collectivist sense of resentment of globalization, industrial decline and loss of cultural-community identities; increasingly, ‘free market’ groups yielded to a less neo-liberal social-economic approach,[178]  that is, to “populist anti-Statism” by Kitschelt’s definition.


One scholar argued a veritable “war of words” surrounded questions of neo-populist typology noting also the need for differentiation between “political style and ideological feature”.[179]  Another scholar observed populism’s “negativity and its breadth”, “opposed to the system and those who run it”, an “anti party ideology” fed by those with an “indignation at their exclusion from political life.”[180] 


The Confederate Action Party certainly espoused the worth of private property and economic individualism but it tempered this with programmatic protectionism, welfare, cheap credit and a cross-class appeal.  The early CAP had an underlying commitment to an armed populace empowered by popular democracy.  The specified Australian origins of populist-monarchism caused a tense ‘intra’ and ‘inter’ organizational relationship with Conservative Right politics as argued above.  This tension might also be seen as the neo-liberal and national populist strains in struggle for dominance, particularly since the former position did move some traditional National Party and ex-satellite conservative activists.


Empirically, populist-monarchism grew out of the ex-satellite milieu.  For example:  one CAP candidate conceived his party as the one “that Peter Sawyer spoke about years ago”;[181]  strong CAP branches emerged in the Sunshine Coast where Nexus and Exposure, conspiracy journals of the Conservative Right, were influential;[182]  the CAP’s Activities Manual, in an admission of the source of its social-contract doctrine, advised its ‘house groups’ to study Alan Gourley’s Democracy And Treason, Saving The Future and Assault On Childhood, and LOR founder Arthur Chresby’s Your Will Be Done;[183]  the Activities Manual also specifically recorded branch ‘codes’ for members won from the National Party, CEC and Christian Outreach Centre, meaning they were ‘targets’ for recruitment;[184]  a NSW conference urged the recruitment of John Grover[185]; and Fight mourned the death of News Digest International stalwart, George Turner.[186]


Polzen described the internal struggle between those who desired “a revolt to overthrow the government” and “the Moderates” who “joined the party for its Christian ethics”.  He argued:  “These two factions have been at odds since the early days of the party.”[187]  This fight was essentially won by “the Moderates” with Jewell’s removal, the ‘national populism’ of the party in retreat towards a familiar conservative approach with Bjelke-Petersen-style liberal economics.[188]  This analysis notes opposition to this course with the attempt to mesh populist-monarchism with radical-populist forces.  The 1994 proposal to stabilize the CAP’s electoral presence by a united front with AAFI, EFF and the Wollongong ‘Rex Connor Senior Labor Party’[189] – although rejected – indicated continued internal support for the national populist course.

The inherent danger CAP represented as a national populist party, may be understood in the terms of Eatwell’s analysis of Extreme Right “electoral breakthrough”.


He drew upon ‘rational choice theory’, and added those factors which “explain the individual embedded in much wider social structures, both meso and macro” not simply in “individualistic-economist” routines.  Here individuals seek community normalization and personal “identity” and “meaning”.  Electoral breakthrough occurs if “rising personal efficacy” encourages the belief that action is utile, if “insurgent group legitimacy” develops “respectability” and if “declining system trust” fuels radical dissent.[190]  In this way the CAP concretized the ‘prediction’ of Connell and Gould (Chapter Two) that a section of conservatism might develop a radical system-critique, and act militantly.


Reasonably, the CAP moved beyond advocacy and fulfilment of protest voting.  Although further research is certainly warranted, it would seem that populist-monarchism in Queensland (1992-3) had provided a rationale for action with the resultant first electoral breakthrough by the Extreme Right.
















The evidence established that populist-monarchism emerged from a crisis of confidence in Queensland’s exceptionalist politics.  The New Right Bjelke-Petersen system collapsed, and its conservative satellites received ‘independence’.  It was shown that a section of the National Party electorate defected to the new Confederate Action Party which also mobilized new pools of discontent.  The CAP functioned during 1990-1993 as an embryonic ‘people’s party’, organized in a novel grassroots branch system.


Populist-monarchism possessed particular attributes.  Its membership qualities and geographic distribution told of an ‘Old Australian’ protest at the advent of a multiracial-multicultural order.  This grassroots non-metropolitan response by groups which conceived that their status in Australia had changed was however symbiotically wrapped in an iconography and heritage derived of satellite-conservatism.  This genesis-point signified further that populist-monarchism’s delegitimization of the State was never complete; in practice populist-monarchist organization would be ideologically-politically weak, unsure of how far to go in challenging State power and uncertain as to the proper relationship between parliamentarist action and grassroots mobilization. 


Yet if the CAP is seen as an opportunistic event, it is concluded that Extreme Right breakthrough could occur at weak points in the political order and that certain forms would be linked to the temporary availability of that space.  The CAP case indicated that only further radicalization might have extended the gap before it was closed by the National Party and a new independent conservatism.


Populist-monarchism appeared as an ally for other radical-populist forces in rural areas and the new metropolitan anti-immigration electoral organization AAFI.  But CAP’s fragmentation largely precluded opportunities for a united national-populist front.  It was clear that an audience had become available to Extreme Right politics.  The issues raised – immigration, gun ownership, CIR, industrial-protection – indicated the existence of areas of public concern that could not be accommodated by the bourgeois parties.


It is concluded that the populist-monarchist concept of democracy would pass into currency as a continuing legacy to inspire new organizations.


[1] Laurie Aarons, Here Come The Uglies, pp. 80-91; Richard Brass, “Think Tanks And The New Right Offensive”, Tribune, October 23 1985, p. 9.

[2] Andrew Moore,  The Right Road?, pp. 127-135, 145, 156.

[3] Paul Spoonley, The Politics Of Nostalgia, pp. 14-231, 252-3; Alain de Benoist, “La Religion D’Europe”, Elements, No. 36, Autumn 1980, pp. 5-20, Alain de Benoist and G. Faye, “La Religion des Droits De L’Homme”, Elements, No. 37, January 1981, pp. 5-22 for Nouvelle Droit’s critique of globalism, economic man, capitalism.

[4] John Woodley, Fascism, Fundamentalism And The New Right, Brisbane, undated, pp. 42-9.

[5] Piero Ignazi and Colette Ysmal, “New And Old Extreme Right Parties:  The French Front National And The Italian Social Movement”, European Journal Of Political Research, Vol. 23, No. 1, July 1992, pp. 111, 116 for the strength of ‘liberal economics’ support at the 1990 Front National conference;  for the origins of these Front National views  and its ‘revolutionary nationalist’ critique:  Charles Culbert and Pierre Terrin, Non Au Liberalisme, Paris, 1979, passim.

[6] John Woodley, op.cit., p. 48.

[7] Paul Hainsworth, “The Extreme Right In Post-War France: The Emergence Of The Front National”, in Paul Hainsworth (ed.), The Extreme Right In Europe And The USA, London, 1992, pp. 49-54.

[8] Michalina Vaughan, “The Extreme Right In France:  ‘Lepenisme’ Or The Politics Of Fear?” in L. Cheles (ed.), Neo-Fascism In Europe, Harlow, 1991, pp. 220, 225-6, records the Front National’s penetration of working class areas after 1986;  Jean-Gilles Malliarakis, “Strategie D’Une Avant-Garde Alternative”, Revolution Europeene, No. 28, November 1990, pp. 18-28, for the radical Troisieme Voie’s assessment of the shift in the Front National towards anti-Americanism and ‘anti-system’ politics.

[9] John Woodley, op.cit., p. 237.

[10] ibid., pp. 233, 243.

[11] Boris Frankel, From The Prophets The Deserts Come:  The Struggle To Re-Shape Australian Political Culture, p. 130.

[12] ibid, pp. 147, 159, 161, 244.

[13] G. Sheridan, “The New Split In The Right”, The Weekend Australian, September 21-22, 1991, pp. 27-28;  some conservatives in NCC/Quadrant have questioned aspects of the New Right but were “complementary” (see:  Pam Stavropoulos, “Reappraising The Right:  The Challenge Of Australian Conservatism”, The Australian Journal Of Politics And History, Vol. 39, No. 2, 1993, pp. 177-179.

[14] Greg Sheridan (ed.), Living With Dragons:  Australia Confronts Its Asian Destiny, Sydney, 1995, pp. xix-xxi.

[15] For John Hyde’s Perth ‘Australian Institute For Public Policy’ - Tim Duncan, “New Right Crusaders challenge The Labor Line”, The Bulletin, 2 October 1984, pp. 28-33;  John Hyde, “Why Population Growth Is Environmentally Sound”, The Australian, June 1 1990, p. 9.

[16] For Katherine West’s significance:  “Editorial”, The Optimist, No. 9, July-August 1986, p. 3.  For her activism: John Stubbs, “Joh Warns:  It’s Me Or Howard”, Sunday Telegraph, February 8 1987,   p. 5.

[17] Tim Duncan, “Western Mining’s Messiahs Of The New Right”, The Bulletin, July 2 1985, pp. 61-70 for Morgan’s labour-busting and ‘patriotism’.

[18] Marian Sawer (ed.), Australia And The New Right, Sydney, 1982, passim.

[19] On Target, September 12 1986, p. 3.

[20] Sam Harris, op.cit., pp. 21, 22.  Harris as ‘chief of staff’ to Urbanchich was in a good place to make judgments.  “Thatcher and Reagan had been elected on unashamedly radical conservative platforms identical to … (Spectrum) …”  Also:  “Sydney Conservatives Honour Sir Joh”, News Digest International, No. 3, 1987, pp. 45-46 - praised his dry economics anti-socialism, Constitutionalism, at a Dinner for Bjelke-Petersen who attended.

[21] Piero Ignazi, “The Silent Counter-Revolution:  Hypotheses On The Emergence Of Extreme Right Parties In Europe”, European Journal Of Political Research, Vol. 22, Nos 1-2, 1992, pp. 18-25;  Andrew Moore, The Right Road, p. 134.

[22] Michael Minkenberg, “The New Right In Germany”, loc.cit., pp. 55-81;  Hans Georg Betz, “Political Conflict In The Post Modern Age:  Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties In Europe”,  Current Politics And Economics Of Europe, No. 1, 1990, pp. 11-27;  Robert Manne, “Our Delayed Reactionaries”, The Australian, May 12 1997, p. 13.  Manne refers to European political cynicism, personal insecurity, xenophobic tendencies as fuelling a new ‘populism’;  parties which began as Thatcherite neo-liberals “did not prosper” and became ‘extremist’.  The Democratic Socialist Party still argues ‘legitimization’:  Sam Wainwright, “Le Pen:  Pauline Hanson’s Big Brother”, Green Left Weekly, June 4 1997, p. 15.

[23] Frank Knopfelmacher, “The Case Against Multiculturalism”, in Robert Manne (ed.), The New Conservatism In Australia, Melbourne, 1982, argued a case adopted by Geoffrey Blainey and others.  See David Barnett, “How The Bloated Ethnic Industry Is Dividing Australia”, The Bulletin, February 18 1986, pp. 58-62, which demanded migrant “education” on Common Law, ANZAC, Westminsterism, monarchy but no ethnic exclusiveness and support for refugee intakes.

[24] Robert Catley and Bruce McFarlane, op.cit., p. 184.

[25] Frank Stilwell, Cities And Regions:  Landscapes Of Capital Class And State, 1992, pp. 113-4;  Ross Fitzgerald, From 1915 To The 1980’s:  A History of Queensland, St. Lucia, 1984, pp. 250, 252, 632.

[26] “Asians Here Are Good People - Joh”, The Courier Mail undated, clipping reproduced, quoted in, Audacity, No. 22, July 1984, p. 4.

[27] Deane Wells, The Deep North, Collingwood, 1979, pp. 35-6, 60-1, 63, for the statement of the ‘totalitarian’ case.

[28] John Harrison, “Faith In The Sunshine State”, pp. 129-137, 472, 529.

[29] Save Our Children, WWWW leaflet, 1980;  Jacki Butler, telephone conversation, 1996.  Mrs Butler declined interview but agreed she saw her activities as an adjunct to National Party politics.  She was no longer active following a car accident.

[30] Queensland First, October 1980, p. 8.

[31] National Action offered a full analysis of Wake Up!  See:  “A Word With Conservatives”, Audacity, No. 20, November 1983, pp. 4-5.


[32] John Freeland, “Class Struggle In Schooling:  MACOS And SEMP In Queensland”, Intervention, April 12 1979, pp. 29-62;  Glen Milne, “Rona Fights On”, Telegraph, February 2 1984, p. 3.

[33] Rupert Goodman, telephone conversation with author, June 1997;  Rupert Goodman, Secular Humanism And Australian Education, Bullsbrook, 1982.  (This document was a published address to the Toowoomba LOR ‘Conservative Speakers Club’).

[34] “Foundation Of ANFA (Qld)”, Newsletter Of The Australian National Flag Association Of Queensland, May 1996, pp. 3-4;  The Australian National Flag, ANFA leaflet, Sydney, undated.  The RSL link was acknowledged.

[35] “The Australian League Of Rights”, in Social Responsibility Section, Queensland Synod, The Uniting Church In Australia, Kit On:  The Logos Foundation And The Australian League Of Rights, May 1989.  The Kit did not mention Lady Bjelke-Petersen’s subscription to Ladies Line, League assistance with ‘How To Vote Cards’ and electoral propaganda.

[36] Jim Saleam, Never In Nazi Uniform, p. 11, discussed the subject generally.

[37] John Dique, conversation with author, 1985.  The ICA used the same postal address as several LOR fronts.

[38] “Conservative Folly”, Audacity, No. 23, November 1984, p. 10.

[39] Australia In Crisis:  Public Meeting, leaflet, 1984.

[40] Peter Morley, “Nats Boss Tackles League Of Rights”, The Courier Mail, March 11 1988, p. 1.

[41] Philip Adams, “A Catalogue Of Wrongs From The Right”, The Weekend Australian Magazine, November 3-4 1984 (for “anti-semitism”, Butler’s ‘wartime disloyalty’);  this piece followed Victorian and Federal Labor claims that the LOR stymied Land Rights Bills. See: Jeremy Lee, “Fair Reporting - Or Stone Throwing?”, Intelligence Survey, Vol. 33, No. 11, November 1984, pp. 3-6.

[42] Alan Griffiths, M.P., “League Of Rights Dilemma”, Weekend Australian (letters), October 29-30 1988, p. 6.

[43] Senator Ron Boswell, The League Of Rights:  Speech In The Senate, Wednesday April 27 1988, pamphlet form.

[44] J. Bjelke-Petersen, “Violence And The Church Council Visit”, South Burnett Times, July 8 1981, p. 3.  (This paper was owned by a League Of Rights supporter.);  John Mackenzie, The World Council Of Churches, Adelaide 1981.  The ICCC denounced World Council Of Churches forays into ‘Aboriginal rights’.

[45] One Australia For All Australians, leaflet, undated.

[46] “An Open Letter From Howard Carter”, in Kit On:  The Logos Foundation And The League Of Rights.

[47] Howard Carter, “The Structure Of Government”, Restore, November-December 1986, pp. 4-5;  John Woodley, op.cit., pp. 106-7 describes reconstructionism as “amillenarianism” whereby Christians control the world before the apocalypse through energetic struggle.

[48] L. Apps, “Media Coverage Of The Queensland Election”, Australian Journalism Review, No. 11, 1989, pp. 145-6.

[49] Neville Buch, “American Influence On Protestantism In Queensland Since 1945”, PhD Thesis, University of Queensland, 1995, pp. 70-73, 151; Michael Barkun, “Millenarian Aspects Of White Supremacist Movements”, Terrorism And Political Violence, Vol. 1, No. 4, Winter 1987, pp. 410-411.

[50] Jeffrey Kaplan, “The Contest Of American Millenarian Revolutionary Theology:  The Case Of The Identity Church Of Israel”, Terrorism And Political Violence, Vol. 5, No. 1, Spring 1993, pp. 48-50;  Michael Barkun, op.cit., p. 427;  Neville Buch, op.cit., pp. 423-438.

[51] Alan Gourley, How To Avoid The Looming Catastrophe, Sydney, 1985 - was the group’s manifesto;  First And Last Discussion Bulletin (undated, but 1985) on gestation of CHPS.

[52] Alan Gourley, Democracy And Treason In Australia, Sydney, 1988.

[53] Alan Gourley, Speech At The Presbyterian Hall, Sydney, 1987 (notes taken by author who attended);  John Grover, The Hellmakers, Sydney, 1986.

[54] Craig M. White, Directory Of Conservative, New Right, Anti-Socialist Organizations, the author, 1988.

[55] For an account of Sawyer’s rise to prominence:  “On The Inside With Peter Sawyer”, Take A Closer Look, Vol. 9, No. 3, March 1988, pp. 14-23 covers his timetable for totalitarian rule: wild interest rates, national strikes, universal video surveillance and collapse of financial institutions 1988-9.

[56] Peter Sawyer, Inside News, No. 2, October-November 1987, p. 11.

[57] Andrew Biggs, “Righting The Course Of Australia”, The Courier Mail, January 26 1989, p. 9;  “Right Wing Groups Predict Black Uprising”, The Sunday Mail, March 13 1988, p. 1.

[58] Peter Sawyer And Jeremy Lee Speak At Nanango, February 1988, video recording, Ravensbourne, 1988; Jeremy Lee, who referred to meetings in Rockhampton, Gold Coast, Toowoomba.

[59] Brian Wilshire, The Fine Print, Sydney, 1989;  the author has listened to Wilshire’s 2GB broadcasts occasionally 1987-95.

[60] Geoff McDonald, Red Over Black, Bullsbrook, 1984, pp. 92-98.

[61] Geoff McDonald, ibid..; the flyleaf carried testimonials from Charles Porter who launched the book, Lady Cilento, Tony McGillick, Premier Bjelke-Petersen.  The book carried an Introduction by Bruce Ruxton.  McDonald’s follow-up, The Evidence, Bullsbrook, 1984, included a fascinating ‘concession’:  “While advancing CPA strategy to use land rights claims as the device to stop mining of minerals and other free enterprise initiatives …” Two chapters were entitled:  “The Anti Free Enterprise Mining Offensive Continues” and “Opposition To Mining Is Also To Establish Apartheid”.  In this way the New Right could use the Old Right.

[62] “The Eric Butler/On Target Issue”, Inside News, No. 3, January 1988, pp. 14-15.

[63] Jeremy Lee, “World Heritage, Boswell And The Bankers”, Enterprise, No. 71 (Supplement), June 1988, pp. 1-3;  “Power Maniacs Exploit Conservation Issue”, Intelligence Survey, Vol. 38, No. 2, February 1990; David Thompson, The Green Hoax, Bullsbrook, 1989.

[64] Dynamic Speaking Tour:  Rev. Jacobs, LOR leaflet, 1989;  Jeremy Lee.

[65] Eric D. Butler, “Australia Can Be Saved”, On Target (Supplement), September 5 1988, pp. 1-2 - a grudging acknowledgement of CEC activism in South Burnett.

[66] La Rouche himself suggested cultic style:  Lyndon La Rouche JR, The Power Of Reason, Washington D.C., 1987.  John Koehler and Morris Hetherington, Sovereign Australia:  An Economic Development Programme to Save Our Nation, Kingaroy, 1990.

[67] “The ‘Big Battle’ And The Great King O’Malley”, The New Citizen, Vol. 3, No. 12, April-June 1995, pp. 8-9.

[68] Scott Coomber, “MPs Seek Inquiry Into Racist La Rouche Cult”, The Australian, February 7 1996, p. 2;  Martin Daly, “Families Fight Back”, The Age, January 30 1996, p. 13 - all pointed to cult conduct, financial frauds, harassment of Jewish community leaders.

[69] Chip Berlet and Joel Bellman, Lyndon La Rouche:  Fascism Wrapped In An American Flag, Internet, December 10 1990, pointed to Jewish members.  This document was provided to the author in ‘hard copy’ and is in my possession;  David Greason, “Lyndon La Rouche Down Under”, p. 5 - referred to a large number of anti-semitic Jews;  Michael Sharpe, Interview, May 1995.  Sharpe as CEC leader, insisted the Jewish community feared “defections”.

[70] Andrew Maythier, Letter To J. Saleam, November 19 1982, for ASKS/PL contacts;   For the pattern of ‘conservative’ interlinkage:  “General Meeting”, Australia First (Newsletter of the Patriotic Lobby), February 1983 - Ruxton to speak to PL;  “General Meeting”, Australia First, April 1983, McDonald to speak to PL;  The ASKS sponsored ‘Australian Heritage Society’ which unified ASKS, the LOR front, the ‘Concerned Voters Association’ (Tasmania) and PL and National Flag Association (Tasmania).  See Topical, No. 5, November 1988;  “Jeremy Lee Wins Australia Day Award”, Topical, No. 6, February 1989, p. 7, suggested unity of view amongst Ruxton, Dique, Bennett and League Assistant Director Lee.

[71] John Bennett, Your Rights 1988, Melbourne 1988, pp. 86-89, 93-94.  For ‘prejudiced’ reaction to Bennett:  Bill Rubinstein, “John Bennett:  Profile”, Without Prejudice, No. 2, February 1991, pp. 47-51:  “widely regarded as a cross between a freak of nature and a squalid nuisance”.

[72] “The Fabian Role In Destruction Of Representative Government”, Intelligence Survey, Vol. 36, No. 1, January 1988, pp. 4-6.  The LOR concurred with Gourley and others.  One key progenitor of this creed was Liberal parliamentarian and LOR founder Arthur Chresby;  See:  Your Will Be Done, Brisbane, 1979.

[73] Various examples of Conservative discontent would be:  columns of the Toorak Times 1984-8 featuring Ruxton, Jenny McCallum, Bennett, Paul Madigan 3RRR compere;  the various resolutions passed at RSL congresses against multiculturalism;  Geoff Blainey’s critique of multiculturalism;  John Howard’s 1988 attack on multiculturalism.

[74] Arthur Tuck, The Australian Revolution (3rd edition), July 1984.  Tuck said:  “… The Humanist knows if the family is destroyed, Christianity, the enemy of humanism will be weakened …”  Tuck rose through the LOR:  “New Times Dinner And League National Weekend Another Spiritual Feast”, The New Times, Vol. 57, No. 11, November 1993, pp. 1-2.  In 1991-2, Tuck tried to obtain private prosecutions of republicans for treason; Neville Buch, op.cit., p. 427.

[75] Sally Loane, “How The Right Gets It Wrong”, The Age, October 21 1988, p. 11.

[76] Dean Jaensch and David Mathieson, A Plague On Both Your Houses:  Minor Parties In Australia, St. Leonards, 1998, pp. 108-111.

[77] Agenda And Minutes Of The Inaugural Meeting Of The Confederate Action Party Of Australia, July 20 1990.

[78] Don Vietch, Hansonism:  Trick Or Treat?, Melbourne, 1997, p. 172.

[79] John Jarvis, Letter To The Electoral Commission Queensland, August 10 1993, p. 2, in Electoral Commission Queensland, File:  Registration Of Political Parties:  Confederate Action Party EL 38, Part 2. (Hereafter the Commission is recorded as ECQ.)

[80] Perry Jewell, Tape Recorded Interview, November 1997.

[81] ibid.

[82] Anon, Confederate Action Party:  Philosophy, Platform, Promise, Ipswich, 1992, pp. 21-23.

[83] A Promise To The People Of Australia, CAP leaflet, undated.

[84] Perry Jewell, Interview, October 1997;  Paul Hildebrand, Interview, October 1997.  Hildebrand was a founding member.

[85] Agenda And Minutes Of The Inaugural Meeting Of The Confederate Action Party.

[86] “Freedom Fighters Opt For The Death Penalty”, Sunday Mail, March 17 1991, p. 8.

[87] “A Confederate Action Credo”, in Confederate Action Party Philosophy, Platform, Promise, pp. 23-25;  Perry Jewell, Dear Fellow Australian, CAP form letter, undated.

[88] “If It Has To Be, Then It’s Up To Me”, CAP members leaflet, June 30 1992, p. 1.

[89] Paul Hildebrand.  Perry Jewell.

[90] Figures computed from:  Kevin Polzen, Letter To The Qld. Electoral Commission, August 4 1993, in ECQ, Registration Of Political Parties, Confederate Action Party Of Australia, File EL38/Part One;  Perry Jewell, Letter To All Branches CAP, April 20 1993, p. 2;  Bill Murray/Robin Murray, Interview, October 1977:  the Murrays were key officials in the NSW Branch 1993-4;  Joe Ross, Chairman Qld State Council, Letter To Electoral Commissioner, September 6 1993, on branch strengths, in ECQ, Registration Of Political Parties, Confederate Action Party, File EL38/Part Three.

[91] Paul Hildebrand;  Perry Jewell.

[92] Paul Rackemann, Letter To James Saleam, August 21 1995.  Rackemann was a Rockhampton member.

[93] John Jarvis, Letter To The Electoral Commissioner, p. 2.

[94] Confederate Action Party, Meeting In Bundaberg, Video Recording, 1992.

[95] Don Pinwell, Interview, October 1997.

[96] For early CEC ideas, see:  First Inverell Forum Summary, June 1988;  Second Inverell Forum:  Programme 13, 14 August 1988;  Citizens’ Electoral Councils Programme, 1990.  Essentially, CEC ideas of ‘independent’ candidates controlled by citizens, was unremarkable compared to similar forces (see Chapter Eight).

[97] A.R. Pitt, A Proposal For Co-Ordination Not Amalgamation, CAP circular, May 2 1991.

[98] Dawn Brown, Questionnaire, 1997.

[99] Tom Little, Questionnaire, 1997.

[100] Bill May, Questionnaire;  Bill May, Interview, October 1997.

[101] T. Livingstone, “Nats Take Action Against New Party”, Sunday Mail, June 21 1992, p. 57.

[102] T. Livingstone, “Gun Lobby Fires Election Shots”, Sunday Mail (Review), January 10 1993, p. 47, described CAP propaganda over preceding months.

[103] Russell Cooper, quoted in, Tess Livingstone, “It’s All Uphill For Joan”, Sunday Mail, June 14 1992, p. 49.

[104] “Queensland Election Results”, The Confederate Action Party Newsletter, October 1992, p. 3.

[105] Electoral Commission Queensland, Details Of Polling At General Election, Brisbane, March 1993, pp. 47, 50, 77, 79, 82, 85-7, 92, 109-110, 112.

[106] Constitution Of The Confederate Party (Inc.), June 1992, Confederate Party (C.P.) Inc. leaflet, 1991.

[107] Alan Rossiter, An Open Letter To All Western Australian Members Of CAP, June 5 1994;  Alan Rossiter, Letter To Western Australian State Council CAP, August 8 1994.

[108] Jim Perrett, Interview, 1997.

[109] Confederate Action Party (as at 30/9/93), leaflet, 1993.

[110] Ron Owen, Interview, 1997.

[111] “The Faces Of The True Believers:  Bob Doring”, Sunday Mail, May 19 1996, p. 4;  Ron Owen, for background on Doring in CAP.

[112] Kevin Polzen, Telephone Conversation With Author, May 1997.  Mr Polzen provided some information but declined interview.

[113] Tony Pitt, “Editorial”, Fight, unnumbered, February 1993, p. 2.

[114] Perry Jewell, Like A Hole In The Head, CAP leaflet, 1993.

[115] Confederate Action Party Of Australia:  Candidates In The 1993 Federal Election, CAP Media Release, undated.

[116] Australian Electoral Commission, Funding And Disclosure Entitlements To Election Funding – House of Representatives 1993 Federal Election, p. 15.

[117] ibid., page number unknown;  pages out of order.  (Document in possession of author.)

[118] National Executive Secretary CAP, “To Branch Secretary”, Form Letter Memo, July 11 1993.

[119] “Minutes Of Inaugural Meeting Of The National Council Of The Confederate Action Party of Australia, RSL Club Nambucca Heads, July 17 1993 at 5.00 pm”, ECQ, Registration Of Political Parties:  Confederate Action Party Of Australia:  File EL38 Part 4.

[120] “Memorandum To Electoral Commissioner 28/9/93”, ECQ, Registration Of Political Parties:  Confederate Action Party Of Australia:  File EL38 Part One.

[121] Consolidated Party Of Australia, Form Letter, September 27 1993.  The intention was obviously to keep the letters “CAP”.

[122] Tony Pitt, Letter To James Saleam, April 4 1991.

[123] Cec Clark, Apathetic:  Calling All Partisans, CAP leaflet, August 4 1994;  Fight:  Don’t Let Australia Down, circular, undated.

[124] Tony Pitt, Telephone Conversation, June 1997, Pitt’s views on united fronts, see: Tony Pitt, Situation Assessment And Suggested Action Statement, CAP Circular, March 25 1993.

[125] Perry Jewell, To All CAP Branches, CAP Internal Memorandum Censure Motion Of Tony Pitt, April 20 1993, p. 2.

[126] Minutes Of The Meeting Of The NSW State Council Of The CAP Of Australia Held At Tamworth, April 18 1993.

[127] Report On The State Council Meeting, June 19/20 1993, p. 2.

[128] Minutes Of National Executive Meeting CAP, March 29 1993.

[129] Minutes Of The Meeting Of The NSW State Council Of The CAP, Armidale, February 14 1993.

[130] Minutes Of NSW State Council CAP, October 10 1993.

[131] Warren Woodford And Others, Letter To The Electoral Commissioner, Commissioner in ECQ, Registration Of Political Parties, File EL38/Part 2.

[132] Tony Pitt quoted at meeting of the CAP Executive, April 18 1993, in Frank Hurt, Letter To Alan Rossitter, Chairman WA CAP, June 6 1994, p. 2.

[133] Kevin Polzen, “Comprehensive Assessment Of Confederate Action Party Present Problems”, in ECQ, Registration of Political Parties, File EL38/Part 4.

[134] “Right’s New Hope Falters”, Gold Coast Bulletin, July 1993, no other details, in op.cit.

[135] Perry Jewell, Warren Woodford, Michael Blades, Your Party Is In Peril, CAP Open Letter, July 5 1993.

[136] Minutes Of The Meeting Of The NSW State Council Of CAP, op.cit.;  Perry Jewell.

[137] David Croft, Chairman, Buderim Branch, Letter To John Jarvis, June 27 1993, in Australian Electoral Commission, Party Registration – Confederate Action Party, File 93/923.  Hereafter:  Australian Electoral Commission given as AEC.

[138] Joe Ross, Chairman Qld State Council CAP, Letter To The Electoral Commissioner, ECQ, Registration Of Political Parties – Confederate Action Party Of Australia File EL38/2.

[139] National Executive CAP, Please Read The Following, Conservative Action Party Members’ Letter, undated, in AEC, Party Registration – The Confederate Action Party File 93/923.

[140] A New Political Party, leaflet, January 1995.

[141] Confederate Action Party:  Constitution Policy, Activities, Brisbane, 1994, pp. 15-16.

[142] ibid. p. 17.

[143] See CAP advertisement “Aborigines Hard To Find”, Geraldton Guardian, March 11 1994, p. 5;  Report Of The Activities of WA State Council Administration, June 18 1994;  Saving Australia For All Australians, CAP Leaflet, 1994.

[144] Paul Hildebrand, Exit Tony Pitt, January 23 1995;  John Jarvis, Fax To Queensland State Council CAP, February 5 1994;  Reg Murray.

[145] Minutes Of The Queensland State Council Meeting Of The CAP, Maryborough, October 8-9 1994;  “Wondai Man Takes Over CAP Leadership”, South Burnett Times, August 16 1994, p. 3.

[146] Tony Pitt, Situation Assessment And Suggested Action Statement, March 25 1994.

[147] Tony Pitt, To All Groups Interested In Saving Australia, leaflet, May 15 1994;  The Last Train Out Of Australia, CAP leaflet, undated.

[148] Kevin Polzen, Minutes Of The Meeting NSW State Council CAP, October 10 1993.

[149] “Confederate Action Party Or The Australians?”, In The National Interest, No. 1, undated, p. 13.

[150] Kevin Polzen.

[151] List Of Rank And File CAP Members, in author’s possession, self-titled.  Valid August-September 1993.  This list was a compilation from the several Federal and State Electoral Commission files.

[152] Confederate Action Party (As At 30/9/93), members’ leaflet;  The Confederate Action Party Is Nationwide:  Organization As At 12/3/97, members’ leaflet;  Branch List:  CAP, loose sheets provided by Reg and Robin Murray, NSW Branch officers (in author’s possession).

[153] Questionnaires:  CAP, in author’s possession.  Hereafter:  general conclusions from the questionnaires will not be cited but referred to directly in the text.  See Chapter Ten for further analysis.

[154] Perry Jewell;  Paul Hildebrand;  Jim Perrett.

[155] Robin Murray, Interview, October 1997.

[156] CAP Calen Branch Form Letter, May 19 1993.

[157] Paul Hildebrand.

[158] Perry Jewell.

[159] Confederate Action Party:  Nominations For Queensland State Chairman, October 8 1994.

[160] Newspaper cutting in, AEC, Party Registration:  The Confederate Action Party of Australia:  File No. 92/360.

[161] Dawn Brown;  A.R. Pitt, Dear Friends, March 31 1991, p. 1.

[162] One Flag:  One Nation, CAP leaflet, undated.

[163] Dawn Brown;  Tom Little;  Bill May.

[164] Bill May;  Tom Little;  Kevin Polzen.

[165] Confederate Action Party:  Activities Manual, Ipswich, 1992.  For the ideological issue see sub-section (d)(iii).

[166] ibid., pp. 4, 8.

[167] ibid., p. 9.

[168] ibid., p. 11.

[169] ibid., pp. 17-18.

[170] Questionnaires;  Robin Murray;  Dawn Brown.  This was also Perry Jewell’s opinion.

[171] Allan and Vivienne Wardrope, Letter To The ECQ, August 16 1993 and Lorraine Elliot, August 4 1993, in ECQ, Registration Of Political Parties:  Confederate Action Party Of Australia EL/38 Part 1.

[172] Activities Manual, p. 8.

[173] Bernie Clark (Chairman, Nundah Branch CAP), Members’ Letter, January 12 1994;  Joe Ross (Chairman, CAP Queensland State Council), Fax To Branches, August 18 1993.

[174] Queensland State Council CAP, Form Letter, addressed to all sections of the trade union movement, January 5 1995.

[175] Activities Manual, p. 22.

[176] ibid.  The use of the term ‘shepherding’ was curious and no further light could be shed on its origin.  Possibly it was a religious reference.

[177] Herbert Kitschelt, The Radical Right In Western Europe:  A Comparative Analysis, Ann Arbor, 1995, pp. (viii), 21-22, 160, 166, 226;  Footnote 672.

[178] Hans Georg Betz, Radical Right-Wing Populism In Western Europe, Basingstoke, 1994, pp. 109-110;  Hans Georg Betz, “The New Politics Of Resentment:  Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties In Western Europe”, Comparative Politics, Vol. 25, No. 3, 1993, pp. 413-427, passim.

[179] Cas Mudde, “The War Of Words:  Defining The Extreme Right Party Family”, West European Politics, Vol. 19, No. 2, 1996, p. 231.

[180] Paul Taggart, “New Populist Parties In Western Europe”, West European Politics, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 36, 37, 39.

[181] Jeff Gehrmann, Letter To Perry Jewell, April 24 1992, in ECQ, Registration Of Political Parties:  Confederate Action Party, File EL/38 Part 2.

[182] John Howell (Nundah Branch CAP), ‘Discussion Letter’, 1993, for ‘use’ of Nexus in crafting propaganda.

[183] Activities Manual, pp. 17-18.

[184] ibid., pp. 13-14.

[185] Minutes Of The Meeting Of The NSW State Council Of CAP Of Australia, April 4 1993.

[186] “George Turner”, Fight, No. 9, undated, p. 10.

[187] Kevin Polzen, CAP Members’ Letter, undated (1995), in ECQ, Registration Of Political Parties:  Confederate Action Party, File EL/38 Part 4.

[188] See:  “Small Business Australia” and “Wanted:  A Real Accord”, In The National Interest, August 1995, p. 9.

[189] Sue Hammond, Confederate Action Party Discussion Paper:  The Development Of A Political Strategy, September 15  1994, passim.

[190] Roger Eatwell, “Un Nuovo Modello Di Fascismo Generico”, introduction in English to a forthcoming book, pp. 14-15, 19.  (Copy provided by Eatwell;  in author’s possession.)