|
The State Conspiracy Against National Action And The Australian Nationalists Movement 1988 - 1991 |
Special Prologue
In August 2004, Jack van Tongeren, founder and leader of the Australian Nationalists Movement, was arrested on some 23 charges and imprisoned without bail. In some ways, it was a re-run of his 1989 arrest. There were charges of malicious damage and conspiracy, allegations of the existence of a paramilitary wing of the ANM, the state's use of roll-over witnesses and a possible long-term informer in the Perth section. As in 1989, there was a Sydney-link with the arrests, shadowy persons who incited van Tongeren to play act in the media and who encouraged some Perth supporters to talk up neo-nazism and commit offences. As the new trial process developed and state propagandists mouthed off about the need for 'harder' anti racial vilification legislation and for more intrusive security services operations against 'racists', there was a counter-struggle by Nationalists to drag out the truth about the inter-relationship of the political police and the neo-nazis generally - and the fundamentally unjust quality of the new charges. Mr. van Tongeren eventually was given bail but he absconded, leading to a man-hunt in Western Australia. He was re-arrested and imprisoned. His health deteriorated. The hapless van Tongeren faced another ten years in prison for crimes he insisted this time around - that he had not committed. In November 2006, he pleaded guilty to various charges and was released under Parole Board supervision. The guilty plea was necessary, in the very interests of his life. Mr. van Tongeren has now retired from all political action.
Introduction
I authored a pamphlet under a similar title in 1990. I was the Chairman of Australian National Action (NSW branch), having just stepped down from the National Chairman's position under new organizational arrangements. That document was constructed to assist nationalists to struggle against a conspiracy then in motion. The state was attempting the suppression of National Action (NA) and the neo-nazi Australian Nationalists Movement (ANM). Both these groups, despite their divergent ideologies, had performed certain actions which 'warranted' a state response. By the time I wrote my pamphlet, the conspiracy had been under way for twenty months. The state perception of its' targets meant that the operation was run against both simultaneously and with the advantage of an overlap of organization and means. The suppression operation was to be run by any means necessary.
At the time, there were some persons on the fringe of nationalism, in other patriotic groups, and even a few nationalist leaders, who found the facts (as they were), difficult to accept. Some considered that the author was exaggerating, or wrong, or distorting the circumstances of criminal investigations - to allege conspiracy. This was despite the fact, that to this time, a number of people had been 'charged' with an array of offences and the leader of the ANM (Jack van Tongeren) was on remand without bail, amidst sensational reports of informers, tape-recordings and murder. There were some who, because of their criticisms of van Tongeren's ideas and methods, refused to draw the lessons from his prosecution. There were others who, with the media-police targetting of National Action, ducked for cover. And there were venal elements, jackals, who perceived the crisis of whichever group, an opportunity to peddle personalist messages and ideas.
The present pamphlet includes the weight of information which has since become available to prove the conspiracy-case, absolutely. The old pamphlet has therefore been drastically overhauled and expanded. That pamphlet was itself part of the struggle and was at one point, 'used in evidence' - against me. For that reason, as well as simplicity, I prefer the title. There are, of course, other documents that refer to parts of what you will read here. These documents include my Pardon Me: The Anatomy Of An Australian Political Trial and The Other Radicalism and Jack van Tongeren's The ANM: The Pre- Revolutionary Years. There are others which touch on bits and pieces of the tale. Nonetheless, this one document gives you the gory details.
But it is also a matter of history. These years were years of an intense political struggle between nationalists and the secret police apparatus. I have realised since that provocateurs have arisen to deny the facts with the clear intent of discrediting people and ideas. Clearly, he who commands the past commands the present and dictates the future. It is incumbent therefore upon the nationalists to recount the events and explain them.
There was a three-year state conspiracy that functioned on multi-levels. It had some real success. Indeed, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, in its Report To Parliament 1991 - 1992, would claim "operational success" against the two organizations at issue. What does "operational success" - mean? During the later stages of one of the 'legal processes' (sic) directed at me, I asked this question in 1992, of the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal. I received no answer - save the loss of an appeal and the continuation of a prison sentence. Or possibly, I did get an answer. Graham Barr QC, the Crown advocate (now Mr. Justice Barr), told the Court that I: "had an obsession with spies and spying". Silly me, I must have been paranoid! Obviously, the notion that the state's agents would conspire to pervert the course of justice is never to be formally considered by our state-paid 'legal-minds'. Mr. Barr's argument was tacitly accepted and he too - was ulimately rewarded by promotion.
In this pamphlet, the story will be told as the events unfolded. You will observe what "operational success" involved. It meant: perjured witnesses, the misuse of electronic surveillance, perverting the course of justice, rape, assault, informers, dividing families, intimidation, media disinformation, lying politicians and legislative action, show-trial processes and fake public inquiries. Everything was employed to break the target groups, and divide their parts against each other, break individuals and take advantage of the destabilisation. In a phrase: it was political warfare.
Let us learn from the facts. Of course, back then, the state did not get what it wanted.One of the targetted groups survived in a more limited form - and moved on. Some of the target-individuals escaped the net while others endured imprisonment, but resumed their lives. Certainly the state's agents did not come away unscathed. The Special Branch in New South Wales was broken at the Royal Commission Into The New South Wales Police Service, the head actor, Superintedent Neville George Ireland, biting the dust for stealing, perjury, drunk-on-duty, protecting a judge of the Supreme Court against criminal charges, and more. What a man!
More importantly, for the patriotic cause, no sooner had the state won its "operational success" against the target groups, than new patriotic groups grew into sizeable formations in new political circumstances. But the contours of much patriotic action (good and bad) was set in the suppression-operation period. I am sure the reader will note this. Today, as the Australian state becomes ever more authoritarian in its push to be part of the New World Order system, it is inevitable that some of the circumstances of the past, will repeat themselves. There is a new broad nationalist and patriotic movement in the field and the hour is late for Australia's Identity, Independence and Freedom to be secured. We must ensure there will be only 'operational defeat' for the political police.
In 1988, the two organisations claimed upon themselves the mantle of "Australian Nationalism." Australian National Action was the larger of the two movements and squarely based, on the Australian Nationalist tradition, tempered by its commitment to the "Third Position" (neither Left nor Right). The ANM, chiefly a Perth organisation, is not so easy to describe. It reflected a certain mixture of conservative ideology flavoured by neo-nazism and some true Nationalism. It was a 'blend' in some external ways; nonetheless, with respect to a few members who joined it onlyon the basis of its campaign against Asian immigration, it was essentially a 'neo-nazi' organization. I shall explain all this as we proceed. While it was very much the creation of Jack van Tongeren, and reflected his ideological interests, it also represented the neo-nazi 'tradition' and could be expected to follow certain 'forms'. At its 'peak' in early 1989, it might have had 125 nominal members; because, it lacked formal structure and very much depended upon the presense of its leader, it was therefore a britle entity.
The ANM had issued from an engineered split in the Western Australian section of National Action in 1985. National Action had sought to base itself on the nativist tradition of Nationalism with radical tactics (a youth / working class orientation); the founders of the ANM sought to capture the membership of the conservative monarchistic groupings through moderate ideas and tactics. The ANM later changed course on this very subject, though, in all fairness, traces of the previous tendencies survived. This is not to say that all ANM members held these views; clearly, as things turned out, they did not. But this is how things initially stood . The ANM founder, Jack van Tongeren, believed in the early period that Nazism had become a mass movement by taking on conservative patriotic values and won therefore the support of moneyed elements. He identified the RSL, the League of Rights and the National Flag groups as suitable benefactors on this model of fascist success. He reasoned that the nativist nationalism and labour references of NA were alienating "better people" and in particular he denounced any use of the Eureka Flag. Of course, van Tongeren had joined NA to take it over - and had been rebuffed by the party at, and after, its 1985 conference. It was considered by the members then, that van Tongeren had deceived them as to his ideology and intentions.
Unsurprisingly, the relationship between National Action and the ANM was not very good. The ideologies, though distinct, were "similar" enough in one particular area (i.e. the Asianisation of Australia) to cause comparison in the media, public confusion, etc. It was also the case, as will be relevant below, that bad relations were incited by certain persons. Though obviously, "unity" of organisation or even purpose, would have been impossible even if desirable, there was no need for certain "feelings" between some members of both movements. I would have preferred, since I was in the period 1985–89 generally the prime-mover of NA, to have ameliorated this situation. The difficulties between the two organisations was known to the political police directly through their informers and through journalists who often convey "information" of one sort or another to these authorities.
It was also the case that both NA and ANM were going through a very active period in 1988. The ANM had engaged in a hyperactive bill-pasting campaign in Perth which had been the subject of innumerable protests in the media from various politicians, church-liberals, Asian organisations and other political liberals. The ANM, to its credit, had managed to spearhead a growing public awareness of the "Asian Future" of our country as mapped out by Big Business. Even though I had, as National Action had, grave criticisms of the policies of the ANM’s leader, there is no doubt at all in our minds that the ANM drive was as effective as it was disturbing to those in Western Australia who held influence and who were embarrassed by these activities. In particular, one could name the former WA Premiers, Brian Burke and Peter Dowding, and the Minister for Multicultural and Ethnic Affairs, Gordon Hill. All these gentlemen agitated against the ANM. In proof of that claim, I could refer the reader to innumerable citations advanced in my doctoral thesis available on this Site.
The ANM had also developed its line in 1988 in a most significant way. It had adopted the American book, The Turner Diaries, as its ideological-political guide and strategic-tactical manual. The book, as is a matter of public record, was the epitome of international neo-nazi ideology and politics. It argued for a policy of racist terrorism (I say, as van Tongeren does, the ANM's actions were not 'terrorism'). The violence would be aimed at both state agencies and members of racial groups, growing in intensity up to the violent overthrow of the U.S. government. Car bombs, illegal fundraising, murder, were all in the tale.
Section Five: The Political Situation For National Action In 1989.
The Turner Diaries has itself been discussed by the author and by others in different places. It was introduced to the ANM by Coleman and he produced a pirate edition of the book. He sold copies (at a profit) to the ANM. ANM recruiits were given a copy of the book. There is no doubt that Jack van Tongeren considered it important in the cosmology of his movement. At a meeting at the Victoria Park Hotel in Enmore, in Sydney, in early 1988, Jack asked me if I had read the book: "yes, a crock of shit". "I knew you'd say that", he replied. Coleman, who was present, said nothing.
Mr. van Tongeren wrote his own book while he was in prison. One might object to the politics expressed therein, or about some matters of fact here and there, but at the end of the day, it is a ripper-read. Break and enters, assorted mishaps, burning down Asian restaurants with buckets and spray-units of petrol, and the truthful data of the police violence that accompanied the final arrests, all up makes a gripping tale. Mr. van Tongeren entitled the book The ANM: The Pre-Revolutionary Years 19 - 1991. It is on the Internet. This was how Jack sought to apply The Turner Diaries. I cannot accept that its significance was not 'picked' by the political police.
The ANM violence campaign began on September 1 1988 with the arson of a Chinese restuarant. Between that date and May 23 1989, another three restaurants were arsoned and another, bombed. A campaign of robberies (warehouse burglaries) was also commenced early in 1989. The campaign was hardly a professional effort and not a terrorist campaign. The latter issue has always been pivotal.
To be continued.
In 1988, the strength of National Action, human and materiel, began to increase. It is a matter of fact that its membership, in all categories, passed 500 persons. Its' income was rising. Its' ability towage campaigns, acquire political and other intelligence and its ideological sophistication, were all developing well. The members took great pride in its' achievements and looked forward to achieving a 'political breakthrough' by 1990 ie. a move into the broader sphere of public acceptance and support. It also, by virtue of its aggressive campaigning, managed to politically intimidate the liberal-internationalist propagandists in media, churches, academia and elsewhere. This was new and inherently dynamic.
The Special Branch had always maintained an interest in the affairs of the author and of Australian National Action. My Special Branch file, available for view by genuine nationalists, showed this to be true. The file had been opened in 1974 (I did not reside in New South Wales at the time) and maintained scrupulously. It seems that I had my own 'nemesis' (or would-be nemesis), a certain Detective Sergeant G. Crothers, who slowly worked on my 'case' from (at least) 1981 until 1988. And yet, I had never heard of this secret policeman! In all the goings-on between NA and Special Branch, all the campaigns, arrests and so on, he never came into view. It is concluded that Crothers was therefore the 'craftsman' behind any number of irregular processes. In August 1988, Crothers set up his last anti-nationalist operation.
On August 29 1988, Operation Odessa was established. This operation ran until September 16. Its' function was to investigate particular political events and to amass information (work, address, vehicles, criminal history, status) of the various members of the NA committee and some other leading persons. A group of officers, Neville Ireland, John Garvey, Charles Poniris, Andrew Georghiou, Sean Edwards, and some others including the shifty Constables, Magdopoulos and Midson. This operation was finalised by the then- Detective Inspector Crothers. It was the 'beginning' of the formation of the organizational relationship amongst those officers who would commit offences in the pursuit of the final objectives. It provided certain basic intelligence data.
The ultimate task force allotted in Sydney to the close investigation of National Action was seemingly assembled in late November or early December 1988. The "order" doubtlessly came from the Premier’s office after months of intensive lobbying for such an action from a variety of groups. Political liberals such as those who supported the activities of the Reverend McMahon, the Community Alert Against Racism and Violence, the Gay and Lesbian Immigration Taskforce and many others, including journalists, politicians and clergy, were all pushing for "police action" against National Action and against those held responsible for a spate of vandalism against property and vehicles owned by supporters of "anti-apartheid" and "anti-racist" groups.
Superintendent Mick O’Brien of the Special Branch was called in. The character of the now-deceased O’Brien is "typical." This secret policeman was called to Special Branch after a career which took a sudden "lift" after June 1978. O’Brien was one of the arresting officers in the sensational Ananda Marga case which saw three young members of a strange religious sect perjured into prison for allegedly attempting to murder a "National Front" figure and several policemen. The case brought Special Branch into public view. The appointment of O’Brien to head this secret police indicates the commitment of the State to those who have served it well. O’Brien was also corrupt. When serving in the licensing branch, he had a certain relationship with a smash repair business in Alexandria operated by the "P" family. A member of the same family later served in Special Branch under O’Brien. Interestingly, Magdopoulos 'moonlighted' at Villawood Autovillage in 1989-91. The connection with vehicles might easily have related to the Special Branch's need for falsely-registered vehicles.
O’Brien detailed the then Detective Sergeant Neville George Ireland to head this team (Ireland would make Superintendent and be the last commander of Special Branch), along with the then Detective Senior Constable John William Garvey (he would finally make Chief Superintendent and even serve as the head of Olympics Security). Detectives Poniris and Georgiou were also drafted in, as were Simm and Lawson. Ireland denies there ever was a 'task force' assigned to National Action. Really!?
Ireland epitomised the sinister nature of the Special Branch organisation. He served in the SB since 1975. Ireland was the officer on duty at the Hilton Hotel in 1978 who first met the perjurer of the Ananda Marga trial, Richard Seary. Ireland recruited Seary for the Branch, but appears to have played no direct role in the case thereafter; indeed, little paperwork and precise material on the recruitment of Seary could ever be found during the famous Inquiry into the Ananda Marga case in 1984–85. In those days, Ireland worked very closely with one of the SB perjurers in the Ananda Marga trial, Alan Henderson. In company with Henderson, Ireland was involved in investigations into leftist groups in the early 1980s. I located an article concerning Ireland from the paper of the International Socialists and published it The International Socialists accused Ireland of perjury. I noted he hadn’t changed too much; only his victims had changed! As far as it goes, I would believe the account given by the International Socialists since it correlated exactly with Ireland’s "main methods" in dealing with National Action: assault, forced entry, perjury.
As the Ireland-led investigation into NA developed, I had an occasion or two to meet him in "inquiries" of a different sort, but inquiries which Ireland was relating to his central desire: to "get" National Action. A few of us took time to observe him. On one occasion in April 1989, we provoked him - by publishing his address and home phone number in a certain publication. We gauged the reaction. For Ireland, Special Branch must be "invulnerable." Our crime was: we had reduced them to a very human level. I would say that for this and many reasons, Ireland developed a hatred of me personally. And he admitted to his dislikes in court before Justice Jane Matthews under oath (November 1 1989). Ireland was also a drunk and as the Police Royal Commission showed, he was, at the time he was investigating National Action, protecting old Justice Yeldham on indecency ( flashing') allegations And as this account develops, you can further judge for yourselves.
Garvey should also be commented on. Essentially Garvey was a blusterer, good with threats, but short on intelligence. Why he was promoted to Senior Sergeant over Ireland in 1990 was a bit of a mystery, although the Police Royal Commission in 1996 would suggest that he was part of a rat-pack in the Police Service. Ireland was, in fact, a little more professional - when he was sober. Garvey made his name at the famous Milperra Bikie Massacre of 1983 and won a bravery medal, though as it would appear, some of the bikies disputed Garvey’s role in things. A book was written on the massacre by Sydney Morning Herald journalist Sandra Harvey; Garvey used Harvey for the production of certain material in that paper. In 1989, a number of articles barbed against NA were published under her by-line. (Note the "link" between journalists and political police.)
The initial activities of this task force was so basic: the garbage at the NA office disappeared on a few occasions and our headquarters building was placed under surveillance regularly. Visitors were sometimes harassed. Photos were taken of various visitors and activists. Photographs turned up in released Special Branch files.
On November 16 1988, a rubber tyre wrapped around a dummy was burned outside the home of the Reverend McMahon. This incident made page one of the Sydney Morning Herald. This incident occurred just as (we noted above) high-pressure delegations of liberals, led by journalist Adele Horin, were pushing the Human Rights And Equal Opportunity Commission to organize an "inquiry into racist violence". This incident might have sparked a clear response. The liberals were very correct to pursue this lobbying approach. By creating a 'legitimizing' National Inquiry Into Racist Violence (formed December 1988), a cover existed for the criminal rampages of the political police. The other aspect of the emergent strategy was to get 'prosecutions' and use the legal system. The best result was to imprison activists on 'criminal' charges. Journalists could then praise the political police thugs as they 'did their duty'.
Substantially however, there was nothing to go on. The pressure on Ireland for "results" must have been heavy. On December 5, 1988, a small group of National Action members "raided" a dinner hosted by the Pyrmont-Ultimo branch of the Liberal Party. The meeting was addressed by Mrs. Helen Sham-Ho, Australia’s only Chinese member of parliament. The media was outraged, the Premier incensed, and the Special Branch caught by NA’s successful "political guerilla" tactics. Our lads had complete surprise and carried the field. The calls came down for legislation to curb "racial vilification" (read: legislation to curtail NA and other patriots). This legislation has since been enacted, as it is in Western Australian for pretty much the same reasons, as I will comment on below.
(To be continued)Section Six:
Simon Makes A Statement.Psycho-Ward Politics Adopted By Special Branch
Around Christmas 1988, Ireland/Garvey obtained their first "statement" for use against National Action. It came from Mr. Simon Lain. Ireland has denied taking or seeing this statement. But as per usual with the disingenuous nature of his court room evidence, it is possible Ireland was telling the 'truth' - it's just he did not say if he knew of the statement and its contents! Certainly, in January 1989, whilst in custody at the Sydney Police Centre on the Sham-Ho disruption ("violent disorder"), Evan Raftery saw the Lain statement (further details below). We cannot accept that this 'statement' was a concocted cover-sheet with Lain's name upon it. There was no market in that. Ireland was able to decipher that National Action would have assumed that Lain had squealed against the party. Ireland could not have been 'confirming' it with the ridiculous idea in mind that we might decide to 'punish' Lain - and be caught doing it! No: the statement was genuine and it was sighted somewhat by accident. Indeed, as events developed, it became clear the statement was real enough.
The history of Mr. Lain (and his statement) is of some value to us and should be recorded. Simon Lain had had an association with National Action. He had been on the fringes of a predecessor group and on that basis (nothing was known 'against' him) he passed into National Action as a supporter in 1982. As such he became well known to many of the members and participated in some activities. Simon Lain was, and remains, a strange disturbed personality and the decision was finally taken in May 1986 to remove him from the organization. But Lain could not be got rid of easily; his personality did not allow it. And the attempts to ease him away only increased his ire and malice - particularly his malice against this writer. In November 1987, Lain contrived my arrest on a offensive behaviour charge at a planned demonstration at the University of New South Wales, as he later freely admitted to a reliable source. He failed. Formal contact of any sort between this individual and the party could only have been terminated early in 1988. That did not end the contact. Attempts were made by Lain on a few occasions to damage the party offices at Tempe - and occasional telephone threats were received. Throughout 1988, Lain blustered that he would settle accounts with "Saleam and his henchmen".
To get Lain to talk to them, Ireland/Garvey also used another strategy. They told Lain that the author had 'nformed' on him (I discuss this matter shortly). This would not only induce Lain to talk, but just as easily would have encouraged him to try violence on his own behalf. Any violence could have any number of effects and Ireland/Garvey would have viewed that as 'positive'.
Lain would have been a "godsend" to the Special Branch investigation but for one reason: the man spent time in an asylum, as we have established, and like such persons, was the proverbial master of fabrication. Lain’s statement to Ireland was a cacophony of lies. Lain informed Ireland that National Action was indeed responsible for the "terrorism" ascribed to it; the worst of it was done, the tale went, by a certain "Chris M" from Queensland who travelled to Sydney under my orders to stay at the flat of a "Mark S." Lain also maintained that a certain "John" was one of the persons who did the mock "tyre-dummy" burning (i.e. a "necklacing") at the home of the Reverend McMahon and that this "John" had various criminal convictions. Amusingly, and at great expense, a number of Special Branch detectives travelled to country Queensland in February 1989, to interview an innocent person with substantive alibis to the offences discussed! They brought in a helicopter which hovered overhead throughout, and a crew of Queensland police - for nothing! The "John" in question found the whole affair of real comedy value when he was taken to Special Branch headquarters and to ensure his quick release from his temporary custody "agreed" with Ireland/Garvey that I was a truly reprehensible personality! And so: it was back to square one for our inveterate investigators, with their only triumph, the arrest of Evan Raftery for participation in the Sham-Ho "violent disorder."
Section Eight:
The Shot Gun Attack Upon African National Congress Terrorist Eddie Funde, January 27 1989.
Section Nine: A Visit To The ANM
In late February 1989, I travelled to Perth on National Action business. We had received a number of positive enquiries from Perth. The Perth Skinhead movement, through some of its leaders, had also contacted us. Personal experience with ANM's official neo-nazism had encouraged these youth to break with neo-nazism, whereas those further away from Perth continued to fantasize that van Tongeren was about to reinstate the Third Reich. I was able to meet some of these Perth youth and other supporters. While only a few joined our party, the others were willing to help us. We preferred the distanced arrangement.
I was invited to a meeting with certain "activists" of the ANM. At a house in Victoria Park I met Wayne and John van Blitterswyk, Mark Ferguson, Willey and perhaps two others. They enquired of me as to the original "division" between ourselves and Mr. van Tongeren; we discussed various political ideas and concepts which appeared to differ NA from the ANM. I remember Willey leaving; if Willey claims, as I came later to believe he had been instructed to say, that any person at that meeting discussed violence, criminal actions or conspired to commit any such actions, then such comments would be state-paid lies. After all, we had just met for the first time: why would I (or they) discuss criminality with someone first met that day? As a general principle, that would be foolish indeed.
The fact is that we also discussed the criticism these persons had of the ANM’s tactics and ideology. It was said that they may break from the ANM and I mentioned that they assess National Action before founding a new organisation. They agreed. I suggested that, in the interest of not buying into personalisms, they consult with Michael Brander and not with me. They agreed. Sadly, nothing came of this discussion.
I also met briefly a few days later with Mr. van Tongeren. It was a courtesy call and nothing of any note was discussed. Needless to say, I did not inform van Tongeren of what appeared to me to be, the possible break-up of the ANM. Our relationship was necessarily strained. Nonetheless, it was very clear to the author that Jack van Tongeren's sincerity was beyond dispute.
That was how matters stood when I went to prison in April: it appeared the ANM would splinter over ideological questions. Indeed, Wayne van Blitterswyk quit soon afterwards. Neither I nor anyone else in National Action had any direct knowledge of any alleged action carried out by the then-united ANM or of any actions carried on by them after my visit to Perth. However, I had a vague suspicion that the ANM might have a link to some of the anti-Asian arson. It was a suspicion only which arose from conversation, but it was nothing certain. Of course, I realised that such a suspicion, if grounded upon reality, was a dangerous thing. But because there was no admission or clear reference, I stayed utterly silent and did not report it to the committee. We were in the political dark—but ASIO had the idea that the ANM was the culprit to catch in Perth.
I can see no place for neo-Nazism in Australian Nationalism. I can see no value in following any set of Strategical/Tactical principles gleaned from any book of any sort let alone The Turner Diaries.
I must insist that whatever tactics, etc. are followed that Nationalists guard against any weakening of their vigilance against the secret police and their methods.
Section Ten:
The Merry Month Of March
Section Eleven:
I 'Threaten' Special Branch Detectives Ireland And Garvey
Section Twelve:
April 20 1989: Saleam To Jail: Van Tongeren Celebrates Adolf's 100
It is now necessary for me to discuss the Australian political police. Already, a lot has been said, but before we go on, and right into the crime sprees that followed their 'enquiries', we need to place them in some historical and political perspective.
Understanding the workings of the political police is important for all nationalists, particularly so for those in leadership roles.
I, for one, had urged vigilance in that area for many years right back into the 1970s period. I had recorded certain observations of the political police for the instruction of nationalists. It is something I have continued to do. It is a fact that this has not endeared me to them as I found out on various occasions. Further, it was National Action which took up the exposure of the political police as a mass question. This campaign differntiated the nationalists from other patriotic groups.
We should recall that the entire history of the various secret police groups in Australia to answer the simple question: do they have it "in them" to operate extra-legally against organisations their political masters do not like? Consider the fact that the Federal Police was established to "investigate" those Australians who opposed conscription in the First World War (the majority of people as two referenda proved). Consider that ASIO was set up to pursue communists and that ASIO aided the National Civic Council and others who followed the American line. Consider that violence was employed regularly against "leftists" in the late 1960s and early 1970s by the various Special Branches in several states with small "extreme right" groups being the perpetrators. So why wouldn’t the political police want to work against NA/ANM? They certainly show no "morals" in that regard. Nor does the Establishment. Whoever is in the way ends up on the receiving end.
The fact is that the hand of political police has operated several times in the history of National Action and other groups. At the time of certain "splits" and "divisions," it has sometimes turned out that "ears" and outright "informers" and "provocateurs" have been in place. Some persons may figure in this account of things now before you.
It does not surprise me at all to learn that one individual (Coleman) who will be exposed to you in full here considered my concern with the Special Branch in NSW and political police generally to have stemmed from my "irrational" dislikes of police authority, that it was all a sort of paranoia, that they were not really interested in nationalist organisations, that I needlessly provoked them and that they only acted against National Action when forced to do so. Such a position is a lie of the type designed to lower the awareness of the movement to the clear nexus which we have proved exists, again and again proved exists, between Media and Politicians and Political Police to marginalise our cause and ghettoise it. Of course, given this man's connection with Special Branch, such a line had multiple purposes.
The political police are no great "secret" to those who set out to understand them and their methods of operation. In fact, to grasp the essentials of things is a simple exercise. Their methods and ploys are essential to the understanding of what took place in the "history" of National Action/ANM in the period 1988–90; if the reader cannot grasp these things then he will miss the depth of the operation put in place.
It should be seen that we do not condition the behaviour of the political police; rather they will come at us if it is clear to their masters that what we think and the possibility that we might communicate that to others is a problem. If we are "violent" in your tactics, then they will come "at" us sooner; but a "peaceful" approach does not guarantee that our organisations will not be smeared, destabilised and harassed. Quite the contrary. Our politics, nationalist politics, is rapidly becoming a thought crime in this country. This development was even clear in the late 1980s.
There is, in my opinion, and in the collective opinion of all serious nationalists, no language strong enough to convey our moral contempt for these forces. Certainly, we must never allow our awareness of the problem to get out of hand and into the very paranoia our detractors in this area condemn, but we must face the fact that political police are real and that they are working against us - or our movement will fail.
That these shadowy forces set out to crush NA/ANM is a fact and is the base fact in this account of the attack on these organisations.
(To be continued)Section Fourteen:
Selecting Individual Targets: An Old Game
The political police reasoned, quite correctly, that it was the position that nationalist politics (and we won’t argue here about the definition of that term) was such that the removal of a few key personalities from the scene would have a deleterious effect upon the entire movement.
It is certainly the situation that extensive effort was aimed at both myself and Jack van Tongeren. A certain effort was also made against Michael Brander of National Action in South Australia. Other individual nationalist leaders and activists were also closely investigated: Andrew Guild (Melbourne), Evan Raftery, S. Rosier, R. Cuneo and others.
The use of media, legislation and "police" methods are all parts of the entire process. In the case of van Tongeren, it was the media which sought to trivialise and distort his ideology (I say this regardless of any criticism on our part of it) and render him a neo-nazi ranter likely to be the sort of person who would commit terrorism and violence. In the case of Saleam, it was the position that I was to be rendered what one Sydney TV journalist called a "smug thug," an "operator" linked to violence and criminality through propaganda which was linked to me. That was the media’s perception of Michael Brander also.
The operation centred, as events showed, on Sydney and Perth. But I would suggest that was because of mismanagement in Adelaide. In December 1988, Senator Teaghue’s office was shot-gunned; the good senator was a dedicated multiracialist liberal. There were media suggestions that the crime could be ascribed to Michael Brander. In January 1989, a young member of Adelaide NA was at home when a police "raid" began. In charge was Detective Senior Constable Modra. This creature was a vicious opponent of nationalism with a fixation about Brander. The youth was bashed. He was given an "offer" by Modra: confess to the Teaghue shooting and incriminate Brander - or else. The youth was innocent of the crime in any case and bravely stood his ground in the face of assault. He refused to "confess" and refused to be a perjurous witness against Michael Brander. Why the attempt at criminal conspiracy? Can we really believe that Modra acted alone?
The reason for Modra’s attempt to pervert the course of justice stems from the Establishment’s "appreciation" of Michael Brander. The fact is that Michael Brander had grasped nationalist politics, applied nationalist tactics and organisational methods, and spoke authoritatively in the Establishment’s press. There is no forgiveness from the enemy; there is no "mercy." If the youth could have been persuaded to make false statements, a "trial" would have been the result. And bear in mind that this was Modra’s second attempt. In 1987 he harassed a number of National Action members and supporters and sought "witnesses" for a prosecution on serious charges. The reader should now understand this: the use of courts by the Establishment as agencies of repression is a fact. No established power could ever conceive of justified political critics; it must "criminalise" protest and judge patriots as breakers of the criminal law. I say this whether or not the accused has broken a law or not. That is irrelevant. From court, the accused heads for jail, the official concentration camp for political prisoners. Brander was lucky. There was no "evidence" - and Modra couldn’t fabricate any.
It is not only one’s views which makes a nationalist leader a "target." It is his abilities to agitate, to cause the Establishment trouble, to articulate new opinions or to grasp hard at some area where the Establishment is weak, to damage something the Establishment values. Mr. van Tongeren was a target because he had created a place where militants could gather and had sparked certain activity amongst them. His neo-nazism had of course, annoyed the Jewish community. The anti-immigration material issued by the ANM had sparked disorder in some Perth schools and encouraged vigilantism amongst the Asian community.
In my case, I should only mention one "virtue" (I leave it up to the nationalists to assess my political work) which set me down as an enemy. I would explain it in a way relevant to this pamphlet. In 1989, as the result of certain media statements made by me in respect of the Funde shooting and ASIO (as below), Mr. Evan Raftery was interviewed by ASIO. At the conclusion of the interview, it was suggested that our comrade would be coming to be "debriefed" by me—meaning that I would attempt an "interpretation" of the discussion. Secondly, I refer to part of a police Internal Affairs record of an interview performed by Detective Sergeant Ireland. He suggested I would "operate" to "circumvent the law" (meaning undermine his operations against the party). In November 1988, I examined certain Files concerning detailed allegations that I had made to the NSW Director of Public Prosecutions that the perjury of Martinreyes had been used to convict me in a trial. I read a letter from two NSW police officers who suggested I was out to undermine the processes of Appeal in NSW Courts and had found the way to do it - and they refused to carry out any investigation of anything lest they "help" me! What am I saying? Only that I have made it my business to examine the "systems" employed by the authorities in their criminal actions against patriotic people and have done my level best to perfect ways to "circumvent" Establishment authority. I couldn't be forgiven either.
The campaign designed to destroy ANM and NA was therefore multifaceted. Preferably, it was a case of "get the leaders" into court. But destroying the members one by one "legally" was another option. Using media lies and professional "wreckers" inside the broad confines of the nationalist movement was another set of tactics. The campaign was, as I said, all-embracing. It was more than a "police" effort; it was clearly something very important to the Establishment.
(To be continued)Section Fifteen A Collection Of Fish
There is no doubt at all that the campaign of the political police waged against NA and ANM yielded a net full of "fish"—if arrests are the guide rule to that. Most of the NA arrests took place in May-July and in waves. The ANM arrests were also in waves, with a charge on van Tongeren in May, then other arrests in early July (which netted an informer) and the big busts in mid-August.
The following members of National Action and ANM went before the Establishment’s courts. I set out the "charges" and the penalties:
(1) Jim Saleam. I was put before the District Court for "accessory to malicious damage" in that I organised a shotgun attack on the home of Eddie Funde, Australian Representative of the African National Congress. I served four years.
(2) Wayne Smith. He faced the same charge as I did. Smith was also charged and acquitted in December 1989 of "malicious damage" to the property of the Reverend Dorothy McMahon and "violent disorder" from his alleged attendance as a "disruptor" of a meeting of the Gay and Lesbian Immigration Taskforce held in April 1989. Unfortunately, Smith died before the trial.
(3) Jason Frost. Now exposed as an informer, he pleaded guilty to involvement in the Funde shooting and claims Saleam and Smith instigated it (a lie as I shall show). He received a mere 18 months weekend detention for the shooting. He also pleaded guilty to the "malicious damage" and the "violent disorder" mentioned above, a plea which cannot be accepted, as I shall show. He was given jail for this (two three-month sentences, cumulative; he tried a sentence Appeal and 'of course' was successful.)
(4) Michael White. He pleaded guilty to driving Frost to the Funde shooting. He was given two years jail, a disparity in sentence as compared to Frost, which shows "something" on the Establishment’s part. It was reduced to 12 months on Appeal in May 1990.Put under unbearable pressure, he was obliged to testify falsely against Saleam and Smith.
(5) Keith Low. An English visitor from the National Front, was fined $500 for "violent disorder" (as above).
(6) Tim Wainwright. A young activist, was given a bond for participation in "violent disorder."
(7) Shane Rosier. A longstanding nationalist militant, was jailed in March 1990 for three months for his participation in "violent disorder."
(8) Richard Holdforth. A young nationalist, was given a bond for participation in "violent disorder."
(9) Doug McKenna. A young nationalist, was given a bond for participation in "violent disorder."
(10) Peter Colantuono. A young nationalist, was forced to incriminate himself in the McMahon "malicious damage." He was, as he has said to us, not involved in any such incident—and threatened into a guilty plea! He was given a bond.
(11) Perry Whitehouse. A nationalist activist, was charged with possession of a crossbow (fined) and with using this crossbow to attack the home of pro-African National Congress supporter, Kel Richards. Case dismissed. He was then charged with "attempting to pervert the course of justice" in persuading Michael White to falsely testify against the police in the case of Saleam and Smith. He was remanded to a date to be fixed. This trial was never held. As shall be explained, Whitehouse committed another offence and was tried on that matter.
(12) Evan Raftery. A long-time nationalist militant, hated by the political police, he was charged in January 1989 with "violent disorder" from a December 1988 disruption of a Liberal Party private function as addressed by Chinese MP in NSW, Helen Sham-Ho. He was given a bond.
Each of these persons were involved in National Action.
(13) Jack van Tongeren. He was charged with over 100 offences from arson, conspiracy to commit arson, uttering, malicious damage, break and entry, receiving. He will appear in various Western Australian courts this year.
(14) John van Blitterswyk. Ditto on charges. John was arrested first in June 1989 on receiving charges. He appeared with Jack van Tongeren and others.
(15) Wayne van Blitterswyk. He appeared chiefly on arson and conspiracy.
(16) Chris Bartle. He appeared on arson, conspiracy and uttering, etc.
(17) John Lyons. Ditto.
(18) Judith Lyons. Harbouring a fugitive and other minor charges.
(19) John Bain. Appeared on arson and break and enter.
(20) Mark Ferguson, an independent nationalist militant, appeared with ANM members on conspiracy and receiving, and now arson.
(21) Russell Willey. Charged initially with John van Blitterswyk, with robbery and receiving, he turned informer, indicating the extent to which the Establishment’s police will go to get "convictions." He is an "immune" witness!
(22) David Locke. An ANM member who planned to go "Crown Witness" against his friends. He was murdered (!) allegedly by two other ANM members sickened by the betrayals and informing.
Twenty-two arrests was a sizeable "bag." It resulted in the near-cessation of operations by ANM and a very necessary critical analysis of the ideology, politics and organisational methods of that party. It resulted in a considerable destabilisation of NA operations and activities in Sydney.
Many lessons have been drawn and I shall share some of them with you in this pamphlet.
Section Sixteen: Peter Coleman Or CC18 Enters Into Play As A Special Branch Informant!
I was in prison assessing the arrests of many of the National Action members (Low, Wainwright, McKenna, etc.) in late June 1989 when the Sydney Morning Herald announced the arrests in Perth of John van Blitterswyk and Russell Willey of the ANM. I recalled both of these men from the meeting in February. It was not long after this arrest that Willey was 'turned'. The question was of course - how did the police manage to arrest these two?
Coleman’s brief association with National Action 1983–85 was not a happy one. Coleman was found to be a smooth-talking liar whose objective in any organisation was to find the leading figure and get behind him (and under his feet) and guide the organisation in "his" direction. That is - neo-nazism. Once Coleman realised the party majority (and me in particular) would never adopt neo-nazism, he looked elsewhere. In Jack he thought he’d found someone who could peddle the ideology. Ideology? Blind hatred of other races including other Europeans. Rampant sick Jew-hating, anti-worker ideas, mindless anti-communism. For Coleman any Social Justice ideology was communism and in his mind National Action was/is "Marxist" - particularly by that he meant me. That idea also developed legs and was used as propaganda against National Action. The principle of White Australia was always second place to his drunken screaming that "Nordics" are the "master race," etc.
Coleman was the prime author of the 1985 split. He pushed for it, conspired it and helped it happen. Of course, an explosion was inevitable given Jack's politics, but the rancour was Coleman's work. Unfortunately for van Tongeren, he trusted him and his "advice" shaped the ANM. Some people underestimate Coleman, because he is, as such, neither educated nor overly intelligent. That under-rates his other abilities. Coleman has demonstrated an ability to live by his wits, so much so that a nick-name "Jewboy" stuck to him and is used by his neo-nazi associates. Coleman's militaria business, a structure he has used to further the collection of intelligence at arms fairs and so forth, has made a living for him. His cons, frauds and tricks are universally known in that milieu. Members of National Action considered him a prime manipulater and often found themselves confronted by people in different patriotic groups who had been misled by him. All considered him a moral imbecile, a person who recognised no 'wrong' in the pursuit of his advantage. Such a creature always makes the best informer-wrecker.
Onto the ANM Coleman grafted the American racist fantasy book The Turner Diaries. That the author of the book wasn’t being too serious could be judged from the fact that his political group never tried to apply any of it. It was given over to loons ("Klan," U.S. "Nazis") as a means of getting them into real action; it did that alright, but most of them ended up in prison for their efforts. For Coleman, The Turner Diaries was the ultimate hate-book, though, of course, he’d never tried to apply any of it. But he imposed it on van Tongeren and it obviously lay at the basis of the ANM’s campaign. The final "proof" of that may be the fact that one ANM prisoner claimed that under the effect of ANM "terror," Asians may move en masse to the Eastern States - and thence create even further disorder. That was straight out of The Turner Diaries where coloureds from a liberated white zone flood into other areas bringing instability.
The question I would ask is: should any nationalist strategy be aimed at "migrants" or at those who organise immigration - the Committee for the Economic Development of Australia, capitalists of the largest corporations?
Coleman’s "influence" was in another area also disastrous for the ANM. In The Australian Nationalist magazine sometime in 1988 he argued that "nationalists" (sic) should not be in any way concerned with phone tapping or electronic surveillance. He suggested it was all just paranoia. Now it may be that Coleman knew nothing of the ANM plan to operate criminally or that the editor was remiss in publishing the article, but it is true that it was published and that it operated to disarm the ANM in face of the weapons of the state. The ANM men went to prison precisely because of taped conversations.
Coleman’s pooh-poohing of the armaments of the secret police stems also partially from his rancorous hatred of me. I had warned again and again of such secret police weapons and of their activities yet Coleman continually chided me as a paranoiac with a complex about police methods and maintained to all and sundry that I am just "lying" for some purpose known to me.
Section Seventeen: The Formation Of A Neo-Nazi 'Counter-Gang'.