Enemies Of The State.
The State Conspiracy Against National Action And The Australian Nationalists Movement 1988 - 1991


Dr. Jim Saleam



This pamphlet is under production. We hope you will return soon. It is not possible to indicate when the item will be completed,. To a point, the 'disorderly' nature of some sections below is meant to lure you back and we make no apology for this device. The author apologises for the long delay. The pressures of political work and other ideological work have caused this lapse. It is expected more will be completed before January 2007. The Editors, September 8 2006

Special Prologue

In August 2004, Jack van Tongeren, founder and leader of the Australian Nationalists Movement, was arrested on some 23 charges and imprisoned without bail. In some ways, it was a re-run of his 1989 arrest. There were charges of malicious damage and conspiracy, allegations of the existence of a paramilitary wing of the ANM, the state's use of roll-over witnesses and a possible long-term informer in the Perth section. As in 1989, there was a Sydney-link with the arrests, shadowy persons who incited van Tongeren to play act in the media and who encouraged some Perth supporters to talk up neo-nazism and commit offences. As the new trial process developed and state propagandists mouthed off about the need for 'harder' anti racial vilification legislation and for more intrusive security services operations against 'racists', there was a counter-struggle by Nationalists to drag out the truth about the inter-relationship of the political police and the neo-nazis generally - and the fundamentally unjust quality of the new charges. Mr. van Tongeren eventually was given bail but he absconded, leading to a man-hunt in Western Australia. He was re-arrested and imprisoned. His health deteriorated. The hapless van Tongeren faced another ten years in prison for crimes he insisted this time around - that he had not committed. In November 2006, he pleaded guilty to various charges and was released under Parole Board supervision. The guilty plea was necessary, in the very interests of his life. Mr. van Tongeren has now retired from all political action.

Introduction

I authored a pamphlet under a similar title in 1990. I was the Chairman of Australian National Action (NSW branch), having just stepped down from the National Chairman's position under new organizational arrangements. That document was constructed to assist nationalists to struggle against a conspiracy then in motion. The state was attempting the suppression of National Action (NA) and the neo-nazi Australian Nationalists Movement (ANM). Both these groups, despite their divergent ideologies, had performed certain actions which 'warranted' a state response. By the time I wrote my pamphlet, the conspiracy had been under way for twenty months. The state perception of its' targets meant that the operation was run against both simultaneously and with the advantage of an overlap of organization and means. The suppression operation was to be run by any means necessary.

At the time, there were some persons on the fringe of nationalism, in other patriotic groups, and even a few nationalist leaders, who found the facts (as they were), difficult to accept. Some considered that the author was exaggerating, or wrong, or distorting the circumstances of criminal investigations - to allege conspiracy. This was despite the fact, that to this time, a number of people had been 'charged' with an array of offences and the leader of the ANM (Jack van Tongeren) was on remand without bail, amidst sensational reports of informers, tape-recordings and murder. There were some who, because of their criticisms of van Tongeren's ideas and methods, refused to draw the lessons from his prosecution. There were others who, with the media-police targetting of National Action, ducked for cover. And there were venal elements, jackals, who perceived the crisis of whichever group, an opportunity to peddle personalist messages and ideas.

The present pamphlet includes the weight of information which has since become available to prove the conspiracy-case, absolutely. The old pamphlet has therefore been drastically overhauled and expanded. That pamphlet was itself part of the struggle and was at one point, 'used in evidence' - against me. For that reason, as well as simplicity, I prefer the title. There are, of course, other documents that refer to parts of what you will read here. These documents include my Pardon Me: The Anatomy Of An Australian Political Trial and The Other Radicalism and Jack van Tongeren's The ANM: The Pre- Revolutionary Years. There are others which touch on bits and pieces of the tale. Nonetheless, this one document gives you the gory details.

But it is also a matter of history. These years were years of an intense political struggle between nationalists and the secret police apparatus. I have realised since that provocateurs have arisen to deny the facts with the clear intent of discrediting people and ideas. Clearly, he who commands the past commands the present and dictates the future. It is incumbent therefore upon the nationalists to recount the events and explain them.

There was a three-year state conspiracy that functioned on multi-levels. It had some real success. Indeed, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, in its Report To Parliament 1991 - 1992, would claim "operational success" against the two organizations at issue. What does "operational success" - mean? During the later stages of one of the 'legal processes' (sic) directed at me, I asked this question in 1992, of the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal. I received no answer - save the loss of an appeal and the continuation of a prison sentence. Or possibly, I did get an answer. Graham Barr QC, the Crown advocate (now Mr. Justice Barr), told the Court that I: "had an obsession with spies and spying". Silly me, I must have been paranoid! Obviously, the notion that the state's agents would conspire to pervert the course of justice is never to be formally considered by our state-paid 'legal-minds'. Mr. Barr's argument was tacitly accepted and he too - was ulimately rewarded by promotion.

In this pamphlet, the story will be told as the events unfolded. You will observe what "operational success" involved. It meant: perjured witnesses, the misuse of electronic surveillance, perverting the course of justice, rape, assault, informers, dividing families, intimidation, media disinformation, lying politicians and legislative action, show-trial processes and fake public inquiries. Everything was employed to break the target groups, and divide their parts against each other, break individuals and take advantage of the destabilisation. In a phrase: it was political warfare.

Let us learn from the facts. Of course, back then, the state did not get what it wanted.One of the targetted groups survived in a more limited form - and moved on. Some of the target-individuals escaped the net while others endured imprisonment, but resumed their lives. Certainly the state's agents did not come away unscathed. The Special Branch in New South Wales was broken at the Royal Commission Into The New South Wales Police Service, the head actor, Superintedent Neville George Ireland, biting the dust for stealing, perjury, drunk-on-duty, protecting a judge of the Supreme Court against criminal charges, and more. What a man!

More importantly, for the patriotic cause, no sooner had the state won its "operational success" against the target groups, than new patriotic groups grew into sizeable formations in new political circumstances. But the contours of much patriotic action (good and bad) was set in the suppression-operation period. I am sure the reader will note this. Today, as the Australian state becomes ever more authoritarian in its push to be part of the New World Order system, it is inevitable that some of the circumstances of the past, will repeat themselves. There is a new broad nationalist and patriotic movement in the field and the hour is late for Australia's Identity, Independence and Freedom to be secured. We must ensure there will be only 'operational defeat' for the political police.



1. The Split In National Action 'Predicted'


In order that the reader can get into the story, it is necessary to start somewhere. If I appear to jump over events and allude to things I haven't yet explained, that will be an exercise in laying down the groundwork. Basically, the split in National Action, as it unfolded in 1989, is as good a place as any to bring out necessary facts, to put the reader into the events at issue. And yet, this event has wheels within wheels.

In 1999, files from the New South Wales Special Branch, were opened. Into my hands (amongst many other things) came two documents, one openly authored by Denis Freney, and the other – obviously also his work. Freney had been the editor of the Communist Party's newspaper, Tribune, and he was, throughout the 1980's, an energetic opponent of National Action. He had been a mover of 'Combined Unions Against Racism' (founded 1984); he even claimed to be a 'victim' of NA violence - namely a shotgun blast which shattered windows at his home one happy December 1984 evening, whilst he was exploring the rear-end of a fellow communist male. Freney was never beyond co-operating with state agencies in his crusade. In that mode, he approached the National Inquiry Into Racist Violence, a show-trial process set up by the Human Rights And Equal Opportunity Commission which operated in the crucial 1988-91 period (see below). Clearly Freney hoped to invoke this state propaganda mechanism and discredit his targets.

The first Freney document was a submission to the National Inquiry (dated March 13 1989) and the second, a ‘briefing’ of sorts undoubtedly distributed to his leftist and media mates as smear (undated, but clearly July 1989). There were two intriguing sets of comments that set these documents apart from the humdrum of a Special Branch file. I was peering into parts of the state conspiracy.

The first set of comments were directed against the ANM. I noted that Freney was somewhat confused at one point, referring to the neo-nazi leader of the 1970’s and early 1980’s, Robert Cameron, as a then-current leader of ANM in Sydney. Of course, Cameron was retired off the scene. Other than that, Freney's storyline was significant, even if coupled with some wishful and erroneous thinking. He wrote:

"The possibility therefore exists that Cameron and the ANM in Sydney, at least, is being used by the Special Branch as a controlled organisation by Special Branch to keep tabs on neo-nazi activities, as they seem unable to directly infiltrate National Action. Claims that National Action is losing members and support among skinheads could mean that it is the ‘ANM’ that is winning them, upstaging the Saleam group by their open anti-semitic activities" (Submission)

"It has been suggested that Special Branch, given its long use of neo-nazis as informers, and its practise of allowing them a certain level of criminality, is using people such as Cameron to keep tabs on NA, which is said to have been difficult to directly infiltrate…It is also suggested that NA may be losing support to another group forming around ANM (being also more openly anti-semitic), possibly involving Cameron." (Briefing document)


Now the important thing is this: there was a group "forming around ANM" in Sydney right then in March 1989. It was directed by David Palmer and ANM 'deputy' Peter Coleman, both of whom figure extensively here. However, and it is an enormous 'however', this new group was as yet - totally unknown. And further, it had not yet hardly begun its attempt to do the things which Freney described! It had not yet begun to approach Skinheads with their 'over-the-top' anti-semitic ravings, nor their hyper-racism and so on. It had not yet attempted infiltration. However, the hint that they were "keeping tabs" was most accurate.


The second set of comments were directed at National Action and its South Australian chairman, Michael Brander.. Freney wrote:

" Unconfirmed reports indicate that Brander is challenging Saleam for the leadership of NA nationally." (Submission)

" There are reports that Brander is challenging Saleam for the national leadership of NA nationally." (Briefing document)

At the time Freney's submission was written, the National Committee of NA had no apprehension of any 'leadership challenges' from any person. None had been offerred. However, in due course, there was one, or at least something which was tantamount to one. It began to develop and ultimately blossomed into a peculiar split in the organization. The split indeed came from Michael Brander. Yet, it was not even appreciated by the NA committee as any sort of "challenge" until well into 1990.

Let us apply the academic style here. Essentially, Freney made two predictions. Each involved statements that events were occurring (ie. gestating) as he wrote, yet there was no reasonable way Freney could know of either. Further, neither the leaderships of ANM or NA were aware of the organizational 'irregularities' referred to in Freney's secret writings. One or the other of these events, if 'predicted', could be dismissed as guesswork. However, to get both right - defies all odds. Somehow - Freney knew what was going on.

Needless to say, Messrs Palmer and Coleman, if forming a group around ANM which was not the ANM, were not likely to tell Mr. Freney. And just as certain, leadership challenges in NA, were not the subject of press releases to Tribune. So, how did Freney know? Further, if anyone pondering over these ANM and NA internalisms, suggested that Freney's writing was a load of nonsense, then there is the simple problem of probabilities. Freney was right - twice. We are left with the inevitable conclusions:

Freney had been taken into confidence by state agents for some reason. The state agents knew of a new group within the ANM being formed to target National Action and which would engage in anti-semitic provocations. The state agents knew of an impending internal crisis in National Action.

I suppose these findings might one day cause historians of the Communist Party to re-examine the role of Denis Freney. But for my purpose, I am more interested in the obvious facts. If state agents were aware that two groups, described as "dangerous" in the 1989-90 ASIO Report To Parliament were about to suffer from within, then how they acted to ensure this course of events took on concrete form, is very significant.

The split in National Action followed on from my imprisonment on April 20 1989. I was imprisoned after losing an appeal on cooked up charges dating back to 1984. For some months, I would be out of the way while the state could move against National Action. It was tragic that, while these state machinations were in train, a split was fomenting in the group. The split came about in stages, the first rupture occurring not long after the arrests on August 14 1989 of Jack van Tongeren and other members of the ANM, and it was, interestingly, directly related to these arrests. I do not mean that the arrests of van Tongeren and the ANM members was background to internal disputes in the organization, but rather that the forces who had procured the arrests played a special role in the split! It occurred, as I say and as I shall prove, after the Palmer/Coleman group had betrayed van Tongeren into the hands of the political police. It began because the National Committee of National Action published a statement in September 1989 calling for a political defence of van Tongeren and the ANM accused. This statement (it will be described below) was trenchantly criticised by Michael Brander, both for its content and for the manner of its issue. His comments owed much to Peter Coleman, who had already passed into the shadow world of the political police, as an informer and wrecker, and who in covert conversations with Brander and many others cleverly sowed disputation over time and who now 'counselled' (sic) against any involvement from National Action in the ANM case.

However, before we advance, let us review the political status and activities of the target-groups in 1989. Why did it happen? Why were these organizations targets?


2. The Political Situation For The ANM In 1989. A Fuse Is Lit.

In 1988, the two organisations claimed upon themselves the mantle of "Australian Nationalism." Australian National Action was the larger of the two movements and squarely based, on the Australian Nationalist tradition, tempered by its commitment to the "Third Position" (neither Left nor Right). The ANM, chiefly a Perth organisation, is not so easy to describe. It reflected a certain mixture of conservative ideology flavoured by neo-nazism and some true Nationalism. It was a 'blend' in some external ways; nonetheless, with respect to a few members who joined it onlyon the basis of its campaign against Asian immigration, it was essentially a 'neo-nazi' organization. I shall explain all this as we proceed. While it was very much the creation of Jack van Tongeren, and reflected his ideological interests, it also represented the neo-nazi 'tradition' and could be expected to follow certain 'forms'. At its 'peak' in early 1989, it might have had 125 nominal members; because, it lacked formal structure and very much depended upon the presense of its leader, it was therefore a britle entity.

The ANM had issued from an engineered split in the Western Australian section of National Action in 1985. National Action had sought to base itself on the nativist tradition of Nationalism with radical tactics (a youth / working class orientation); the founders of the ANM sought to capture the membership of the conservative monarchistic groupings through moderate ideas and tactics. The ANM later changed course on this very subject, though, in all fairness, traces of the previous tendencies survived. This is not to say that all ANM members held these views; clearly, as things turned out, they did not. But this is how things initially stood . The ANM founder, Jack van Tongeren, believed in the early period that Nazism had become a mass movement by taking on conservative patriotic values and won therefore the support of moneyed elements. He identified the RSL, the League of Rights and the National Flag groups as suitable benefactors on this model of fascist success. He reasoned that the nativist nationalism and labour references of NA were alienating "better people" and in particular he denounced any use of the Eureka Flag. Of course, van Tongeren had joined NA to take it over - and had been rebuffed by the party at, and after, its 1985 conference. It was considered by the members then, that van Tongeren had deceived them as to his ideology and intentions.

Unsurprisingly, the relationship between National Action and the ANM was not very good. The ideologies, though distinct, were "similar" enough in one particular area (i.e. the Asianisation of Australia) to cause comparison in the media, public confusion, etc. It was also the case, as will be relevant below, that bad relations were incited by certain persons. Though obviously, "unity" of organisation or even purpose, would have been impossible even if desirable, there was no need for certain "feelings" between some members of both movements. I would have preferred, since I was in the period 1985–89 generally the prime-mover of NA, to have ameliorated this situation. The difficulties between the two organisations was known to the political police directly through their informers and through journalists who often convey "information" of one sort or another to these authorities.

It was also the case that both NA and ANM were going through a very active period in 1988. The ANM had engaged in a hyperactive bill-pasting campaign in Perth which had been the subject of innumerable protests in the media from various politicians, church-liberals, Asian organisations and other political liberals. The ANM, to its credit, had managed to spearhead a growing public awareness of the "Asian Future" of our country as mapped out by Big Business. Even though I had, as National Action had, grave criticisms of the policies of the ANM’s leader, there is no doubt at all in our minds that the ANM drive was as effective as it was disturbing to those in Western Australia who held influence and who were embarrassed by these activities. In particular, one could name the former WA Premiers, Brian Burke and Peter Dowding, and the Minister for Multicultural and Ethnic Affairs, Gordon Hill. All these gentlemen agitated against the ANM. In proof of that claim, I could refer the reader to innumerable citations advanced in my doctoral thesis available on this Site.

The ANM had also developed its line in 1988 in a most significant way. It had adopted the American book, The Turner Diaries, as its ideological-political guide and strategic-tactical manual. The book, as is a matter of public record, was the epitome of international neo-nazi ideology and politics. It argued for a policy of racist terrorism (I say, as van Tongeren does, the ANM's actions were not 'terrorism'). The violence would be aimed at both state agencies and members of racial groups, growing in intensity up to the violent overthrow of the U.S. government. Car bombs, illegal fundraising, murder, were all in the tale.

The Turner Diaries has itself been discussed by the author and by others in different places. It was introduced to the ANM by Coleman and he produced a pirate edition of the book. He sold copies (at a profit) to the ANM. ANM recruiits were given a copy of the book. There is no doubt that Jack van Tongeren considered it important in the cosmology of his movement. At a meeting at the Victoria Park Hotel in Enmore, in Sydney, in early 1988, Jack asked me if I had read the book: "yes, a crock of shit". "I knew you'd say that", he replied. Coleman, who was present, said nothing.

Mr. van Tongeren wrote his own book while he was in prison. One might object to the politics expressed therein, or about some matters of fact here and there, but at the end of the day, it is a ripper-read. Break and enters, assorted mishaps, burning down Asian restaurants with buckets and spray-units of petrol, and the truthful data of the police violence that accompanied the final arrests, all up makes a gripping tale. Mr. van Tongeren entitled the book The ANM: The Pre-Revolutionary Years 19 - 1991. It is on the Internet. This was how Jack sought to apply The Turner Diaries. I cannot accept that its significance was not 'picked' by the political police.

The ANM violence campaign began on September 1 1988 with the arson of a Chinese restuarant. Between that date and May 23 1989, another three restaurants were arsoned and another, bombed. A campaign of robberies (warehouse burglaries) was also commenced early in 1989. The campaign was hardly a professional effort and not a terrorist campaign. The latter issue has always been pivotal.


To be continued.

Section Five: The Political Situation For National Action In 1989.


In 1988, the strength of National Action, human and materiel, began to increase. It is a matter of fact that its membership, in all categories, passed 500 persons. Its' income was rising. Its' ability towage campaigns, acquire political and other intelligence and its ideological sophistication, were all developing well. The members took great pride in its' achievements and looked forward to achieving a 'political breakthrough' by 1990 ie. a move into the broader sphere of public acceptance and support. It also, by virtue of its aggressive campaigning, managed to politically intimidate the liberal-internationalist propagandists in media, churches, academia and elsewhere. This was new and inherently dynamic.

The Special Branch had always maintained an interest in the affairs of the author and of Australian National Action. My Special Branch file, available for view by genuine nationalists, showed this to be true. The file had been opened in 1974 (I did not reside in New South Wales at the time) and maintained scrupulously. It seems that I had my own 'nemesis' (or would-be nemesis), a certain Detective Sergeant G. Crothers, who slowly worked on my 'case' from (at least) 1981 until 1988. And yet, I had never heard of this secret policeman! In all the goings-on between NA and Special Branch, all the campaigns, arrests and so on, he never came into view. It is concluded that Crothers was therefore the 'craftsman' behind any number of irregular processes. In August 1988, Crothers set up his last anti-nationalist operation.

On August 29 1988, Operation Odessa was established. This operation ran until September 16. Its' function was to investigate particular political events and to amass information (work, address, vehicles, criminal history, status) of the various members of the NA committee and some other leading persons. A group of officers, Neville Ireland, John Garvey, Charles Poniris, Andrew Georghiou, Sean Edwards, and some others including the shifty Constables, Magdopoulos and Midson. This operation was finalised by the then- Detective Inspector Crothers. It was the 'beginning' of the formation of the organizational relationship amongst those officers who would commit offences in the pursuit of the final objectives. It provided certain basic intelligence data.

The ultimate task force allotted in Sydney to the close investigation of National Action was seemingly assembled in late November or early December 1988. The "order" doubtlessly came from the Premier’s office after months of intensive lobbying for such an action from a variety of groups. Political liberals such as those who supported the activities of the Reverend McMahon, the Community Alert Against Racism and Violence, the Gay and Lesbian Immigration Taskforce and many others, including journalists, politicians and clergy, were all pushing for "police action" against National Action and against those held responsible for a spate of vandalism against property and vehicles owned by supporters of "anti-apartheid" and "anti-racist" groups.

Superintendent Mick O’Brien of the Special Branch was called in. The character of the now-deceased O’Brien is "typical." This secret policeman was called to Special Branch after a career which took a sudden "lift" after June 1978. O’Brien was one of the arresting officers in the sensational Ananda Marga case which saw three young members of a strange religious sect perjured into prison for allegedly attempting to murder a "National Front" figure and several policemen. The case brought Special Branch into public view. The appointment of O’Brien to head this secret police indicates the commitment of the State to those who have served it well. O’Brien was also corrupt. When serving in the licensing branch, he had a certain relationship with a smash repair business in Alexandria operated by the "P" family. A member of the same family later served in Special Branch under O’Brien. Interestingly, Magdopoulos 'moonlighted' at Villawood Autovillage in 1989-91. The connection with vehicles might easily have related to the Special Branch's need for falsely-registered vehicles.

O’Brien detailed the then Detective Sergeant Neville George Ireland to head this team (Ireland would make Superintendent and be the last commander of Special Branch), along with the then Detective Senior Constable John William Garvey (he would finally make Chief Superintendent and even serve as the head of Olympics Security). Detectives Poniris and Georgiou were also drafted in, as were Simm and Lawson. Ireland denies there ever was a 'task force' assigned to National Action. Really!?

Ireland epitomised the sinister nature of the Special Branch organisation. He served in the SB since 1975. Ireland was the officer on duty at the Hilton Hotel in 1978 who first met the perjurer of the Ananda Marga trial, Richard Seary. Ireland recruited Seary for the Branch, but appears to have played no direct role in the case thereafter; indeed, little paperwork and precise material on the recruitment of Seary could ever be found during the famous Inquiry into the Ananda Marga case in 1984–85. In those days, Ireland worked very closely with one of the SB perjurers in the Ananda Marga trial, Alan Henderson. In company with Henderson, Ireland was involved in investigations into leftist groups in the early 1980s. I located an article concerning Ireland from the paper of the International Socialists and published it The International Socialists accused Ireland of perjury. I noted he hadn’t changed too much; only his victims had changed! As far as it goes, I would believe the account given by the International Socialists since it correlated exactly with Ireland’s "main methods" in dealing with National Action: assault, forced entry, perjury.

As the Ireland-led investigation into NA developed, I had an occasion or two to meet him in "inquiries" of a different sort, but inquiries which Ireland was relating to his central desire: to "get" National Action. A few of us took time to observe him. On one occasion in April 1989, we provoked him - by publishing his address and home phone number in a certain publication. We gauged the reaction. For Ireland, Special Branch must be "invulnerable." Our crime was: we had reduced them to a very human level. I would say that for this and many reasons, Ireland developed a hatred of me personally. And he admitted to his dislikes in court before Justice Jane Matthews under oath (November 1 1989). Ireland was also a drunk and as the Police Royal Commission showed, he was, at the time he was investigating National Action, protecting old Justice Yeldham on indecency ( flashing') allegations And as this account develops, you can further judge for yourselves.

Garvey should also be commented on. Essentially Garvey was a blusterer, good with threats, but short on intelligence. Why he was promoted to Senior Sergeant over Ireland in 1990 was a bit of a mystery, although the Police Royal Commission in 1996 would suggest that he was part of a rat-pack in the Police Service. Ireland was, in fact, a little more professional - when he was sober. Garvey made his name at the famous Milperra Bikie Massacre of 1983 and won a bravery medal, though as it would appear, some of the bikies disputed Garvey’s role in things. A book was written on the massacre by Sydney Morning Herald journalist Sandra Harvey; Garvey used Harvey for the production of certain material in that paper. In 1989, a number of articles barbed against NA were published under her by-line. (Note the "link" between journalists and political police.)

The initial activities of this task force was so basic: the garbage at the NA office disappeared on a few occasions and our headquarters building was placed under surveillance regularly. Visitors were sometimes harassed. Photos were taken of various visitors and activists. Photographs turned up in released Special Branch files.

On November 16 1988, a rubber tyre wrapped around a dummy was burned outside the home of the Reverend McMahon. This incident made page one of the Sydney Morning Herald. This incident occurred just as (we noted above) high-pressure delegations of liberals, led by journalist Adele Horin, were pushing the Human Rights And Equal Opportunity Commission to organize an "inquiry into racist violence". This incident might have sparked a clear response. The liberals were very correct to pursue this lobbying approach. By creating a 'legitimizing' National Inquiry Into Racist Violence (formed December 1988), a cover existed for the criminal rampages of the political police. The other aspect of the emergent strategy was to get 'prosecutions' and use the legal system. The best result was to imprison activists on 'criminal' charges. Journalists could then praise the political police thugs as they 'did their duty'.

Substantially however, there was nothing to go on. The pressure on Ireland for "results" must have been heavy. On December 5, 1988, a small group of National Action members "raided" a dinner hosted by the Pyrmont-Ultimo branch of the Liberal Party. The meeting was addressed by Mrs. Helen Sham-Ho, Australia’s only Chinese member of parliament. The media was outraged, the Premier incensed, and the Special Branch caught by NA’s successful "political guerilla" tactics. Our lads had complete surprise and carried the field. The calls came down for legislation to curb "racial vilification" (read: legislation to curtail NA and other patriots). This legislation has since been enacted, as it is in Western Australian for pretty much the same reasons, as I will comment on below.

(To be continued)


Section Six:
Simon Makes A Statement.Psycho-Ward Politics Adopted By Special Branch

Around Christmas 1988, Ireland/Garvey obtained their first "statement" for use against National Action. It came from Mr. Simon Lain. Ireland has denied taking or seeing this statement. But as per usual with the disingenuous nature of his court room evidence, it is possible Ireland was telling the 'truth' - it's just he did not say if he knew of the statement and its contents! Certainly, in January 1989, whilst in custody at the Sydney Police Centre on the Sham-Ho disruption ("violent disorder"), Evan Raftery saw the Lain statement (further details below). We cannot accept that this 'statement' was a concocted cover-sheet with Lain's name upon it. There was no market in that. Ireland was able to decipher that National Action would have assumed that Lain had squealed against the party. Ireland could not have been 'confirming' it with the ridiculous idea in mind that we might decide to 'punish' Lain - and be caught doing it! No: the statement was genuine and it was sighted somewhat by accident. Indeed, as events developed, it became clear the statement was real enough.

The history of Mr. Lain (and his statement) is of some value to us and should be recorded. Simon Lain had had an association with National Action. He had been on the fringes of a predecessor group and on that basis (nothing was known 'against' him) he passed into National Action as a supporter in 1982. As such he became well known to many of the members and participated in some activities. Simon Lain was, and remains, a strange disturbed personality and the decision was finally taken in May 1986 to remove him from the organization. But Lain could not be got rid of easily; his personality did not allow it. And the attempts to ease him away only increased his ire and malice - particularly his malice against this writer. In November 1987, Lain contrived my arrest on a offensive behaviour charge at a planned demonstration at the University of New South Wales, as he later freely admitted to a reliable source. He failed. Formal contact of any sort between this individual and the party could only have been terminated early in 1988. That did not end the contact. Attempts were made by Lain on a few occasions to damage the party offices at Tempe - and occasional telephone threats were received. Throughout 1988, Lain blustered that he would settle accounts with "Saleam and his henchmen".

To get Lain to talk to them, Ireland/Garvey also used another strategy. They told Lain that the author had 'nformed' on him (I discuss this matter shortly). This would not only induce Lain to talk, but just as easily would have encouraged him to try violence on his own behalf. Any violence could have any number of effects and Ireland/Garvey would have viewed that as 'positive'.

Lain would have been a "godsend" to the Special Branch investigation but for one reason: the man spent time in an asylum, as we have established, and like such persons, was the proverbial master of fabrication. Lain’s statement to Ireland was a cacophony of lies. Lain informed Ireland that National Action was indeed responsible for the "terrorism" ascribed to it; the worst of it was done, the tale went, by a certain "Chris M" from Queensland who travelled to Sydney under my orders to stay at the flat of a "Mark S." Lain also maintained that a certain "John" was one of the persons who did the mock "tyre-dummy" burning (i.e. a "necklacing") at the home of the Reverend McMahon and that this "John" had various criminal convictions. Amusingly, and at great expense, a number of Special Branch detectives travelled to country Queensland in February 1989, to interview an innocent person with substantive alibis to the offences discussed! They brought in a helicopter which hovered overhead throughout, and a crew of Queensland police - for nothing! The "John" in question found the whole affair of real comedy value when he was taken to Special Branch headquarters and to ensure his quick release from his temporary custody "agreed" with Ireland/Garvey that I was a truly reprehensible personality! And so: it was back to square one for our inveterate investigators, with their only triumph, the arrest of Evan Raftery for participation in the Sham-Ho "violent disorder."



It seems the full truth behind the Lain statement was even more incredible. In early December 1988, Lain had stolen a shotgun from Robert Leys, a mentally unstable neo-nazi and member of the ANM. There was a background 'story' to Leys. Leys had found National Action in May of 1988 and had purchased materials. He attended some functions and pasted posters. However, it was soon obvious he was not suited to the party. Indeed, Leys was a manic-depressive (now called Bipolar Disorder) with a pathological obsession with Jews. In October 1988, Leys revealed that he was a neo-nazi and had initiated contacts with the ANM. Further, he disrupted a National Action campaign on Sydney's north shore by making threats to a certain real estate agent while wearing Nazi insignia. In November, he came to NA headquarters and was confronted. Two members, after losing patience with his 'answers' to their questions, belted him and threw him off the premises. Leys immediately formally joined the ANM under Coleman (and Palmer) and was 'debriefed' for all he knew of National Action (such as it was). Leys quickly made the acquaintance of Lain. One day in early December 1988, Lain stole Lees's shotgun.

Why? From a point in 1985, Lain had developed an interest in a woman known to myself, Coleman and himself. This lady worked in a large law firm in Leichhardt which was part-owned by prominent Jewish community leader - Leslie Caplan. The lady was a personal friend of the writer, as was her husband, and at some points in 1984 she had casually met Coleman and Lain. In September 1985, Coleman called upon the lady and made sexual advances. He was rebuffed. Around the same time, Lain also called upon her, and similarly made sexual overtures, only to be likewise - rebuffed. Not long afterwards, the story was first circulated by Coleman to van Tongeren that my knowing this woman was a type of 'plot', a confirmation of the fact my refusal to play 'Nazi' was because I was a "Jewish agent". Lain heard the story and, as a true pathological personality, adopted it in 1988. Over the years, and in company with contemporary neo-nazis, he has modified the fiction in various ways, making himself a direct witness to my personal political corruption, even claiming to see sums of money paid to me by Caplan. So, in December 1988, Lain was ready to murder Caplan and put an end to the secret financing of National Action and myself (sic)

The theft of the shotgun was reported to the NA committee the day after it occurred. The committee called a meeting and brought in some additional prominent members to pass comment on the matter. It was a critical moment. There was an animated discussion. It was M. Slyney who put it in the bluntest of terms, saying that we had two choices. "Either we report it officially, or we don't". R. Cuneo said that Lain was "likely" to be caught if he did it. He would "probably offer a deal, or something, to accuse us." It was said by me, S. Rosier and E. Raftery that we had our policy against communication with the state, particularly the political police, who we anticipated would become involved. T. Cooksley warned that if Lain did something, and we suspected he would, this fact of our prior knowledge (if ever it became known) would be used against us. In discussion, it was agreed to report both the theft of the gun and the reasons for its theft. It was decided to cut to the chase and simply report it to the Special Branch. Reporting it to police would have involved Special Branch, so we cut out the middle man. It was decided I would make the call to Special Branch.

The Special Branch would reasonably have understood this call as a boon. It allowed 'contact' with the party in the guise of an official visit. On a date, believed to have been December 8 or 9, three Special Branch officers called at the offices of NA. I say "believed" for a reason. In my SB file, there are also two separate dates provided (December 18 and 20) for a subsequent visit where Lain was also mentioned. No details of the first visit were provided. Because the contents of the file on the second visit were false, it is reasonable to conclude the political police were fabricating a 'line' for Lain and scripting themselves, a practise we noted in those days. On the first visit, I spoke with two officers. Raftery, my wife and Cuneo were in attendance. They were told the bare facts of how we knew of this story. When they left, Raftery commented: "expect trouble". It came quick enough. Special Branch raided Lain's premises, telling him National Action had "informed us of the shotgun matter". No gun was found. Lain played dumb. Lain then telephoned the offices of the party and threatened murder. The committee met again and it was decided to divest ourselves of the matter as quickly as possible. It was obvious that the affair was already spinning out of control. The political police were contacted and told they should take the tape of the threats. Once again, Special Branch called and the tape was passed over. And then, a game was played.

The attending persons (myself, Raftery, Rosier and Cuneo) were asked questions. Was Lain responsible for damage to an African cafe? Did he deal drugs? It was obvious they wanted to judge reactions. I took over the conversation. "We don't know". "Anything is possible". "We have no detail". In my file, it was said we made the allegations! Was the Special Branch writing scripts? Definitely. And why are there two dates for the one meeting? Lain was charged with making telephone threats. When he was brought to court in July 1989, I was brought from custody to give evidence. I refused to do so; I told the magistrate that any comment I would make would be part of a Special Branch agenda linked to "fabrication of allegations". The charge against Lain was dismissed.

The volatile Simon Lain was not finished with. In early 1990, he sold his business (a motor cycle shop) and moved into bohemia. Already infected with HIV which he contracted from the drag-queens with whom he now regularly associated, he fished around for ways to strike back at NA. Palmer and Coleman avoided him, criticising him to all and sundry as "the poofter", "the AIDS infected faggot" and so on. They understood him then, as too dangerous for their game. However, another fringe informant still had marginal uses for him early in 1990, as I shall also briefly mention later in the context of another SB operation..

It was clear the Lain statement and its attendant affair were useful to the political police. They had engaged us. It was, as Raftery observed, "something you could feel". Slyney remarked in early January to the committee: "there's going to be a fight with these Special Branch scum. Let's stay cool. We can win this thing."


Section Eight:
The Shot Gun Attack Upon African National Congress Terrorist Eddie Funde, January 27 1989.



The month of January 1989 saw a quickening of nationalist action and an intensification of the conspiracy against the nationalists in Sydney.

We were aware that the Human Rights gestapo were moving against us. Therefore on January GG, some thirty five members of the party staged a demonstration at the offices of the State Race Discrimination Board and briefly occupied its office. The public effect was excellent. We had total surprise. Our aim was to alert people to what the new "anti racial vilification legislation" was about. We succeeded.

We also caught the Special Branch by surprise. Around the time that the demonstration was taking place, Raftery was walking into the Sydney Police Centre for an "interview" with the SB. They had called at his home. They had called him. On January DD, they had asked me to inform Raftery they wished to interview him over the Sham-Ho matter. I said I would "tell" Raftery. Raftery phoned them and agreed to make a statement; when Raftery appeared, they told him "Saleam told us you were involved". Of course, he looked back and smiled. He was charged. When the NA committee met to discuss the arrest, it was considered that SB was desperate indeed. However, during the 'interview', Ireland said something about "would you tell us about activities?" "Sure", Raftery added, "up to forty of us occupied the Race Discrimination Board, I suppose, an hour ago." "Next time, we will have a hundred." The Special Branch investigators panicked, Ireland fleeing the room to confirm a demonstration had actually occurred.

A chronology of events in January will help the reader to place things in context. To be continued!

Section Nine: A Visit To The ANM

In late February 1989, I travelled to Perth on National Action business. We had received a number of positive enquiries from Perth. The Perth Skinhead movement, through some of its leaders, had also contacted us. Personal experience with ANM's official neo-nazism had encouraged these youth to break with neo-nazism, whereas those further away from Perth continued to fantasize that van Tongeren was about to reinstate the Third Reich. I was able to meet some of these Perth youth and other supporters. While only a few joined our party, the others were willing to help us. We preferred the distanced arrangement.

I was invited to a meeting with certain "activists" of the ANM. At a house in Victoria Park I met Wayne and John van Blitterswyk, Mark Ferguson, Willey and perhaps two others. They enquired of me as to the original "division" between ourselves and Mr. van Tongeren; we discussed various political ideas and concepts which appeared to differ NA from the ANM. I remember Willey leaving; if Willey claims, as I came later to believe he had been instructed to say, that any person at that meeting discussed violence, criminal actions or conspired to commit any such actions, then such comments would be state-paid lies. After all, we had just met for the first time: why would I (or they) discuss criminality with someone first met that day? As a general principle, that would be foolish indeed.

The fact is that we also discussed the criticism these persons had of the ANM’s tactics and ideology. It was said that they may break from the ANM and I mentioned that they assess National Action before founding a new organisation. They agreed. I suggested that, in the interest of not buying into personalisms, they consult with Michael Brander and not with me. They agreed. Sadly, nothing came of this discussion.

I also met briefly a few days later with Mr. van Tongeren. It was a courtesy call and nothing of any note was discussed. Needless to say, I did not inform van Tongeren of what appeared to me to be, the possible break-up of the ANM. Our relationship was necessarily strained. Nonetheless, it was very clear to the author that Jack van Tongeren's sincerity was beyond dispute.

That was how matters stood when I went to prison in April: it appeared the ANM would splinter over ideological questions. Indeed, Wayne van Blitterswyk quit soon afterwards. Neither I nor anyone else in National Action had any direct knowledge of any alleged action carried out by the then-united ANM or of any actions carried on by them after my visit to Perth. However, I had a vague suspicion that the ANM might have a link to some of the anti-Asian arson. It was a suspicion only which arose from conversation, but it was nothing certain. Of course, I realised that such a suspicion, if grounded upon reality, was a dangerous thing. But because there was no admission or clear reference, I stayed utterly silent and did not report it to the committee. We were in the political dark—but ASIO had the idea that the ANM was the culprit to catch in Perth.



There had always been suspicion, as amplified in the media that the ANM had some connection with the arsons. In February 1989, van Tongeren had been a candidate in a Perth state by-election. There were reports of a shooting at his residence and publicity. He claimed to be the victim of a gun crime. The NA committee decided he done the job himself (which turned out to be right) as a publicity stunt. If we could see things, surely the political police could too? It was inevitable that ASIO had suspicions of van Tongeren's break with bourgeois law. Still, neither officially nor unofficially, was there evidence they could act on. However, as with all political police, collecting evidence means either a surveillance operation (electronic or otherwise) or informers. Time was running out for the ANM.

We should recognise that the ANM was really on the path to destruction long before the arrest of its members. I say this even though true nationalists maintained a sympathy for what was ultimately done to these men (as below); outrageous as it was. Ideology and correct Strategy and Tactics are essential. The lessons are as sharp as arrows.

I can see no place for neo-Nazism in Australian Nationalism. I can see no value in following any set of Strategical/Tactical principles gleaned from any book of any sort let alone The Turner Diaries.

I must insist that whatever tactics, etc. are followed that Nationalists guard against any weakening of their vigilance against the secret police and their methods.



Section Ten:
The Merry Month Of March



The month of March 1989 showed a quickening of the political police operation. There is now revealed evidence which we can put together as an 'intelligence picture'.

Freney signed his submission to the National Inquiry Into Racist Violence on March 13 1989. This was a major development. He was seeking to guide the Human Rights gestapo into urging government to create a system of intimidation to achieve its multi-culti community. In the name of the old Communist Party, he had offered the system a new auxiliary.

On or about March 20 1989, the National Action office was visited by an ostensible 'new supporter', David John Palmer. He paid us $20 to be placed on the mailing list. He presented himself as a concerned patriot and obtained some stickers. Not a word about who and what he was. Obviously, in view of what follows in our discussion, he was sizing up the NA headquarters, some of the people, getting access to publications.

During one of my many court appearances in 1989, Ireland mentioned "first hearing" the name of Jason Roderick Frost, a man who would appear as a state witness against me, "around March" 1989. This too was remarkable and I believe it. I believe it because Robert Leys had met Frost in 1988, and Leys had joined the ANM and been debriefed by Coleman. Was Coleman already talking to Special Branch? As below, I discuss Peter Coleman.


Ireland also intensified his own personal investigations. There was a crafted 'visit' to the National Action office. Here Ireland appeared to enquire about (To be continued)


Section Eleven:
I 'Threaten' Special Branch Detectives Ireland And Garvey



On April 15, Special Branch hatched its first 'big' arrest. What a flop it turned out to be! What an indictment of the Special Branch liars Ireland and Garvey! They had arested W.D. Smith and charged him with damage to the property of Reverend McMahon (the tyre/dummy incident) and for violent disorder at a meeting of the repulsive Gay And Lesbian Immigration Task Force held on April 10.

We acted quickly. The arrest took place outside the National Action offices. I told Smith to stay silent and we would get him bailed as soon as possible. Ireland threatened to arrest me for "hinder a police investigation" as I spoke. Obviously, telling a man of his rights in law fitted badly with him. Ireland and Garvey whisked Smith out to his home where they conducted a search, taking with them several items as "evidence". I could not establish Smith's whereabouts until much later. In the meantime, I telephoned Special Branch headquarters and made it very clear to the Special Branch officer on duty that Ireland was illegally holding Smith and that we may launch a demonstration at his private address.

Ultimately, around 7pm, I was present at Newtown Police when Smith was bailed. He had broken with my instruction to silence (he said after receiving threats to his family), but had actually performed brilliantly in disrupting the Special Branch liars. He confessed to the tyre incident in an utterly impossible way.

MMMMMMMMMMMMMMM


Section Twelve:
April 20 1989: Saleam To Jail: Van Tongeren Celebrates Adolf's 100



I have always been a sucker for a laugh. My Appeal on the 1984 charges was finalised on April 20 1989 - and I went to jail. On the way to the cells, scumbag Garvey said: "well that's justice." I replied: "no, that's Catalina Martinreyes's perjury" (Catalina Martinreyes: the perjurer in that case, a mad individual still at large, but soon <2005> to find her way to the Supreme Court to 'explain' her lies of long ago). By the time I arrived at Long Bay, Jack was in Perth getting ready to celebrate the 100th birthday of Adolf Hitler. I remember that someone said in the media that I'd been jailed on Hitler's birthday. And?? The real significance of the date lay in the continuing commitment to neo-nazism on the part of the ANM. It was still committing certain offences.

Coleman saw his personal opportunity. With me in prison he could square up with National Action for a number of things. And with van Tongeren "out of control" (his words to me as spoken in December 1989), it was time to get away from the ANM "losers" (Coleman's words of 2000). Van Tongeren had no idea of what Coleman was thinking or doing. It was all in the dark. I shall discuss Coleman's conversion into an informant called "Cabbie" below, but this interpolation was necessary such that the reader keeps up with the flow of events.

Van Tongeren was trying to escalate the ANM's violence campaign and simultaneously have on hands the funding he believed necessary to launch the group as a national phenomenon. The campaign had been risky. But to this point, despite the obvious suspicion which hung over the ANM in Perth for the restaurant attacks, there was still no proof of involvement. The robberies were still a secret. However, Coleman knew.

Another (smaller) aspect of the ANM's campaign was the van Tongeren's desire to outbid and eclipse National Action. He was not succeeding, as we have noted. But from around about March-April 1989, it was reported from Victorian National Action that the defamation of some NA leaders in Melbourne and elsewhere was under way. The sources of the smears were not identified, but the stories were being circulated to the 'Skinhead' groups in Melbourne.

The stories were aimed at Andrew Guild, Brendan Fredricks, this writer and at "the NA committee". It was said that Guild and Fredricks were "freemasons" and as such were not fit to be nationalist leaders. They were "soft on Zionism", said another smear. It was claimed that my writings against the neo-nazi cult were in fact statements in crypt that I was not actually a nationalist but some sort of 'softie' on matters of immigration and race.

The Skinheads were targetted for a reason. Their milieu was deeply divided. Contrary to some media propaganda, the Melbourne Skinheads were divided (as they were throughout the country) into three defineable groups - nationalists, non-political 'racists' and neo-nazis. The neo-nazis were rather intimidated by the radical-nationalist politics of National Action. Indeed, the neo-nazis feared that any open expression of their nonsense would be met by a violent response.

The hand of Coleman was in these smears and by employing Coleman, the ANM placed itself further under his influence. Coleman's aim was to first incite the neo-nazis to poison the entire milieu, divide it and then bid for hegemony. Ultimately, this was a successful strategy. Yet it seems one that was not connected to van Tongeren's objectives.

As 1989 wore on, the neo-nazi Skinhead 'leaders' (sic) became bolder and they began to acquire dominance in the scene. As it became clear National Action was in crisis, the neo-nazis broadened their attacks. I found myself defamed in increasingly venomous terms - as a "communist" concerned with my own power in the movement. The Skinhead neo-nazis were ready to move against National Action.

On Saturday, December 9, in melbourne, a group of neo-nazi Skinheads with Coleman in attendance burned an effigy ofthe present writer

(To be continued)

Section Thirteen:
Understanding The Political Police


It is now necessary for me to discuss the Australian political police. Already, a lot has been said, but before we go on, and right into the crime sprees that followed their 'enquiries', we need to place them in some historical and political perspective.

Understanding the workings of the political police is important for all nationalists, particularly so for those in leadership roles.

I, for one, had urged vigilance in that area for many years right back into the 1970s period. I had recorded certain observations of the political police for the instruction of nationalists. It is something I have continued to do. It is a fact that this has not endeared me to them as I found out on various occasions. Further, it was National Action which took up the exposure of the political police as a mass question. This campaign differntiated the nationalists from other patriotic groups.

We should recall that the entire history of the various secret police groups in Australia to answer the simple question: do they have it "in them" to operate extra-legally against organisations their political masters do not like? Consider the fact that the Federal Police was established to "investigate" those Australians who opposed conscription in the First World War (the majority of people as two referenda proved). Consider that ASIO was set up to pursue communists and that ASIO aided the National Civic Council and others who followed the American line. Consider that violence was employed regularly against "leftists" in the late 1960s and early 1970s by the various Special Branches in several states with small "extreme right" groups being the perpetrators. So why wouldn’t the political police want to work against NA/ANM? They certainly show no "morals" in that regard. Nor does the Establishment. Whoever is in the way ends up on the receiving end.

The fact is that the hand of political police has operated several times in the history of National Action and other groups. At the time of certain "splits" and "divisions," it has sometimes turned out that "ears" and outright "informers" and "provocateurs" have been in place. Some persons may figure in this account of things now before you.

It does not surprise me at all to learn that one individual (Coleman) who will be exposed to you in full here considered my concern with the Special Branch in NSW and political police generally to have stemmed from my "irrational" dislikes of police authority, that it was all a sort of paranoia, that they were not really interested in nationalist organisations, that I needlessly provoked them and that they only acted against National Action when forced to do so. Such a position is a lie of the type designed to lower the awareness of the movement to the clear nexus which we have proved exists, again and again proved exists, between Media and Politicians and Political Police to marginalise our cause and ghettoise it. Of course, given this man's connection with Special Branch, such a line had multiple purposes.

The political police are no great "secret" to those who set out to understand them and their methods of operation. In fact, to grasp the essentials of things is a simple exercise. Their methods and ploys are essential to the understanding of what took place in the "history" of National Action/ANM in the period 1988–90; if the reader cannot grasp these things then he will miss the depth of the operation put in place.

It should be seen that we do not condition the behaviour of the political police; rather they will come at us if it is clear to their masters that what we think and the possibility that we might communicate that to others is a problem. If we are "violent" in your tactics, then they will come "at" us sooner; but a "peaceful" approach does not guarantee that our organisations will not be smeared, destabilised and harassed. Quite the contrary. Our politics, nationalist politics, is rapidly becoming a thought crime in this country. This development was even clear in the late 1980s.

There is, in my opinion, and in the collective opinion of all serious nationalists, no language strong enough to convey our moral contempt for these forces. Certainly, we must never allow our awareness of the problem to get out of hand and into the very paranoia our detractors in this area condemn, but we must face the fact that political police are real and that they are working against us - or our movement will fail.

That these shadowy forces set out to crush NA/ANM is a fact and is the base fact in this account of the attack on these organisations.

(To be continued)

Section Fourteen:
Selecting Individual Targets: An Old Game


The political police reasoned, quite correctly, that it was the position that nationalist politics (and we won’t argue here about the definition of that term) was such that the removal of a few key personalities from the scene would have a deleterious effect upon the entire movement.

It is certainly the situation that extensive effort was aimed at both myself and Jack van Tongeren. A certain effort was also made against Michael Brander of National Action in South Australia. Other individual nationalist leaders and activists were also closely investigated: Andrew Guild (Melbourne), Evan Raftery, S. Rosier, R. Cuneo and others.

The use of media, legislation and "police" methods are all parts of the entire process. In the case of van Tongeren, it was the media which sought to trivialise and distort his ideology (I say this regardless of any criticism on our part of it) and render him a neo-nazi ranter likely to be the sort of person who would commit terrorism and violence. In the case of Saleam, it was the position that I was to be rendered what one Sydney TV journalist called a "smug thug," an "operator" linked to violence and criminality through propaganda which was linked to me. That was the media’s perception of Michael Brander also.

The operation centred, as events showed, on Sydney and Perth. But I would suggest that was because of mismanagement in Adelaide. In December 1988, Senator Teaghue’s office was shot-gunned; the good senator was a dedicated multiracialist liberal. There were media suggestions that the crime could be ascribed to Michael Brander. In January 1989, a young member of Adelaide NA was at home when a police "raid" began. In charge was Detective Senior Constable Modra. This creature was a vicious opponent of nationalism with a fixation about Brander. The youth was bashed. He was given an "offer" by Modra: confess to the Teaghue shooting and incriminate Brander - or else. The youth was innocent of the crime in any case and bravely stood his ground in the face of assault. He refused to "confess" and refused to be a perjurous witness against Michael Brander. Why the attempt at criminal conspiracy? Can we really believe that Modra acted alone?

The reason for Modra’s attempt to pervert the course of justice stems from the Establishment’s "appreciation" of Michael Brander. The fact is that Michael Brander had grasped nationalist politics, applied nationalist tactics and organisational methods, and spoke authoritatively in the Establishment’s press. There is no forgiveness from the enemy; there is no "mercy." If the youth could have been persuaded to make false statements, a "trial" would have been the result. And bear in mind that this was Modra’s second attempt. In 1987 he harassed a number of National Action members and supporters and sought "witnesses" for a prosecution on serious charges. The reader should now understand this: the use of courts by the Establishment as agencies of repression is a fact. No established power could ever conceive of justified political critics; it must "criminalise" protest and judge patriots as breakers of the criminal law. I say this whether or not the accused has broken a law or not. That is irrelevant. From court, the accused heads for jail, the official concentration camp for political prisoners. Brander was lucky. There was no "evidence" - and Modra couldn’t fabricate any.

It is not only one’s views which makes a nationalist leader a "target." It is his abilities to agitate, to cause the Establishment trouble, to articulate new opinions or to grasp hard at some area where the Establishment is weak, to damage something the Establishment values. Mr. van Tongeren was a target because he had created a place where militants could gather and had sparked certain activity amongst them. His neo-nazism had of course, annoyed the Jewish community. The anti-immigration material issued by the ANM had sparked disorder in some Perth schools and encouraged vigilantism amongst the Asian community.

In my case, I should only mention one "virtue" (I leave it up to the nationalists to assess my political work) which set me down as an enemy. I would explain it in a way relevant to this pamphlet. In 1989, as the result of certain media statements made by me in respect of the Funde shooting and ASIO (as below), Mr. Evan Raftery was interviewed by ASIO. At the conclusion of the interview, it was suggested that our comrade would be coming to be "debriefed" by me—meaning that I would attempt an "interpretation" of the discussion. Secondly, I refer to part of a police Internal Affairs record of an interview performed by Detective Sergeant Ireland. He suggested I would "operate" to "circumvent the law" (meaning undermine his operations against the party). In November 1988, I examined certain Files concerning detailed allegations that I had made to the NSW Director of Public Prosecutions that the perjury of Martinreyes had been used to convict me in a trial. I read a letter from two NSW police officers who suggested I was out to undermine the processes of Appeal in NSW Courts and had found the way to do it - and they refused to carry out any investigation of anything lest they "help" me! What am I saying? Only that I have made it my business to examine the "systems" employed by the authorities in their criminal actions against patriotic people and have done my level best to perfect ways to "circumvent" Establishment authority. I couldn't be forgiven either.

The campaign designed to destroy ANM and NA was therefore multifaceted. Preferably, it was a case of "get the leaders" into court. But destroying the members one by one "legally" was another option. Using media lies and professional "wreckers" inside the broad confines of the nationalist movement was another set of tactics. The campaign was, as I said, all-embracing. It was more than a "police" effort; it was clearly something very important to the Establishment.

(To be continued)

Section Fifteen A Collection Of Fish


There is no doubt at all that the campaign of the political police waged against NA and ANM yielded a net full of "fish"—if arrests are the guide rule to that. Most of the NA arrests took place in May-July and in waves. The ANM arrests were also in waves, with a charge on van Tongeren in May, then other arrests in early July (which netted an informer) and the big busts in mid-August.

The following members of National Action and ANM went before the Establishment’s courts. I set out the "charges" and the penalties:

(1) Jim Saleam. I was put before the District Court for "accessory to malicious damage" in that I organised a shotgun attack on the home of Eddie Funde, Australian Representative of the African National Congress. I served four years.

(2) Wayne Smith. He faced the same charge as I did. Smith was also charged and acquitted in December 1989 of "malicious damage" to the property of the Reverend Dorothy McMahon and "violent disorder" from his alleged attendance as a "disruptor" of a meeting of the Gay and Lesbian Immigration Taskforce held in April 1989. Unfortunately, Smith died before the trial.

(3) Jason Frost. Now exposed as an informer, he pleaded guilty to involvement in the Funde shooting and claims Saleam and Smith instigated it (a lie as I shall show). He received a mere 18 months weekend detention for the shooting. He also pleaded guilty to the "malicious damage" and the "violent disorder" mentioned above, a plea which cannot be accepted, as I shall show. He was given jail for this (two three-month sentences, cumulative; he tried a sentence Appeal and 'of course' was successful.)

(4) Michael White. He pleaded guilty to driving Frost to the Funde shooting. He was given two years jail, a disparity in sentence as compared to Frost, which shows "something" on the Establishment’s part. It was reduced to 12 months on Appeal in May 1990.Put under unbearable pressure, he was obliged to testify falsely against Saleam and Smith.

(5) Keith Low. An English visitor from the National Front, was fined $500 for "violent disorder" (as above).

(6) Tim Wainwright. A young activist, was given a bond for participation in "violent disorder."

(7) Shane Rosier. A longstanding nationalist militant, was jailed in March 1990 for three months for his participation in "violent disorder."

(8) Richard Holdforth. A young nationalist, was given a bond for participation in "violent disorder."

(9) Doug McKenna. A young nationalist, was given a bond for participation in "violent disorder."

(10) Peter Colantuono. A young nationalist, was forced to incriminate himself in the McMahon "malicious damage." He was, as he has said to us, not involved in any such incident—and threatened into a guilty plea! He was given a bond.

(11) Perry Whitehouse. A nationalist activist, was charged with possession of a crossbow (fined) and with using this crossbow to attack the home of pro-African National Congress supporter, Kel Richards. Case dismissed. He was then charged with "attempting to pervert the course of justice" in persuading Michael White to falsely testify against the police in the case of Saleam and Smith. He was remanded to a date to be fixed. This trial was never held. As shall be explained, Whitehouse committed another offence and was tried on that matter.

(12) Evan Raftery. A long-time nationalist militant, hated by the political police, he was charged in January 1989 with "violent disorder" from a December 1988 disruption of a Liberal Party private function as addressed by Chinese MP in NSW, Helen Sham-Ho. He was given a bond.

Each of these persons were involved in National Action.

(13) Jack van Tongeren. He was charged with over 100 offences from arson, conspiracy to commit arson, uttering, malicious damage, break and entry, receiving. He will appear in various Western Australian courts this year.

(14) John van Blitterswyk. Ditto on charges. John was arrested first in June 1989 on receiving charges. He appeared with Jack van Tongeren and others.

(15) Wayne van Blitterswyk. He appeared chiefly on arson and conspiracy.

(16) Chris Bartle. He appeared on arson, conspiracy and uttering, etc.

(17) John Lyons. Ditto.

(18) Judith Lyons. Harbouring a fugitive and other minor charges.

(19) John Bain. Appeared on arson and break and enter.

(20) Mark Ferguson, an independent nationalist militant, appeared with ANM members on conspiracy and receiving, and now arson.

(21) Russell Willey. Charged initially with John van Blitterswyk, with robbery and receiving, he turned informer, indicating the extent to which the Establishment’s police will go to get "convictions." He is an "immune" witness!

(22) David Locke. An ANM member who planned to go "Crown Witness" against his friends. He was murdered (!) allegedly by two other ANM members sickened by the betrayals and informing.

Twenty-two arrests was a sizeable "bag." It resulted in the near-cessation of operations by ANM and a very necessary critical analysis of the ideology, politics and organisational methods of that party. It resulted in a considerable destabilisation of NA operations and activities in Sydney.

Many lessons have been drawn and I shall share some of them with you in this pamphlet.


Section Sixteen: Peter Coleman Or CC18 Enters Into Play As A Special Branch Informant!

I was in prison assessing the arrests of many of the National Action members (Low, Wainwright, McKenna, etc.) in late June 1989 when the Sydney Morning Herald announced the arrests in Perth of John van Blitterswyk and Russell Willey of the ANM. I recalled both of these men from the meeting in February. It was not long after this arrest that Willey was 'turned'. The question was of course - how did the police manage to arrest these two?



We must now discuss in further detail, Peter Coleman. The author has, consistently since early 1990, maintained that Coleman was recruited as an informant by the New South Wales Police Special Branch. The evidence for this proposition has become overwhelming. But before we come to that, we must ask: what made him turn to become a political police informer?

Coleman’s brief association with National Action 1983–85 was not a happy one. Coleman was found to be a smooth-talking liar whose objective in any organisation was to find the leading figure and get behind him (and under his feet) and guide the organisation in "his" direction. That is - neo-nazism. Once Coleman realised the party majority (and me in particular) would never adopt neo-nazism, he looked elsewhere. In Jack he thought he’d found someone who could peddle the ideology. Ideology? Blind hatred of other races including other Europeans. Rampant sick Jew-hating, anti-worker ideas, mindless anti-communism. For Coleman any Social Justice ideology was communism and in his mind National Action was/is "Marxist" - particularly by that he meant me. That idea also developed legs and was used as propaganda against National Action. The principle of White Australia was always second place to his drunken screaming that "Nordics" are the "master race," etc.

Coleman was the prime author of the 1985 split. He pushed for it, conspired it and helped it happen. Of course, an explosion was inevitable given Jack's politics, but the rancour was Coleman's work. Unfortunately for van Tongeren, he trusted him and his "advice" shaped the ANM. Some people underestimate Coleman, because he is, as such, neither educated nor overly intelligent. That under-rates his other abilities. Coleman has demonstrated an ability to live by his wits, so much so that a nick-name "Jewboy" stuck to him and is used by his neo-nazi associates. Coleman's militaria business, a structure he has used to further the collection of intelligence at arms fairs and so forth, has made a living for him. His cons, frauds and tricks are universally known in that milieu. Members of National Action considered him a prime manipulater and often found themselves confronted by people in different patriotic groups who had been misled by him. All considered him a moral imbecile, a person who recognised no 'wrong' in the pursuit of his advantage. Such a creature always makes the best informer-wrecker.

Onto the ANM Coleman grafted the American racist fantasy book The Turner Diaries. That the author of the book wasn’t being too serious could be judged from the fact that his political group never tried to apply any of it. It was given over to loons ("Klan," U.S. "Nazis") as a means of getting them into real action; it did that alright, but most of them ended up in prison for their efforts. For Coleman, The Turner Diaries was the ultimate hate-book, though, of course, he’d never tried to apply any of it. But he imposed it on van Tongeren and it obviously lay at the basis of the ANM’s campaign. The final "proof" of that may be the fact that one ANM prisoner claimed that under the effect of ANM "terror," Asians may move en masse to the Eastern States - and thence create even further disorder. That was straight out of The Turner Diaries where coloureds from a liberated white zone flood into other areas bringing instability.

The question I would ask is: should any nationalist strategy be aimed at "migrants" or at those who organise immigration - the Committee for the Economic Development of Australia, capitalists of the largest corporations?

Coleman’s "influence" was in another area also disastrous for the ANM. In The Australian Nationalist magazine sometime in 1988 he argued that "nationalists" (sic) should not be in any way concerned with phone tapping or electronic surveillance. He suggested it was all just paranoia. Now it may be that Coleman knew nothing of the ANM plan to operate criminally or that the editor was remiss in publishing the article, but it is true that it was published and that it operated to disarm the ANM in face of the weapons of the state. The ANM men went to prison precisely because of taped conversations.

Coleman’s pooh-poohing of the armaments of the secret police stems also partially from his rancorous hatred of me. I had warned again and again of such secret police weapons and of their activities yet Coleman continually chided me as a paranoiac with a complex about police methods and maintained to all and sundry that I am just "lying" for some purpose known to me.



In December 1988, Coleman had a violent altercation, with NA member Wayne Smith. Coleman was in the wrong, but Smith came out the better in the physical confrontation. The matter was cooled down, but the Special Branch found out and contact was made. That initiated the process of ensnaring Coleman and of his estrangement from his own group. The process began slowly. It seems that in March 1989, Ireland first became aware of the name 'Jason Frost' in relation to National Action and South African nationalist politics. This was undoubtedly information from Robert Leys via Coleman. At this stage it was just a name and ironically there were a few persons with this name which Ireland had to sort out.

In 2000, during a recorded abusive phone call made to me, Coleman referred to Jack van Tongeren as a "loser". This was certainly the view Coleman began to adopt of him in 1989. In that year, Coleman entered into a new relationship with a well-to-do German lady. His militaria business was improving. He could not have wanted any part of a political violence campaign. Around this time, Coleman tried to befriend members of National Action and it was noted he was 'pumping' for information. Why? In his testimony at the Police Royal Commission in 1997, Ireland referred to the recruitment of CC18 (Royal Commission code) in "late May or early June" 1989. This would mean formal registration as an informer. In a duty book entry in June 1989, Ireland referred to an informer "Cabbie". I predict that was Coleman. It could not really have been anyone else. There is some uncertainty (naturally) as to the manner in which formal recruitment took place. Was it blackmail (once one begins to talk the fear of exposure as an informant would have driven him on)? Was it coercion over the likely case Coleman was caught early on with some 'stolen' property? Was it self-protection?

The proceedings of the 1994-97 Royal Commission Into The New South Wales Police Service contained revelations that strike at the neo-nazi gang. In the Special Branch sequence of evidence on March 11, 12, 13 1997, the Commission referred to a certain Special Branch informer. He was given the code CC18. This pamphlet will identify this informer.

The Commission Code was ironic. The whole world knows about the British neo-nazi group Combat 18. The ‘18’ stands for the first and eighth letters of the alphabet – AH (Adolf Hitler). The C18 gang was exposed as a provocateur gang under the control of MI-5 and Special Branch. The leader of C18, Charlie Sargent, had worked hand in glove with these intelligence agencies for years. His prime target: the British National Party, a nationalist party, which was making progress in the years after 1993 when C18 was established (!) Sargent made dire threats of a "race war", mobilized some impressionable kids who wanted to be "tough" and staged a number of provocations. These "tough" kids were incited against the "soft sell-out British National Party"!) After Sargent was jailed for murdering a supporter, the truth came out. He worked for the State. He even helped Special Branch collect information on Loyalist paramilitaries in Northern Ireland. Sargent was an important tool, not some stereotypical neo-nazi loon.

Was our own CC18 up to similar tricks?

The reader has seen that Freney rightly referred to certain goings-on in the ranks of the ANM. Somehow, Freney was aware of confidential material. His submission to the National Inquiry was dated March 13 1989. The Special Branch files revealed that on March 17 1989, someone (named blacked out) was interviewed about members of Australian National Action. This ‘someone’ had a lot to say. Now there were a number of possible suspects. And Peter Coleman, was one of them.

But first, what do we know about CC18? This informer was male; he had been offered and refused telephone and vehicle expenses. Now that alone excluded a couple of other possible ‘suspects’. Certain Sydney neo-nazis had neither phones nor vehicles. He came on board officially around May (possibly June) 1989. Most of his contacts with Neville Ireland were by telephone and he had Ireland’s home telephone number; CC18 would call ‘home’ at an agreed day and hour. The latter implied a high degree of trust. We know Ireland worked almost exclusively on the ANA/ANM cases in 1989-90 and logically CC18 related to these cases. He was also ‘important’ since Ireland passed him on officially to another officer who claimed large sums from the Informants Fund as "payments" to CC18. Only an important informant would merit substantial payments, if in fact, payments were being made. Of course, Ireland and other officers were stealing from the Informant's Fund.

In November 1990 at Parramatta Local Court, Coleman appeared as a witness in a case aimed at the author. He said that he had had telephone conversations with Ireland and discussed "this and that", passed over "gossip" about National Action and answered (unspecified) questions about the ANM. Ireland also testified. He was asked directly whether Coleman was an informant and his reply was significant. Rather than decline to answer the question as one governed by privilege ("I can neither confirm nor deny …."), his answer was a deceptive perjury. He said that he preferred to say Coleman was a "contact". To the layman, a ‘contact’ is a person we casually know etc.; but in Special Branch language, it was the very term for informant (!) This fact was not known at the time of the case. We may take it from the evidence of both that Coleman was an informant; but was he CC18? It was said too in evidence by each, that their contact was generally by phone. In 1997, a person acquainted with Coleman ‘innocently’ told the author that Coleman had Ireland’s home phone number.

Taken together, the Commission evidence and the Parramatta evidence confirm Coleman as an informant and almost certainly as CC18.

CC18 was uniquely placed in the affairs of different groups to serve State interest. If CC18 was already talking to Special Branch in March 1989, we are entitled to ask many questions.

The reader should know that Peter Coleman denies being CC18. But he equally refuses to provide any explanation whatsoever about his dealings with Ireland. We do not believe there was ever any ‘moral’ opposition on his part to becoming an informer. Quite the contrary. Coleman is well-known as a militaria salesman on a considerable scale and has operated this business for years; he is a consummate merchant (to use the common phrase) so much so that his neo-nazi business associates called him "Jewboy"; he described several of his associates in years past as "losers"; he was consumed in hate of National Action; he had a fear of imprisonment. There was no reason why he should not ‘inform’.

I go one step further: if Mr. Coleman was not an informant, I shall unreservedly apologise in print and in public-notices columns of the daily press. Could I be any fairer? However, I note that a few years ago Mr. Coleman said to a Mr. Paul X: "so what if I spoke to Special Branch, so what?" It was just one degree short of a full confession.

The most startling aspect of CC18’s activities concerns the ANM’s political violence campaign. Coleman knew about this campaign. He knew ANM in Perth was burning Chinese restaurants and committing other offences. He admitted this to members of ANA. In May 1989, a bombing occurred. What conversation occurred between Ireland and Coleman about this bombing? Was information given about other offences? Was the kitchen getting too hot for CC18, and to use a phrase often used by Peter Coleman, did he wish to – "bail out"? I also reveal here for the first time, that ANM in Sydney ostensibly had a plan to arson a community-centre in the Marrickville area. The crime did not go ahead. It was set for May 1989. Was this the thing which caused CC18, who was already passing over detailed information about ANA, to "bail out" of the ANM? There exists an even more disturbing possibility. If the relationship between Ireland and CC18 began in March 1989, was anything said which alerted Special Branch to ANM’s guilt in the Perth campaign? Did Special Branch tell ASIO, and did ASIO, rather than ensure van Tongeren committed no more offences, allow the crime spree to deepen – in the hope a ‘terrorism trial’ would be the result? These are serious questions which remain unanswered.

We should realise too, that David Palmer had secretly joined ANM in Sydney at a date early in 1989. Further, when on August 14 1989, arrests of ANM members took place in Perth and Sydney, the New South Wales police knew exactly where to find two of their Sydney suspects. Who informed? With the old ANM out of commission, a new dawn for nutzism was on the horizon. The dynamic duo now had a new personal-political agenda: to reinvent neo-nazism as an open swastika-clad screaming cult without even the refinements of a van Tongeren, who at least, had masked it a little and had a strategy in mind. So let us now place David Palmer under our microscope to set more of the scene.


Section Seventeen: The Formation Of A Neo-Nazi 'Counter-Gang'.



Freney had predicted it and it duly came to pass. The formation of a neo-nazi counter-gang was achieved in secret. The front-man was David John Palmer. While Coleman still pretended he was the 'leader' of the ANM in New South Wales and Deputy Leader of the group nationally, he was already hooked up with Palmer. If Coleman was an informer-wrecker, it defies belief that this dwarf was not aware of his partner's status. It seems that Palmer emerged in the Sydney ANM in late 1988. His existence was kept secret both by his design and obviously by Coleman's. Whatever the initial 'idea' was, nothing leaked.

Hence when Palmer appeared at the NA offices in March 1989, he was there for covert reasons (as above). It seems that in July 1989, an ANM committee of three was formed in Sydney with Palmer, Coleman and Leys in command. This too, was achieved in secret. Why such a structure? It seems van Tongeren had only scanty knowledge of the structure. Was it in place to take over ANM when 'the moment' came, a moment which was in that month rapidly approaching.

It is generally understood that the ANM was planning a national night of racist violence (if I can use the enemy's phrase). It was planned to attack Chinese-owned restaurants in a number of cities in July or August. In Sydney, there was a weird plot to burn down the Marrickville Community Centre in Addison Road, Enmore. The target housed a multiculturalist centre. It seems Coleman was involved. Palmer must have known of it. Members of NA were approached. We never got to the bottom of this plot. I instructed Rosier and Smith to make discreet enquiries into who in National Action had been approached and to take details from them, swearing all to silence. We noted a couple of persons had been approached by Coleman and rebuffed him.

On or about June 30 1989, van Tongeren came to Sydney. He left on July 2. On July 5, Willey and John van Blitterswyk would be arrested in Perth. Whilst in Sydney, van Tongeren met with Coleman and Palmer. That seems to be the decisive thing. No record of this meeting exists and van Tongeren has said nothing about it.


Check back about January 1 2007 and we expect substantial additions here!.


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